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Abstract
2
This thesis explores the apparent paradox that exists between Voltaire’s promotion 
of universal tolerance and his negative writing about the Jews. It considers the way 
that past critics have tended to approach these two aspects of his work, often either 
ignoring those elements that do not fit with their view of Voltaire, or interpreting his 
comments relating to the Jews as manifestations of an ‘antisemitism’ that denies the 
sincerity of his drive for tolerance. We therefore explore today’s understanding of 
the term antisemitism, and trace the development in such thinking from historical 
Christian anti-Judaism and anti-Jewishness through to the nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century pseudo-biological theories of race. The thesis contends that Voltaire’s 
promotion of tolerance and his often vitriolic Jewish discourse do not offer 
contradictory arguments, but represent differing approaches to the same problematic 
questions: the causes and effects of intolerance, and the ways mankind might be 
encouraged to use reason and to avoid fanaticism. Using psychocritical analysis, we 
investigate Voltaire’s figures relating to the Jews and the Christians, figures that 
represent them as both victims and victimizers. This methodology further allows us 
to consider Voltaire’s own self-understanding, an understanding that appears not 
only in terms of an empathy with fellow sufferers, but also of a suggested awareness 
of a certain relationship to the Jews themselves. The thesis therefore presents two 
propositions: first, that it was Voltaire’s unconscious acknowledgement of this (for 
him) troubling kinship with the Jews that gave birth to his more ‘hallucinatory’ anti- 
Jewish form of writing, and second, that it was only when he began to embrace this 
awareness, to tolerate his self-understanding, that he embarked on his programme to 
promote the rights of all people, including the Jews.
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Tolerance and intolerance in the writings of Voltaire: the instance of the Jews 
Introduction
This thesis aims to study closely Voltaire’s representation of the Jews within the 
context of his enlightened propaganda as a whole, specifically his work on the 
question of tolerance and, within that framework, the place of religions in human 
life. In the main, existing studies of Voltaire as an Enlightenment writer give only 
brief, passing attention to what he writes about the Jews; on the other hand, studies of 
his statements about the Jews tend to set them in the context of modem antisemitism 
or the history of anti-Jewish prejudice. This thesis attempts to bridge the gap between 
the two, using methods of literary criticism that have not been exploited in this area 
in the hope of reaching an interpretative synthesis, a comprehension of the place of 
the question of the Jews that Voltaire takes from his own present-day cultural context 
and instates within the prospective vision of enlightenment.
Voltaire repeatedly addresses the issues of tolerance and intolerance, both directly 
and indirectly, and his discourse frequently refers -  usually in highly negative, even 
vitriolic terms -  to the Jews, their texts, beliefs and customs. It is impossible to make 
a proper assessment of the one aspect of Voltaire’s work without giving full 
consideration to the other. Both together make up his thinking, and in seeking to 
present an argument about either aspect, we cannot ignore that part of his discourse 
which appears to contradict it. So this study extricates, from the many disparate texts 
through which they are scattered, Voltaire’s often fragmentary Jewish figures, to 
borrow the expression used by Elisabeth de Fontenay in her study of ‘les figures 
juives de Marx’, and marks out the field of these figures as the central focus of 
discussion in this thesis. The difficulties that we face today could perhaps make 
Voltaire’s enlightenment demystification of religious texts seem superficial, but we 
can bear in mind that his contribution was a very important stage in the development 
of our capacity at least to think about such issues; this thesis studies not just this 
demystification, but also its fragility.
While I shall attempt, where possible, to construct Voltaire’s anti-Jewish discourse 
as a part of his larger discourse on tolerance and religion, in order to address the
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charges of ‘antisemitism’ levelled against him, I am obliged to repeat the 
stereotypical collective fantasies which, unquestionably, his figures often reiterate. 
For this I do not apologize as a detailed exposition of Voltaire’s stereotypical writing 
is a necessary aspect of this thesis. To determine how, for his contemporaries, his 
thinking could integrate his apparent antipathy for the Jews with his fight for 
tolerance, we have temporarily to restrain our reasonable critical reaction to his 
discourse. By doing this, I hope that we shall be able to assess the impact of the 
Jewish figures on Voltaire’s work and on the public of his times, as well as their 
place in relation to the collective stereotypes as we understand them today.
* * *
Critics’ interpretations of Voltaire’s Jewish discourse
Voltaire is a writer who inspires totally opposing responses in those who read him, 
and the disparity in readers’ reactions to his statements on the Jews is a particular 
instance of this. While some have dismissed his remarks as typical of his period and 
to be disregarded in the general appreciation of his works, others, accusing him of 
‘antisemitism’, have condemned him out of hand. Summarizing some of these views 
in a chronological sequence, we find the following. J.H. Brumfitt, stating that 
Voltaire’s writing is ‘not altogether free from antisemitism’ (1958), claims that it 
merely uses the Jews to criticize the Christians.1 In a similar way Peter Gay contends 
that Voltaire’s ‘anti-Jewish remarks are a partly unconscious, partly conscious cloak 
for his anti-Christian sentiments’ (1959).2 This thinking is repeated by C. Lehrmann, 
who perceives however a double cause for Voltaire’s comments; ‘la lutte contre Je 
christianisme’, and ‘une haine implacable contre les Juifs’ (1960-61).3 Pierre 
Aubery asks whether Voltaire is not being ‘modem’ in attempting to represent the 
Jews with characteristics and failings common to all people, in seeking to ‘faire 
rentrer les Juifs dans la commune humanite dont non seulement les anti-semites mais
aussi quelques prophetes tentent parfois de les faire sortir’ (1963).4Jean Bensimon
1 Voltaire: Historian, p.59.
2 Voltaire’s Politics, p.353.
3 L ’element ju if  dans la litterature frangaise, p. 141.
4 ‘Voltaire et les Juifs: ironie et demystification’, p.78.
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questions the way critics have tried to ignore Voltaire’s ‘antisemitism’, or to interpret 
it ‘simply’ in terms of an antijudaism that was driven by personal experiences or the 
attitudes of the period. But, for Bensimon, with Voltaire Tantijudaisme sert de 
tremplin & l’antis6mitisme’ (1967).5 L6on Poliakov accuses Voltaire of ‘castrating’ 
the Jews in order to combat Tobscurantisme ecclesiastique, d’ ecraser I ’Infame' 
(1968).6 For Arthur Hertzberg it is abundantly clear’ that ‘Voltaire’s contemporaries 
I...J did not doubt that he was an anti-Semite’ (1968),7 and Gay, in a later 
quote, claims that, like certain other philosophes, he ‘never overcame or even tried to 
overcome (his) prejudices against the Jews’ (1969).8 Theodore Besterman considers 
that Voltaire’s ‘language was the language of his time, and we must not expect even 
the greatest of men always to rise above their environment’ (1969).9 Arnold Ages 
describes Voltaire and other philosophes, such as Diderot and d’Agens, as ‘heirs to 
Christian prejudices’, but he contends that their anti-Judaism, ‘while springing from 
the same roots diverged somewhat in its approach to the Jews. From a religious 
aversion we move in the philosophes to something resembling a racial antipathy’ 
(1970).10 A. Owen Aldridge believes that the charge of ‘antisemitism’ ‘may be 
substantiated only in the degree in which Voltaire may also be considered anti-Jesuit 
or anti-Calvinist. [...] He was merely taking advantage of a recognized propaganda 
technique to promote his campaign against institutional religion’ (1975)." 
David Levy, although wanting to distinguish between Voltaire’s antijudaism and his 
‘antisemitism’, finds that Tun et 1’autre se completant, se confondant parfois pour 
former un tout desolant, comprehensible peut-etre, mais injustifiable de la part d’un 
homme qui se voulait l’apotre de la tolerance’ (1975).12 D.H. Jory contends that ‘by 
his own lights, Voltaire was tolerant of the Jews, and he can only be considered anti- 
semitic (in the full sense of the term) if his writings, his actions, and his enlightened 
approach to social concerns are ignored’ (1978).13 M.F. Nef finds in Voltaire ‘un type
' ‘Un antisdmitc rationaliste: Voltaire’, p.20, p.28.
6 Histoire de I ’antisemitisme, III, ‘De Voltaire a Wagner’, 105.
7 The French Enlightenment and the Jews (1990), p.299.
8 The Enlightenment (2nd edn 1996), p.38, note.
9 Voltaire, (3rd edn 1976), p.92.
10 French Enlightenment and Rabbinic Tradition, p.69.
11 Voltaire and the Century o f Light, p.296.
12 Voltaire et son exegese du Pentateuque, p.234.
13 ‘Voltaire and the Jews of Metz: Tolerance or Anti-semitism”, p.98.
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d ’antisemitisme rationnel’ similar to that of Kant and Marx. He then goes further and 
charges Voltaire with an ‘antisemitism’ which ‘depasse l’antipathie a la civilisation 
hebraique pour aboutir a une volonte de suppression reelle ou symbolique des juifs, 
complice active ou consentante de la persecution’ (1978).14 In the view of Frank 
E. Manuel, Voltaire’s ‘aversion to Judaism assumed the proportions of an obsession’ 
( 1982).'5 But Pierre Aubery, reaffirming his position, remarks that a representation of 
‘Voltaire as an antisemite is both anachronistic and unwarranted’ (1983).16 Pierre 
Pluchon, when questioning the reasons for ‘cette hostilite, pour ne pas dire cette haine, 
ce ressentiment, chez le maitre a penser de l ’Europe’, concludes that for Voltaire ‘le 
Juif, c’est l’anti-philosophe, la conviction sectaire face a la tolerance’ (1984).17 Rene 
Pomeau contends that with Le Pour et le contre (1722) Tantisemitisme ou 
1’antijudaisme de Voltaire (les deux ici se confondent) se donne carriere’ -  evidence, 
he believes, of a ‘father complex’, founded on Voltaire’s identification of the 
Christian God ‘avec le Dieu vengeur de l’Ancien Testament et le Dieu cruel des 
jans£nistes’ (1985).18 Allan Arkush remarks that ‘Voltaire, like other eighteenth- 
century deists, attacked Judaism in order to weaken the foundation on which 
Christianity rests’, but he rejects Hertzberg’s antisemitic interpretation of his 
discourse. For Arkush, when comparing the two religions, ‘Voltaire apparently 
considered Judaism to be the “lesser evil’” (1993).19 Pierre Lepape says that, ‘comme 
les prejuges n’6pargnent personne, y compris ceux qui font profession de les 
combattre, Voltaire lui-meme partage l ’antisemitisme de la majorite de ses 
compatriotes’ (1994).20 But Christiane Mervaud considers that ‘[s]es positions de 
principe sont claires: un antijudaisme religieux a ne point confondre avec un 
antisemitisme racial’ (1994).21 Likewise, Marie-H£Jene Cotoni observes that several 
critics ‘jouent sur une double confusion: entre antijudaique et antisemite, entre les 
anciens H6breux et les juifs modemes’, and she declares that her own position 
consists in arguing that ‘on identifie k tort 1’antijudaisme religieux et I’antisemitisme
14 ‘Le rdcit voltarien: Toldrance el resignation’, p. 127, p. 119.
15 ‘Israel and the Enlightenment’, p.38.
16 ‘Voltaire and anti-semitism: a Reply to Hertzberg’, p. 180.
17 Negres et Juifs ciu XVIIIe siede: le radsrne au siede des Utmieres, p.70.
18 Voltaire eti son temps, I, ‘D’Arouet a Voltaire’, 122.
14 ‘Voltaire on Judaism and Christianity’, p.242, p.238.
20 Voltaire le conquerant, p. 135.
21 Le ‘Dictionnaire philosophique ’ de Voltaire, p.89.
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racial’ (1994).22 Roland Desn£ similarly marks out certain critics’ non-separation of 
these terms, and he describes this as evidence of:
la confusion entre antijudaisme ou antih^braisme -  critique des croyances juives et des moeurs 
des H^breux d ’un point de vue philosophique et religieux et antis&nitisme (le mot 
n’apparaisscnt qu-au XIX' sifccle), ideologic raciale qui propose ou justifie des mesures 
discrimatoires contre les juifs.
He considers that to accuse Voltaire of antisemitism would be to forget that Me propos 
voltairien s ’inscrit dans une lutte g£n£rale contre le fanatisme et la barbarie’ (1995).23 
Bertram Eugene Schwarzbach claims that it is justified to reproach Voltaire for his 
antijudaism, ‘mais seulement si l’on se rappelle, en meme temps son anti-siamisme et 
son anti-franciscanisme’ (1997).24 For John Gray, while ‘his anti-Semitism originated 
partly in his hatred of Christianity’, and while ‘he could not forgive the people that 
had given birth to Christianity, [...] Voltaire’s repellent anti-Semitic prejudices were 
merely those of all of European Christendom’ (1998).25 But Adam Sutcliffe, although 
referring to the author’s ‘personal antisemitism’, also recognizes that there is a 
‘fundamental difference between Voltaire’s judaeophobia and twentieth-century 
fascistic antisemitism’ in that his ‘intolerance was held in check by his equally deep 
commitment to ideals of tolerance and cosmopolitanism’. Distinguishing ‘different 
antisemitisms’, Sutcliffe writes that ‘the extent to which moments of purely 
destructive energy erupt into Voltaire’s texts would be an indication of the extent to 
which he personally slipped from the tensions of his philosophy into an unthinking 
antisemitic hatred’, a comment the critic explains further with the remark that ‘it 
would (...) be appropriate to consider as antisemitic only such impulses and acts that 
stem from a rejection of the values of justice and toleration that Voltaire strove to 
promote’. For Sutcliffe Voltaire’s writings manifest what he deems to be ‘the tight 
web of antinomies and tensions that define the significance of Judaism and the Jews 
in Enlightenment thought’ (1998).26 Sutcliffe claims that even as Voltaire argues for
22 ‘Voltaire lit fa bibfe’, p. 187.
23 Inventaire Voltaire, pp.80-81.
24 ‘Voltaire et les Juifs: bilan et plaidoyer’, p.38.
25 Voltaire: Voltaire and the Enlightenment, p.4.
26 ‘Myth, Origins, Identity’, p. 120, p. 122.
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the toleration of Jews, he ‘implies that any genuine acceptance of Judaism is 
essentially impossible’. But, Sutcliffe continues, it is this ‘enduring ambiguity that 
keeps at bay the collapse of Voltaire’s anti-Jewish polemics into unrestrained verbal 
violence’. Re-emphasizing the problems inherent in investigating the issue of 
antisemitism, Sutcliffe comments that ‘the accusation of antisemitism, and the 
immediate recoil that it induces, short-circuit investigation of the complicated 
relationship between the violent undercurrents of Voltairean Enlightenment [...| and 
their recuperable, or even indispensable, emancipatory ideals’ (2003).27 And Harvey 
Chisick concludes that ‘given (...) his understanding of Judaism, Voltaire could not 
well have had a consistently sympathetic attitude toward the Jews. This is not to say, 
however, that he was antisemitic’ (2003).2*
The above sampling of scholars’ various positions calls for some brief remarks. 
Before the Second World War, Voltaire’s expressions of anti-Jewish feeling did not 
arouse comment, but since then we see an increasingly complex scholarly polemic 
developing on this subject. He has been labelled an antisemite (Brumfitt, Lehrmann, 
Bensimon, Poliakov, Hertzberg, Levy, Nef, Lepape, Pomeau), and has sometimes 
been partially or entirely excused by reference to the current thinking of his times and 
of his milieu (Besterman, Gay, Aldridge, Gray). The division in this first group of 
scholars, between those who accuse him of antisemitism and those who excuse him, 
may be expressed metaphorically as an important difference in two global 
interpretations of the enlightened thinker and champion of causes celebres. Those 
who soften their perception of the Jewish figures represent a will to remain faithful to 
Voltaire as our culture’s representative figure of tolerance and humanity; certain 
others express, through their denunciation, the same culture’s experience of loss of an 
exemplary model, a deeply disappointed ‘falling out of love’. This difference situates 
the Jewish reference in Voltaire as the location of a late-twentieth century crisis in 
readers of his works and bears the mark of our era’s tense relationship to the 
Enlightenment in general. I hope through my study to advance our knowledge of 
Voltaire’s significance for this crisis.
Recent years have brought a more careful application, or avoidance of the term 
antisemitism, and while certain scholars (Aubery, Ages, Jory, Manuel, Pluchon,
27 Judaism and Enlightenment, p.244, p.8.
28 ‘Community and Exclusion in Rousseau and Voltaire: the Case of the Jews’, p.93.
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Arkush, Mervaud, Cotoni, Desne, Schwarzbach, Sutcliffe, Chisick) do not hestitate to 
criticize Voltaire for anti-Judaism or anti-Jewishness, the distinction has become 
recognized between the thinking manifested in those two tendencies during his 
lifetime, and the pseudo-biological theory of race which engendered antisemitism in 
the nineteenth century and became central to twentieth-century Nazism. We find 
running through both the earlier and later instances a recurring emphasis on the 
pragmatic character of Voltaire’s criticism of the Jews, a progressively developing 
enquiry into what larger set of preoccupations might constitute the real context, and 
thence explanation, of anti-Jewish passages which appear wholly incompatible with 
Voltaire’s staunchly maintained values.
*  *  *
Note on method
While remaining as attentive as possible to the historical understanding that now 
exists of the persecution of the Jews and on the ways in which the persecution has 
been transferred to texts, and equally attentive to psychoanalytic and other theoretical 
studies of this problem, I intend to carry out my analysis by way of a comparative 
literary-critical reading of key passages in Voltaire’s works. By putting aside the 
question of truth and unintended falsehood, the accuracy or not of his accusations -  
acknowledging at the same time those instances where Voltaire purposely distorts the 
meaning of the biblical scriptures -  and provisionally suspending the process of moral 
judgement, this process should enable me initially to mark out the field of 
representation of the Jews in Voltaire’s (euvre.
This method of critical reading, the uncovering and analysis of certain repeated 
figures in my chosen texts, has been partially inspired by Charles Mauron’s 
psychocritique, elaborated in Des Metaphores obsedantes au my the personnel. 
Although it must be freely adapted to the character of the Voltairean images under 
discussion, Mauron’s methodologically restrained and theoretically modest 
application of psychoanalysis to literature may suit this demystifying critical writing 
better than more recent, more theoretically ambitious psychoanalytic approaches.
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Mauron hopes by superimposing interrelated passages in several texts to ‘distinguer 
les r^seaux d’associations, les figures mythiques qu’ils dessinent, enfin les relations 
dramatiques entre ces figures’. He sets out the stages necessary for putting this 
method into practice: the superimposition of the author’s texts, to reveal ‘des reseaux 
d’associations ou des groupements d ’images, obs6dants et probablement 
involontaires’; the uncovering of the structures discovered within the repetitions and 
modifications of these associations, and their themes analysed by reference to the 
analysis of dream images and processes, so as to arrive at an understanding of the 
author’s ‘personal myth’; and the checking our interpretation of this by reference to 
the known biographical evidence of the author. For Voltaire’s writing on the Jews, the 
reference is both to a personal myth and to a collective one. The vitriolic language of 
some of Voltaire’s Jewish references sends the reader in search of such methods as 
may defend him or her against the kind of reaction which puts an end to any reading, 
any effort of understanding, by resorting to a moral or ‘diagnostic’ judgement on the 
writer that would prematurely foreclose our questioning of the texts. The problem, 
after all, is not to decide whether or not the figures in question are anti-Jewish, but to 
try and understand the presence of such figures in a body of writing dedicated to an 
inspired emancipatory demystification of exactly that kind of prejudice.29
Therefore, as this thesis aims to examine the question of the intrication of Voltaire’s 
attitudes about the Jews with his more characteristic propagandist writing in defence 
of tolerance, I intend to undertake a simultaneous comparison of Voltaire’s 
representations of the Jews and of the Christians, including their comparable roles as 
both victims and victimizers, as these appear in both the critical and the ludic works. 
This analysis, applied in particular to the same chosen texts, should show where the 
Jewish and the Christian figures are the same and where they differ, and, I hope, 
reveal whether or not Voltaire’s writing is specifically anti-Jewish, or seeking to 
attribute praise or blame only where he thinks it is due.
*  *  *
29 Des Metaphores obsedantes au My the personnel, p. 12, p.32.
Choice of texts
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The effort to avoid subjectivity can have only limited success since my social and 
historical conditioning must partially determine any choice of certain texts, any 
discarding of others. The critic has to take responsibility for such value judgements. 
But that choice is also inextricably linked to my simultaneous decision about the 
method appropriate to such writing; Mauron’s networks of interrelated elements of 
different texts are a meeting-place of psychoanalytic and literary theory, and the 
theoretical works to which I refer, on racism and related questions, are equally hybrid. 
Similarly my selection among Voltaire’s texts is highly variegated.
My thesis concentrates on two texts that may be viewed as anti-Jewish documents: 
the Sermon des cinquante and the article ‘Juifs’ -  the latter erroneously included by 
Moland in the Dictionnaire philosophique. Reference to these two controversial 
works is essential as both are so frequently mentioned by those who accuse Voltaire 
of ‘antisemitism’. However, it is necessary to draw attention to the origins of the later 
article. As Roland Desn6 points out, it is made up of an amalgamation of different 
texts, brought together after Voltaire’s death; section I being ‘Des Juifs’ in the 
Melanges of 1756; section IV being ‘Juifs’ in the Questions sur VEncyclopidie of 
1771; sections II and III were undated fragments found among his papers.
This choice, of course, reflects my intuitive response after reading Voltaire, but is 
also justifiable on objective grounds. So much of his work centres on the Jews and the 
Bible that the quantity of relevant material exceeds the possibilities of close analysis; 
selection, too, is difficult. The process of elimination depends largely on the 
repetitiousness of many of the anti-Jewish themes, and, in this context, the Sermon des 
cinquante (written clandestinely for friends and acquaintances) and ‘Juifs’ stand out 
as containing some of his most virulent and, at times, scatological language. They 
therefore warrant particular attention, being among the most difficult of Voltaire’s 
anti-Jewish texts.
In addition, my thesis concentrates on Voltaire’s allegedly more documentary or
‘historical’ work, the Essai sur les moeurs: here my analysis includes La Philosophie
de Vhistoire because, four years after its publication, ‘Voltaire incorporated it in his
larger study of universal history’ -  it appeared as the Introduction to the Essai.30 In
30 J.H. Brumfitt, Introduction to La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p. 13.
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these texts I hope to find some evidence of Voltaire’s more balanced critical writing.
I shall also introduce two fictional works that make only passing reference to the 
Jews; namely, La Pucelle d'Origans and Candide. These may help us to distance 
ourselves from the often venomous language of the above texts, and allow us to 
discover the structures of Voltaire’s discourse. At the same time we may come closer 
to the Voltairean imaginary; as Virginia Marino points out, ‘Candide is always 
experiencing his [painful] reality as a dream’.31
The juxtaposition of La Pucelle and Candide can be justified by striking parallels 
within their differences. First we should note the differences, starting with their 
publishing destiny. The earlier poem, whose exact date is not known (having been 
begun perhaps even as early as 1725, and then added to and altered over thirty years 
or more), like the Sermon des cinquante, was passed privately among acquaintances, 
while Candide, even though published anonymously, was soon attributed to the 
famous author and widely read. They differ in genre and structuring. Candide was 
written as a prose conte in thirty generally short chapters, while La Pucelle is a poem 
made up eventually of twenty-one chants (varying in length from nearly 300 to nearly 
600 lines each). Yet between these two works there is a strong thematic resemblance: 
war, rape, constant wandering, manipulation, moral deviation, religious persecution 
and the Inquisition, and in each case the title points to the eponymous central 
character’s emblematic force as a figure of innocent purity in an imperfect world. 
Jeanne d’Arc, la Pucelle, who is chosen by Saint Denis to redeem the French from 
the assaults of the English, is constantly threatened in her task, not just by her 
outwardly visible enemies, but also by those concealed within. The success of her 
mission depends on the maintenance of her virginal status, which frequently comes 
under attack from the lust of others, and from her own desires. At the same time, 
within her circle other vulnerable young women, such as Agnds and Doroth^e, 
become prey to the machinations of the supposedly enlightened figures of moral 
authority. Similarly Candide, repeatedly misled by those who claim to guide him, 
often self-styled arbiters of philosophical principles and reason, is endlessly driven in 
search of an unobtainable happiness, and is unable to rest until he arrives at a more 
realistic and pragmatic appreciation of life’s possibilities in his garden on the 
Propontis.
31 ‘Dreams and Narrative Coherence in Voltaire’, p.93.
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Besterman contends that Voltaire did not consider his contes to be trivia, but as the 
writer called all such texts rogatons, I hope that the two that I have chosen, through 
their veiy marginality relative to other works, and through their ludic character, may 
indirectly reveal some of the more obscure aspects of his desire to enlighten.32 
Voltaire himself links these two works; referring to La Pucelle, he writes: ‘il y a un 
chant ou tout le monde est fou; chacun des acteurs donne et refoit cent coups de 
poing. Voil& l’image de ce monde. Je conclus avec Candide qu’il faut cultiver son 
jardin’ (11 August 1764).33
*  *  *
Because the Complete Works directed by Besterman are still unfinished, I have 
had to use different primary sources. Wishing wherever possible to draw on latest 
research, I have referred to the Moland edition published by Gamier Fr&res (1877- 
85) only where the more recent series is incomplete. Thus, while references to La 
Pucelle, Candide, and La Philosophie de Vhistoire will be taken from the Voltaire 
Foundation publications, quotations from the Sermon des cinquante, ‘Juifs’ and the 
Essai sur les moeurs will be according to Moland. The same methodology applies to 
the other texts cited in this thesis, with the one exception of the Lettres 
philosophiques, where, in order to avoid certain inaccuracies in the Moland text, I 
refer to the 1964 edition directed by Gustave Lanson and Andr6-Michel Rousseau.
This thesis seeks to show the chronological development of Voltaire’s thinking, 
and to indicate evidence in his oeuvre for the existence of a period of crisis. I have 
therefore felt it necessary, where possible, to accompany all quotations by their 
presumed date of composition. In the case of works such as Candide and La 
Philosophie de Vhistoire, where the period of writing was of short duration and 
followed soon afterwards by the first printing, this will be the year of the original 
publication. As for ‘Juifs’, here dating will be according to the section from which 
each extract has been taken. But the Sermon des cinquante will not, as in Moland, be 
dated in line with its publication in 1762, but according to what J. Patrick Lee finds 
to be the most probable period of writing, 1749-52. Following Ira Wade’s research,
32 See Voltaire, p.435.
33 D 12045 to Charles Palissot de Montenoy. See also D 11808 to Damilaville, 2 April 1764.
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Lee writes that, while agreeing ‘that the Sermon could have been written in 1749, 
[and] that it is indeed the fruit of Voltaire’s daily reading of the Bible and Dom 
Calmet’s commentaries during the philosophers stay at Cirey, [...] there is no 
evidence of its existence before 1752’. The situation is even more complicated with 
La Pucelle and the Essai sur les moeurs where, because both texts developed over 
some thirty years, each chant or chapter may belong to a very different period.
Vercruysse bases his edition of La Pucelle on the 1775 version (approved by
Voltaire) that was founded on the 1761 edition published in London. Only certain 
chants can be dated with some precision, although Vercruysse discovers two ‘dead’ 
periods in the development of this work: 1740-55 and 1757-59. As for the main 
body of the Essai sur les moeurs, here dating is according to the Gamier Fr&res 1963 
edition (based on the 1756 version with later additions identified), published under 
the directorship of Ren6 Pomeau.34
*  *  *
I have linked the examinations of my selected texts (in Chapters 2-6) in a
differing and, what might seem, arbitrary order. Although still endeavouring to show 
the chronological development, here my choice has been made according to what I 
perceive in each case to be the network of figures; where relevant figures have not 
been found, texts will be omitted from the discussion.
*  *  *
For consistency and because we are dealing with a period of orthographic change, 
eighteenth-century variations in spelling have been standardized -  an action which 
Voltaire himself promoted -  and, for clarity, some punctuation has been modernized.
Abreviations: D = Numbered letter in Correspondence
M = Moland edition, Gamiers freres, CEuvres completes
SVEC = Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 
V f  = Voltaire Foundation, Complete Works
34 ‘The publication of the Sermon des cinquante\ p.691; Introduction to La Pucelle d ’Orleans, p. 18.
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Sutcliffe’s observation that Voltaire’s ‘intolerance was held in check by his 
equally deep commitment to ideals of tolerance and cosmopolitanism’ can serve as a 
valuable starting point for the discussion. Before considering in detail our chosen 
texts, we have to reach some understanding of what is indicated by the terms 
tolerance and intolerance, and we soon see that this remains as much an enduring 
problem for Voltaire as for his readers. But in order to address the question of the 
evidence of these issues in his work, we need to find some kind of working 
definition for these terms. On the surface level tolerance is a question of accepting 
the difference of different others, a cause that Voltaire champions. In the Avis au 
public sur les parricides imputes aux Calas et aux Sirven, he condemns persecution 
of those whose opinions are different, writing: ‘En un mot, la tolerance mutuelle est 
l ’unique remede aux erreurs qui pervertissent l’esprit des hommes d’un bout de 
l’univers a l’autre’ (1766). But Voltaire’s championing of tolerance is often achieved 
by his minimization of the differences between people and groups, and by his 
emphasis on their shared characteristics.35 As J.H. Brumfitt contends: ‘tolerance, for 
Voltaire, is more than a mere acceptance of other peoples’ right to their own views. 
It is also an assertion that these views, though they may differ superficially, are 
really fundamentally the same.’36 In the Traite de metaphysique Voltaire writes:
Quoique cc qu’on appelle vertu dans un climat soit pfecisdment ce qu’on appelle vice dans un 
autre, et que la plupart des fegles du bien et du mal different comme les langages et les 
habillements, cepcndant il me paraTt certain qu’il y a des lois naturelles dont les hommes 
sont obliges de convenir par tout 1’univers malgrd qu’ils cn aient. (1734-37),7
Second, at a deeper level, the acceptance of difference, the reinscription of an 
excluded particular, refers necessarily to some conception of the universal. Voltaire’s 
reference to the universal predominates as his primary way of attacking intolerance, 
on the basis of enlightened reason and a universal morality. In Le Philosophe
35 Avis au public, p.536.
36 Introduction to La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.30.
37 Traite de metaphysique, pp.475-76.
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la loi fondamentale de la morale agit dgalement sur toutes les nations bien connues. I l y a  
mille differences dans les interpretations de cette loi, en mille circonstances; mais le fonds 
subsistc toujours le meme, et ce fonds est l ’idde du juste et de l’injuste.
Thus, even while describing the Jews of the past as ‘une horde barbare, ignorante, 
superstitieuse, un peuple sanguinaire et usurier’, Voltaire contends that nonetheless 
the Jewish people have ‘les memes lois fondamentales’ (1766).38 He does not tolerate 
those who deny these universal values in favour of ridiculously brutal and arbitrary 
man-made relative laws, and he satirizes such thinking in Andre Destouches a Siam 
(1766). Nor does Voltaire tolerate that specific form of denial of universal morality, 
found in those who would cancel the religious freedom of others by claiming that 
their own religion is the one and only. For him, universal morality is rooted solely in 
the common human understanding of beneficence, doing to another as one would 
have others do to oneself; it does not belong in the realm of man-made laws and 
religious dogma. He writes:
La morale n’est point dans la superstition, elle n’est point dans les cdrdmonies, elle n’a rien de 
commun avec les dogmes. On ne peut trop rdpdter que tous les dogmes sont differents, et que 
la morale est la meme chez tous les hommes qui font usage de leur raison. ( 1767)39
A recent criticism of the Enlightenment has consisted in a relativist rejection of 
its characteristic reference to the universal, whether that of morality, human 
qualities, or values. However, to study Voltaire is to see that the stress was fully 
justified in his day. In that period of scientific development, archeological discovery, 
geographical exploration, growing categorization and classification, and religious 
questioning, traditional moral values were reconsidered and more fundamental ones 
were sought in relation to which a new definition of the transgressive could take 
shape. Still today, as Ernesto Laclau comments, because ‘the demands of various 
groups will necessarily clash with each other, we have to appeal [...] to some more
38 Ije Philosophe ignorant, pp.86-87, p.77.
39 ‘Morale’, p.398.
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general principles in order to regulate such clashes’. Laclau states that ‘there is no 
particularism which does not make appeal to such principles in the construction of its 
own identity’; we have to accept that ‘universality is incommensurable with any 
particularity but cannot, however, exist apart from the particular’. Laclau further 
underlines the aporia that these comments present by his following remark: ‘[while] I 
can defend the right of sexual, racial and national minorities in the name of 
particularism [...] if particularism is the only valid principle, I have to also accept the 
rights to self-determination of all kinds of reactionary groups involved in antisocial 
practices.’ The rights of one set of individuals may impinge on the rights of 
another.40 But while critics of the Enlightenment find in its universalism the seeds of 
modem totalitarianism, the extreme mobility of much of Voltaire’s writing already 
performs certain deconstructive arguments such as these. His modest approach 
anticipates the postmodern acceptance of the impossibility of finding indisputable 
solutions, although he never renounces the challenge to search for possible answers. 
In A.B.C. he writes that ‘il faut toujours se reserver le droit de rire le lendemain de 
ses idees de la veille’ (1768), and in his letter to d ’Argental he states humbly: ‘c’est 
toujours a me corriger que je m’etudie’ (20 January 1757).41
The third area of the understanding of tolerance recognizes that it has to start with 
self-acceptance, that is with an undoing of the imaginary projection on to the other of 
perceived weaknesses not acknowledged by the self as its own, and the reintegration 
of the unwanted qualities in the self. Here the writings of a largely non-confessional 
writer impose definite limits on what we can say. Voltaire’s effort after impartiality 
might also seem to work against us, and yet I propose that it implies an awareness 
that subjectivity can get in the way of his project. In the introduction to the Traite de 
metaphysique he indicates the effort it cost him to escape from his site of vision or 
episteme, his desire to shake off his own prejudices: ‘je vais tacher, en 6tudiant 
1’homme, de me mettre d’abord hors de sa sphere et hors d’interet, et de me defaire 
de tous les prejuges d’education, de patrie, et surtout des prejuges de philosophe’ 
(1734-37). In face of the acknowledged difficulty of achieving unbiased thinking, he 
commits himself to that unremitting effort.42
40 Emancipation(s), p.26, p.34.
41 A.B.C., p.399; D7129.
42 Traite de metaphysique, p.418.
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In the main, Voltaire believes that all mankind is in need of tolerance and so he 
writes in ‘Tolerance’: ‘Qu’est-ce que la tolerance? C’est l’apanage de l’humanity. 
Nous sommes tous p£tris de faiblesse et d ’erreurs; pardonnons-nous reciproquement 
nos sottises, c’est la premiere loi de la nature’. This is later repeated: ‘Mais il est plus 
clair encore que nous devons nous tolerer mutuellement parce que nous sommes tous 
faibles, incons^quents, sujets & la mutability, & l ’erreur’ (1764).43 We again find this 
implicit inclusion of the self at the end of his life when he writes: ‘Quand on songe a 
tous les maux qu’a produits le fanatisme, on rougit d’etre homme’ (1777) and: 
‘Pardonnons aux hommes, et qu’on nous pardonne’ (1777). These statements typify 
the collective character of his recognition of faults from which he does not exempt 
himself. Avowal takes the form of reference to a class to which the writer himself 
belongs. In the above examples, this ‘subject’ class that constitutes the culpable side 
of a destructive subject-object relation is in fact the whole of humanity: the easiest 
scope for an avowal, one might say, since it leaves no residue of others who are able 
to see our failings from outside.44
Voltaire’s argument at times becomes more personal, in the sense that it depends 
on a criticism of a less universal class of which he is a member. Irrespective of 
scholars’ doubts surrounding his own religion or lack of it, he saw himself as a 
member of the European world of Christendom, and so his criticisms of that world 
include himself. I adopt the term ‘Christendom’ to differentiate those who are merely 
inheritors of Christian culture from the Christian religion and its adherents. Speaking 
as one of Christian culture, he says of Christianity: ‘nous avons fait tant de mal par 
son moyen, que quand nous parlons des autres, nous devons etre modestes’ (1764).45 
Discord which always exists in direct opposition to the spirit of tolerance lies at the 
heart of the Christian world, and so he writes in ‘Tolerance’:
Cette horrible discorde qui dure depuis tant de sidcles est une \cqon bien frappante que nous 
devons mutuellement nous pardonner nos erreurs: la discorde est le grand mal du genre 
humain, et la tolerance en est le seul remade. ( 1764)46
43 ‘Tolerance’, VF, p.552, p.566.
44 Prix de la justice, p.552; Histoire de I ’etablissement du christianisme, p. 116 (published 1785).
45 ‘Religion’, p.486.
46 ‘Tolerance’, VF, p.562.
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Fanaticism can be prevented only ‘en adorant Dieu sans superstition, et en tolerant 
son prochain’ ( 1777).47 But Voltaire emphasizes the paradox that lies at the heart of 
Christianity, the chasm between the dictates of that religion and the realities of its 
actions. In Le Siecle de Louis XIV he writes:
II est affreux sans doutc que l’£glise chrdtienne ait toujours 6\6 ddchirde par ses querelles, ct 
quc le sang ait could pendant tant de sidcles par des mains qui portaient le dieu de la paix.
Cette fureur fut inconnue au paganisme. ( 1735-52)48
In ‘Tolerance’ he contends: ‘De toutes les religions, la chretienne est sans doute celle
qui doit inspirer le plus de tolerance, quoique jusqu’ici les chretiens aient ete les plus
intolerants de tous les hommes’ (1764).49 He repeatedly makes us notice the tension
that lies in the dichotomy between the Church’s pacific claims and its brutal deeds.
He proposes that by inspiring fanaticism and causing social unrest, the merely
mistaken actions of the Christians have taken on a criminal dimension. He contends
that errors become crimes when they disturb society and inspire fanatics, and it is
only by ceasing to be fanatical that men merit tolerance: ‘il faut done que les
hommes commencent par n’etre pas fanatiques pour meriter la tolerance’ (1763).50
Here we see the extremism of Voltaire’s commitment to fighting intolerance.
The champion of tolerance is first and foremost intolerant of intolerance, and of its
causes and effects. But at times this thinking introduces the aporia to which Laclau
refers; while Voltaire declares that all people deserve to be shown tolerance, in the
case of those who abuse the rights of others, he indicates that this privilege should be
denied. Although this does not necessarily justify every instance of intolerance in
Voltaire’s writings, it exposes his awareness of the need for both self-criticism and
active resistance. His often vitriolic condemnation of every individual act of
fanaticism, whether perpetrated by Christians, Jews or others, rests alongside his
impassioned promotion of the rights of all people. Therefore, his contention that the
Christians through their brutality have lost their right to the indulgence of others 
4" Histoire de I ’etablissement du christianisme, p. 106.
48 Le Siecle de Louis XIV, II, 14. Although Voltaire may have begun work on this in 1732,1 have dated 
it according to the most probable period of composition. The complete work was first published in 
1752, and for the next twenty or more years Voltaire continued to make corrections to the text.
49 ‘Tolerance’, VF, p.558.
50 Traite sur la tolerance, p.236.
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combines with his demand for positive action by his fellow thinkers in the fight 
against fanaticism. But this acknowledgement of the requirement for self-criticism 
also relates to his representation of the Jews. Voltaire focuses his attention on, what 
he represents as, their failure to demonstrate the above-mentioned attributes; he 
censures them for their supposed denial of ancient Jewish guilt for the ‘immoral’ 
messages of the Bible, he condemns the contemporary Jews’ alleged unthinking, 
apathetic acceptance of the ‘illogical’ truths of the biblical stories, and he accuses 
them of showing passive indifference in the face of injustice. We shall pay particular 
consideration to these issues as found in his Jewish discourse, namely the author’s 
demand for a frank and honest self-appraisal by the enlightened Jews of the 
eighteenth century, and his allegation of apathy among the Jewish people as a whole.
But Voltaire’s self-inclusion in a class of guilt identified as Christian rather 
than as universally human cannot be wholeheartedly enlisted in our attempt to find a 
humble self-acceptance at the basis of his defence of tolerance towards others. He 
clearly distinguishes himself, entirely deservedly, as a child of Christian culture 
endowed with a gift of detachment from his own milieu who undertakes, heroically 
rather than humbly, to launch that milieu on its own autocritique. Despite his 
concern as to the possible negative effects of atheism, Voltaire’s critical efforts to 
dismantle religious authoritarianism on all these fronts contributed hugely to the 
launching of European culture on its modem path of secularization.
Contrary to the common European attitudes in his times and since, Voltaire
further contends that Christian Europe has a lesson to learn from its other. This
reinscription and conferring of moral status on the other carries the Christian
autocritique in Voltaire’s works to a higher level. In the ‘Avant-propos’ to the Essai
sur les maeurs, he writes that ‘en philosophic’ we need to look towards the East,
‘berceau de tous les arts, et qui a tout donn6 a l’Occident’ (1756), while in
‘Philosophe’ he refers to the act of fate that -  to the ‘shame’ of the West -  caused the
East through the teaching of Confucius to practise tolerance and vivre heureux six
cents ans avant notre ere vulgaire, dans un temps ou tout le septentrion ignorait
l ’usage des lettres, et ou les Grecs commen9aient a peine a se distinguer par la
sagesse’ (1765).51 He also reverses the representation of benign European
colonisation, in that, infected with intolerant passion, ‘nous avons empeste ces beaux
51 Essai sur les mceurs, I, 158 (dated 1740 by Moland); ‘Philosophe’, p.435.
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climats’ of China, Tonkin and Japan (1772).52 This carries forward the thinking of Le 
Siecle de Louis XIV:
Cette furcur des prosdlytes est une maladie particulidrc k nos climats [...); elle a toujours dtd 
mconnuc dans la haute Asie. Jamais ces peuplcs n’ont envoyd de missionnaires en Europe, et 
nos nations sont les scules qui aient voulu porter leurs opinions, comme leur commerce, aux 
deux extrdmitds du globe. (1735-52)™
This dismantling of the prevailing self-other opposition and hierarchy also occurs 
repeatedly in his representation of the Jews’ tolerant attitude towards religious 
difference. In the Histoire de V etablissement du christianisme he mockingly draws 
attention to the contradiction between the conduct of the Jews of former times and 
that of contemporary Christians. Despite the differences of belief among the Jewish 
sects regarding the afterlife, they were able to live together in harmony.
Ce qui peut paraitre trds singulier aux chrctiens intolerants de nos jours, s’il en est encore, e’est 
qu’on ne voit pas que les pharisiens et les saducdens, en different si essentiellement, aient eu 
entre eux la moindre querelle. ( 1777)54
Voltaire’s critique targets a smaller class yet: that part of Christendom which 
belongs to his own time and place. Here his identification with the culpable group 
has a more personal tone, with the implication that the collective autocritique that he 
ceaselessly demands must be proportionately harder for being much closer to home, 
and for entailing a shaming comparison with the now more tolerant neighbour, 
England. ‘Que nous sommes petits et miserables, en comparaison des Grecs, des
Romains, et des Anglais!’ (12 April 1764). In his texts he repeatedly draws attention
to the fact that whereas in the London Royal Exchange, peoples of different faiths 
trade peacefully together, in France religious discord lives on in the shadow of the 
events of Saint Bartholomew’s Day.55 In the Traite sur la tolerance Voltaire places
this latter event alongside the savage acts of ancient times:
52 ‘Tolerance’, M.xx, p.525 (originally in Questions sur I ’Encyclopedic).
™ Le Siecle de Louis XIV, II, 83.
54 Histoire de Vetablissement du christianisme, p.52.
55 D11821 to Marmontel.
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Y a-t-il, dans les relations avdrdes des persecutions ancicnnes, un seul trait qui approche de la 
Saint-Barthdldmy, et des massacres d ’Irlande? f...) Je le dis avee horreur, mats avec vdritd: 
e ’est nous, chrdtiens, e ’est nous qui avons dtd persdcutcurs, bourreaux, assassins!
(1763)*’
This same passage links these events to the continuing expression of intolerance, the 
continuing persecution of religious difference, evident among the people of 
Toulouse. The savagery of the past persists into the present, and Voltaire belongs to 
the Catholic France that is still intolerant.
Last, on the most personal level of all, that of his own need for the tolerance of 
others, Voltaire is mainly silent. His self-recriminations concentrate chiefly on his 
physical ‘feebleness’ and ever-growing fragility, his gradual withdrawal from the 
centre of political affairs. But he goes further when writing to Mademoiselle 
Bessieres following the untimely death of his sister, an event which caused him to 
reconsider his own sense of worth:
J ’ai bien fait des fautes dans le cours de ma vie. Les amertumes et les souffrances qui en ont 
marqud presque tous les jours ont dtd souvent mon ouvrage. Je sens le peu que je vaux, mes 
faiblesses me font pitid et mes fautes me font horreur. ( 15/n.s.26 October 1726)57
Later to Thieriot he writes:
etre accabld de langueur des anndes entidres, voir tous ses goQts s ’andantir, avoir encore assez 
de vie pour souhaiter d ’en jouir et trop peu de force pour le faire, devenir inutile et 
insupportable & soi-meme, mourir en ddtail, voilii ce que j ’ai souffert et ce qui m ’a dtd plus 
cruel que toutes les autrcs dpreuves. (c. February 1729)w
In his letter to d’Alembert about the article ‘Histoire’, he blames his ill health for the 
lack of thoroughness in his work, commenting: ‘Pardon, je suis un bavard qui dit ce
qu’il aurait du faire et qui n’a rien fait qui vaille’ (9 October 1756), and to Anne
56 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 182.
57 D302.
58 D344.
Marie Fiquet du Bocage he writes:
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G£nic vous-mcme, Madame, jc suis un pauvre vieillard moitid podte, moitid philosophe et qui 
n’cst pas k moitid persdeutd, quoi qu’il ne dflt etre qu’un objet de pitid dtant surchargd de 84 
ans et de 84 maladies et dtant trds prds par consdquent d ’aller voir mes anciens maTtres, les 
Socrates et les Sophocles que j ’ai bien mal imitds. (2 November 1777)w
These avowals, while undoubtedly sincere, do not have the precision of his more 
general criticisms of groups. However, we are free to question also the silences in 
his texts:
selon le critdre de V intentionnalite, on peut distinguer deux sortes de silence textuel: le silence 
volontaire et le silence involontaire, le vide sciemment introduit comme stratagdme discursif 
et le manque qui, dans le texte, rdfdre k l’indicible et & l’innommable. Le premier rdfdre k ce 
que l’dcrivain ne veut pas dire, le second k ce qu’il ne peut pas dire. (author’s italics)60
The silences give us an intuition concerning Voltaire’s thinking regarding his own 
sense of victimhood. Ira Wade finds a parallel between the writer’s own experiences 
and the themes found in Candide.
It is possible to [...] see in the plot of the conte a series of little incidents in the author’s own 
life, beginning with Candide’s illegitimate birth, which Voltaire suspected was his own case, 
and ending with a dillusioned but determined individual who accepts his lot and cultivates his 
garden, as Voltaire was actually doing at the time he was writing Candide. (author’s italics)61
*  *  *
David Wootton goes much further than Wade, arguing that writing Candide 
allowed the release of the repressed in Voltaire. This conte, according to Wootton, 
marked his coming to terms with early traumatic sexual experiences with the Jesuits,
59 D7018; D20876.
60 Pierre van den Heuvel, Parole mot silence, p.73.
61 Voltaire and 'Candide’, p.299.
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and his ambivalent adult sexuality.62 Wootton bases his thesis on Voltaire’s alleged 
accusation at Mrs Pope’s house in Twickenham against his former school masters, 
an occasion where according to Jeffrey Bamouw he may have taken English 
frankness and ‘bold speaking’ too far, thereby possibly giving ‘evidence of a social 
misperception on Voltaire’s part, [...] the result of his playing a role for the 
English’.6* According to Theodore E.D. Braun the possible misperception -  one that 
‘might have cost him Pope’s friendship’ -  lay in Voltaire’s ‘anti-religious attitude, 
coupled with the coarse language that was acceptable in the Parisian circles he 
frequented, but was not looked on favourably in mixed company in England’.64 
Whichever may be the correct scholarly interpretation of the reported event, it is a 
fact that Candide inaugurated Voltaire’s more openly committed writing, and 
launched his period of causes celebres. Wootton proposes that the fundamental 
liberation, in writing this conte, lay in finding a form that could assert, through the 
detour of a wise old woman, that everyone had been raped or violated. If I have 
correctly understood Wootton’s argument, it is that in this way an unbearable inner 
truth could be made bearable. However, we might object that, while we could hardly 
expect Voltaire, or anyone else at that time, to be open about a homosexual 
dimension of their experience when the law forbade it and could punish it brutally, 
he was nevertheless not completely silent about these things, and we have access to a 
few documents. What little we know suggests that for most of his life he had 
integrated his sexual facts well enough, rather than that he found that outlet in 
Candide. But this may be where we need also to distinguish between van Heuvel’s 
‘strategic void’ and ‘unspeakable absence’, the intentional silence about chosen adult 
experiences and impossible reference to unwanted childhood abuse. In Prix de la 
justice et de I'humanite Voltaire refers to some victims’ inability to receive justice 
for physical abuse suffered in private: ‘II en est du viol comme de l’impuissance; il 
est certains cas dont les tribunaux ne doivent jamais connajtre’ (1777). The 
experiences of characters such as Agnes in La Puce lie and la vie i lie in Candide
62 Wootton quotes the following passage from Andrd Michel Rousseau, L ’Angleterre et Voltaire, I,
113: ‘As he [Voltaire] supped one night with Mr. Pope at Twickenham, he fell into a fit of swearing 
and of blasphemy about his constitution. Old Mrs. Pope asked him how his constitution came to be so 
bad at his age. “Oh” (says he)”those d....d Jesuits, when I was a boy, b(u)g...g(a)r’d me to such a 
degree that I shall never get over it as long as I live” ’, ‘Unhappy Voltaire’, p. 137.
63 ‘The contribution of English to Voltaire’s enlightenment’, p.81.
64 ‘Voltaire the English Connection’, p.220.
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reveal, according to my understanding of Voltaire’s discourse, the appositeness of 
the editors’ comment in the Kehl edition: ‘Le viol est un veritable crime C ’est 
une violation de la propriete que chacun doit avoir de sa personne, c ’est un outrage 
fait & la faiblesse par la force.’65
Wootton proposes that Voltaire’s disgust at Desfontaines, who was accused of 
pederastic activities with some chimney sweeps, might well have been founded on 
the latter’s being a child molester, rather than his homosexuality.66 But whatever the 
truth, while Voltaire’s negative public statements about homosexuality 
unsurprisingly internalize the anathema unavoidable in that period, they also 
conform to his characteristic combination of the negative stereotype with the 
injunction to desist from persecution of that which we deplore: he accordingly took 
up the cause of Desfontaines.67 Therefore what did happen in the writing of Candide? 
As Wootton’s main point convinces us, even if we question the specific psychical 
determinants of the moment of release of energy available, after Candide, for 
important work, we can readily concede that that moment occurred. I would prefer to 
adapt Wootton’s interpretation, taking into my study of Voltaire that aspect of it 
which strikingly fits the structure I have been defining, whereby he advances 
secularization, the diminuation of religious authority, by launching his own society 
on its autocritique, and does this by himself criticizing whole classes to which he, 
Voltaire, belongs. This structure takes on greater importance when we can see that in 
Candide the universalization of sexual victimhood literally includes the writer’s self. 
It shows us that the effort to get outside the limitations of his own viewpoint and to 
universalize his critique for the sake of impartiality takes the same path as a certain 
integration of his subjecthood in the social space.
The two areas of Voltaire’s sexuality potentially susceptible of social
opprobrium are his affair with his niece, Madame Denis, and his possible
relationships with known homosexuals. As for incest, Besterman in a comment
relating to Voltaire’s satirical passage in La Defense de mon oncle (1767) has 
iA Prix de la justice, p.567 including note 1.
66 Thelma Morris writes: ‘Depuis quelque temps des plaintes £taient ddpos^es au sujet des mauvaises 
moeurs de J’abb£ qui, disait-on, corrompait nombre de jeunes gens.’ L'Abbe Desfontaines et son role 
dans la litterature de son temps, p.38.
67 Morris comments that Voltaire ‘est intervenu trds activement aupr&s de la police et de la cour 
pour sauver Desfontaines, quoiqu’il soup9onnat ce dernier d’etre 1’auteur d’une Edition subreptice et 
fautive de la Henriade dans laquelle il avait ins£r£ des vers de sa fa ^ n .’ L ’Abbe Desfontaines et son 
role dans la litterature de son temps, p.41.
pointed out the contemporary thinking.
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I must make it clear that in the eighteenth century and in Roman Catholic countries incest was 
not and is not judged with Calv inist severity. Voltaire once said, with perfect accuracy, that ‘a 
man can marry his niece by permission of the pope, for a fee w hich I believe is normally forty 
thousand <Scus, including the petty cash. I have always heard it said that it cost monsieur de 
Montmartel only 80,000 francs. I know some who have gone to bed with their nieces much 
more cheaply than that’.68
In ‘Des Lois’ (1764) Voltaire satirically introduces the incest taboo into his 
critique of the relativity of social laws; he contrasts natural law with man-made 
laws, and ridicules the arbitrary nature of the latter. He had already written in this 
vein in the Traite de metaphysique (1734-37), drawing attention to differences in 
attitudes to adultery and homosexuality around the world, and contrasting these 
relative laws to the universal condemnation of falsity, lying and deceit. But, when 
studying his figures, we shall also see how, alongside his demolition of social 
conventions attached to non-conforming sexual behaviour, Voltaire repeatedly 
condemns what he significantly calls the ‘spiritual incest’ perpetrated by religious 
authorities against their flocks. However, for our study these issues raise still further 
questions. Incest is a theme which constantly reappears in Voltaire’s writing, and 
frequently underpins his critique of the Jewish texts, an emphasis that becomes even 
more relevant when viewed in the light of Sander L. Gilman’s statement: ‘The 
implicit charge of incest stood at the center of the understanding of the pathology of 
the Jew.’ Gilman discovers among Christians a critical reaction to the Jews’ 
endogamous marriages that leads to a mental construct of the ‘biological inheritance 
of the Jew, an inheritance tainted by the Jew’s incestuous inbreeding’.69 Bensimon, 
going further, finds all such thinking to be typical of the antisemite: ‘c’est sans doute 
une constante du propos antisemite [...] d’avoir une coloration sexuelle marquee’.70
While Voltaire does not publicly comment on homosexuality with reference to 
himself, in so far as it concerns others, it is an issue whose paradoxes obviously
strike him, and one which again repeatedly marks his Jewish critique. In ‘Amour
68 Voltaire, pp.270-71.
69 Inscribing the Other, p. 125, p. 23.
70 ‘Un anti-somite rationaliste: Voltaire’, p.21.
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nomme socratique’ (1764), he condemns pederasty which preys on innocent youth, 
but shows understanding for the weakness of the young and, by implication, the 
beautiful. But homosexual acts carried out between the older and, he suggests, 
coarser are described as ‘a disgusting abomination’; here he separates the physical 
and the emotional, denying a place for love in the relations between mature adult 
men. Homosexual relations are practised and ‘natural’, albeit ‘un attentat infame 
contre la nature’ in that they exclude the possibility of procreation.71
Rictor Norton illustrates a tension in Christian thinking as regards so-called 
illicit sexual behaviour. While pointing to the accusations of sodomy or fornication 
levelled at this time against the Jesuits and other members of the Church (a figure 
often found in the works of Voltaire and his predecessors), Norton explains how the 
religious authorities were prepared to overlook the sins of adultery if they resulted in 
childbirth, and how anti-homosexual prejudice was ‘nourished by the Roman 
Catholic attitude professing the sanctity of procreation’ -  a paradox that, through 
reversal, Voltaire further problematizes by emphasizing how Christian chastity is in 
itself non-productive.72
E.M. Langille in his study into ‘allusions to homosexuality’ in Candide, 
suggests that Voltaire ‘was not the least indifferent’ to all such ‘so-called 
perversities’, and this critic contends that, ‘depending on his mood, depending on the 
public he was addressing, we see him malign the “sodomite”, or defend him, or do 
both at once’. Langille summarizes therefore with the comment that the homosexual 
satire in Candide is just one more in a long list of assaults Voltaire levies on the 
whole gamut of human follies and failings’.73 But I propose that there is a still further 
fundamental element behind Voltaire’s argument. In the Prix de la justice et de 
rhumanite, even while calling the homosexual act an ordure, he declares that it is 
‘plus faite pour etre ensevelie dans les t&iebres de l’oubli que pour etre 6clairee par 
les flammes des bQchers aux yeux de la multitude’ (1777) -  a telling reference to the 
much hated form of execution that appears so often in his texts. Voltaire’s 
representation of all such sexual practices form part of his discourse regarding 
victims and victimizers, which leads us to understand that for him the essential point
71 ‘Amour nomm6 socratique’, p.329, p.328.
72 Mother Clap’s Molly House, p. 125.
73 ‘Allusions to homosexuality in Voltaire’s Candide’, p.63.
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is that such secret relationships between willing adults are better private, a matter for 
tolerance and certainly not deserving of persecution. His various public statements, 
whatever their mode -  protective, defensive or militant -  imply an inner acceptance 
of his own homosexual aspect, for all their generalizing impersonal nature.74 His 
need to question his own origins and his enduring rage at his abusive teachers may 
well form part of the dynamic of his propagandist writing on behalf of victims, and it 
may prove illuminating to ask how they do so. I shall explore the suggestion that 
Voltaire’s sexual history intersects, at an emancipatory moment, with the history of 
the evolution of his oeuvre, the creation of a life of propaganda as a literary genre, 
fragmentary, hightly mobile, and vast.75
*  *  *
In a different way, Desne, too, discovers in the writer’s thinking on tolerance 
three levels that gradually reduce down from the universal to the personal. Into this 
system, Desnd integrates Voltaire’s attitude towards the Jews, describing it as one 
displaying an ‘antijudaisme obsessionnel et outrancier’. But Desne then softens his 
criticism and points to the fact that Voltaire by attacking the biblical Jews as ‘le 
peuple le plus intolerant et le plus cruel de toute l’antiquit^’ (1764), in fact 
incorporates them in the universal: ‘le proems du judaisme s’inscrit done dans une 
vision de l’histoire et n’est pas isold d’une lutte gdndrale, constante et coh^rente, 
contre la barbarie.’ Desne then continues, showing how Voltaire further reduces the 
field of his attack and condemns the Christians as ‘les plus intoldrants de tous les 
hommes’ (1764). Finally he indicates a level of Voltaire’s criticism that comes even 
closer to the self; he quotes the latter’s bitter comment that ‘il n ’y a point au fond de 
nation plus cruelle que la fransaise’ (1769). These statements reveal that, while 
Voltaire’s condemnation against each group is total, and while the biblical Jews are 
included in brutal universal humanity, his assault against alleged Jewish savagery is
74 Thelma Morris points to how Abbd Thdru (who first denounced Desfontaines to the police) claimed 
that there was a similarity between the actions of the Abbd and Voltaire himself: ‘En effet 
1’ intervention de Voltaire souleva une protestation de Thdru, qui l’accusait du meme crime lequel 
Desfontaines avait dtd mis en prison.’ L ’Abbe Desfontaines et son role dans la litterature de son 
temps, p.42.
^  Prix de la justice, p.570.
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moderated by being particularized in, what is for him, a ‘fictional’ past.76 Unlike his 
comments on the Christians that are couched in the present tense, his references to 
Jewish acts of cruelty show that they belong to antiquity. I therefore find that 
Voltaire does not condemn the Jews of the eighteenth century, does not see them as 
personally involved in or responsible for past brutality, but just mocks them as 
followers of a foolish, immoral and ‘absurd’ religious tradition -  here (for Voltaire) 
they are ‘today’ responsible only for their continued ‘illogical’ thinking, one that 
makes them deserving solely of the ridicule with which he portrays them. While he 
dismisses the Jewish populace as irrelevant, and while at times he goes so far as to 
commend certain contemporary Jews as enlightened, his mockery against all 
followers of the Judaic religious tradition ever remains, becoming, as with other 
groups, its most severe against those who, he considers, should be best able to resist 
foolish thinking. But even this sarcastic treatment is not limited to the Jews alone. 
When he describes the Judaic custom whereby during the ceremony of circumcision 
the Jews leave a chair ready for Elijah who is expected to accompany the Messiah at 
the Last Coming, he indicates that a comparable ‘superstition’ has passed to other 
faiths, to the ‘prophets’ of the Cevennes, and to the convulsionnaires of Paris (1761). 
Voltaire thus associates Jewish ‘irrational’ thinking with that of all mankind, even of 
those fellow countrymen and Christian coreligionaries of his own day.77 Considering 
that ridicule can be a highly effective device to undermine the status of any religious 
or political authority, he writes to Count Algarotti: ‘Je fais ce que je  peux pour 
rendre les Jesuites et les Jans6nistes ridicules’ (1 May 1761).78
But at the same time this introduces us to a fundamental distinction that we 
find exists between Voltaire’s discourse relating to the Jews and that representing 
the Christians. Sometimes the faults of the latter are marked by such excessive 
brutality or intolerance that mockery is inappropriate. This, as he writes to 
d’Alembert, 23 July 1766, is the situation as regards the recent La Barre affair, the 
case of the young chevalier from Abbeville, who, on a charge of blasphemy, was 
tortured and publicly executed; his body was then burnt. Here, for Voltaire, the 
seriousness of the Church’s attested brutality far exceeds that of the Jews’ ‘fabled’
76 Inventaire Voltaire, p.764. The quotations are taken from ‘Tolerance’ (1764), VF, pp.556-57, 
p.558, and ‘Torture’ (1769), p.572.
77 Essai sur les mceurs, III, 143.
78 D9761.
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savage deeds of the Bible; in such instances the actions of the Christians render all 
humour out of place and it is no longer the time for laughter. While the ‘modern- 
day’ Jews do not deserve the intolerance of others, and their actions may be mocked, 
the Christians, whose intolerance is at times intolerable, have repeatedly committed 
actions whose nature goes beyond the bounds of ridicule.
*  *  *
So, while not denying the anti-Jewish tone of his discourse, which would be 
impossible, my purpose is to reveal the methods with which Voltaire dismantles his 
own arguments, and thereby show that his championing of tolerance and his anti- 
Jewish language do not simply represent a contradiction within his thinking, 
whatever our present-day assessment of their coexistence may be. But at times our 
analysis of Voltaire’s discourse is complicated by the highly sarcastic tone that he 
adopts, one that with hindsight may appear particularly problematic. In ‘Tolerance’, 
while declaring himself a friend of the Jews, he scornfully refers to the supposedly 
ridiculous or revolting episodes of the Judaic tradition; the donkey of Balaam, the 
(according to Voltaire’s interpretation) coprological supper of Ezechiel, the whale’s 
swallowing of Jonah, the serpent’s temptation of Eve, etc. Thus mockingly he 
welcomes his ‘brother, the Jew’ to dinner, provided that he does not take it into his 
head to follow the ancient practices of his biblical forebears (1772). But I suggest 
that here the highly derisive tone adopted denies all possibility of similar events 
occurring among the contemporary Jews. Rather, by the very excessive nature of the 
examples that he has chosen, once more I propose that Voltaire points solely to the 
foolishness of those who can still hold such ‘fables’ to be sacred.79 We might note 
that almost identical episodes appear in ‘Miracles’ (1771) where Voltaire defines 
such paranormal events as those that ‘have never happened and will never happen’.80
Similarly in the difficult section IV of ‘Juifs’, Voltaire again ridicules the Jews 
for their adherence to what is, for him, a nonsensical religion. Sardonically 
declaring himself to be their servant, their friend, their brother, reassuring them of 
his compassion, and begging them not to accuse him of ill will, he reiterates the
”9 Tolerance’, M.xx, p.526 (originally in the Questions sur VEncyclopedic).
80 ‘Miracles’, M.xx, p.82 (originally in the Questions sur I ’Encyclope'die).
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savage or ‘absurd’ events of the Bible; the slaughter of the Jews, the varying and 
unjust punishments meted out to the people. Sarcastically he makes reference to the 
putting to death of fifty thousand and seventy Jews who dared to look at the Ark, 
‘tandis que ceux qui favaient prise si insolemment a la guerre en furent quittes pour 
des hemorroides et pour offrir & vos pretres cinq rats d ’or et cinq anus d ’or’. Other 
problems arise for the modem critic in Voltaire’s apparently dismissive conclusion 
where he writes: ‘Vous etes des animaux calculants; tachez d’etre des animaux 
pensants’ (1771 ).**' Poliakov sees this as a ‘comparaison entre le chretien qui pense 
et le Juif qui calcule’, a comparison that ‘anticipe l ’a-priori de l ’antisemitisme 
raciste, decr6tant la superiorite de l’intelligence creatrice des chretiens [...] sur le 
sterile intellect des Juifs’.82 But in this case Voltaire’s comment makes no reference 
to the Christians, and instead concentrates solely on how the Jews might imitate the 
peaceable nature of the Banians and Guebres. Moreover, although he often mocks 
the Jews of the past for their alleged failure to engage in the arts and sciences, 
Voltaire indicates in the Trciite sur la tolerance that a practical/financial shrewdness 
is not incompatible with good citizenship: he declares that the requests by ‘heretics’ 
in sixteenth century France to be absolved from Catholic taxation were founded on 
their claim to be ‘plutot bons calculateurs que mauvais sujets’ (1763).83 And I also 
suggest that we might discover a still softer intent behind Voltaire’s argument when 
we consider two other passages. In the Sermon preche a Bale he writes: ‘Ltres 
pensants, ne redoutez plus rien de la superstition’ (1768), and in the Histoire de 
Vetablissement du christianisme he declares: ‘La superstition change tellement les 
hommes en betes’ (1777). For Voltaire, therefore, in order to qualify as fully 
thinking human beings, all people must reject superstition.84
We might further help our reading of such negative texts regarding the Jews, 
by relating such passages to others that address the Christians. During his 
involvement in the ‘Belissaire affair’ in which he defended the arguments put 
forward by fellow Encyclopediste Marmontel against intolerance, Voltaire wrote his 
satirical Lettre de Varcheveque de Canterbury a M. Varcheveque de Paris. Here, in
81 Juifs’ p 532, p541 .
82 Histoire de I 'antisemitisme, p. 106.
83 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 142.
84 Sermon preche a Bale, p.590; Histoire de Vetablissement du christianisme, p. 112.
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the 4Post-Scriptum\ the English archbishop writes: ‘Quand vous ecrirez a l ’eveque 
de Rome, faites-lui, je vous prie, mes compliments; j ’ai toujours beaucoup de 
consideration pour lui, en quality de fr&re.’ Then, having mockingly listed the 
Pope’s troubles, the kicking received by his mule, the buffeting of his barge, his 
violent indigestion from eating Parmesan cheese, he concludes that although his 
father was ‘a good banker’, ‘le fils n ’entend pas son compte’ (1768).85 For Voltaire, 
criticism can be achieved by scornful sarcasm, and thus he writes: ‘On digere tout, 
hors le ntepris’ (1771). So 1 find that the agenda for the writer is always the same; 
all those who are too self-important, all those who hold to -  what he finds to be -  
foolish religious beliefs or practices, need to be ridiculed. His mockery is not 
reserved just for the Jewish people.86
*  *  *
Schwarzbach rightly observes that Voltaire’s discourse ‘n ’exprime aucune 
chaleur, aucune amitte’ towards the Jews -  even though he was on good terms with 
certain Jewish individuals.87 Mervaud also denies the presence of sympathy for them 
on the part of the author and she writes: ‘Honte done aux chtetiens, mais peu de 
sympathie pour ces malheureux persecutes.88 However, in the light of the attitudes of 
the times, the texts also give evidence of a non-typically eighteenth-century polemic 
in favour of the Jews, and I would endorse Sylviane Albertan-Coppola’s statement 
that, while not exempt from the contemporary prejudices, ‘Voltaire voue aux Juifs 
une profonde bienveillance en tant que victimes de 1’intoterance, et ce au meme titre 
que d ’autres persecutes tels que les protestants ou les jansenistes’.89 Where he saw 
good in the Jews -  even if this was not often -  he acknowledged it, and Robert 
Wokler contends that Voltaire ‘seldom turned his acerbic wit upon any individual 
Jew, and he was conspicuously much less kind to Rousseau’.90 Even though we shall 
have to consider later the charge often levelled against Voltaire of both failing to see
85 Ijettre de iarcheveque de Canterbury, p.579.
86 ‘Philosophe’, M.xx, p.202 (originally in the Questions sur I ’Encyclopedic).
87 ‘Voltaire et les Juifs: bilan et plaidoyer’, p.85.
88 Le ‘Dictionnaire philosophique’ de Voltaire, p.87.
89 ‘L’Abbd Gu6n6e, “Secretaire Juif” contre Voltaire a l ’occasion du Traite sur la tolerance', p. 101.
90 ‘Multiculturalism and Ethnic Cleansing in the Enlightenment’, p.78.
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the Jews as individuals and group stereotyping them, Wokler’s claim here needs 
consideration. In his letters, Voltaire calls Rousseau, his fellow philosophe, an 
animal and a madman: ‘le plus m^chant fou qui ait jamais exists, un singe qui mord 
ceux qui lui donnent a manger est plus raisonnable et plus humain que lui’ (to 
Damilaville, 3 November 1766), and ‘un fou et un plat monstre d’orgueil’ (to 
d ’Alembert, c. 10 August 1766).9' He implies satirically to the Comte and Comtesse 
d ’Argental that he should be sent to the colonies (5 November 1766), and, again to 
Damilaville, claims that Rousseau ‘m^riterait au moins le pilori s’il ne m&itait pas 
les Petites Maisons’ (12 November 1766).92 To Helv£tius he indicates the danger 
presented to the philosophes' cause by ‘ce Judas de la troupe sacr6e’ (27 October 
1766), and to d’Alembert refers to their ‘faux frere Rousseau’ (13 June 1766), later 
commenting:
C ’est bien dommage encore une fois que Jean Jacques soit un fou et un mdchant fou, sa 
conduite a fait plus de tort aux belles lettres et k la philosophic que le vicaire Savoyard ne leur 
fera jamais de bien. (23 July, 1766)93
These statements may go some way towards revealing the less personal 
reasons behind Voltaire’s antipathy for Rousseau, his concern for the possible 
damage his fellow writer might do to the Encyclopedic's cause. But, for this thesis, 
the essential point of Voltaire’s whole argument against intolerance and persecution 
appears in his letter to Damilaville, where he compares Rousseau to the Jews: ‘Je 
pense sur Rousseau comme sur les Juifs; ce sont des fous, mais il ne faut pas les 
brOler’ (2 June 1766).94 This comment links closely with the passage regarding the 
Jews that closes the first section of ‘Juifs’: ‘// ne faut pourtant pas les hrdler' (1756: 
Moland’s italics).95 Even in his most vitriolic and uncontrolled texts against what he 
sees as the unreasoning Jews, Voltaire does not condone the persecution of them; he 
rails against the treatment they suffered from the Inquisition, and never, as many did 
at the time, and have since done, denies their claim to the rights of all human beings,
91 D 13646; D 13485.
92 D 13652; D 13669.
93 D 13626; D13345; D13440.
94 D 13336.
95 ‘Juifs’, p.521.
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‘dont on ne doit d^pouiller personne’ (1761).96 Later we shall investigate this further 
when also considering Voltaire’s dual understanding of what denotes true humanity 
-  the biological dimension that is universal, and the moral dimension that he judges 
to be generally absent in a large variety of social groups. He underlines the 
distinction between ‘humankind’ or ‘human nature’ and Tam e la plus humaine, la 
plus sensible, qui aura joint le plus de justice £ cette vertu’ (1777).97
The Jews, however, like others such as Rousseau, belong to the human 
fraternity and so in the Traite sur la tolerance he writes:
je vous dis qu’il faut regarder tous les hommes com me nos fr£res. Quoi! mon frfcre le Turc? 
mon fr£re le Chinois? le Juif? le Siamois? Oui, sans doute; ne sommes-nous pas tous enfants 
du meme p6re, et creatures du meme Dieu? ( 1763)98
While not denying the possible tensions within such a sweeping statement, we can 
affirm that Voltaire promotes a way of thinking that contradicts the common 
attribution to the Enlightenment of polarized, Eurocentric notions. In ‘Tolerance’ he 
writes: ‘II est clair que tout particulier qui persecute un homme, son frere, parce qu’il 
n’est pas de son opinion, est un monstre’ (1764)." Aggression, not ignorance, 
is inhuman, as the tolerance of the ancient Greek and Roman sects reveals:
Toutes se trompaient, et nous en sommes bien f&ch£s; mais toutes £taient paisibles, et c ’est ce 
qui nous confond; c ’est ce qui nous condamne; c ’est ce qui nous fait voir que la plupart des 
raisonneurs d ’aujourd’hui sont des monstres, et que ceux de 1’antiquitd dtaient des hommes.
(1748-51)100
The same thinking appears in his letter to Marmontel: ‘II y aura toujours en France 
une espece de sorciers vetus de noir qui s ’efforceront de changer les hommes en 
betes; mais c’est a vous et a vos amis a changer les betes en hommes’ (28 January 
1764). The abuse of reason is more violent than unreason. The oppressor, not the
96 Essai sur les rneeurs, II, 163.
* Prix de la justice, p.533, note 1 (de Voltaire).
98 Traite sur la tolerance, p.247.
99 Tolerance’, VF, p.557.
100 Lettres philosophiques, I, 212.
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oppressed, lacks humanity. This reversal of the civilized-savage opposition 
characterizes every instance of intolerance to which Voltaire refers.101
*  *  *
Anne-Marie Mercier Faivre describes a progression from a tolerance which is 
‘passive’ -  ‘celle qui laisse faire ce qu’elle d6sapprouve’ -  to an ‘acceptation, qui 
pourrait aller jusqu’& une comprehension de l’autre’, and she marks this change in 
the actions taken by Voltaire regarding the Protestants. She points to the non­
involvement of many thinkers of the period in the problems experienced by the 
Huguenots in France following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). Thus, 
while referring to certain comparable propagandist texts written by Protestants, she 
describes the Traite sur la tolerance as a unique example of a work by a non- 
Protestant writer, an ‘oeuvre d’un homme qui parle pour des hommes qui pensent 
differemment de lui, qui met done la notion de tolerance en acte dans sa propre 
personne’. She indicates that Voltaire became concerned in the Protestant cause, in 
spite of personal differences of opinion, and (we might add) in spite of his bitter 
disapprobation for their instances of intolerance. In his texts, therefore, he unites the 
Protestants with all mankind as both victimizers and victims, thus presenting them as 
part of flawed humanity, but also as equally deserving of the tolerance of others. 
Mercier Faivre emphasizes the self-critical element of Voltaire’s work and the way it 
addresses the importance of the attitude of the individual, his personal responsibility 
in the fight for tolerance; she shows that in the Traite sur la tolerance, writing as a 
member of Christian Europe, Voltaire ‘n’accuse pas tant le despote [...], le clerg6 
fran£ais (...] ou les Toulousains J...J, que 1’homme et principalement 1’homme 
europ^en et chr6tien’.102
Isabelle Brouard-Arends points to how ‘le protestant importait peu k Voltaire’, 
and Anne Richardot comments that Voltaire was ‘often hostile’ towards the 
Protestants.103 She declares that he was initially ‘indifferent’ to the execution of Jean 
Calas who was charged, on apparently specious evidence, with murdering his son to
,0ID 11667.
,<E ‘Les tra ils  sur la tolerance’, p.626, pp.613-14, p.626.
“* Lectures de Voltaire, p. 11, p. 123.
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prevent him from converting to the Catholic faith, and Simon Harvey reinforces this 
view with the remark that Voltaire’s first reaction to the news was ‘shockingly 
offhand’.104 Voltaire’s texts often imply a link between the Protestants and the Jews, a 
link reflected in the contemporary representation of -  what increasing became 
known as -  the Non Catholic Church. As explained by Didier Poton: ‘Cette p^riode 
de resistance et de restauration des eglises reformees porte le nom de “Desert”. Ce 
terme fait reference k la fois k Terrance du peuple juif dans le desert du Sinai et aux 
lieux desertiques.’ Poton also describes how, in certain areas, there was among 
Catholics a fear ‘de 1’emigration de populations indispensables k 1’economie’, a 
tension that Voltaire often refers to in his texts by pointing to the paradoxical 
treatment received by both Protestants and Jews -  even though the two groups are 
excluded from certain practices and occupations, on occasion they are sought after 
for their services.105
However, we must also consider Pomeau’s views regarding Voltaire’s 
attitudes to the Protestants. For him, the writer’s move to Switzerland indicated a 
certain affinity with this group, his possible belief that those Protestants who were 
enlightened, by their rejection of earlier dogma, could be found ‘k mi-chemin du 
d^isme’. But Pomeau then goes on to show that Voltaire eventually came to see 
these same people as sociniens honteux who through weakness were unable to reject 
Christianity in its entirety and to ‘aller jusqu’au bout de leur pensee’. Thus, for 
Pomeau, Voltaire’s later campaigns became marked not so much by personal feeling 
or mutual understanding, as by pragmatic propagandism for his philosophic cause: 
‘La tolerance des protestants n’est qu’une etape, ou un moyen. Voltaire entend 
profiter du succes pour r^gler son compte a Fin/dme.’106
Graham Gargett, pointing to the ‘complex’ nature of Voltaire’s attitude 
towards the Protestants and Protestantism, also finds a pragmatism in his actions. He 
contends: ‘C’est la possibility d’influencer non seulement 1’opinion publique en 
general mais aussi la politique du gouvemement qui explique la fa$on dont il 
s’exprime sur les protestants.’ He finds that ‘si Voltaire condamne la Revocation de 
1 ’Edit de Nantes et deplore la perte d’hommes et de ressources qui en resulta, il
104 Treatise on Tolerance, p.xii.
105 ‘La monarchic et les protestants en France au XVIII' siecle’, p.45, p.54.
106 La Religion de Voltaire, p.292, p.298, p.335.
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montre souvent assez peu de compassion envers les huguenots eux-memes’. But 
Gargett then explains how, from the time of his involvement with the Calas case, 
Voltaire begins to understand better their situation. He discovers ‘dans ses 
contemporains protestants des citoyens utiles et paisibles qui souffrent pour les 
p6ch6s de leurs ancetres, victimes d’une legislation injuste et perim6e qu’il faut aider 
k tout prix V07 Therefore, in the Traiti sur la tolerance, while emphasizing that he is 
not demanding that they should be given immense privileges, Voltaire declares that 
the State should ‘laisser vivre un peuple paisible’, and should grant these same 
people the rights of citizenship (1763). Again his argument hinges on the duality of 
rights and duties; all people have a right to be treated with tolerance, provided that 
they do no harm to others.108
John Ren wick states that ‘the Protestant cause, leading up to 1762, was 
gathering momentum’ and that ‘there was [...] a growing body of diverse writings 
[...] that demonstrate that the political, religious and moral demands of toleration 
(fast becoming an ideal of behaviour) had determined proponents’. He contends that 
a textual examination of the period dating from about 1716 ‘to the eve of the Calas 
case [...] will show that Voltaire’s thoughts on toleration tend to be reactive rather 
than what they would become: positively pro-active’. In the discourse before 1762, 
according to Renwick, ‘it has yet to become an attainable ideal linked with the 
principle of human freedom’.109
Monique Cottret has also outlined the development in the understanding of 
tolerance from a negative seventeenth-century attitude, a shutting of one’s eyes to 
what one does not like, to a more positive ‘modem’ thinking, the extending of 
respect and benevolence, the pleading fo r  someone or something. For her too it was 
Voltaire’s involvement in the Calas affaire that marked this change to a more activist 
connotation for the term; no longer ‘il dit le mal, le doute, l’indiff6rence’, but instead 
‘il dit le bien, la patience, la bienveillance’.110
J. Patrick Lee makes a further connection between areas of Voltaire’s 
discourse on victims, and he points to how the publishing of the Sermon des
cinquante in 1762 came about at the same moment as Voltaire became interested in
107 ‘Voltaire, les protestants et le protestantisme’, p.33, p.26, p.29.
108 Traits sur la tolerance, p. 155.
109 ‘Theory becomes action’, p.585, p.583.
110 ‘La tolerance £tat des lieux’, p. 19.
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the Calas affair. He shows how in his correspondence with Damilaville the writer 
uses language similar to that adopted in the Sermon, with the emphasis on the 
allegedly ‘abominable’ and ‘absurd’. In this case Voltaire writes: ‘On est toujours 
indign6 ici de l’absurde et abominable jugement de Toulouse’ (17 April 1762).111 
Lee also quotes Voltaire’s letter to d ’Alembert where, having referred to the public 
reading of the Sermon, the philosophe then summarizes with the comment: ‘la 
raison va grand train. £crasez l’infame’ (18 January 1763).112 But while Lee’s 
objective in his paper is to define the creative and publishing history of the Sermon 
des cinquante, for the present discussion the more important question is that of the 
relationship between this work and Voltaire’s later involvement in the causes 
celebres. One aim of this study is to discover whether or not the Sermon should be 
described solely as the product of a period of uncontrolled writing, that is whether or 
not Voltaire’s subsequent publication of what was originally a private vituperative 
attack against the allegedly reprehensible Jews (and Christians) is integral to his 
drive for the promulgation of tolerance for all victims. The positive demand in his 
letter to d’Alembert for the propagation of universal consideration and 
understanding, framed in the context of the Sermon, may help us to discover the 
sincerity of Voltaire’s movement towards the more ‘modem’ spirit of tolerance, his 
movement away from a vitriolic particularized excoriation of the allegedly savage 
and despised Jews and Christians, to the active promotion of all peoples’ rights.
Laclau, again pointing to the aporia that exists at the heart of the concept of 
tolerance, writes:
If what I tolerate is what I morally approve (or, at the very least, that vis-a-vis which I am 
morally neutral) 1 am not tolerating anything. At the most, I am redefining the limits of a 
perfectly intolerant position. Tolerance only starts when I morally disapprove of something 
and, however, I accept i t  (author’s italics)113
By his reference to the moral, Laclau here brings us back to the insoluble problem of
how we determine the tolerable and the intolerable. But this comment also reminds
us of the tension that lies at the core of Voltaire’s discourse, the problems he faced
1)1 D10417.
112 D10922; see ‘The publication of the Sermon des cinquante', p.693.
113 ‘Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony’, p.51.
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personally when calling for universal tolerance. I propose that Voltaire constantly 
strives to promote the tolerant treatment of all victims, including the Jews, and since 
tolerance, by its very definition, indicates an embracing of that which the individual 
finds different and hard to accept, we, the readers, might concede that his 
championing of the Jewish cause, precisely because it brings his own ambivalence to 
the surface of his discourse, represents in that respect the embodiment of the real 
spirit of tolerance. We shall therefore attempt to show that apart from the presence in 
Voltaire’s Jewish discourse of the earlier spirit of a ‘passive’ acceptance of 
difference, there also irrefutably exists evidence of an ever-growing and more 
‘modem’ form of tolerance, one that includes a demand for the promotion of a more 
active programme in favour of the Jews.
Chapter 2 Group identity as target of invective
44
While, with reference to all groups, Voltaire aims his criticisms at what he 
perceives as definitely intolerant behaviour, either directly detrimental to the good of 
others, or conducive to harm, in the case of the ancient Jews he discovers an added 
difficulty in any critical analysis; in La Philosophie de I’histoire he sets out the 
problem of forming a factually based assessment, since, for him, the only ‘historical’ 
records on which to undertake a study consist of ‘fictional’ biblical texts. All his 
judgements have to rely on these accounts which, he contends, relate the fantastic, 
the impossible, the immoral and the brutal.
As most religious groups, including the Christians, have presumed factual
records of positive achievements against which to balance negative judgements,
Voltaire’s analyses of these appear to entail proportionally less condemnatoiy
criticism than that which he directs at the Jews. But, as this thesis endeavours to
show, his excoriation of all intolerance, regardless of its provenance, is
fundamentally egalitarian, indeed universal, and I propose, contrary to the opinion of
several critics, that his attack on the Jews no more cloaks his criticism of the
Christians than his condemnation of the Christians cloaks his criticism of the Jews.
The open virulence of his discourse against both groups goes a long way towards
refuting the suggestion of such selective concealment of his opinions. I rather find
concealment in his frequent denial of authorship. His correspondence attests to this
denial, often attributing to others authorship of his own works: he indicates that La
Pucelle belongs to Abb£ Trithdme (to Charles Palissot de Montenoy, 11 August
1764), repeatedly credits others with the writing of the Dictionnaire philosophique,
which he describes as ‘ce malheureux portatif qu’on s’obstine k m’imputer’ (to
d’Argental, 20 October 1764), and accuses Rousseau of ‘unjustly calumniating’ him
with the charge of having written the Sermon des cinquante (to d’Argental, 10
January 1765).114 Criticizing the Church was indeed dangerous at the time, and when
writing to Diderot Voltaire refers to the problems and risks: ‘on est oblige de mentir,
et encore est-on persecute, pour n’avoir pas menti assez’ (26 June 1758).115 His letter
to the Comte and Comtesse d’Argental indicates how any criticism of the Bible is
U4 DT2045; D 12155; D 12302.
115 D7768.
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threatened with censorship and it points to the need for deviousness in his method of 
attack. ‘II n’est pas difficile de donner aux proscriptions h^braiques un tour qui 
d6sarme la censure th^ologique. Ce n’est point la verity qui nous perd, c’est la 
mani&re de la dire’ (22 June 1766). His criticisms are repeatedly addressed to Jews 
and Christians in turn, indicating that he does not seek to camouflage his anti- 
Christian feelings under a cover of anti-Jewishness. Only where the accusation 
relates to both may the criticism of one be read as an indirect criticism of the other.116
Schwarzbach relates the attack on the Jews to that on the Christians and 
contends that the Jews were not Voltaire’s main objective but only ‘secondary 
targets’. He considers that since, in his view, nearly every Voltairean attack against 
the Jews is immediately followed by an analysis of the New Testament, we may find 
in his work evidence of the tension that defines the Judeo-Christian relationship. But, 
although Voltaire reiterates the historical emergence of Christianity out of Judaism, 
and we accordingly find evidence in his writing of the implication of ancient Jewish 
causality in the activities of the Christians, he does not appear to exonerate the latter 
from full, personal blame for their fanatical behaviour, the more reprehensible than 
that of the biblical Jews for occurring in the supposedly more enlightened 
contemporary world. Thus, taking the argument further, I would propose that while 
the Judeo-Christian tension is ever present in Voltaire’s anti-Jewish discourse, his 
attacks on the Jews are not subordinate to those against the Christians, but belong in 
a wider field which embraces all acts of intolerance. All groups or individuals, 
whether religious or secular, are held responsible for their own behaviour, and, 
where found wanting, they are condemned.117
As explained in the Introduction, my ensuing chapters will show, through a 
literary psychocritical reading largely based on the method developed by Mauron 
through the 1950s and ‘60s, that Voltaire’s figures are consistent throughout his 
life’s work. These chapters will also draw on the thinking of Pierre Bayard in his 
recent study on ‘failed works’, to propose that at a certain period in particular -  the 
late 1740s to the mid 1750s -  Voltaire’s discourse indicates a certain loss of writerly 
control. This, adopting Bayard’s terminology, suggests an ‘ecriture de 
l’hallucination’, where the unconscious has come very close to the surface of the
116 D 13369.
117 ‘Voltaire et les Juifs’, p.80.
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text. Finally, as indicated above, I hope to show that despite this temporary loss of 
control, despite the current thinking and prejudices of his times, and despite his 
revulsion for what he deemed intolerable in the biblical Jews, in the main Voltaire 
stayed faithful to his Fight for tolerance, for Jews no less than for others.
With these aims in mind, we shall first consider Voltaire’s representation of 
Jewish and Christian identity, including the stereotypically perceived characteristics 
of both these groups; this enquiry must include a detailed consideration of relevant 
aspects of today’s criticism of the writer. Our investigation will look at how he 
reveals his understanding of the contemporaiy fantasies, showing where at times this 
becomes particularly vehement. Voltaire realizes how an individual’s thinking is 
influenced by his environment, his site of vision: ‘On voit combien 1’education, la 
patrie, tous les pr£jug£s, gouvement les hommes’ (1756).118 But we must accept that 
we too are subject to our own particular prejudices, and we shall therefore bear in 
mind Voltaire’s recommendation to us, his readers, as found in the Essai sur les 
mceurs where, referring to the disputes that occurred during the reign of Louis XII, 
he writes: ‘La posterity 6clair6e sera etonnee qu’on ait fait de telles questions; mais il 
fallait alors respecter les prejuges du temps’ (1756). We, as members of a later 
generation with additional hindsight, have to put aside our ‘surprise’ at certain 
comments and ‘respect the prejudices of the times’ in which he was writing.119 As 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle comments: ‘Refuser le contexte historique en tant qu’il est 
incame dans les intentions de sens de 1’auteur, c’est entrer dans 1’interpretation sans 
garde-fou.’120
*  *  *
Confused perceptions o f Jewish identity
Gilman has drawn attention to the eighteenth-century separation between the 
‘good’ Jew and the ‘bad’, what Isaac Pinto in his Reflexions critiques sur le Jer 
chapitre du tome VIP des (Euvres de M. de Voltaire defined as ‘the Jew of
118 Essai sur les mceurs, III, 106.
119 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 197.
120 ‘Shakespeare a-t-il vraiment vouiu dire tout cela?’, p.218.
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Bordeaux’ and ‘the Jew of Metz’.121 Pinto accuses Voltaire of failing to observe these 
distinctions between the educated and the non-educated, the rich and the poor, but on 
occasion Voltaire marks them out clearly. In a few successful and enlightened 
individuals, usually named, he distinguishes an urbane quality -  Orobio, ‘un rabbin 
si savant’ (1767), Spinoza, the ‘modest’ metaphysicien (1767), and the English 
financial traders who gather ‘pour 1’utility des hommes’ (1734).122 And later in his 
mockingly satirical text Un Chretien contre six Juifs, answering the same charges, he 
separates the ‘Portuguese’ Jews (‘of Bordeaux’) from those of biblical times, 
alleging his ‘esteem’ for all of the former (1777).123 But to the majority of Jews, the 
unnamed individuals whom he generally and collectively dismisses as poor and 
dirty, he attributes a lack of reasoning, apathy, resignation and non-resistance, traits 
similar to those that he finds in the French populace at large. This, as Gilman shows, 
was in line with the stereotypical thinking of the times: ‘The good Jew was non 
disputatious [...] He was clean while the Other was dirty. He created; the Other 
seemed only to exist.’ These stereotypes correspond with what we know about 
Voltaire’s personal experiences and knowledge of the different groups; his social and 
financial relations (both bad and good) with those such as the Mendds da Costa 
family, and his probable ignorance of and lack of contact with the impoverished 
Jews of cities such as Metz and Strasbourg.124
But Voltaire also shows to what degree the contemporary attitudes impinged 
on all Jewish people; while the poor were confined to the ghettos, excluded from 
most employment, and subjected to the prejudices of the times, even the rich and 
successful, those individuals partially embraced by the larger society, were not what 
one could call ‘assimilated’. He satirically implies the discrimination in that above- 
mentioned passage that describes their active and useful role in the London Stock 
Exchange; on the trading floor i e  juif, le mahometan, et le chretien traitent l’un avec
121 Reprinted in the Abbd Gudnde’s Lettres de quelques Juifs, p. 12. Pinto’s text first appeared in 
Apologie par la nation juive, (Amsterdam: 1762). Pinto also writes to Voltaire, c.10 July 1762 
(D 10579).
122 Lettres a S.A. Mgr. Le Prince de *** sur Rabelais, p.519, p.522; Lettres philosophiques, 1,74.
123 Un Chretien contre six Juifs, p.558.
134 Inscribing the Other, p. 125. Pomeau explains the details of Voltaire’s dealings with his English 
bankers, the losses caused by the son, Anthony, and the probable partial financial assistence given by 
the father, John. Voltaire en son temps, I, 166-67. Jory points to the apparently limited contact 
Voltaire had with the Jews of Metz: ‘no first hand knowledge [...] but [...] some acquaintance with 
their way of life at second hand’. ‘Voltaire and the Jews of Metz’, p.44.
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l’autre comme s’ils etaient de la meme religion, et ne donnent le nom d’infideles 
qu’a ceux qui font banqueroute’ (1734), but on leaving the workplace each goes off 
separately to his own environment, and there takes up again his different religious 
practices and social customs.125 Here Sutcliffe, while conceding that -  for Voltaire -  
the Jews as individuals were ‘both entitled to toleration and deserving of sympathy 
for their sufferings’, suggests that the author ‘slips a hint of anti-Judaic sentiment 
into his vision of tolerant cosmopolitanism’. Sutcliffe proposes that Voltaire 
juxtaposes ‘the straightforward pleasures of alcohol with the implied arcane futility 
of synagogue worship’ so that the ‘affirmation of the Jews’ unproblematic and 
unqualified right to be tolerated is undermined from within’.126 But I suggest that the 
mocking tone of this passage -  the satirical reference to the allegedly bizarre 
practices regarding baptism, circumcision, and suitable church attire, the 
contradiction between the religious celebration of some and the social drinking of 
others -  relates to that found throughout the Lettres philosophiques. Voltaire 
ridicules the customs of all strands of society, even those with whom he most 
sympathizes or identifies; the Quaker’s unusual dress, temperance and religious 
practices, the Frenchman’s automatic and exaggeratedly courtly manners, and, on a 
more critical note, even the judge’s drunkenness, his daily excessive drinking ‘de 
mauvaise biere et d’eau-de-vie’ (1734).127 Repeatedly in his texts Voltaire addresses 
the mixture of the good and the bad, the foolish and the commendable, the moderate 
and the extreme, found in all human activity. He writes of ‘ces quakers pacifiques’ 
whose religion ‘a et€ tournee en ridicule’, but of whom ‘on a ete force de respecter 
les moeurs’ (1756);12* he contrasts the Quakers’ lack of falsity and unusually simple 
clothing with the behaviour of the artificial Frenchman who is ‘all in miens [and] 
compliments’, concerned solely with how he appears to others (1726-28?).129 Even 
though appreciating the pleasures of ‘civilized’ society, ‘la proprete, le goflt, les 
omements’ (1736),130 he criticizes the superficiality and the ‘vanit^s [de] l ’appareil’
of those in elevated social positions (composed 1736?);131 he introduces the evident
125Lettres philosophiques, I, 74.
126 ‘Myth, Origins and Identity’, p.l 18.
127 Lettres philosophiques, I, 35.
128 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 320.
129 ‘Small Leningrad Notebook’, Notebooks, 1,54 (passage written in English).
130 Le Mondain, p.295.
131 Discours en vers sur I ’homme, p.458 (publication of first complete edition 1745).
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contrast between his contemporary citizen’s delight in le bon vin (1736),132 and the 
‘work’ and ‘sobriety’ that was so beneficial to the people of seventeenth-century 
Holland (1756).133
But at the same time Voltaire’s representation of the Jews does portray them in 
the stereotypical terms of the time; they are ‘a separate society’ (1761) that exists as 
the other that defies definition and classification.134 They, exiled from their ‘original’ 
home, denied citizenship in their new countries, were as Jacob Katz indicates, a body 
of strangers, ‘barely sustaining itself on the margins of the state’.135 Endeavouring to 
overcome the difficulty of a more precise specification and to fix their identity, 
Voltaire draws on the current fantasies and constructs a Jewish self synonymous with 
overpopulation, vagrancy, diaspora and alienation. Daniel Sibony demonstrates how 
an individual’s angoisse identitaire, or ‘phobie de Y autre' causes him to feel a need 
‘de fixer l’autre, de l’encadrer’, and Mary Douglas reiterates this with her comment 
that ‘most of us indeed would feel safer if our experience could be hard-set and fixed 
in form’. But Douglas exposes how, as in the case of Sartre’s antisemite, it is 
impossible for the individual fully to satisfy this desire:
of course, the yearning for rigidity is in us all. It is part of our human condition to long for 
hard lines and clear concepts. When we have them we have to either face the fact that some 
realities elude them, or else blind ourselves to the inadequacy of the concepts.136
Seeking such concepts, in La Bible enfin expliquee Voltaire represents the 
Jews as still ‘today’ numerous, ‘wandering’, ‘dispersed’ and ‘despised’ (1776).137 In 
this late text that concerns itself chiefly with addressing the mythical, so-called 
‘absurdities’ of the Bible, he gives weight to the arguments of Katz and Sutcliffe 
who both perceive a non-differentiation on the part of the writer between the biblical 
Jews and their descendents in the contemporary world. Katz contends that for 
Voltaire ‘the people of Israel are conceived as one historical entity whose primary
characteristics are permanent despite wandering and dispersions throughout the
132 Le Mondain, p.296.
133 Essai sur les moeurs, III, 116.
134 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 166.
135 From Prejudice to Destruction, p.59.
136 Le ‘racisme’, une haine identitaire, p. 1; Purity and Danger, p.200.
137 La Bible enfin expliquee, p.44, notel.
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ages’. He adds that the writer usually ‘ignores historical distinctions and treats the 
Jews of every generation as a single entity’, and then concludes that the ‘distinction 
between past and present is entirely blurred’.138 Using similar terms, Sutcliffe 
contends that Voltaire ‘indiscriminately blurs together Jewish past and present’.139 
But I shall be exploring how the reference to the ‘contemporary’ Jews as 
perpetuating a biblical and social tradition usually takes one of two forms: either 
Voltaire dismantles the ‘historical’ element of Jewish tradition by emphasizing the 
fictionality of the so-called fables, or he portrays the connection between past and 
present in terms of the Jews’ enduring persecution at the hands of others, their 
persisting confinement to unpopular trades, their constantly denigrated status, and 
their lasting errancy -  in these latter cases he stresses their continued victimhood.
In the Sermon du Rabbin Akib, using the historical example of Christian 
suppression under the Muslims, the apparent non-integration of the former into the 
society of the latter, Voltaire goes so far as to query the importance given by the 
Church to Jewish diaspora, to question why it has interpreted Jewish misfortune as a 
‘crime’ worthy of punishment. The rabbi asks in the name of the Jews: ‘Quels 
avantages pr6tendez-vous done tirer de ce que nous vivons parmi les nations sans 
nous incorporer a elles?’ He then answers his own question, revealing the Christian 
fantasy that has given excuse to their discriminatory (if not persecutory) actions: 
‘Votre d^mence va jusqu’a dire que nous ne sommes disperses que parce que nos 
pdres condamnerent au supplice celui que vous adorez’ (1761).140 The wandering 
existence of the Jews, a figure repeatedly represented as dating from earliest biblical 
times, is blamed on the therefore anachronistic evidence of Christ’s subsequent 
crucifixion -  a form of execution that Voltaire repeatedly portrays as performed 
solely by the Romans. But Katz proposes that the more positive tone of the Sermon 
du Rabbin Akib represents a ‘lone case’ where ‘Voltaire absolves his contemporary 
Jews from the responsibility for sins attributed to their ancestors’, and he perceives 
this action on the part of the writer as purely an answer to the demands of 
‘rationalistic ethics’.141 But, even while I find that such a rational action might show
evidence of Voltaire’s ethical desire to propagate tolerance towards those who held
138 From Prejudice to Destruction, pp.41-42.
139 ‘Myth, Origins, Identity’, p. 109.
140 Sermon du Rabbin Akib, p.282.
141 From Prejudice to Destruction, p.42.
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beliefs with which he could not agree, I also propose that this particular work gives 
weight to our argument that we need to mark a separation between the writing of the 
years of crisis and those texts that may be defined as belonging to Voltaire’s more 
rational or balanced periods.
*  *  *
Sermon des cinquante
Bayard contends that for a work to be successful, the author has to find a 
‘reasoned balance’ between two types of writing: Vecriture desolation and Vecriture 
d ’hallucination. The first is marked by a too rigid control, a lack of passion, that 
limits the artistic expression: Te sujet a trop bien reussi la transformation litteraire du 
fantasme et, protege par sa propre creation, ne laisse plus aucun acces mener jusqu’& 
lui.’ The second shows a failure on the part of the writer to ‘filter’ the desires of his 
unconscious: ‘Les affects et les representations lies a l’objet du fantasme ne sont pas 
suffisamment elabores; ils envahissent le texte.’ 1 propose that this latter form of 
writing, showing ‘un exces de presence que les mots ne viennent pas temperer’, 
marks the vehemently critical Sermon des cinquante.142 In this text, Voltaire depicts 
the Jews as wretched brigands who belong to an ‘atrocious nation’, and he describes 
Joseph of the tribe of Judah, as ‘un enfant de cette famille errante’. He throws further 
scorn on the Jews by connecting the figure of wandering to those of proliferation, 
foolishness and non-reason; he represents them ‘multiplying’ to two million people 
who ‘s’enfuient d’£gypte et [...] prennent le plus long [chemin] pour avoir le plaisir 
de passer la mer a sec’.143 This reveals how Voltaire undermines the Jewish figure by 
his use of ridicule, that rhetorical device which he explains in his letter to 
d ’Alembert. Condemning absurd religious tenets, he states that i e  ridicule est le 
point fixe avec lequel vous enleverez tous ces maroufles, et les ferez disparaitre’ (1 
May 1765).144 Thus his mocking figures act as palimpsests which call for an effort on 
the part of the critic to look beneath the surface of the text. This device, by obliging 
the latter to question and to investigate the writer’s meaning, not only emphasizes the
142 Comment ameliorer les oeuvres rate'es?, pp.95-96.
143Sermon des cinquante, p.444, p.440, p.445. As all extracts from this text belong to the same period, 
dates will not be repeated. The same will apply to quotations from Candide.
144 D 12576.
52
underlining message when it is revealed, but persuades the reader to strip away the 
various interpretations that have been given to the issues addressed and to reconsider 
his own thinking regarding the same. His interest and involvement in these are 
increased because the author throughout his works -  both comic and serious -  
renders his agenda more appealing or more palatable by the use of his wit. Voltaire 
makes full use of his art of satire and derision; he states (again to d’Alembert) that 
ridicule is ‘la plus forte des armes’ (26 June 1766), and in a similar vein, in Le Siecle 
de Louis XIV, contends that whatever has become ridiculous ‘ne peut plus etre 
dangereux’ (1735-52).145 Such thinking, separating the foolish from the genuine, the 
unimportant from the serious, repeats that of the Lettres philosophiques, where the 
Quaker indicates that the proof of the reasonableness of his faith -  as set out in 
Theologice vere christiance apologia (1675) -  lies in the fact that their enemies 
‘acknowledge’ that Robert Barclay’s text ‘is very dangerous’ (1734).146
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire uses similar mockery when describing 
the followers of Moses: ‘Ces peuples errent dans le desert. [...] Ils n’ont ni pain ni 
pate; on leur fait pleuvoir des cailles et de la manne. Leurs habits se conservent 
quarante ans, et croissent avec les enfants nouveau-n6s.’ Here by his intended 
denigration and rejection of all possibility of fact, he removes from the Jews their 
very existence, virtually writing them out of history. He demolishes their claims to 
divine election, assertions based on the multiplying of their numbers, by satirically 
feigning to accept God’s rewarding of them for their apparently horrific and immoral 
acts. Instead of receiving divine punishment for their ‘despicable’ actions, ‘les filles 
de Loth sont recompenses par la plus grande et la plus ch&re des benedictions selon 
1’esprit juif, elles sont meres d’une nombreuse posterite’. The Jews’ own claims of 
identity, those based on their chosenness, are denied all possible veracity and 
logicality by Voltaire’s undermining of the justice of the God who has conferred this 
status. Status and identity based on injustice become untenable.147
*  *  *
145 D 13374; Le Siecle de Louis XIV, II, 62.
146 Lettres philosophiques, 1,5; in the discussion the masculine pronoun is used for simplicity.
147 Sermon des cinquante, p.446, p.440.
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‘Juifs’
The figures of non-belonging and wandering again loom large in ‘Juifs’, where 
Voltaire writes: ‘les H6breux ont presque toujours ete ou errants, ou brigands, ou 
esclaves, ou seditieux; ils sont encore vagabonds aujourd’hui sur la terre’ (1756). He 
emphasizes the continued, enduring nature of these particular characteristics: ‘Les 
Gu&bres, les Banians et les Juifs, sont les seuls peuples qui subsistent disperses, et 
qui, n’ayant d’alliance avec aucune nation, se perpetuent au milieu des nations 
6trang&res, et soient toujours k part du reste du monde’ (1756). Yet Voltaire 
distinguishes the Jews, ‘this singular nation’, from the other groups that he 
mentions. The Guebres and the Banians are contained within certain regions, the 
Indies and the East, while the Jews are dispersed over ‘the face of all the earth’ 
(1756) -  in this instance he portrays the Jews alone as having this particular 
characteristic of worldwide dispersal.148 But we can compare this passage with that 
found in Le Si&cle de Louis XIV, where he shows that the detrimental effect of the 
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was that ‘les Fran9ais ont ete disperses plus loin 
que les Juifs’ (1735-52). This more contemporary reference to the negative results of 
religious discrimination, the loss to society incurred by persecutory actions, enables 
us to identify a figure applicable to his representation of the Jews; their alleged non­
service to society was brought about by their ostracization by that very same society. 
Across his texts Voltaire repeatedly questions this aspect of the Jews, and sets their 
paradoxical roles of usefulness and non-usefulness in the context of the Christians’ 
manipulative and hypocritical treatment of them. He addresses the Jews’ position in 
the world in the light of the place allotted to them by others, deploying the figure of 
victimization to modify an identity constructed on outsider status, difference, and 
despised occupations.149
In ‘Juifs’ Voltaire comments that in the light of the persecution that they have
suffered throughout histoiy, it is amazing that ‘non seulement ce peuple subsiste
encore, mais qu’il ne soit pas moins nombreux aujourd’hui qu’il le fut autrefois’
(undated). This comment occurs among Voltaire’s apparently more controlled
writing, but where the discourse is blatantly negative he mockingly reiterates the
stereotypical fantasy of the Jews’ tendency to proliferate. He contends that their
148‘Juifs’, p.518, p.512.
149 Le Siecle de Louis XIV, II, 29.
54
concern (equally alleged to be that of the Arab peoples) has always been 
characterized by an ‘interest in population’ (1756). Then taking the popular 
stereotype even further, he connects it to a still more pejorative figure suggesting 
financial greed. For him the Jews have ‘deux grands devoirs: des enfants et de 
l’argenf (1756). Voltaire dates this perceived tendency to population growth from 
their early history, satirically commenting that in ancient Egypt ‘il n ’y a point 
d’exemple sur la terre d’une population si prodigieuse’ (1756). And, moving the 
figure into the present, he contends that if the Jews were now to reunite, they would 
become ‘une nation beaucoup plus nombreuse qu’elle ne le fut jamais dans le court 
espace ou ils furent souverains de la Palestine’ (1756).150 These representations of 
the Jews’ population growth demonstrate the flexible nature of Voltaire’s discourse. 
He denigrates the Jews in two contradictoiy ways; on one hand representing them in 
terms of the impossible foolishness of their textual claims -  the excessive 
multiplication of their numbers in times past -  and on the other in the stereotypical, 
if not racist, terms of an ever increasing demographic foreign force. But the 
manipulative nature of Voltaire’s text of 1756, his mocking presentation of the true 
picture, as he sees it, regarding the number of Jewish people currently alive, is 
revealed by his later comments. In Un Chretien contre six Juifs he gives a 
sardonically precise enumeration of the Jews reportedly living at the time in Europe 
and the East; he declares: ‘Voila tout ce que je connais de votre population; elle ne 
se monte qu’a cent huit mille sept cent trente Juifs’ (1777).151 Later, in a similar vein, 
giving a larger, possibly more global figure, he states in relation to the contemporary 
Jewish population: ‘II n’est point etrangement abondant; on a calculi qu’il n ’existe 
pas aujourd’hui six cent mille individus juifs’ (1777). While these comments might 
indeed be the result of later information that he received, I find here further evidence 
of Voltaire’s satirical, but also more balanced, writing. In the Dernieres remarques 
sur les pensees de Pascal, very possibly his final text, the discourse appears marked 
by a more documentary intention, even if one with the negatively passive 
implication that the Jews are a minority of little influence, no power, merely subject 
to the will of others.152
150 ‘Juifs’, p.524, p.513, p.518, p.513, p.512.
151 Un Chretien contre six Juifs, p.557.
152 Dernieres remarques, p.36.
55
Voltaire constantly indicates that despite the European desire (and his own) to 
define a Jewish essence, the difficulty of identification ever remains. This insoluble 
‘problem’ has confronted Christians of all times, leading to their imposition on the 
Jews of, what the writer calls, ‘infamous markers’, a forced wearing of 
distinguishing symbols (undated).153 In this case Voltaire’s choice of adjective gives 
us a sympathetic figure despite the tension the passage introduces. Appearing among 
the private papers, this comment suggests a more tolerant personal attitude on his 
part than that possibly suggested by Desn6 in such circumstances. Desne, in his 
criticism of Poliakov, considers that the latter’s charge of antisemitism against 
Voltaire depends too much on the private jottings, often satirical and tendentious, 
that were posthumously included in ‘Juifs’. He thereby identifies a difference of 
tone between the public and the private discourse. But while he discovers in the 
latter a tendency towards a more critical representation of the Jews, I find in this 
particular passage of ‘Juifs’ evidence of a certain sympathy on the part of Voltaire 
towards them, even though this statement as it stands was not apparently intended 
for public airing. Rather than a difference of tone between the public and private 
discourses regarding the Jews, I see a correspondence between the two. Just as the 
negative Jewish figures of the private papers recur in the texts for publication, the 
sympathetic ones also appear in both.154
Jennifer Tsien notes a similar separation between the various texts, but one that 
she relates to a matter of taste, of what Voltaire might consider acceptable for his 
fellow-enlightened, but detrimental to the good of his wider readership. She finds an 
elitist explanation for this discrepancy in his discourse, one that explains the 
apparent gap between his openly declared social values and his privately diffused (if 
at times questionable) aesthetic expression. Tsien states that Voltaire’s ‘professions 
of decency only applied to the works he produced for the public, while those literary 
inside jokes that he produced and circulated in his circle of friends escaped the rules 
he imposed on the rest of literature’.155
*  *  *
153 ‘Juifs’, p.525.
154 ‘Voltaire 6tait-il antis6mite?\ p. 121.
155 ‘Voltaire and the Temple of bad taste’, p.369.
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Essai sur les moeurs and La Philosophie de I'histoire
In the Essai sur les moeurs Voltaire again points to the difficulty of 
identification, taking up once more the theme of markers. In a passage that re­
emphasizes the negative nature of the discrimination that the Jews have suffered, he 
writes: ‘Le concile de Latran ordonna qu’ils portassent line petite roue sur la 
poitrine, pour les distinguer des chr&iens. Ces marques changerent avec le temps; 
mais partout on leur faisait porter une a laquelle on put les reconnaitre’ (1761).156 
Voltaire connects the imposing of markers to the persecution suffered by the 
wearers, and observes lucidly that violence when it happens, is not an effect of this 
or that specific difference or distinguishing sign, but triggered by manipulation on
the part of the authorities for political purposes. He points to the hypocritical 
paradox, the need, when finding an absence of visible difference, for authorities to 
create one, to introduce an identifying mark of otherness. Voltaire’s analysis 
significantly prefigures, and is corroborated by present-day theorists of identity. 
About such artificially created ‘physical differentiation’, Langmuir comments:
whether individual members are distinguishable by cultural or by physiological differences, 
recognition of their empirical reality will be repressed by the symbolic significance of their 
label; that is, the sight of identifiable Jews will only bring the significance ascribed to ‘the 
Jews’ to mind.
Langmuir sees the function of the Jews to symbolize ‘social and psychic menaces’ 
experienced by the ‘ingroup’ as one that ‘makes them peculiarly valuable’ to the 
society subject to such chimeria. He indicates how ‘real Jews have been irrationally 
converted in the minds of many into a symbol, “the Jews,” a symbol whose meaning 
does not depend on the empirical characteristics of Jews yet justifies their total 
elimination from the earth’.157Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard reinforces this view by his 
reference to ‘the jews’ (and their extermination): ‘Car ce n’est pas comme hommes, 
femmes et enfants qu’on les extermine, mais comme le nom de ce qui est maudit,
156 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 162-63.
157 Toward a Definition o f Antisemitism, p.340, p.349, p.352.
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‘juifs”, que l’Occident a donn6 k l’angoisse inconsciente.’158 As expressed by David 
Carroll: ‘the jews’ find themselves ‘in the (non)place of an Otherness that thought 
cannot think but cannot not think either.’159 Otto Fenichel explains how traditionally 
the role of the scapegoat has been projected on to the Jews, and Slavoj Zizek shows 
how the Jews correspond to a fantasy figure for the societies in which they find 
themselves. They serve others as an ‘explanation’ for the lack of harmony in society, 
an ‘explanation’ that in fact covers up the reality of society’s impossibility. He 
writes:
What appears as the hindrance to society’s full identity with itself is actually its positive 
condition: by transposing onto the Jew the role of the foreign body which introduces in the 
social organism disintegration and antagonism, the fantasy-image of society qua consistent, 
harmonious whole is rendered possible.160
Regardless, therefore, of the physical form it takes, the mark of identity imposed on 
Jews by the members of the Church since the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) is the 
symbol of a symbol, an empty signifier which, according to Laclau, announces itself 
‘as the impossibility of realizing what is within [the] limits’ of signification; it is a 
signifier that is constitutively inadequate because it has been ‘emptied in order to 
assume the representing function’.161
Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin state that the ‘first aim of Jewish law is to 
have the Jew express his affirmation of God and denial of other gods in daily 
actions’, and, accordingly, enforcing Jewish difference by insistance on particular 
religious and social practices, the Torah visibly sets the Jews apart from other 
people.162 This moves the argument into the area of self-marking, and Karen 
Armstrong echoes this thinking when she refers to a further contradictory element 
found in the adoption of distinguishing signs. She shows how in fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century Spain the very name given to the new Jewish Christians, Marranos 
(from the Spanish word for ‘pigs’), even though intended as a term of abuse, was
158 Heidegger et ‘les ju ifs’, p.53.
159 Introduction to Heidegger and “the jew s”, p.xii.
160 Enjoy Your Symptom!, p.90.
161 Emancipationist p.37, p.40.
162 Why the Jews?, p. 17.
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adopted as a ‘badge of pride’ by some of the converts.163 Similarly Mary Douglas, 
investigating in the 1970s the situation of ‘the Bog Irish’ and their continued 
adherence to the laws of Friday abstinence, explains the significance of chosen or 
rejected symbols. While the Catholic Church had removed from its followers the 
obligation to eat fish on Friday, among the poor Irish immigrants of London of the 
time the practice remained. Here, according to Douglas, ‘the sense of exile and 
boundary is sharper’ and Friday abstinence being ‘no empty symbol, it means 
allegiance to a humble home [...] and to a glorious tradition’. Thus for the 
marginalized a symbol can move from one meaning to another; it may become 
subverted into an expression of their sense of apartness’.164
Voltaire suggests that same ambiguity in the Quaker’s display of difference by 
his rejection of the ‘markers of dignity’ worn by others. The latter declares: ‘Nous 
portons aussi un habit un peu different des autres hommes, afin que ce soit pour 
nous un avertissement continuel de ne leur pas ressembler’ (1734).165 Voltaire’s 
treatment of the Quakers arrives as close as is possible to a commendation. Their 
choice of dress, manners, etc., are as near as man has yet come to the pure, 
unadulterated, impoverished lifestyle of Jesus, and he suggests that to achieve that 
pure state, to emulate the way of Christ, contemporary people do not have to adopt 
the exclusiveness marked by ritual or violence. The Quakers’ exclusivity is one of 
free choice, open to all who opt for a righteous peaceful life, and their rejection is 
only of those signifiers of humanity’s acquisitive greed and selfishness. But this also 
introduces the inherent problem contained in such gestures; the particular group’s 
desire to separate itself from its other by the adoption of a visible sign indicates a 
rejection of what it finds undesirable. Non-significant gestures of cultural difference 
are scorned by Voltaire where a perceived superiority of self accompanies the 
adoption. In Un Chretien contre six Juifs he refers to circumcision in ancient Egypt 
as ‘un privilege qui n’etait alors reserve qu’aux pretres d’lsis et aux inities’ 
(1777).166 The figure is repeated in La Bible enfin expliquee where he describes this 
marker of the Egyptian priesthood ‘comme un signe d’association qui les distinguait
163 The Battle for God, p.7.
164 Natural Symbols, p.40.
165 Lettres philosophiques, I, 6.
166 Un Chretien contre six Juifs, p.558.
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du genre humain’ (1776).167 Similarly in the Traite sur la tolerance he questions the 
activities, the dress and the customs of certain Christian religious confraternities 
who, he alleges, had sworn to ‘hate their brothers’. Thus he writes: ‘Pourquoi se 
distinguer ainsi des autres citoyens? S’en croyait-on plus parfait? Cela meme est une 
insulte au reste de la nation’ (1763).168 It is here that Voltaire’s criticism of 
the Christians converges with that of the Jews; both are censured for their actions of 
self-marking or self-distinction. The former have carried out their brutal ceremonies 
bedecked in the trappings of their self-claimed authority, the latter have 
distinguished themselves as the chosen people by the (for Voltaire) barbaric and 
ridiculous ritual of circumcision. He excoriates the actions of the Christians who 
have falsely invested with hypocritical ceremonial their savage acts of butchery, as 
embodied par excellence in the auto-da-fe; he reviles the Jews, who he contends -  
like others before them -  have taken their activities to a more mundane level, one 
that defies civilized human reason. He writes:
Le bapteme est commun k toutes les anciennes nations de 1’Orient; la circoncision des 
Iigyptiens, des Arabes et des Juifs, est infiniment post^rieure: car rien n’est plus naturel que de 
se laver; et il a fallu bien des sifccles avant d’imaginer qu’une operation contre la nature et 
contre la pudeur pflt plaire k l’fitre des etres. ( 1769)169
While he mocks all religious ceremonies that have been created by man, Voltaire 
distinguishes between what he conceives as natural and what he views as contrary to 
nature and pudicity.
In the Essai sur les moeurs Voltaire again suggests that Jewishness might be 
found in the Jews’ wandering nature, a characteristic shared with the Gypsies -  
another ‘vagabond little nation’ (1761) -  although he then reduces the significance 
of this relationship by marking a separation between those same Gypsies and the 
Jews.170 Sibony, analyzing typical racist attitudes, marks out a stereotypical linkage 
between these two groups. He writes:
1<r7 La Bible enfin expliquee, p. 25, note 1.
168 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 140.
169 Essai sur les moeurs, I, 201.
m Essai sur les moeurs, II, 165.
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C’est done comme symbole que le “Juif” fut obs^dant; symbole de l’identife qui 6chappe, de la 
difference qui vire au meme, de l’origine en manque, de la nfemoire mena9ante... Le peuple 
tzigane, lui, fut chargd de symboliser r “asocial”, le trait asocial que comporte toute socfefe et 
sans lequel elle devient folle.171
But in this case Voltaire, repeating his much reiterated deprecation of the 
Gypsies’ forefathers, dismisses ‘ces restes d’Egyptiens adorateurs secrets d’Isis’, 
and creates instead a connection between the Jews and the more favourably 
represented Gudbres and Banians (1765) -  a change of emphasis that may indicate, 
to use Bayard’s term, the ‘filtering’ of the unconscious by the writer, his desire in 
this period for a more balanced representation.172 He then goes further, alleging that 
in the past the Jewish desire to remain apart from other peoples was an essential 
characteristic of their identity, one that differentiated them from the Muslims.
Les Ffebreux [...] assocferent rarement les Strangers k leur culte. Les musulmans arabes 
incorpfcrent & eux les autres nations; les Ffebreux s’en tinrent toujours s^pafes. [...] Le peuple 
Ifebreu avait en horreur les autres nations, et craignait toujours d’etre asservi; le peuple arabe, 
au contraire, voulut attirer tout & lui, et se crut fait pour dominer. (1756)
Here he invests the representation of the Hebrews with characteristics of 
subservience and fearfulness, attributes of non-resistance that he constantly 
associates with his Jewish figures. But, in a similarly dated passage, Voltaire 
reverses this figure of hatred and rejection, taking it from one manifested by the 
Jews to that where the ‘horror’ is demonstrated against them by others. He makes 
the negative comment that the Jews are ‘en horreur k tous les peuples chez lesquels 
ils sont admis’ (1756).173
He contends that since Mohammed, they have in fact ceased ‘to compose a 
body of people’ and, as in ‘Juifs’, he reasserts his surprise at Jewish survival, 
declaring that, given their having never had a country of their own, ‘il est etonnant 
qu’il reste encore des Juifs’ -  a situation he explains with the satirical comment that
171 Le ‘racisme une haine identitaire, p. 201.
172 La Philosophie de I’histoire, p.236.
173 Essai sur les moeurs, 1,208, II, 160.
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‘Dieu [...] rendit cette nation si differente en tout des autres homines’ (1765). 
However, this suggestion of chosenness he then immediately dismantles, exploiting 
mathematical logic in an attempt to prove the impossibility of Jewish assertions, 
their claimed growth in number in biblical times. He satirically enumerates the 
alleged losses recorded in the Bible, figures which, by his mockingly precise 
reckoning, add up to a ‘total sum’ of 239,020 victims, ‘extermin^s par 1’ordre de 
Dieu meme, ou par leurs guerres civiles, sans compter ceux qui p6rirent dans le 
desert, et ceux qui moururent dans les batailles contre les Cananeens etc’. He 
sardonically summarizes: ‘on ne pourrait concevoir comment les enfants de Jacob 
auraient pu produire une race assez nombreuse pour supporter une telle perte’ 
(1765).174
Many of Voltaire’s texts apply this figure of the Jews as a group given to self- 
proliferation in order to undermine the authenticity of the biblical texts. So, drawing 
attention to the way texts confuse fact and fable, he emphasizes the fictional nature 
of the numbers accredited to the biblical Jews by the Jesuit, Denis Petau: ‘Et ce 
n’est pourtant pas k la suite des Mille et une Nuits qu’il a fait imprimer ce beau 
denombrement’ (1770-72).175 In the ‘Avant-propos’ of the Essai sur les moeurs, 
Voltaire distinguishes between the fact of science and the merely probable of non­
science: ‘N’admettons en physique que ce qui est prouv6, et en histoire que ce qui 
est de la plus grande probability reconnue’ (1761).176The same figure occurs 
in ‘Tolerance’, where he insists on the separation of the factual or believable and the 
fictional or incredible.
toute secte, comme on sait, est un titre d’erreur; il n’y a point de secte de g6om£tres, 
d’alg£bristes, d’arithmdticiens, parce que toutes les propositions de g^omdtrie, d ’algfcbre, 
d ’arithmdtique sont vraies. Dans toutes les autres sciences on peut se tromper. ( 1764)177
Remaining constant in his indictment of the allegedly fabulous and unbelievable 
nature of the Old Testament accounts, at the end of his life Voltaire reiterates his
view that the Bible was ‘not given to us to instruct us in geometry and physics’
174 La Philosophie de I ’histoire, p.234, p.230.
175 ‘Population’, M.xx, p.247 (originally in the Questions sur I’Encyclopedic).
176 Essai sur les moeurs, I, 164 (dated 1740 by Moland).
177 ‘Tolerance’, VF, p.563.
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(1776).178
With Voltaire, as with most of his contemporaries in France, the size of the 
countiy’s population was ever of concern, one that present-day research suggests 
was unfounded. But the fear of demographic decline caused by war, colonization 
and disease becomes integrated with the criticisms of many philosophes regarding 
the restrictive moral practices of the Church, above all its teaching on chastity in the 
monastic sphere. As Mark Hulliung writes: ‘Arguments against celibacy and 
seclusion are so much the common currency of the French Enlightenment that one 
blow delivered against the monastic life blends into another.’179 And with Voltaire 
the philosophical and pragmatic questions become linked. Thus he moves the 
argument from one that addresses the ‘sacred right’ of people to populate the world, 
to another that emphasizes the practical distinctions between Protestant and Catholic 
countries. He writes: ‘Je crois l’Angleterre, l’Allemagne protestante, la Hollande, 
plus peuplees k proportion. La raison en est evidente: il n’y a point dans ces pays-l& 
de moines qui jurent a Dieu d’etre inutiles aux hommes’ (1770-72).180 Voltaire’s 
condemnation of the religious authorities for their enforced incarceration of young 
people in, what he sees as, unnatural environments, becomes represented in the 
figures of Frere Giroflee in Candide, and the nuns in La Pucelle. He decries the 
‘uselessness’ of the lives of those in enclosed orders, rails against the uncalled-for 
suffering caused by the denial of natural human affections and inclinations, and 
condemns the non-procreation that results from such actions. In the Essai sur les 
moeurs, even while distinguishing between religious houses that serve some practical 
purpose and those that do not, he concludes that the great number of such 
establishments have ‘derobe trop de sujets k la society civile’. And, drawing a 
contrast between Jewish and Catholic teachings, Voltaire points to the practical and 
humanely productive nature of the practices of certain Jewish groups, whereby they 
‘n’eurent ni ess6niennes ni filles therapeutes’ (1756).181 However, while this might 
suggest a reversal of the negative ‘Jewish figure’ of proliferation by showing the 
desire for children not to be one of ambitious ‘racial’ growth, but one of sensible
pragmatism and social usefulness, we still have to be aware of the Christian
178 La Bible enfin expliquee, p. 18, note 2.
179 The Autocritique o f Enlightenment, p. 15.
180 ‘Population’, p.252 (originally in the Questions sur TEncyclopedie).
181 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 344.
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fantasies explored by Gilman. When attributing the increase in number of 
contemporary Jews ‘a leur ardeur pour le mariage, a leur coutume de le contracter 
de bonne heure dans leurs families, a leur loi de divorce’ (undated), Voltaire taps 
into the stereotypical thinking regarding Jewish endogamous marriage.182
*  *  *
Candide
In Candide Voltaire again places a stress on the theme of wandering, this time 
in connection with the non-Jewish eponymous hero. But certain figures found in the 
portrayal of the naive Candide link up with those used in Voltaire’s representation 
of the Jews. Revealed solely through his actions or through his experiences which 
are the result of natural causes or man’s treatment of him, the protagonist is given 
minimal personal identity; he is the outsider, with no family, no home, no formal 
name or identification. Adding to his representation, Voltaire portrays Candide as a 
bastard. He uses the popular eighteenth-century figure that exposes ‘many of the 
ambiguities in the relations of society’: the illegitimate outsider, by not fully 
belonging to any group, questions the role of the individual in the social space.183 
Wherever the wandering Candide goes, he is ever a stranger; he soon feels 
compelled to move on, constantly searching for happiness in a better world. Finally, 
having grown more realistic and pragmatic, he, the outsider from Christian Europe, 
settles as the religious other in the Islamic nation, Turkey, a portrayal that fictionally 
dismantles Voltaire’s assertions of the Jews’ singularity in the aforementioned texts, 
and one which points towards his late comment that ‘tout homme est libre de se 
choisir une patrie’ (1771).184
But Voltaire also introduces certain Jews into this conte: the nameless 
individuals, whose sole identity is found in that of their victimhood at the hands of 
the Inquisition, or in their trades as money-lenders, and the rich merchant ‘lover’ of 
Cunegonde, Don Issachar, whose name, as Pomeau proposes, recalls the Old 
Testament and his position as a ‘Portugese Jew’. Drawing our attention to a possible
182 ‘Juifs’, p.524.
183 John Leigh, The Search for Enlightenment, p.23.
184 ‘Philosophe’, M.xx, p.203 (originally in the Questions sur TEncyclopedic).
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tension, Pomeau suggests that Voltaire’s decision to change the name from Ourdos 
-  as found deleted in the manscript -  shows a desire to remove the exotic with its 
‘nuance de bassesse brutale’, and to present ‘the Jew’ in a guise more in keeping 
with his position as Cunegonde’s ‘protectress’. But, further to this, I propose that in 
light of Voltaire’s sometimes sympathetic representation of Don Issachar, and the 
negative portrayal of his treatment at the hands of the Christians, the textual 
alteration marks his intention to stress the illogical and unjust nature of all 
discrimination; to give greater resonance to this, he needs to minimize difference.185
Don Issachar, the prosperous merchant, an eighteenth-centuiy ‘good’ Jew, 
stands out as a relatively positive figure. But even though Voltaire gives him a name 
and a personalized identification, he is not recognizable for anything except his 
representation of ‘Jewishness’. Through this character the writer demonstrates the 
level of society’s non-assimilation of Jews, even of those who are educated; the 
Inquisitor attempts to strengthen his claim to Cunegonde by reminding her of ‘the 
Jew’s’ inappropriateness as a lover, and, after death, denied the rights of proper 
burial, Don Issachar’s body is thrown in the public pit.186 We find in this repetition 
of what is -  in Voltaire’s work -  a much used figure that is representative of all 
social intolerance and religious dogmatism, an indication of a certain sympathy for 
the Jews. Voltaire’s concern regarding the discrimination shown even after death to 
particular individuals and groups, the inhumane disposal of their bodies, is one that 
he extends to all such victims -  alleged non-believers or nonconformists, Jews, 
Protestants, Jansenists and deists, prostitutes (such as Paquette) and actresses (such 
as Mile Monine, the fictional embodiment of Voltaire’s friend and probable lover, 
Adrienne Lecouvreur, who suffered this fate in 1730). Voltaire underlines the 
unjustness of her treatment in his letter to Algarotti, writing: ‘il est plaisant qu’on 
enterre le bourreau avec ceremonie, et qu’on ait jett£e a la voirie M1Ie Lecouvreur’ (1 
May 1761).187
Lenard R. Berlanstein draws attention to the denial of civil status to Jews, 
Protestants and actors in France before 1789,188 and Ruth Richardson has explored in
the nineteenth-century English context the understanding of disrespect for the
185 Candide (1959), p.49.
186 Candide, p. 145.
187 D9761.
188 ‘Women and Power in Eighteenth-Century France’, p. 186.
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bodies of the dead. She writes: ‘The significance of the human corpse in popular 
death culture [...| seems to have been coloured by a prevailing belief in the existence 
of a strong tie between body and personality/soul for an undefined period of time 
after death.’ She finds that ‘meanings and values attached to the customary 
treatment of the dead meant that in the early nineteenth century’ people did not just 
fear ‘the exposure of nakedness’ or ‘the possibility of assault upon and disrespect 
towards the dead’, but also ‘the deliberate mutilation or destruction of identity, 
perhaps for eternity’. In the eighteenth century Voltaire already shows the way for 
the respect that Richardson insists is necessary.189
Voltaire emphasizes how in France, following the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes, Protestants who refused the sacraments, after death had their bodies ‘trames 
sur la claie, et jetes a la voirie’ (1735-52), and in Candide he draws attention to the 
persecutory measures resulting from the Bulle Unigenitus (1713), that papal edict 
which imposed impossible demands on devout Jansenists or non-conformists.190 
Unable to renounce their articles of faith, to profess penitence for their alleged 
heresy, these were refused the billets de confessions that certified their final 
absolution, and, without such proof, they were denied proper burial and the promise 
of eternal rest. This is one area of commiseration for the collective of victims, in 
which Voltaire, the follower of deist thinking, clearly identifies himself; sympathy 
becomes empathy.
*  *  *
La Pucelle
In La Pucelle the characters are similar to those of Candide, many identified 
solely by their figurative names or by their constant movement. Above all Agnes, 
the King’s errante mistress (1730-62), his ‘charmant peche’ (1730-62) who has 
‘perdu la trace’ (1730-62), most resembles the ingenuous Candide. Voltaire 
purposely combines characters who are both historical (Jeanne d’Arc, Charles VII, 
Agnes Sorel, Dunois the ‘charmant batard’, etc.) and fictional (Sacrogorgon,
189 Death, Dissection and the Destitute, p.7, p.29.
190 Le Siecle de Louis XI, II, 30.
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Hermaphrodix, and la vieille, etc.), thus creating a dual representation. As with the 
incorporation of real events and places in Candide, here the introduction of a factual 
element gives authority to the text, places it within the field of lived human 
experience, while that which is fantastical and farcical allows the author to relate 
episodes that otherwise would be totally unpalatable. The contradiction between the 
true and the false contrives both to engage and to amuse the reader, to allow him to 
sympathize without an excessive sense of personal involvement or responsibility for 
the actions of his fellow men, an awareness that might bring about a rejection of the 
text. Again, by Voltaire’s wit, the reader is encouraged to read on.191
As for the Jews who appear in the poem, these are restricted to those ancient 
figures of the biblical scriptures, ‘ce peuple errant pendant quarante ann6es’ (1755- 
62), or to the marginal, prophesizing advisors of Charles VII, with the one exception 
of the old woman’s unnamed acquaintance, ‘Un circoncis’, ‘Le digne Hebreu’, the 
‘Enfant barbu d’lsaac et de Juda’ (1755-62). Described in intentionally stereotypical 
terms that emphasize his Jewish otherness, this figure, like the Jews found in 
Candide, belongs in the contemporary field, and as such is separated off from the 
(for Voltaire) fictional figures of the biblical past. He, the money-lending Jew of the 
‘modem’ world presents a double image; the devious, scheming trader who, as 
Voltaire repeatedly indicates across his texts, is himself manipulated, confined 
within the social space allotted to him, restricted to the despised role accorded to 
him by Christian society.192
*  *  *
Voltaire’s invective and the reproaches of Isaac Pinto and others
Here temporarily setting aside our analysis of the chosen texts, we must
consider the question of a writer’s responsibility, and how we should view the
relevance of private discourse in our judgement of his works. While Desn6 calls for
a separation in the writings on the Jews between those intended for private
distribution or those destined for the public, Cotoni points out that Voltaire’s texts
191 La Pucelle, X, 391, p.430; II, 478, p.297; X, 368, p.429.
J92 La Pucelle, XVI, 126, p.509; VIII, 417, 421,418, p.404.
67
inspired Henri Labroue to publish his Voltaire antijuif (1942) as a ‘warning’ to the 
Vichy government.193 Poliakov adheres to this view, but as Pascal Pellerin points out 
much of Poliakov’s argument rests on a misrepresentation: he does not perceive the 
nature of Labroue’s contrived interpretation of the texts, the way he selects and 
discards passages so that he can present ‘1’image d’un philosophe champion de la 
tolerance et de la raison done antisemite’ (my italics).194 Mervaud also demolishes 
Labroue’s work as an ‘anthologie composee de textes extraits de leur contexte, 
artificiellement d6coup6s, largement annot£s par des citations de Celine ou des 
freres Tharaud’. For her, Voltaire was misrepresented in the 1940s by a 
manipulative choice of references taken from his works so as to construct an 
argument ‘suivant une probtematique raciste’, an opinion again shared by Desn£ 
who considers that it was this that brought about the subsequent (mistaken) ‘image’ 
of the philosophe as an antisemite.195 To illustrate his point further, Desn£ comments 
that Drumont, considering that Voltaire’s ‘hostility’ towards the Jews was based on 
personal resentments, regretted that ‘unfortunately’ it had no connection with the 
‘antisemite cause’.196 Even as we try to understand the reason for Voltaire’s 
statements, and, while we acknowledge Langmuir’s contention that ‘xenophobes 
can listen to the assertions invented by people prone to chimeria and reinterpret 
them to serve their own needs’, another point deserves mention: critics who wish to 
charge Voltaire with irresponsibility, lack of concern for the possible effects 
produced by his remarks, should base their accusations on those texts that he 
intended for public view -  although sometimes the separation between the public 
and the private might be difficult to define. This does not mean, however, that we 
may disregard the private discourses. These ought to be given a place in any 
analysis of Voltaire’s conscious thinking and any possible consideration of its 
unconscious determinants.197
But, in order to consider the impact of his work on the public of his day, we 
need temporarily to defer moral judgement. Haskell M. Block in his investigation of 
certain German thinkers of the period, including Goethe, discovers evidence of
193 ‘ Voltaire lit la bible’, p. 186.
m ‘Le “Voltaire antijuif’ d’Henri Labroue’, p. 176.
195 Le ‘Dictionnaire philosophique’ de Voltaire, p.86.
196 Inventaire Voltaire, p.80-81.
197 Toward a Definition o f Antisemitism, p.350.
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Voltaire’s beneficial influence on contemporary attitudes. He writes that the appeal 
to tolerance in Lessing is closely akin to Voltaire’s appeal in his Traite sur la 
tolerance, and sets forth a similar call to positive action’. Block also describes how 
‘in the Briefe zu Befdrderung der Humanitat of 1795 Herder gives special thanks to 
those who pleaded for tolerance and exposed persecution in its true light. His list 
begins with Locke, Bayle and Spinoza, and ends with Voltaire’.198
Regarding the Jewish discourse in particular, Mervaud has considered the 
reactions ‘que les plaisanteries et injures de Voltaire ont suscit^es de son temps’, 
and she quotes the remark of Zalind Hourwitz who commented that ‘il se peut bien 
que Voltaire en ait moins voulu aux juifs modemes qu’aux anciens, c’est-a-dire au 
tronc du christianisme contre lequel il vise sans cesse’. Demonstrating how, for his 
contemporaries, Voltaire’s attacks appear solely as part of a critical biblical 
exegesis, Mervaud contends that he ‘ne s’int6resse guere au statut actuel des juifs, il 
ne veut pas s’y int^resser’. For her, his dismissive attitude towards the Jewish 
people gives evidence of his lack of interest in the ‘distinctions elitistes entre 
sefarades et ashkenazes’.199
Elie Bertrand found continued evidence of Voltaire’s stereotypical thinking 
while the latter was writing the Essai sur les moeurs; the Swiss pastor contended 
that, despite wishing to write a ‘history’ of the world, Voltaire, an ‘ennemi des Juifs’ 
was going to descredit them considerably in the text under production.200
However, Schwarzbach contends that Jewish apologistes of the 
Enlightenment, Hourwitz and Isaie Berr-Bing, ‘voyaient un cote positif meme dans 
l’oeuvre de Voltaire, tout virulent qu’il fOt parfois contre les Juifs’.201 Desn6 
too, going further than Mervaud when quoting Hourwitz, shows how the latter 
pointed to the ‘good’ that the philosophe had indirectly brought to the Jewish 
people. Regarding the Jews, Hourwitz contended:
quoique sans le vouloir, peut-etre sans le savoir, car s’ils jouissent depuis quelques anndes 
d’un peu de repos, ils en sont redevables au progr&s des Lumifcres, auquel Voltaire a sflrement
198 ‘Confrontations of Voltaire in 18th-century Germany’, p. 1167, p. 1169.
199 Le ‘Dictionnaire philosophique’ de Voltaire, p.87, p.88. Mervaud takes her quotation of Hourwitz 
from Poliakov, Histoire de Vantisemitisme, p. 117.
200 D 12066 (30 August 1764) to baron Johann Hartwig Ernst von Bemstorff.
201 ‘Une nation reni6e -  une nation adoptee’, p.331.
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plus contribud qu’aucun autre 6cnvain, par ses nombreux ouvrages contre le fanatisme.202
The Abbe Gurnee, following Pinto’s publication of Reflexions critiques, 
took up the argument in favour of the Jewish people. By adopting the persona of the 
Jews, an action that caused Voltaire to dub him ‘secretaire juif’, Guenee was playing 
Voltaire at his own game: ‘Assez souvent Voltaire s’etait deguise en pasteur 
protestant, en “papa” grec, en eveque orthodoxe, ou en rabbin juif. L ’abbe Guenee 
eut l ’ing6niosite de retoumer contre Voltaire les proc&les voltairiens.’203 The Abbe, 
as a man of letters and a member of the Church, questions the separation, as he sees 
it, between the propaganda of universal tolerance as set out in the Traite sur la 
tolerance and the philosophers negative representation of the Jews. Using their 
voice, Guenee asks how Voltaire could have treated ‘notre nation, nos livres sacr6s, 
et tout ce qui nous est cher, d’une maniere si opposee au caractere d ’equite et de 
moderation’. He adds: ‘Aurions-nous cru devoir trouver tant de prevention et tant de 
haine contre un peuple malheureux, dans l’ouvrage d’un Philosophe conciliateur et 
ami du genre humain!’ The Abbe condemns the prejudiced and stereotypical nature 
of Voltaire’s attacks and he asks: ‘A-t-on jamais juge d’une nation par les 
dereglements de quelques particuliers?’204 Albertan-Coppola shows how, in his 
critique of the Traite sur la tolerance, Guenee exposes the manipulative way 
‘Voltaire inflechit la logique et l’Histoire pour faire entrer le peuple juif comme 
modele dans son grand dessein antifanatique, sans pour autant renoncer a enfourcher 
son cheval de bataille antijudaique h finality antichr&ienne’.205 Gu£n6e refutes 
Voltaire’s representation of the Jews as tolerant on the grounds that it is a false 
proposition created solely in order to further the writer’s programme of universal 
tolerance. And, pointing to the manipulative nature of Voltaire’s interpretation of 
the Jewish biblical texts on which Christianity is based, he underlines the danger of 
such slanderous discourse as found in ‘Des Juifs’. He declares: ‘Le poids que cet 
illustre ecrivain donne par son authorite a ses prejuges etait capable d’ecraser cette 
nation.’206 This dispute between Guenee and Voltaire lasted some fourteen years, a
202 Inventaire Voltaire, p.81 (Hourwitz quoted from Desn6).
203 Sylvain Menant and Rene Pomeau, Voltaire en son temps, II, 503.
204 Lettres de quelques Juifs portugais, allemands et polonais d M. de Voltaire, I, 61, 227.
205 ‘L’abbe Gudn6e, “secretaire juif” contre Voltaire a I’occasion du Traite sur la to le ra n cep.101.
206 Lettres de quelques Juifs, 1,3.
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controversy that Albertan-Coppola proposes was marked by ‘un certain estime’ on 
the latter’s part.207 And, as for Guenee, despite his criticism of Voltaire’s discourse, 
he recognizes (again speaking in the name of the Jews) the benefits it has brought to 
the Jewish people:
Nous ne devons point le dissimuler: [...] le peuple juif vous a quelques obligations. [...] Si les 
autodafes de Madrid et de Lisbonne sont moins sanglants, si la rigueur du tribunal redoutable 
qui nous juge est enfin adoucie, c’est peut-€tre a vos Merits plus qu’& toute autre cause, que 
nous en sommes redevables. Vous avez du moins plus d’une fois exhort^ les chr£tiens k nous 
regarder comme leurs frfcres.208
While this study looks for an integration of Voltaire’s Jewish writing with his 
promotion of universal tolerance, Katz finds that the Jewish discourse is an essential 
part of an alternative programme: the highly negative statements form part of 
Voltaire’s personal drive for a natural religion. For Katz, Voltaire’s vehement 
criticisms of the Jews are fundamental to his intentional demolition of accepted 
Christian teaching.
Criticism of the Bible by the Deists was not accompanied by hostile expressions toward the 
Jews and found no place in contemporary anti-Jewish propaganda. It had to be removed from 
its original context, given pungency, and directed toward a concrete target. The Deist doctrine 
underwent this process in the translation from the English version to the French; the primary 
translator and transformer was Voltaire.
But, despite this observation, Katz concludes that Voltaire could not have foreseen 
how later generations would interpret his writings, and he too credits him with the 
subsequent improvement in the Jewish social condition. He considers that, despite 
the unrestrained extremism of Voltaire’s anti-Jewish discourse, despite the decisive 
influence he had on the attitudes towards the Jews and Judaism within his 
contemporary society, he ‘did more than any other single man to shape the 
rationalistic trend that moved European society toward improving the status of the
207 ‘L ’abb6 Gudnde, “secretaire juif” contre Voltaire k 1’occasion du Traite sur la tolerance', p. 100.
208 Lettres de quelques Juifs, 1,472.
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Jews’.209
However, Katz’s comment needs further examination when we consider that 
even in the eighteenth century Guende and Pinto were able to foresee the possible 
dangers that the writer’s immoderate language might -  even if unwittingly -  incur 
in the future. Pinto directly addresses the question of Voltaire’s responsibility, the 
influence that he, like any other writer, might have on the thinking of subsequent 
generations. He accuses Voltaire of making remarks that appear misinformed, 
provocative amd even unworthy of ‘le plus grand genie du siecle le plus eclaire’. He 
contends that Voltaire’s attacks against ‘une nation deja si malheureuse’ are not just 
unwarranted, but also dangerous for the unknown effects they might create in those 
who encounter them. Thus, using the metaphor of persecution so favoured by 
Voltaire himself, he writes: ‘Ce n’est pas tout de ne pas bruler les gens: on brule 
avec la plume; et ce feu est d’autant plus cruel, que son effet passe aux generations 
futures.’210
In reply to Pinto’s letter, Voltaire acknowledges the violence and injustice of 
his discourse as found in ‘Des Juifs’, his fault in having attributed ‘a toute une 
nation les vices de plusieurs particuliers’ (21 July 1762).211 He promises to correct 
the text, to right the wrong -  actions which he never carries out, although later in 
his Un Chretien contre six Juifs (1776) he readdresses certain issues when 
answering the charges of the Abbe Guenee, who by this time had published Pinto’s 
text as part o»f his own. But for Poliakov the ‘antisemitic’ Voltaire’s response to 
Pinto shows an intentionally devious lack of sincerity. He writes that on that 
occasion ‘sotu ironie se doublait de mauvaise foi polemique; il promettait au Juif 
d ’amender les passages dont celui-ci se plaignait, mais il ne tint pas parole’.212 D.H. 
Jory finds another another reason for Voltaire’s failure to correct his earlier 
comments: ‘By the 1760’s the plight of the Jews in France was serious, but they 
were no long*er subject to judicial murder.’ Voltaire was now ‘trying to protect a 
more obviously threatened religious minority group -  the Protestants. A busy man, 
Voltaire did n ot have time for everything.’213
209 From Prejudice to Destruction, pp. 33-34.
210 Lettres de quelques juifs, I, 25.
211 D10600.
212 Histoire de l imtise'rnitisrne, p. 107.
213 ‘Voltaire and the Jews of Metz’, p.98.
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While we cannot emphasize too much the difference between Voltaire’s 
attitudes towards the Jews and modem antisemitism that culminated in the brutal 
intention to annihilate the Jewish people, Pinto’s remark does suggest overtones that 
bring to mind Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s criticism of Nazi revisionnistes; persecution 
can be achieved as much by the pen as by the sword, and a writer who deprives a 
community of its historical memory may be fittingly described as ‘un Eichmann de 
papier’ -  through his writing an author may continue the process of persecution or 
extermination. Therefore further questions remain as to why Voltaire should have 
failed to rectify his comments in ‘Des Juifs’, particularly in light of his recognition 
of those faults that Pinto condemned. His late comments in Un Chretien contre six 
Juifs attest to the fact that the issues and accusations raised by Pinto and Guenee 
continued to occupy him throughout his life; they were not just put out of mind. 
This latter text, written in his final years, was Voltaire’s answer to the contention 
made by the Abbe in his Lettres de quelques juifs, his claim that the ‘author’ who 
was engaged in a war against the Jews was going to have to reply as ‘son silence 
serait un aveu de sa defaite.’214 But Voltaire’s biased and prejudiced remarks 
levelled against the Jews in the 1756 text simply do not fit with his attitudes towards 
such unfair slander or prejudice against people in general. Bigotry and prejudice are 
the very things that he is fighting against. We can only presume, therefore, that 
while he most probably privately acknowledged the correctness of the comments 
made by such enlightened thinkers, Voltaire was reluctant to reduce his statements 
further for fear of undermining his project in favour of more liberal and secular 
attitudes as a whole. David Levy writes that ‘avec Gurnee, Voltaire a affaire a un 
adversaire de taille, a un pol^miste redoutable’, and Voltaire himself acknowledges 
to d’Alembert the wounding strength of Gu6n6e’s elegant criticisms, the way that 
‘like a monkey’ ‘il mord jusqu’au sang, en faisant semblant de baiser la main’ (8 
December 1776).215
Many critics have pointed to the manipulative nature of Voltaire’s writing, the 
way that he selects, discards and rearranges facts in order to transmit his message, 
an action for which he so severely criticizes the readers of the Bible. The 
manipulation of texts that he condemns in others is central to his drive to demean
214 Lettres de quelques juifs, I, vi.
215 Voltaire et son exegese du Pentateuque, p.297; D20458.
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that religious dogmatism which he finds in the biblical teachings. And the 
programme does not stop here; similar to his distorted presentation of the Jews is 
his portrayal of the Christians. While most groups on occasion are either drawn 
sympathetically in the role of victims, or are offered congratulation for their worthy 
actions, the Church itself is not presented in such positive terms. Voltaire admires 
many social and cultural aspects of European achievement, and in the religious field 
occasionally he gives praise where he sees it as due: he acknowledges the role 
played by certain non-conformist groups such as the Quakers, commends the 
religious enquiry found among some Protestant sects, and, moreover, with the 
passing of time increasingly praises the humanist qualities of Jesus the man. But, 
significantly, he makes minimal reference to any beneficial actions that the Church 
in power has performed in the name of its faith. For him, since he wishes to show 
the highly destructive nature of most religion, the representation of Catholicism (as 
of Judaism) cannot be softened by a non-essential reference to its own 
achievements.
Martha Augoustinos and Iain Walker explain how ‘stereotypes are both a 
cause and a consequence of prejudice’; the danger lies in that they function not just 
as a description, but also as an explanation for the treatment of the outgroup by the 
ingroup. They attribute ‘fixed and constitutional qualities to the target group and its 
members’.216 But David Theo Goldberg proposes that a distinction should be drawn 
between critical and non-critical, rational and irrational stereotypes. He writes:
Stereotypes may be defined in neutral terms as those beliefs concerning the characteristics or 
attributes of persons in virtue of their group membership. Prejudice, by contrast, is a negative 
attitude or disposition towards others in virtue of the differential group membership. Prejudice 
will tend largely to employ negative stereotypes of other groups. But stereotypes need involve 
no prejudice. It should also be noted that prejudices may at times be justifiable or at least 
understandable.217
However, Katz contends that the negative stereotypical fantasies which marked the 
Christians’ ‘sense of superiority, if not hatred, ridicule, and mockery’ lie at the heart
216 Social Cognition, p.208, p.226.
217 Racist Culture, pp. 122-23.
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Voltaire’s image of the Jews was that harbored by the Christian mind for generations; a 
species alienated from the community, strange in language and customs, sunk in obscurantism 
and adhering to an anachronistic tradition, devoted to their brethren in the extreme but hostile 
to those around them, with whom they have no contact other than in business dealings, usury, 
and dishonest trade.218
But Schwarzbach goes some way towards Goldberg’s suggestion, requiring us to 
explore the dangerous notion of ‘a kernel of truth’: he suggests in his turn that the 
sometimes malevolent and exaggerated representations of the Jews by Voltaire and 
Diderot mirror their own resentments based on personal experience. Jewish 
involvement in usury was a historical fact, but a fact whose origin in Christian laws 
was left out of account; in Christian minds it became convenient ‘to emphasize the 
role of the Jews and stereotype Jews as the archetypal usurer’.219 Pomeau sets out 
Voltaire’s approaches to Jewish bankers and moneylenders:
Aprfcs la faillite de ses banquiers d’Acosta et Medina, a Londres, en 1726, Voltaire ne renon9a 
pas & employer les services d’hommes d’affaires juifs. En Prusse, il spicule sur les actions 
de la Steuer par l’interm&iiaire du joaillier Hirschell (1750). Quelques mois plus tard, il est en 
relations avec ‘messieurs Ephraim’, de Berlin, correspondants du ‘sieur Moses’ h Amsterdam
(14 April 1752).220
Fenichel, in line with Augoustinos and Walker’s view, shows how the ghetto 
which resulted from persecution became an excuse for the Jews’ further 
persecution; he sets out the ‘reasons’ for the treatment that the Jews have received 
from others:
The obstinacy with which the Jews have resisted assimilation through the ages [...] is 
obviously due (1) to the ghetto system, which excluded the Jews artificially from full
participation in the cultural life of the host nations [...] and (2) to a stubborn acceptance of the
218 From Prejudice to Destruction, p.44.
219 Gavin Langmuir, Toward a Definition o f Antisemitism, p. 10.
220 Candide (1959), p.282, note 3.
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ghetto system by the Jews themselves.221
The evidence of physical and social separation became symbolized by the barriers 
at the entrance to the ghettos, barriers that both enclosed and excluded. Similarly 
Schwarzbach suggests that the perception of the Jews as ‘antisocial’ may have been 
affected by the way they led their lives, that is dictated by the rabbinic laws, and 
their reaction to the attitudes of the non-Jews with whom they came in contact. As 
the Jews’ isolation became more pronounced, they became ‘plus redoutes, [...] plus 
hais et maltraites, physiquement et 6conomiquement’. According to Schwarzbach, 
while the particularly reduced circumstances in which the Jews (mainly Ashkenazi) 
lived were a result of the treatment the latter received from the Christians, this 
causality was only partially acknowledged by the authors who attributed the Jews’ 
alleged ‘sickliness’ and ‘unhealthiness’* a la surpopulation de leurs quarters’.222
Voltaire himself introduces the dilemma that twentieth-century critics have 
faced when seeking to assess his responsibility for later anti-Jewish attitudes and 
persecutory acts against the Jews. Should we be deemed responsible for unforeseen 
effects of our actions? Voltaire cannot be accused for not knowing what we know 
today, the unfolding of the historic suppression of the Jews, from conversion to 
expulsion and thence, in our own period, to attempted annihilation.223 Recognizing 
the impossibility for one generation to foresee the future events of another, to 
predict the results of its actions, he states:
Si on avait dit alors h Luther qu’il d&ruirait la religion romaine dans la moitid de l’Europe, il 
ne l’aurait pas cru; il alia plus loin qu’il ne pensait, comme il arrive dans toutes les disputes et 
dans presque toutes les affaires. (1756)
Similarly he stresses how those of earlier times would have been unable to 
conceive the depths of brutality to which their descendents would sink; how an act 
of tolerance such as that of the ancient Romans -  the freedoms they extended to the 
early Christians -  would perhaps one day make it possible for the heirs of the early
Church to perpetrate their deeds of savage intolerance. Thus, praising the tolerant
221 ‘Elements of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Anti-Semitism’, p.339.
222 ‘Une nation reni6e -  une nation adoptee’ p.350, p.355.
223 See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction o f the European Jews, 1,8-9.
laws instigated by Locke in Carolina, he writes:
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Ces lois sembldrent admirables, apr6s les torrents de sang que l’esprit d’intol6rance avait 
r£pandus dans l’Europe; mais on n’aurait pas seulement song£ k faire de telles lois chez les 
Grecs and chez les Romains, qui ne soup9onn6rent jamais qu’il pflt arriver un temps oh les 
hommes voudraient forcer, le fer k la main, d’autres hommes k croire. (1761)224
His relation-separation of Roman tolerance and Christian intolerance underlines the 
problems faced by all generations; the uncontrollable character of the effect of their 
actions on those of their successors. Complicated social changes and changes in 
knowledge obfuscate far-reaching decisions distinguishing right from wrong. 
Despite their often honourable aims, men fail through the unpredictability of the 
future, and not knowing what they do, start something new that may promote or 
encourage later, unintended disastrous events. Voltaire’s Enlightenment ‘project’ 
could only hope to foster improvements in the human lot as he knew it: ‘Les 
progr&s de la raison sont lents, les racines des pr6juges sont profondes. Je ne verrai 
pas, sans doute, les fruits de mes efforts; mais ce seront des semences qui peut-etre 
germeront un jour’ (8 January 1764). His faith (such as it was) in the good potential 
of human reason could not extend to future social conditions as yet unpredictable, 
distant effects of countless intervening changes, including the pseudo-scientific 
theory of race and the elaboration of an unheard-of, undreamed-of ‘technology of 
death’. Such an evolution, a collective and largely unintentional process, cannot be, 
or be attributed to, the project of any one individual. It is inadmissible to suppose 
that Voltaire could have ‘dreamt’ or ‘suspected’ the fanatical acting-out to which 
European anti-Jewish attitudes would descend in the twentieth century.225
However, even if Voltaire did not foresee the depths to which modern-day 
antisemitism would plummet, he should have known that his often vituperative 
writing addressing the Jews was bound to foster the anti-Jewish prejudice that had 
existed for centuries. But at the same time, even while accepting the popular 
contention that Voltaire’s writing becomes ever more critical towards the Judaic 
religion, this thesis argues that after his crisis years the discourse loses its
224 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 284,418.
225 D11631 to Elie Bertrand.
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hallucinatory or vitriolic tone as regards the Jewish people. I do not find evidence 
of the ‘grande ferveur antisemite’ that Poliakov discovers reflected in Voltaire’s 
writing during the last period of his life.226 The intentional and stereotypical 
attribution of individual vices to all Jews, to which the writer had admitted in his 
correspondence with Pinto, does not continue to be a driving force for Voltaire. 
From the 1760s his discourse repeatedly refers to the false calumnies still spread by 
the Christians against the Jews, the inhuman victimization of them, and the 
admirable, while for him paradoxical, tolerance of the Jewish people themselves. 
Whether or not Gudnee and others are justified in contending that Voltaire’s 
assertion of Jewish tolerance was a pragmatic measure in order further to promote 
his universal programme, throughout Voltaire’s life this figure recurs frequently, 
not just in the public but also in the private discourse. In his notebooks he describes 
the behaviour of the Jews as a ‘bel exemple de tolerance’ (1735-50?),227 and later 
writing to d’Alembert, comments that despite all the atrocities of the Bible, despite 
the supposedly uncivilized nature of Jews of the past ‘ce meme peuple pourtant 
donne les plus grands exemples de tolerance’. He adds:
il souffre dans son sein une secte accr£dit£e de gens qui ne croient ni k 1’immortality de l’ame 
ni aux anges. II a des pontifes de cette secte. Trouvez-moi sur le reste de la terre une plus forte 
preuve de toiyrantisme dans un gouvemement. Oui, les Juifs ont 6t6 aussi indulgents que 
barbares; il y en cent exemples frappants: c’est cette ynorme contradiction qu’il fallait 
dyvelopper. (13 February 1764)228
Similarly, on the 4 March 1764, writing to Damilaville in a way that reverses the 
representation of a negative Jewish causality, he condemns the Christians for 
having willingly adopted the brutal texts of the Old Testament, while failing to 
learn from the Jews’ more positive behaviour;
On ne peut etre plus atroce et plus barbare que cette nation, cela est vrai; mais si on trouve des 
exemples incontestables de la plus grande tolerance chez ce peuple abominable, quelle le^on
226 Histoire de I ’antisemitism, p. 115.
227 ‘Leningrad Notebook’, Notebooks, 1,399.
228 D 11695.
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Gilman questions ‘the supposed difference between “anti-Judaism” and “anti- 
Semitism” in the history of the treatment of Jews in Europe’, and argues that ‘we 
are dealing with shifts in the articulation of perception, not the basic perception 
itself.230 Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin diminish the separation; they contend 
that the roots of antisemitism are found in Judaism, ‘its distinctiveness and its 
challenges’.231 Langmuir, while accepting that antisemitism is a ‘most misleading 
term’, claims that since the Middle Ages ‘anti-Judaism and antisemitism would 
coexist and be mutually reinforcing’. He suggests that ‘whether or not one thinks 
the terms denote markedly different kinds of hostility depends largely on whether 
one thinks that Jews were primarily responsible for the hostility or that non-Jews 
were’. Following these comments, I find that Voltaire’s hallucinatory writing of the 
1750s about the Jews often consists of what Langmuir describes as ‘chimerical 
assertions’, and so we might, using the term in its loosest and non-historical sense, 
here accuse Voltaire of ‘antisemitic bias’ -  although at this time he adopts similarly 
irrational language when speaking of the Christians and, we must emphasize, does 
not advocate violence against either group. But in his other more rational periods 
his remarks are in tune with those he makes about all peoples; they should be held 
responsible for their own wrongful behaviour, but exonerated from that which is 
not their own fault. In what Bayard might term his more ‘successful’ works, 
Voltaire’s attack concentrates on the teachings and traditions of the Judaic 
scriptures, and on those who in his view foolishly or deviously hold them as sacred. 
Here, I propose, his criticism can legitimately be labelled as marked by anti- 
Judaism. Yet we must also concede that distinctions between anti-Judaism, anti- 
Jewishness and/or what today we call ‘antisemitism’, whether or not consciously or 
unconsciously intended by the writer, may easily lose definition for those who 
cannot or will not see such separations. For this reason I find that the continued 
rashness of Voltaire’s discourse, one capable of perpetuating prejudice or even 
inciting violence, deserves Pinto’s courteous reproach.232
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*  *  *
Christian presumed identity
In the field of Christian identity Voltaire himself is inevitably included, and the 
tonality of his critique changes accordingly. Besides, when reading his texts 
regarding the Christians, we have to remain particularly aware of the added social 
pressures. With the constant threat of persecution by the authorities of the Church 
and State, when attacking the Christians in particular he was obliged at times to 
moderate or to disguise his arguments. As Deidre Dawson points out, remembering 
the non-private nature of correspondence in the eighteenth century, we also have to 
remain aware of the possible separation between the destinataire explicite and the 
destinataire implicite of all letters, and of the intentional double message that the 
writer might be trying to convey, in part for the stated recipient, and in part for any 
wider unknown public. But, in the case of the Christians, Voltaire’s condemnation 
is especially severe, his criticism particularly vehement, partly as a result of his 
personal place among this group, and partly because of the experiences he has 
suffered within that group. Like the Jews depicted in his texts, he is the victimizer 
who has also been victimized.
While the Christians have constructed for themselves an identity founded on 
their alleged civilization, their position of power, their sense of superiority and 
supposed undeniable authority, Voltaire undermines this status. He contextualizes 
them in the area of human weakness and failure and he seeks again to show that 
while culture ‘produces different fruits’, ‘ce qui tient intimement a la nature 
humaine se ressemble d’un bout de l’univers a 1’autre’ (1756). For him, all human 
nature is fundamentally the same: ‘le fonds est partout le meme’ (1756).233 
Therefore, despite his faith in the allegedly different origins of ethnic groups, he 
indicates that all mankind belongs to a shared humanity. This thinking reappears in 
the Sermon du Rabbin Akib (1761) where he presents all difference of colour and 
custom as irrelevant.234
233 Essai sur les moeurs, III, 182 (cf.II, 363).
234 Sermon du Rabbin Akib, pp.280-81.
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Voltaire stresses how Christians continue to judge others by criteria they claim 
as their own, by their ideas of what is right and wrong, judgements based on a 
particular interpretation of morality, and not on the universal, and so he declares: 
‘nous devons etre en garde contre notre habitude de juger tout par nos usages’ 
(1756). More critically still, this characteristic of misplaced pride becomes manifest 
in the religious dimension; the world must be ‘persuaded’ to accept the Christians’ 
teachings and persecuted when it fails to emulate their example. Finding such an 
attitude embodying ferocious aggression and disputatiousness absent from most 
other faiths, Voltaire contends that while the Islamic religion ‘ne s’est 6tablie que 
par les armes’ and the Mohammedans ‘ont eu leurs missionnaires aux Indes et a la 
Chine’ (1756), among the peoples of his own times the spirit of savage proselytism 
is found only among the followers of the Christian faith.”5
In a deliberate departure from the prevailing Eurocentricism, Voltaire contends 
that the Europeans are unattractive to those with whom they have come in contact, 
both in physical appearance and in customs. But more importantly still, by their 
very nature they have appalled other peoples, thereby restricting the spread of their 
religion and culture. He emphasizes how divisions between Christian groups have 
rendered Christ’s teachings incomprehensible to those that his followers wish to 
convert. Repeating his figure of the Jews, Voltaire represents the Christians -  even 
while allegedly on Christ’s missionary work overseas -  as hating and hated:
C’est meme le concours de ces nations [chr^tiennes] qui a nui au progr£s de notre culte.
Commc cllcs sc haisscnt toutes, ct que plusicurs d ’cntrc cllcs sc font souvcnt la guerre dans ces 
climats, elles y ont fait hair ce qu’elles enseignent. [...] Le catholique y combat l’anglican, qui 
combat le luth£rien combattu par le calviniste. Ainsi tous contre tous, voulant annoncer 
chacun la v<5rit<5, ct accusant les autrcs dc mensonges, ils dtonncnt un peuple simple ct 
paisible. (1761)
By representing Christianity in terms of this continued mutual discord, by stressing 
the disunity among the different sects of the Church, Voltaire undermines the very 
assumption of a Christian selfhood.236
235 Essai sur les moeurs, T, 208; TIT, 182.
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Thus, while he partly constructs an identity for the Jews on their allegedly self- 
confessed hatred of others, a desire to remain apart from other peoples, Voltaire 
creates an image of Christian identity based on a hypocritical and false 
representation of charity. He sets out the dichotomy between the claims and the 
realities of religious charity:
charitd dont la th^ologie s’est approprid le nom, comme s’il n’appartient qu’il elle, mais dont 
cllc a proscrit trop souvcnt la rdalitd; charitd, amour du genre humain, vcrtu inconnuc aux 
trompeurs, aux pddants qui argumentent, aux fanatiques qui persdeutent. (1766)237
He intentionally creates a separation between the Christians and others, but one that 
reverses the usual contemporary understanding of their differences; the alleged 
spirit of charity and humanity by which they define themselves is revealed to 
belong not to the followers of Christ, but to those whom the Church seeks to 
convert. The Quakers prove the sole exception to Christian uncharitableness: ‘II 
semble que la loi d’aimer son prochain comme soi-meme n’ait ti€ faite que pour 
ces gens-lif (1764).238 So, in his sermon the rabbi states: ‘Vous savez que quand les 
musulmans eurent conquis toute l’Espagne par leur cimiterre, ils ne molesterent 
personne, ne contraignirent personne a changer de religion, et qu’ils traiterent les 
vaincus avec humanity aussi bien que nous autres isra^lites’ (1761 ).239 Similarly, 
Voltaire shows how the Turks treat with humanity the various Christian sects in 
their midst, an example that has not been emulated by the people of Portugal in 
their dealings with religious others.
Although claiming to love mankind as brothers, the Christians in fact hate and 
persecute all those who hold different opinions and beliefs. This development of 
Christian thinking Voltaire links to their growth in power, and he thus dismantles 
the notion of an authority founded on a moral superiority and the increase of 
enlightenment. In place of the self-claimed mark of identity founded on charity, he 
introduces a dual figure representative of absence, one that emphasizes the 
Christians’ non-existent authoritarian right, and their non-existent benevolence on
which that supposed right is based. Voltaire contends: ‘Des que les chretiens furent
237 Avis au public, p.537.
238 ‘Catechisme du Japonais’, p.494.
239 Sermon du Rabbin Akib, p.280.
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les maitres, ils oublierent le precepte de Jesus et de tant de philosophes, de 
pardonner a leurs ennemis’ (1777). He traces the figure of Christian failure to 
follow the peaceable teachings of Jesus back to the earliest years of Christianity, 
showing how hatred marked its early ambitions, its desire to abolish all faith that 
did not adhere to its own. This introduces his argument as to the fundamental 
difference between the Jews and the followers of the early Church:
Si done on laissa ce peuple [les Juifs] en paix k Rome, e’est qu’il n’insultait point aux lois de 
l’empire; et si on punit quelques chr&iens, e’est qu’ils voulaient d&ruire la religion de l’fitat, 
et qu’ils brfllaient les temples quand ils le pouvaient. ( 1777)240
Even while Voltaire repeatedly portrays the two groups, Jews and early Christians, 
as virtually indistinguishable, peoples originating from the same tradition and the 
same ethnic minority, simultaneously he marks out their difference in terms of the 
tolerance of the former, and the intolerance of the latter; since the beginnings of 
actual recorded history -  outside the world of what Voltaire sees as biblical 
‘mythology’ -  the tolerance of the Jews has enabled them to live in peace, while 
the intolerance of the Christians has destroyed, and continues to destroy, the well­
being of the State. Here the characteristic so often attributed to the Jews has 
become reinscribed in more favourable terms; Jewish exclusiveness is markedly 
different in its peaceable nature from the inclusiveness of the Christians that is 
driven by belligerence. Jews peacefully separate themselves from their other, while 
Christians aggressively seek to convert the other to the same. These figures do not 
just contradict the view accepted in Voltaire’s contemporary European society, but 
more importantly demolish the unarguable authority that it claims to possess.
*  *  *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire undermines the very bedrock of 
Christian identity by setting out to demolish the Christian faith itself. The
illogicalities that he finds present in its texts, beliefs and dogmas lead him to
240 Histoire de Vetablissement du christianisme, p.92, pp.82-83.
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contend that there will be ‘pas besoin de tant de preuves pour ruiner ce malheureux 
Edifice’. He declares that the early Christians, the ‘demi-Juifs’, like the Jews before 
them, belonged to ‘the dregs’ of society, and that they constructed their faith in 
order to ‘se distinguer de la populace’. Thus he dismantles the presumed 
superiority of the Christians by uniting them with the Jewish people, not just in a 
historical, religious tradition, but also in their social degradation and deprived state. 
Their identity allegedly contained in a separate essence, as with the Jews, is in fact 
founded purely on a self-determined difference.241
*  *  *
‘Juifs’
At the same time as Voltaire emphasizes how the Christian tradition has grown 
out of the Jewish faith, how the early believers were converts from Judaism, in the 
third section of ‘Juifs’ he stresses the inconsistent pragmatism that has marked the 
treatment meted out to the Jews by the Church. The actions of the latter have been 
dictated by self-serving ambition and greed, at times using the Jews to achieve its 
own ends, at others promoting conversion, expulsion, persecution and even death. 
Voltaire emphasizes the paradoxical separation/non-separation that both unites and 
divides the two groups; he portrays their individual identities founded on a mutual 
dependence. He relates the suffering of the Jews to the actions of the Christians, 
and thereby invests the perceived identity of the Jews, that marked by errancy and 
diaspora, with a non-Jewish responsibility; their perpetuated vagrancy and non­
belonging is the fault of those who continue to reject them. The identity of the 
wandering outsiders comes from their persecutors, while that of the latter is found 
in the brutality that they perpetrate on their victimized other. Laclau, taking on the 
voice of the victimized, declares: ‘to be oppressed is part of my identity as a 
subject struggling for emancipation; without the presence of the oppressor my 
identity would be different.’242
Voltaire’s texts repeatedly refer to Christ’s Jewishness, and his notebooks 
relate a conversation between Madame Acosta and the Abbe who wished to
241 Sermon des cinquante, p.449.
242 Emancipation(s), p. 17.
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convert her. She asked if Christ was bom a Jew, lived a Jew, and died a Jew, and 
when the answer was always in the affirmative, she responded: ‘Well then be a 
Jew’ (1735-50?).243 This dialogue introduces the tension at the heart of the Judeo- 
Christian understanding, the ambivalence of the two religions’ relationship which 
is founded on ‘une coupure-lien, en resonance avec les coupures-liens qui animent 
toute “identity”’.244 Voltaire constantly seeks to undermine Christian identity by his 
reiteration of Jesus’ adherence to Jewish laws, and in L ’lngenu (1767) he satirizes 
the paradoxical connection/separation between the two religions when he portrays 
the ingenuous Huron’s ready expectation of circumcision following his conversion 
to Christianity. Voltaire discovers in this same mutilating ritual a key to the Judeo- 
Christian relationship. His campaign against religious intolerance had to be 
conducted with caution; he certainly had to be careful when tackling the crucial 
theological difference, the opposed beliefs on the spiritual issue of whether or not 
Christ was the Messiah. So fixing his attentions on the indubitable empirical reality 
of circumcision was his uniquely Voltairean solution, releasing all the energy of his 
gift for derision.
Voltaire constantly re-emphasizes this abitrary distinction between Christians 
and Jews, a unified topic of difference between them, and one which he 
consistently treats as imaginary, meaning non-existent or so slight as not worth 
stressing, and one that certainly is not a worthy pretext for limitless violence. He 
comments that ‘today’ such issues are of too little significance to continue to incite 
bitter disputes between the two groups:
Je sais que l’instrument ou pr6puc£, ou ddpr^pucd, a causd des querelles bien funestes. [...]
Mais apits tout, je ne crois pas qu’aujourd’hui le prdpuce doive produire de si abominables 
horreurs: je ne pense pas surtout que les hommes doivent se hair, se d^tester, s’anathdmatiser, 
se damner rdciproquement le samedi et le dimanche pour un petit bout de chair de plus ou de 
moins. (1771)245
Here the emphasis on difference symbolized by the physical marker of
circumcision or non-circumcision is linked to another, for Voltaire equally
243 ‘Leningrad Notebooks’, p.365.
244 Daniel Sibony, Le ‘racisme’, une haine identitaire, p. 144.
245 ‘Juifs’, p.528.
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arbitrary, marker of difference: the day chosen to celebrate the Sabbath. This figure 
becomes emphasized in the farcical representation of the days allotted to the Grand 
Inquisitor and to Don Issachar to avail themselves of the ‘rights’ to Cunegonde, 
whether the night belongs ‘to the old law or to the new’, a reference that allows 
Voltaire to carry the figure over to the further one of violence.246 In the Sermon du 
Rabbin Akib he links the issues raised by the acceptance or rejection of all such 
religious tenets with acts of savage religious brutality. The rabbi, condemning the 
auto-da-fe, declares:
Deux musulmans ont livr£s aux tourments les plus cruels, parce que leurs peres et leurs 
grands-pbrcs avaicnt un pcu moins dc prdpucc que les Portugais, qu’ils sc lavaicnt trois fois 
par jour, tandis que les Pbrtugais ne se lavent qu’une fois par semaine. ( 1761)2*7
Here we find another example of the way Voltaire uses ridicule, this time directed 
not against the Jews, but against the Christians. Their rejection of certain practices 
-  in this case ritual washing -  now becomes invested with a representation of the 
unclean, thus indicating that the figure has been translated from the circumcised 
outsider to the supposedly civilized subject of Christian Europe. Such mockery of 
ritual Voltaire repeats in the article ‘Secte’, where re-emphasizing the (what is for 
him) non-significance of all ridiculous religious beliefs and practices, he writes:
toute la terre siffle celui qui pretend qu’on ne peut plaire i  Dieu qu’en tenant k sa mort une 
queue dc vachc, ct cclui qui vcut qu’on sc fassc coupcr un bout dc prdpucc, ct cclui qui 
consacre des crocodiles et des oignons, et celui qui attache le salut dternel k des os de morts 
qu’on porte sous sa chemise, ou k une indulgence pl£ni£re qu’on ach£te k Rome pour deux 
sous ct dcmi. ( 1765)248
In the vitriolic second section of ‘Juifs’ found among the private papers, 
Voltaire mocks all so-called sacrifices carried out by peoples across the world, 
‘ceremonies’ that ‘prouvent que le genre humain est capable de tout’. He
incorporates the Jews in all such universal practices, and further reduces the
246 Candide, pp. 145-46.
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significance of these with the comment: ‘Les Cafres, qui se coupent un testicule, 
sont encore un bien plus ridicule exemple des exces de la superstition’ (undated).249 
This figure is repeated in the Essai sur les mceurs where he writes that among the 
Hottentots a similar operation has been performed since time immemorial, ‘sans 
que ces peuples sachent pourquoi et comment cette coutume s’est introduite parmi 
eux’. Then with biting sarcasm that reduces all ritual to irrationality, he adds: ‘II est 
certain qu’ils n’en peuvent rendre qu’une mauvaise raison; et e’est l’origine de bien 
des usages dans le reste de la terre’ (1761).250 This relating of ritual to the 
‘uncivilized’, reappears some years later when, with particular mocking reference 
to circumcision, Voltaire again brings together all such ceremonies. In Un Chretien 
contre six Juifs, referring to his fictional ‘friend’, he writes: ‘je vous jure qu’a son 
age et au mien nous ne prenons aucun parti ni pour les nations prepucieres, ni pour 
les nations deprepuc^es, ni pour les chatres, ni pour les entiers, ni pour les voisins 
du cap de Bonne-Esperance’ (1777). Thus, attacking on two levels, he condemns 
the brutality of physical mutilation, and reduces to senselessness and unreason any 
markers of identity, those of omission as well as those of commission.251
In the same vein, in ‘Juifs’ Voltaire demolishes the deeper foundations of the 
significance given to the rite of circumcision by his mocking comment to the Jews 
that he has been their servant, their friend, their brother ‘quoique mon pere et ma 
mere m’eussent conserve mon prepuce’ (1771). Addressing a public reared in the 
Christian tradition, he proposes that the issue is not that of circumcision alone. 
Non-circumcision is every bit as ritualistic as circumcision: difference becomes a 
matter of indifference, and the Christians and Jews are indistinguishable. Voltaire 
reasserts that violence is not triggered by these markers of difference, but by their 
close complementarity in the Jewish-Christian relationship, a complementarity of 
rejection by each group of the other. The underlying logic of his condemnation lies 
in the figure of the two groups hating one another for imaginary differences that do 
not belong to reality, because in fact the groups depend on one another for their 
very identities; they are, each for the other, their self-other relationship and it is this
relationship which is their only unity.2S2 As Douglas writes:
249 ‘Juifs’, p.522.
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If two symbolic systems are confronted, they begin to form, even by their opposition, a single 
whole. In this totality each half may be represented to the other by a single element which is 
made to jump out of context to perform this role.
In Voltaire’s interpretation, circumcision/non-circumcision is the element that 
represents the separation. His discourse repeats in reverse the Jews’ and Christians’ 
reversal of sameness into difference, and makes use of the traditional identification 
of the two religions to pass off his critique of Christianity as a figure of Jewish 
exclusivity. But the two groups are not reduced to the same by his rhetoric; some 
can only be identified as ‘prepuciers’ because others practise circumcision. And 
while the critique cannot come from outside the Jewish-Christian complementarity, 
the singular value of Voltaire’s argument, as well as its inescapable fragility, lies in 
his belonging to i a  nation prepuciere’ ,2®
*  *  *
Essai sur les moeurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
Again asserting that the Christian inheritance of the Judaic religious texts and 
practices excludes just one ritual, which thus acquires the status of marker par 
excellence of the distinction between Jews and Christians, in the Essai sur les 
moeurs he writes: ‘Ce peuple doit nous interesser, puisque nous tenons d’eux notre 
religion, plusieurs meme de nos lois et de nos usages.’ Once more Voltaire stresses 
the tension in Judeo-Christian thinking, emphasizing the ‘interest’ that one has for 
the other, an interest based on their shared religious tradition. But he then again 
reduces the difference by remarking that ‘nous ne sommes au fond que des Juifs 
avec un prepuce’ (1769). He traces the origins of the desire to mark out that 
difference from the time of the early Christians -  those ‘demi-juifs, demi-chretiens’ 
-  who were confused with the Jews, by reason of their sharing many customs and 
practices: ‘on les confondait avec les Juifs, parce qu’ils etaient leurs compatriotes, 
parlant la meme langue, s’abstenant comme eux des aliments defendus par la loi 
mosai'que’ (1756). Thus the early indistinguishable Christians felt driven to take ie
253 Natural Symbols, pp.43-44.
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nom de chretiens’ (1769). Voltaire gives the Christians’ intentional separation from 
the Jews as a reason for the hatred allegedly felt by the latter for the new sect: 
‘Leur haine pour les chretiens, ou galiteens, ou nazar^ens, comme on les nommait 
alors, tenait de cette rage dont tous les superstitieux sont animes contre tous ceux 
qui se s6parent de leur communion’ (1756). Even though divisions soon occured 
among the early disputatious followers of Christ, ‘les veritables Juifs 6taient les 
ennemis irr^conciliables de tous ces partis’ (1769).254 Judeo-Christian hatred 
originated in those particular tensions found ‘entre identites tr&s proches, entre 
“fares’” .255
Voltaire then takes his criticism still further. He introduces a figure that unites 
the Christians and the Jews in their common arrogance and mistaken thinking: 
‘Notre ignorante credulite se figure toujours que nous avons tout invente, que tout 
est venu des Juifs et de nous, qui avons succede aux Juifs’ (1769). But, 
undermining Judeo-Christian claims of authority, founded partly on a (for Voltaire) 
mistakenly held antiquity, he concludes: ‘De quelque cot6 que nous nous toumions, 
il faut avouer que nous n’existons que d’hier’ (1756) -  he removes antiquity as a 
ground for authority. But here, while he takes away from the Jews their special 
identity defined by such allegedly false claims to an ancient history, at the same 
time he reverses the argument and invests the members of Christendom with an 
authority not just independent of these, but, more importantly, one actually 
supported by their absence. The Jews, because of their allegedly recent past, are 
denied such authority, while, for the same reason, that very status is afforded to the 
Europeans. He writes: ‘Nous allons plus loin que les autres peuples en plus d’un 
genre; et e’est peut-etre parce que nous sommes venus les demiers’ (1756).256
But the image Voltaire creates of the European is not a static one based on a 
conception of the polarized self/other relationship that prioritizes the first term; he 
shows that the Christian self -  like that of all other groups -  contains strangeness, 
ambiguity and inconsistency. He understands that ‘etrangement, l’etranger nous 
habite: il est la face cachee de notre identity’. The European self, like all others, ‘se 
revele comme un etrange pays de frontieres et d’alterites sans cesse construites et
254 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 162; 1,223-24.
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deconstruites’.257 But Fenichel, while affirming that ‘one’s own unconscious is also 
foreign’, shows that it is the presence of this stranger in the European self that has 
given rise to antisemitism with its attempted projection on to the Jewish outsider of 
the unacknowledged qualities found in the self. He writes: ‘Foreigness is the 
quality which the Jews and one’s own instincts have in common.’258
Voltaire’s discourse is highly mobile and he constantly dismantles his own 
argument, thereby obliging the reader to reconsider his own thinking. So, although, 
at times, he represents the Europeans as superior in most aspects of modem life, 
and portrays them as the yardstick against which all peoples should be compared, 
at others, he reverses the usual thinking of his own society, showing how fault lies 
on the side of the argumentative and war-mongering members of Christendom who 
slander those who do not belong to their own group.
Nous avons calomni£ les Chinois, uniquement parce que leur m^taphysique n’est pas la notre; 
nous aurions dfl admirer en eux deux mdntes qui condamnent k la fois les superstitions des 
paiens et les moeurs des chretiens. Jamais la religion des lettr^s ne fut d£shonor6e par des 
fables, ni souill^e par des querelles et des guerres civiles.
Thus, even while presenting the Chinese as an ‘espece d’hommes, si differente de 
la notre’ (1756), behind Europe in the sciences, and incapable, as he contends, of 
certain skills found among the Europeans, he declares they are ‘toujours sup6rieurs 
dans la morale’ (1756). Their admirable appreciation of the laws would cause them 
to be astounded were they to witness some of the actions of the Christian world. 
Addressing his fellow Europeans, Voltaire summarizes that the Christians’ 
misjudgements of others have come about because ‘we’ have indeed judged them 
by our standards, and because ‘nous portons au bout du monde les prejuges de 
notre esprit contentieux’ (1756).259
So too, even though indicating the supposedly special merits of the peoples of 
Europe, such as the progress of their sciences that have allegedly surpassed those 
of Asia, and even though stating that the peoples of the north have proved to be
257 Julia Kristeva, Etrangers a nous-tnemes, p.9, p.283.
258 ‘Elements of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Anti-Semitism’, p341.
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superior to those of the south, he further dismantles his argument with the comment 
that ‘en general, les hommes du Midi oriental ont re9u de la nature des moeurs plus 
douces que les peuples de notre Occident’. This has led all travellers to concede 
that the character of the people of India ‘n’a rien de cette inquietude, de cette 
p&ulence, et de cette duret6, qu’on a eu tant de peine a contenir chez les nations du 
Nord’. Contending that ‘le physique de 1’Inde differant en tant de choses du notre, 
il fallait bien que le moral diff£rat aussi’, he then declares: ‘Leurs vices etaient plus 
doux que les notres’ (1761). Giving further weight to this demolition of a 
Eurocentric notion of superiority, Voltaire shows the non-mutual dependence 
between the Europeans and the people of India.
Nos peuples occidentaux ont fait edater dans toutes ces decouvertes une grande superiority 
d’esprit et de courage sur les nations orientales. [...] Mais la nature leur avait donnd sur nous 
un avantage qui balance tous les notres: e ’est qu’elles n’avaient nul besoin de nous et que nous 
avions besoin d’elles. (1756)
He emphasizes the mistaken arrogance of the West and reveals its thinking not as a 
standard for the universal, but as an undesired, unaspired-to example of the 
particular.260
The Christians are thus represented as the opposite of those non-Europeans so 
often at the time portrayed as less civilized. For Voltaire, while all humanity is 
brutal, the people of Europe are more savage than those of the East. This fury 
‘entre bien moins dans le caractere des peuples de l’lnde et de la Chine que dans le 
notre’ (1756). Stressing his intention to reject the received opinions and to resist 
the common prejudices, he presents an alternative truth. He shows how in a 
complete reversal the Christians -  with the sole exception of the Quakers or 
Anabaptists -  have forgotten the peaceful teachings of Christ and have taken to a 
course of savage intolerance, whereas the followers of Islam have moved from 
their allegedly violent beginnings to a policy of tolerance and indulgence. He 
writes:
Bomons-nous toujours k cette verity historique: le legislateur des musulmans, homme puissant
260 Essai sur les mceurs, I, 189; II, 373.
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et terrible, dtablit ses dogmes par son courage et par ses armes; cependant sa religion devint 
indulgente et toterante. L’instituteur divin du christianisme, vivant dans l’humilit6 et dans la 
paix, precha le pardon des outrages; et sa sainte et douce religion est devenue, pas nos fureurs, 
la plus intoldrante de toutes. (1761)261
Furthermore, by representing the ancient Romans as tolerant in their treatment 
of all sects who did not disrupt the stability of the state, Voltaire is able to attribute 
to the Christians a lasting characteristic of disputatiousness, one existing from 
earliest to most recent times. Within the more contemporary framework he shows 
the full implication of this accusation by underlining the destructive results brought 
about by the devious investigative procedures of the Inquisition, actions that 
created a situation in which ‘il n’y eut plus d’amis, plus de society’ and ‘le frere 
craignit son frere, le pere, son fils’ (1756). The Church’s continued destruction of 
society points to what is, for Voltaire, its enduring criminal nature. But when 
contending that the Romans showed tolerance to those living throughout their 
empire, Voltaire makes the dismissive comment that they looked on the Jews ‘du 
meme oeil que nous voyons les Negres, comme une esp&ce d’hommes inferieure’ 
(1761).262
Voltaire’s thinking on the different peoples of the world, mostly known to 
those of the West through the unreliable reports of travellers, missionaries, traders, 
and soldiers, not only reflected the ignorance of his times, but also rested on a 
belief in the probability of multigenesis, a theory that caused him to place 
individual groups at various levels on a hierachical scale. So describing black men 
as an ‘espece d’hommes differente de la notre’, he writes that ‘on peut dire que si 
leur intelligence n’est pas d’une autre espece que notre entendement, elle est fort 
inferieure’ (1761). But, even while suspending judgment on this reference to the 
myth of white superiority, we find that Voltaire uses this same figure to launch a 
fierce attack on the Christians. Reporting the alleged religious practices of the 
Church during the eleventh century, he writes: ‘A n’envisager que les coutumes 
que je viens de rapporter, on croirait voir le portrait des Negres et des Hottentots; et 
il faut avouer qu’en plus d’une chose nous n’avons pas ete superieurs a eux’
261 Essai sur les moeurs, III, 180; I, 221.
262 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 351; 1,223.
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(1756).263 A similar indictment of Christian brutality also appears in his letter of the 
24 October 1761 to d’Argental: ‘Abominables chretiens, les negres que vous 
achetez douze cents francs valent douze cents fois mieux que vous!’ Thus he shows 
that European particularism, even while relating to the universal, has no moral 
claim to define it.264
*  *  *
Candide
In Candide Voltaire again addresses the notion of confused identity in the 
Christians, emphasizing the separation between their actions and the specious 
claims of charity and humanity on which their identity is based. He draws attention 
to the way their hypocrisy conceals manipulative intent; this becomes manifest in 
the devious actions of the Inquisitor who commands an auto-da-fe. This ceremony, 
created by the Church in order ‘to save souls’, for Voltaire embodies alleged 
Christian charity in its most spurious form. But the fictional event has an even 
more illegitimate and malicious purpose. While the Inquisitor sets it in motion 
ostensibly to quell the earthquake, it soon becomes clear that his more personal aim 
is to intimidate his rival, Don Issachar. The full significance for Voltaire of this 
figure of corrupt private ambition dressed as religious zeal becomes apparent when 
we find that he repeats it almost identically some sixteen years later in the Histoire 
de Jenni (1775). Such duplicity also appears in the passage that repeats the figure 
of the Sermon du Rabbin Akib; Voltaire in the words of the black slave declares 
that ‘nous sommes tous enfants d’Adam, blancs et noirs’, a message whose full 
satirical impact is revealed by the further stipulation that this is the ‘Sunday’ 
teaching of the men of the Church. Stressing the arbitrary distinction given by 
Christians between their chosen holy day and the rest of the week, Voltaire 
underlines the dishonesty of the Christian message, one that, while affirming the 
rights of others, in fact deprives them of all such rights.265
Just as Voltaire seeks to undermine the identity of the ancient patriarchs by
263 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 357; 1,387.
264 D 10090.
265 Candide, p. 196.
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emphasizing the uncertainty of their names, ‘Mos6 ou Moise’, ‘Adonis ou AdonaT, 
and the early Christians as ‘Nazarenes’ or ‘Galileans’, in his contes and other ludic 
works he makes use of a similar device. The intended innuendos behind the 
fictional names draw attention to the instability of our understanding of all identity. 
At times these nominal terms give an indication of the true nature of the 
protagonists (the nonsensical verbalist, Pangloss, the cruel, hard Vandendur and the 
ingenuous hero himself), but at others they point to an ambiguity, an ironic reversal 
of our expectations (the ‘pure’ or possibly ‘saintly’ Cunegonde). But even the lack 
of a name may serve as a marker of identity; the brutalized old woman represents 
the loss of beauty, the castrato the loss of manhood, the mutilated black slave the 
loss of freedom, and the arrogant unreasoning young baron the loss of authority.266
In his text Voltaire plays with figures of misperception, misplaced identity, and
non-recognition. The Oreillons mistake Candide for a friar, and the monarchs see
him as a man of importance. As for the hero himself, he misunderstands the
relationship between the monkeys and the young women, unadvisedly trusts the
dishonest Dutch merchant, and fails to perceive the multiple deceptions perpetrated
against him in Paris. So too, on various occasions he fails to recognize Pangloss,
Paquette, Frere Girofl6e, and the baron. In this way identity is revealed as fluid and
unreliable, a dual construct by the subject who observes it and by the subject who
owns it, a situation comically revealed at the start of the tale with the representation
of the supposedly important old baron and baroness finding their identity solely in
the compliments of their fawning admirers. As for the Christians, they invest their
personal identity with a mistaken authority by emphasizing their difference from
others, bulgares from abares, Catholics from Protestants, Christians from Muslims
or Jews, the ‘civilized’ from the ‘savage’. While the young baron remains always
incapable of standing back from this polarized viewpoint, Candide having escaped
the restrictive world of the castle in Westphalia gradually becomes able to stand
outside the conditioning of his episteme. During his travels, particularly as the
outsider in South America, he is encouraged to question his own thinking further,
to develop his self-understanding. These literary figures, while undermining the
Europeans’ identity, calling into question the Christians’ political and moral
superiority, their self-claimed right to positions of authority, enforce Voltaire’s
266 Reference to Saint Cunegonde appears in llfau t prendre un parti (1772), p.548.
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message: the need for self-examination, for a rejection of prejudice, and for 
tolerance.
* *
La Pucelle
Voltaire portrays mankind’s moral sense as a quality that inevitably develops 
in the individual when he or she is not manipulated by those who abuse their own 
reasoning. Like Locke, he denies the existence of innate ideas, but, diverging from 
his predecessor, he believes humanity to be bom with a natural tendency towards 
an understanding of the just and the unjust. In La Pucelle Voltaire depicts Jeanne 
d’Arc, like Candide, as having a comprehension of the universal interpretation of 
justice, while those who are supposedly more enlightened perpetrate acts of 
extreme savagery and immorality. The almoner, the confessor and the archbishop 
ignore or dismiss the dictates of their religion to satisfy their passionate, selfish 
ambitions, and thus, by their denial of the truly moral, represent the negative side 
of education and the abuse of reason. In this way, Voltaire again represents the 
unfoundedness of the Christian’s alleged superiority, a claim built on the unstable 
base of their presumed understanding of what is right or wrong.
In this text Voltaire plays with the motif of markers, and he mocks the 
significance attributed to them. Therefore he portrays Charles VII bowing down in 
reverence when he sees the fleur-de-lys that Jeanne has drawn on the buttocks of 
Monrose, his rival for the affections of his mistress, Agnes. But as Tsien illustrates, 
Voltaire creates an even more negative figure of the Christian idea of selfhood that 
emphasizes the instability of this construct. She points to the influence on Voltaire 
of Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso, ‘in particular the scenes in which the title character 
goes on a killing rampage, losing his identity and becoming unrecognizable to 
others’. She adds that he then ‘tears off his armour and clothes to run naked in the 
forest’ where his skin becomes so tanned that ‘he no longer resembles a Christian, 
which is one of the defining qualities of his identity’. Indeed, in La Pucelle 
Voltaire stresses these two themes; nakedness and loss or lack of identity. 
According to John Leigh, the former element, symbolic of the lewdness of the
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poem, is a literalized metaphor for the naked truth that the writer wishes to expose. 
In the case of the second element, Tsien demonstrates how -  as in Le Marseillais et 
le lion (1768) with its emphasis on the common feebleness of mankind without the 
trappings of authority -  Voltaire relates the notion of identity to that of perceived 
status; the devious Hermaphrodix when ensnaring Jeanne and others in his castle, 
reduces them to a state of insanity so that ‘each character forgets the individual 
identification of the others and whether they are male or female, friend or foe, 
social equal or not’. Thus, in the words of Tsien, the ‘characters fail to recognize 
themselves’ and ‘fail to recognize those around them’ -  the instability of the 
Christian identity becomes fully revealed.267
267 ‘Voltaire and the Temple of bad taste’, p.395, p.390, p.391.
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Voltaire repeatedly directs his criticism of religion against its refusal of the 
universal, or its specious claim to universality for its particular beliefs. Any 
religion that makes such assertions, that affirms its exclusive chosenness, its unique 
possession of the holy word, denies the freedoms and rights of all others. By 
claiming for itself the absolute religious identity, it logically cancels or reduces 
other religious identities. In the deist’s thinking, any individual religion’s claim to 
universality fails on the grounds of its exclusivity. As Mervaud points out: ‘Le 
theiste ne peut qu’etre hostile a l’idee d’une revelation reservee a un peuple, k 
l’exclusion du reste de 1’humanity.5268 Voltaire sets out the aims of the deist thinker, 
declaring: ‘II y a un Dieu, et il faut etre juste. Voila done la religion universelle 
etablie dans tous les temps et chez tous les hommes’ (1765).269 And in the 
Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke he states:
La religion doit etre claire, simple, universelle, k la portae de tous les esprits, parce qu’elle est 
faite pour tous les coeurs; sa morale ne doit point etre etouffde sous le dogme, rien d ’absurde 
ne doit la d£figurer. (1766)270
Rejection of the absurd becomes part of Voltaire’s condemnation of the reliance of
religions on the fabulous. In Le Taureau blanc (1773) he emphasizes -  through
satirical parody -  the confusion between possible truth and blatant falsehood, and
shows how this confusion enters into story-telling. This text regales us with contes
that are represented as histoires, thereby underlining the way fictional tales,
generally purported to amuse, may falsely acquire the reputation of genuine
accounts that bring about enlightenment. In this story Voltaire weaves together
supposedly sacred narratives of different ages, peoples and places. He postulates
that such fables or myths, through their deceptive or dishonest self-presentation as 
268 Le ‘Dictionnaire philosophique’ de Voltaire, p.89. Pomeau investigates how Voltaire used the 
terms ‘theist’ and ‘deist’ (La Religion de Voltaire, p.428). But Besterman contends Voltaire made 
no distinction and, finding Pomeau’s explanation of deism inadequate, proposes that since 
Voltaire’s beliefs rested on such ‘highly abstract philosophic notions’ that he ‘was at most an 
agnostic’ -  although Pomeau shows that this term did not exist in the eighteenth century 
( Voltaire, p.221, p.218, p.232).
269‘‘Secte’, p.520.
270 Examen important, p.284.
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truths, undermine the natural religion. He indicates how it is only by rejecting such 
man-made fictions that we may discover what universal beliefs unite us. As he 
summarizes, when fable is stripped away: ‘Nous sommes tous de la meme religion 
sans le savoir. Tous les peuples adorent un Dieu, des extremites du Japon aux 
rochers du mont Atlas: ce sont des enfants qui crient k leur p&re en differants 
langages’ (1768).27'
♦ * *
The Jews and the question of exclusivity
Voltaire’s antipathy towards every religion that attests its universality to the 
exclusion of all others lies at the heart of his attack against Judaism. But Douglas 
questions the latter’s alleged exclusivity and points to the way ‘Leviticus teaches 
the congregation, “Love the stranger as thyself’ (Lev. 19.34)’.272 Similarly, 
Kristeva shows how in Judaism the claim to universality does not rest on its 
exclusion of others, but rather on its openness to all who adopt its teachings: ‘sans 
cesse la Torah revient sur les devoirs des Juifs a l’egard des Strangers, et on note 
qu’aucun autre commandement [...] n’est repete aussi souvent.’ But the religion’s 
embracing of others goes further:
dans l’esprit du judaisme, 1’integration totale de l ’dtranger dans la communautd juive fait 
pendant k l’id6e de ‘peuple 61u’: je suis un ‘dlu’, mais le privilege de l’dlection est cependant 
‘ouvert k n’importe quel individu, k n’importe quel moment’ -  d’oil il rdsulte une ‘conception 
hybride de l’eiection qui passe par l’h6r&Iitd et par le libre ralliement de toute conscience 
individuelle ou collective’. (author’s italics)
Kristeva then adds:
Cependant, de son c6te, le monothdisme biblique avait inclus F6tranget6 dans 1’Alliance 
divine. Contrairement k l’image trop facilement regue d’un ostracisme du peuple elu k
271 Sermon preche a Bale, p.583.
272 Purity and Danger, p.67.
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l’encontre des autres, il avait inscrit depuis des mill£naires, au fondement m§me de la royautd 
hdbraique, les Strangers capables d’accepter le contrat divin.273
But Voltaire, seeing this covenant as belonging solely to a particular religion, 
allows himself mockingly to reiterate many of the contemporary stereotypical 
fantasies so that he may deny Judaism’s universality and diminish the Jews’ 
alleged status of chosenness. Mercilessly deriding their claim to possession of the 
one and only religion, he repeats the age-old anti-Jewish figure of proud 
presumptuousness. In the Histoire de Vetablissement du christianisme he 
sarcastically makes reference to the alleged claims of the Jewish people, writing:
Mos£ ou Moise (si on en croit les livres qui courenl sous son nom) veut que le maitre de 
l’univere ne soit que le Dieu du petit peuple juif, qu’il ne protege que cette poignee de sc£l£rats 
obscurs, qu’il ait en horreur le reste du monde. (1777)274
He further denies the rationality of such claims by (on this occasion) depicting the 
Jews as related to the Arabs whom he has at times similarly denigrated. He asks 
‘Comment a-t-on ose supposer que Dieu choisit une horde d’Arabes voleurs pour 
etre son peuple cheri et pour armer cette horde contre toutes les autres nations?’ 
(1766).275
But in La Philosophie de Vhistoire Voltaire invests this state of chosenness 
with a quality that is detrimental to the Jews themselves.
Mais il faul toujoure se souvenir que non seulement les Juifs dtaient le peuple ch£ri de Dieu, 
mais l’instrument de ses vengeances. C’6tait par lui qu’il punissait les pdch£s des autres 
nations, comme il punissait son peuple par elles. (1765)276
He makes chosenness a causality, an instrument of God’s punishment of man, a 
factor which in turn he connects to the Jews’ universally persecuted state. He 
understands the price paid by the Jews for being God’s chosen people, the link
273 Strangers a nous-memes, p.98, pp. 101-02, p.93.
274 Histoire de Vetablissement du christianisme, p. 112.
275 Examen important, p. 183.
276 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, pp.243-44.
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between their chosenness and their continuous suffering: ‘Par ma foi, la nation 
ch&ie est une nation bien malheureuse’ (1771).277 As expressed by Blanchot, 
for the Jewish people Telection n’est pas un privilege’.278
So while, for Voltaire, the Jewish claim to chosenness may belong in the realm 
of myth and may be the cause of suffering to the Jews as a particular group, by its 
denial of the universal, the reality that its presents is more problematic to all 
mankind. He creates his argument against the Jewish claim of chosenness by 
attacking the sanctity, veracity and morality of their biblical texts; by denying the 
truth or justice of these, he endeavours to destroy any justification on the part of the 
Jews to such a claim. Voltaire’s agenda belongs to that of the Enlightenment, 
whereby, according to Jean Starobinski, ‘ce qui etait le sacre, au debut du XVIII6 
siecle -  r6v61ation ecrite, tradition, dogme -, a 6te livre a la critique 
“demystifiante” qui l’a reduit a n’etre qu’oeuvre humaine, imagination 
fabuleuse’.279 He therefore opens the Sermon des cinquante with the prayer: ‘si Ton 
peut deshonorer la Divinite par des fables absurdes, perissent ces fables a 
jamais.’280 This comment permits him to deny that that is exactly what he is doing 
through his demolition of the scriptures -  an interesting instance of what Francesco 
Orlando calls ‘reversal of the subject’, one of the forms of denial that Orlando finds 
constitutes much Enlightenment rhetoric, here compounded with another form of 
denial, ‘extraneity’ or distanciation. Orlando expressly uses the Freudian concept 
of denial (or ‘denegation’) while proposing that the compromise formation, in 
Enlightenment critique, is not sexual but political in character, and does not arise 
from a return of the repressed but from the need to mask a scandalous aggression. 
His detailed analysis of these compromise formations in which the political makes 
use of primary processes, and which usually function in the sexual domain, 
reminds us of the proximity of the two dimensions, at least in the writing of 
Voltaire.281
Voltaire questions Judaism’s claim that God’s truth might be handed down in 
the written word. This he does first by his reference to the obvious mistakes that
277 ‘ Juifs’, p.535.
278 ‘Paix, paix au lointain et au proche’, p.5.
279 ‘Fable et mythologie aux XVII' et XVIII' siecles’, in Le Remede dans le mal, p.260.
280 Sermon des cinquante, p.438.
281 See ‘ Rh&orique des Lumi6res’.
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the texts contain -  satirically attributing these to the copyists, who alone are 
allowed to make errors -  and second by his comparison of the Jews with the black 
peoples, who have no written language. This comparison, even while implying that 
both groups lack reason and civilization, creates a further reversal in that the latter 
appears to belong to a more honest, non-manipulative society, similar to that which 
Candide discovers in Eldorado.
The first prong of Voltaire’s attack is against the fabulous element that he finds 
in the biblical texts, and he again makes use of ridicule to carry out his indictment. 
Repeatedly, while stressing the chronological, geographical, physical impossibilites 
that he finds evident in the Old Testament, he mockingly feigns credence of the 
accounts, and acceptance of their teachings; he pretends to renounce the right of 
humans to question the word of God. His satirical affectation of obedience to the 
dictates of the religious authorities, his adherence to an unquestioning acceptance 
of the biblical ‘oracles’, because ‘il ne nous est pas permis d’en douter’ (1756), 
enable him to introduce one of his major indictments against religion; the stifling 
of ordinary reason.282 While in La Bible enfin expliquee, he contends that ‘ce n’est 
pas avec les yeux de la raison qu’il faut lire ce livre, mais avec ceux de la foi’ 
(1776), in the Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke he remarks that a man ‘qui 
re^oit sa religion sans examen ne differe pas d’un boeuf qu’on attelle’ (1766).283 But 
even though Voltaire derides the fantastical element that he finds in the biblical 
texts, he also repeatedly makes use of it. To suit his purpose, frequently he relates 
these ‘fables’ in a factual mode. At such times, he bases his exegesis on a literal 
reading that purposely ignores these texts’ quality of figure, of which Katz writes 
that the ‘mythical images, metaphorical expressions, and anthropomorphic 
descriptions’ are ‘attempts to express the divine essence’.284 It is here that Sutcliffe 
identifies the focus of Voltaire’s anxieties, the elements of mythic thinking that the 
author ‘wished to but could not expunge from the application of reason’. But 
Voltaire’s representation is part of his rhetorical programme; by selective use of 
such manipulative interpretation, he can condemn the texts not just for their 
‘absurdity’, but also for their ‘barbarity’ -  two qualities he frequently binds
282 ‘Juifs’, p.512.
283 La Bible enfin expliquee, p. 17, note 1; Examen important, p. 169.
284 From Prejudice to Destruction, p. 15.
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together.285
Here we touch on the second prong of his attack, directed at the brutality found 
in the Bible. Even while dismissing the ancient accounts as fiction, he condemns 
the instances of savagery and fanaticism that they report. He allows those same 
biblical ‘facts’ that he has dismissed as ‘fictions’ to be used as grounds for his 
condemnation, and denounces the prophecies, events and customs that these 
‘fables’ relate, censuring, by the same token, those who continue to honour these 
scriptures. Thus he manipulates his presentation of the texts according to his 
particular agenda of the moment. In a letter to Damilaville he acknowledges his use 
of such manipulation in order to reveal the ‘falsity’ of the biblical texts and to 
ecraser Vinfame:
Je crois que la meillure manure de tomber sur l’infame, est de paraitre n’avoir nulle envie 
de l’attaquer; [...] de faire voir combien on nous a tromp£ en tout; de montrer combien ce 
qu’on croit ancien est modeme; combien ce qu’on nous a donnd pour respectable est ridicule; 
de laisser le lecteur tirer lui-meme les consequences. (9 July 1764)286
In a similar vein, to d’Argence he writes: ‘jamais la dispute n’a convaincu 
personne; on peut ramener les hommes en les faisant penser par eux-memes, en 
paraissant douter avec eux, en les conduisant comme par la main, sans qu’ils s’en 
aper9oivent’ (14 March 1764).287
* * *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire links the figure of the Jews’ belief in 
their chosenness to that of their supposed desire for eventual world mastery -  
again he gives evidence of his adherence to the contemporary stereotypical 
thinking. But with obvious irony that refers to their repeated enslavement, which he 
insists is the very contradiction of their alleged assertion, Voltaire writes:
285 ‘Myth, Origins, Identity’, p. 116.
286 D11978.
287 D11769.
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Laissons 1& cette nation atroce dans sa captivity de Babylone, et dans son esclavage sous les 
Romains, avec toutes les belles promesses de leur dieu Adonis ou Adonai, qui avait si souvent 
assure aux Juifs la domination de toute la terre.
Feigning a desire to distance himself from ‘tous ces miracles faits pour donner au
peuple juif un malheureux coin de mauvaise terre, [...] au lieu de leur donner la
fertile terre d’£gypte ou ils 6taient\ he mockingly scorns the Jews’ claim to their
special status: ‘Si ce Dieu leur avait voulu donner une bonne terre, il pouvait leur
donner l’£gypte; mais non: il les conduit dans un desert.’288
Voltaire repeats his accusation that the Jews claim that their holy word ‘ne
permet pas d’en douter’, but then contends that the evidence of their ‘ghastly’
history makes it impossible for the ‘virtuous and wise’ to believe in the Scriptures;
he bitterly indicts the way that, in his mind, Judaism contradicts the universal
morality. He considers that whereas religion, the ‘secret voice’ of God, should
unite and not divide mankind, Jewish history has been one of discord and division.
But the proof of the falsity of their particular claim lies, he says, in the Jews’
refusal, as he construes it, of a genuinely universal religion open to all mankind:
‘done toute religion qui n’appartient qu’a un peuple est fausse.’ Throughout the
Sermon des cinquante, he adds constantly to the figure of falsity and dismantles the
Jewish claims by presenting opposing logical arguments which serve to refute the
supposed veracity of the texts. The ‘falsity’ of the claim of Moses’ authorship is
exposed, he says, by anachronism; the illogicality of the Creation by the
contradictory sequence of events; the fictitiousness of the geographical
descriptions by the mistaken facts of the locations. He brings the divinely inspired
word down to the level of mundane impossibilities and he declares that when the
sun stopped at Gabaon and the moon at Aialon, i a  nature suspend ses lois
etemelles’. He savagely mocks the Jewish faith, deriding the fabulous nature of its
stories; ridiculing Jewish doctines of the ‘clean’ and the ‘unclean’, he questions the
feasibility of Noah’s Ark in which ‘doivent entrer sept paires de tous les animaux
mondes, et deux des immondes’. He queries how these creatures might have been
sustained, and then, questioning the source of all the flood waters, he
contemptuously dismisses the notion of divine intervention -  God’s creation of
288 Sermon des cinquante, p.441, p.444.
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cataracts in the sky -  and concludes that ‘ceux qui ecrivaient cela n’6taient pas, 
comme vous voyez, grands physiciens’. And, in order to reinforce his message 
regarding the impossibility of these accounts, Voltaire makes use of his most 
destructive mockery in the literal repetition of certain events; he reports how the 
Jews were spared from their neigbours’ wrath when Tanesse parle tres 
raisonnablement et assez longtemps au prophete’, and how Eve was expelled from 
paradise as a result of the tempting words of the serpent who ‘parlait alors comme 
l’homme’.289
* * *
La Pucelle
Voltaire’s reduction of the Jewish holy word to the level of the ludicrous
becomes most emphasized in La Pucelle. He mocks the biblical texts by
commenting that in recounting his story he has ‘copied’ the facts, not invented
them (1750-62) -  a pointed reference to what he sees as the unreliable inaccuracies
of the sacred writings. He also underlines the need to read texts with caution;
satirically pointing to the poem’s intentional misreporting of the facts concerning
Jeanne d’Arc’s parentage, he comments that ‘c’est une fiction poetique qui n’est
peut-etre pas permise dans un sujet grave’ (1730-62). He asks us again to question
our ideas of what is untrue and what is true, what is for amusement and what is for
spiritual enlightenment or moral instruction. And when referring to the Bible, he
foregrounds through antiphrasal comments or footnotes what he finds to be the
scriptures’ contradictions or absurd elements, contriving thereby to demolish the
stories by means of his unrelenting and undisguised humour. To add to his
sarcasm, he describes fifteenth-century military deeds and battles in terms taken
from the Bible, giving particular emphasis to the Jews’ dependence on arms such
as ‘lance, clou, dague, epieu, caillou, machoire’ (1730-62). As in the Sermon des
cinquante, he mocks the biblical account of the donkey of Balaam, in this case
introducing into his story a comparable figure in order to reveal the so-called
‘foolishness’ of the Jewish faith and the ‘mistakenness’ of its claim to chosenness.
He makes certain that his reader sees the connection between his fiction and the
289 Sermon des cinquante, p.446, p.444, p.438, pp.445-46.
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Jews’ ‘false’ assertion. Jeanne’s donkey, ‘speaking well’ says: ‘J ’avais parle deux 
fois & Balaam, / Voyez en moi l’ane de Canaan’ (1755-62).290
Jennifer Tsien shows that this figure of the ass ‘with its traditional attributes 
of stupidity and general lasciviousness’ not only ‘reverses the “natural order’” , but 
also ‘demonstrates the degradation of the world’. As she points out, ‘such figures 
help Voltaire to convince readers of the fundamental vulgarity and barbarism of 
the Old Testament’. They show his ‘contempt for the animal legends of the Bible 
and his concern that they could be taken literally by the uneducated, or the 
vulgaire\m However, while Voltaire here parodies the biblical story, we find that 
he demonstrates a non-awareness of what Douglas contends is the parodical nature 
of that original story itself. For her the Balaam episode is a political lampoon 
against someone in authority with a big stick’, a satire where the donkey possibly 
represents ‘the patient people of Israel’.292 But in his later text the Trait6 sur 
la tolirance Voltaire gives a more balanced, if still slightly mocking, portrayal of 
the figure of the donkey, showing the commonly understood interpretation to be 
the result of other people’s misconception. He writes:
dans le temple de Salomon [...] des ch&ubins sont posds dans l’arche, ils ont une tete d ’aigle et 
une tete de veau; et c ’est apparemment cette tete de veau mal faite, trouv6e dans le temple par 
des soldats romains, qui fit croire longtemps que les Juifs adoraient un ane. ( 1763)293
At the same time in the figure of the donkey, as it appears in La Pucelle, 
Voltaire creates a further negative representation of how language may be 
intentionally misused. Jeanne is tempted to succumb to the advances of her donkey 
as a result of his flattering tone, just as in the Garden of Eden, i e  serpent 
seducteur / Quand il voulut subjuguer notre m&re, / Lui fit d’abord un compliment 
flatteur’ (1730-62) -  a representation that emphasizes the way the flatterer counts 
on the foolishness of the person he dupes.294 Linguistic manipulation can serve to 
reinforce the position of social or religious systems and authorities through
290 La Pucelle, XV, 15, p.496; II, p.278 (note 2; de Voltaire); II, 230, p.287; XX, 179-80, p.565.
291 ‘Voltaire and the Temple of bad taste’, p.378, p.384.
292 In the Wilderness, p.225, p.221.
293 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 199.
294 La Pucelle, XX, 169-71, p.564.
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unintelligible words and false compliments, what the Quaker terms ‘cet indigne 
commerce de mensonges et de flatteries’ (1734).295 Voltaire’s point, therefore, 
implies that Judaic scripture has bequeathed illogical and incomprehensible (and 
yet supposedly indisputable) teachings to its followers, and ‘flattered’ them with 
the idea of their chosenness. Such actions forbid debate and instead command total 
credulity and obedience. Stating that Charles VII puts his trust in ‘whosoever’ can 
read, Voltaire indicts any such reliance on the written word. In La Pucelle he 
constantly weaves his figurative network, uniting images of the word, non-reason, 
religious fantasy, falsity, manipulation and misguided innocence. In this way, he 
reiterates his savage criticism of the Bible, representing it as a pernicious text that 
by devious practices has ‘deceived’ the unworldly and the uneducated.296
But, to take his attack further, Voltaire makes use of another comic rhetorical 
device; in the poem he personifies Stupidity, Ignorance, Pride, Imagination, 
Credulity and others. These figures serve to confuse the protagonists of the poem, 
so that on arrival at Hermaphrodix’s castle Jeanne and her knight, Dunois, believe 
themselves (like Candide in Westphalia) to be in the earthly paradise (1730-62). 
Thus Voltaire through a farcically parodic manipulation represents the Genesis 
story, the foundation on which the Bible is based, as one of foolish fable, credible 
only to the gullible. Promoting the Enlightenment agenda, the demolition of the 
dependence on mythic origins, he emphasizes how blind and unreasoning faith 
plays on imagination which ‘abjure le bon sens’, and ambiguity which 
incorporates:
La louche 6nigme et les mauvais bons mots
A double sens, qui font l’esprit des sots.
Les prdjugds, les misprises, les songes,
Les Contresens, les absurdes mensonges. (1730-62)297
* * *
295Lettres philosophiques, 1,6.
296 See Jean Starobinski ‘Sur la flatterie’, in Le Remede dans le mat.
297 La Pucelle, IV, 244, p.328; XVII, 43, 60-63, pp.520-21.
106
‘Juifs’
In ‘Juifs’ Voltaire presents the discord of the ancient Jews as a contradiction to 
the true meaning of religion. He describes the separation, as related in the Old 
Testament, of the Jewish ‘realm’ into two ‘little provinces’, Judah and Israel, each 
with different customs and beliefs: ‘chaque faction ayant done ses rois, son dieu, 
son culte, et ses prophetes, elles se firent une guerre cruelle’ (1756).298 But Cotoni 
draws our attention to the way that in the Traite sur la tolerance (1763) ‘il ne dit 
rien du schisme, ni de la haine qui s’eleva entre Juda et Israel’. This omission in 
the later text again gives us evidence of how Voltaire manipulates his 
interpretation of the Bible, cutting and pasting his references at will. As Cotoni 
and others point out, a figure of Jewish intolerance and disputatiousness would not 
serve his purpose in the Traite; in this case (where the writing is more controlled), 
he needs an example of positive Jewish behaviour in order to give force to his 
message of universal tolerance.299
In ‘Juifs’ Voltaire repeats the figure of the Jews’ supposed ambitious desire for 
world domination. He uses this popular fantasy to reiterate his allegation regarding 
the Jewish ‘oracles’:
Presque tous les peuples qui ont ecrit l’histoire de leur origine ont voulu la relever par des 
prodiges: tout est miracle chez eux. [...] Ce qui distingue les Juifs des autres nations, e ’est que 
leurs oracles sont les seuls veritables: il ne nous est pas permis d’en douter. Ces oracles, qu’ils 
n’entendent que dans le sens litteral, leur ont predit cent fois qu’ils seraient les maitres du 
monde; [...] Ils doivent done croire, et ils croient en effet, qu’un jour leurs predictions 
s’accompliront, et qu’ils auront l ’empire de la terre. ( 1756)300
While in this instance Voltaire diminishes his criticism of perceived Jewish
aspirations by incorporating them into the universal foolishness of mankind, he
then derides their particularity, contending that the Jews are still ‘today’ ‘en
horreur aux hommes, assurant que le ciel et la terre, et tous les hommes, ont ete
crees pour eux seuls’ (1756). He proceeds to demolish this notion of world
mastery by repeating his Jewish figures of impoverishment, forced wandering and 
398 ‘ Juifs \p .5 15.
299 ‘Ambivalences et ambiguitds dans le “Traite’” , p. 187.
400‘Juifs’, p.512.
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non-belonging, which he suggests expose the illogicality of their argument. The 
Jews have founded their mistaken belief in chosenness on the evidence of their 
holy books, despite the non-fulfilment of the prophecies and predictions that these 
contain: ‘ils n’ont jamais possede qu’un petit coin de terre pendant quelques 
annees; ils n’ont pas aujourd’hui un village en propre’ (1756). In his later highly 
sarcastic ‘Reponse a quelques objections’, Voltaire drives home his satirical attack 
on the Jewish faith in God’s promises. Entitling his sixth letter ‘Sur la beaute de la 
terre promise’, he immediately proceeds to reduce Jewish claims for their divinely 
given lands to the realm of the everyday and the pointedly banal, representing ‘ce 
malheureux desert’ as unequal to Provence. But he then takes the ridicule further, 
addressing the Jews with the comment that should they regain possession of 
Jerusalem and its surrounding lands from the Turks:
II est vrai que vous n’auriez point de chevaux, parce qu’il n’y a que des anes vers Hershalaim, 
et qu’il n’y a jamais eu que des anes. Vous manqueriez souvent de froment, mais vous en 
tireriez d’figypte ou de la Syrie. (1771)
Thus Voltaire invests the Jews’ faith with an image of absurdity and falsity, 
represented by the figure of foolishness (the donkey) and by the figure of 
unworthiness, indicated by his implied reference to what he portrays as the Jews’ 
‘thieving’ past.301
By connecting a theoretical future to the reported events of the Bible, Voltaire 
might here appear to be creating an enduring essence for the Jews, the single 
historical entity discovered by Katz. But I propose that, in Voltaire’s view, such a 
permanent essence exists only in the minds of the Jews, who see themselves 
eternally as God’s elect. For him, the ‘problem’ of fixing the Jewish identity rests 
in the absence of such an essence; it is not to be found in chosenness. To 
strengthen his argument, Voltaire brings the Jews’ existance down to the level of 
the worldly or the commonplace, and emphasizes the elements of banality and 
victimhood that he discovers in their ancient scriptures. The highly satirical tone of 
the above passage confers an excessively mundane character on the persecuted
301 ‘Juifs’, p.518, p.512, pp. 538-39. Here Voltaire’s intention behind his spelling of Jerusalem 
appears to be to emphasize ‘foreignness’, and therefore it has not been standardized.
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people of the sacred stories, and, rather than seeking to carry forward into the 
future continued attributes that point to the enduring nature of the biblical Children 
of God, his suggested reference to the ancient texts acts in a regressive way; he 
portrays the ancient Jews as having the everyday charactistics of a living (and 
deprived) people, a representation that undermines their divinely given status. He 
reinscribes the Jews of the Bible in terms of a basic if not immoral humanity. 
However, at the same time he mockingly and selectively creates a reverse 
movement by investing the future with an implication of the reported or alleged 
‘failings’ of the biblical people. I would argue that the passage does not appear to 
have as its main purpose the creation of a permanent Jewish entity; it does not 
pretend to be historical or factual, but introduces a figure that is purely 
hypothetical. I propose that here Voltaire has a more serious intent; he wishes to 
present his contemporary Jews with a choice. Either they have to accept that they 
are related to a so-called ‘wretched’ people of the biblical past, or they have no 
special heritage; either their identity of chosenness is grounded in a common 
human banality or it is historically absent.
While he writes scornfully that the Jews resist questioning and refuse to admit 
to the presence of any doubt, by use of irony, he satirically charges the Bible with 
deception through his often repeated comment that the evident mistakes must be 
the responsibility of the copyists ‘qui seuls ont pu se tromper’ (1756). Voltaire 
asserts the ‘falsity’ of the biblical message by adopting the impersonal form and 
by feigning surprise: ‘on dit’ (1756), ‘on a pretendu’ (undated), ‘ce qu’il y a de 
singulier’ (undated), ‘vos livres disent’ (1771). Once more linking blind faith to 
imagination, he describes the Bible stories as a ‘suite continue de prodiges qui 
etonnent 1’imagination, et qui exercent la foi’ (1756). He pretends that his 
‘historical’ approach will allow these texts to be ‘depouill^s du concours celeste et 
des miracles que Dieu daigna si longtemps operer en faveur de ce peuple’ 
(1756).302 This passage clearly throws into relief the issues that he wishes to 
criticize -  the confusion of an histoire of fact and the mere relation of fiction, the 
claimed chosenness of the Jewish people, the explanation of the incredible by the 
insistance on faith. He scorns man’s dependence on supposed authority and
antiquity, a mode of proof that he reveals as worthless by the figurative network he
302 ‘Juifs’, p.515, p.520, p.523, p.524, p.529, p.512.
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creates between the written word and those peoples commonly assumed in his day 
to be uncivilized: ‘11 se peut que les negres d’Angola et ceux de Guinee soient 
beaucoup plus anciens que vous, [...] mais les negres ne nous ont pas encore 
communique leurs livres’ (1771). Voltaire sees it as an impossibility that the Jews, 
a wandering and often enslaved ‘horde’, who ‘ne furent jamais ni physiciens, ni 
geometres, ni astronomes’ (1756), could have taught their beliefs and ways to the 
rest of the world: Les grands peuples ne peuvent tirer leurs lois et leur 
connaissances d’un petit peuple obscur et esclave’ (1756).303
* * *
Candide
In Candide Voltaire again parodies the Old Testament texts, drawing his
depictions of battle scenes from those described in the Bible. Here too the images
are deeply critical, and the humour that is ever evident in the conte appears with
satirical force to depict the absurd and unreasoning behaviour of mankind.
Deriding all religious and philosophical systems that base their authority on
unintelligible teachings, he sarcastically portrays Candide listening ‘in good faith’
to Pangloss. He repeats his indictment against faith itself which is shown to be
founded on unreason and a blind, even apathetic, acceptance of a teaching that, far
from good, may often be harmful. Pangloss, ‘the oracle’ in the Baron’s castle,
becomes a metaphor for all dogmatic prescription and illogical thinking that denies
all question, that refuses all right to doubt. By contrast, in the idealistic world of
Eldorado we find the truly honest, non-manipulative society, one based on reason.
Eschewing sectarianism and artificially based social systems and hierarchies, it
follows the ‘religion of the whole world’, and, avoiding man-made dogma, it
praises God while allowing others to worship him as they wish. Voltaire
emphasizes the absence in Eldorado of priests and monks ‘qui enseignent, qui
disputent, qui gouvement, qui cabalent’; he makes no mention of books or the
recounting of fables. Instead, he describes his perfect society, one that
concentrates on the factual sciences, mathematics and physics, those same
sciences that he repeatedly contends were absent from the world of the ancient
303 ‘Juifs’, p.531,p.521.
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Jews. The representation Voltaire creates around the figure of Eldorado may be 
viewed as the polarized opposite of all that he finds manifest in Judaism -  
universality as opposed to particularity, reason as opposed to ‘foolish’ dogma, 
factual knowledge as opposed to faith founded on fable.304
* * *
Essai sur les mceurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
In La Philosophie de Vhistoire Voltaire exploits the Jews’ state of wandering 
to throw into question the authority of the Jewish texts. He presents a practical 
reason for rejecting the antiquity and veracity of these ‘oracles’:
Les peuples errants doivent etre les demiers qui aient dcrit, parce qu’ils ont moins de moyens 
que les autres d ’avoir des archives et de les conserver, parce qu’ils ont peu de besoin, peu de 
lois, peu d’6v6nements, qu’ils ne sont occup6s que d ’une subsistence prdcaire, et qu’une 
tradition orale leur suffit. [...] ce n’est qu’au bout de plusieurs sifccles qu’une histoire un peu 
d6taill6e peut succ&ier k ces registres informes, et cette premiere histoire est toujours mel£e 
d ’un faux merveilleux, par lequel on veut remplacer la v6rit6 qui manque.
Voltaire reinforces this demolition through his device of linking the Jewish people 
to other allegedly ‘primitive’ populations; Samoyeds, Nazamons and Eskimos. He 
asks whether, if these other groups tried to present similarly incredible ancient 
stories as true, ‘ne se moquerait-on pas de ces pauvres sauvages’ (1765).305 And 
going further, in the Essai sur les moeurs he contends that the Jews have 
manipulated the truth and ‘enveloped’ it with ‘ridiculous fables’ (1756).306 He 
therefore concludes: ‘La superstition a toujours une mauvaise logique’ (1765).307
Adding to his figure of the falsity of Jewish claims, he emphasizes the failure 
of the prophets’ promises. As the biblical Jews, ‘comptant toujours sur leur 
delivrance, sur les promesses de leurs prophetes, sur le secours de leur Dieu’,
remained ‘abandoned by Providence’, and as the Jews who were Voltaire’s
304 Candide, p. 189.
305 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, pp.269-70.
306 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 160.
307 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.208.
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contemporaries continued to live in a state of deprivation and even persecution, he 
reasserts that the claims of the prophets were false; Jewish prophecies have never 
come true and the veracity of all the Jews’ pretensions are thus undermined. God 
did not give ‘la fertile £gypte a son peuple cheri’, and the state of their ‘wretched’ 
lands in Judah proves that God’s covenant has never been fulfilled. To further his 
demolition of all Jewish claims, Voltaire intentionally uses repetition, constantly 
reiterating sarcastically that God ‘deigned’ to serve his chosen people -  by his 
multiplication of their number ‘contre l’ordre de la nature’, by his decision to 
become ‘le roi du peuple ju if , and by his enactment of such ‘nouveaux prodiges’ 
as the Fall of Jericho (1765) -308
Can we arrive at a general conclusion concerning this plethora of rhetorical 
devices? Brumfitt contends that La Philosophie de Vhistoire, by asserting that 
whosoever ‘claims divine authority for his laws is [...] both un “traitre” and 
“un blasphemateur’” , contains ‘a final condemnation of Judaism and Christianity’. 
Indeed the tone is highly critical when addressing the Jews’ religion, but I find that 
at times in this text Voltaire softens his condemnation of the Jewish people.309 As 
in ‘Juifs’, he represents their pretensions as a widespread misconception, common 
to many others, and contends that ‘il n’y eut presque point de peuple qui ne 
conservat dans ses archives, ou qui n’eut par la tradition orale, quelque prediction 
qui l’assurait de la conquete du monde’ (1765).310 Tony Myers, in his study 
of Zizek, writes: ‘The racist, confronted with the abyss of the Jew’s desire, makes 
sense of it by constructing a fantasy in which the Jew is at the centre of some 
nefarious plot, such as to take over the world.’ But, even while repeating the 
common stereotype, Voltaire reveals the claim of world domination to be one 
common to most people, and therefore not a valid excuse for ostracism or 
persecution of any individual group. According to him, in this instance the Jews 
are like most other people.311
He shows the way ignorance has given rise to such false pretensions that in 
turn have led to suffering. He demonstrates how the Jewish people’s belief that
God had the right to ‘punir les peches des Cananeens par les mains des Juifs’ was
308 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.232, p.222, p.225, p.227.
309 Introduction to La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.320.
310 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p. 194.
311 Slavoj Zizek, p.98.
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a prime reason for their persecution by others.
II n’est pas bien 6tonnant que les peuples voisins se r^unissent contre les Juifs, qui ne 
pouvaient passer que pour des brigands execrables dans l’esprit des peuples aveugl^s, et non 
pour les instruments sacr£s de la vengeance divine et du futur salut du genre humain. (1765)
However, here, by a further ironic mocking reversal that calls on the reader to 
effect the displacement, Voltaire creates an image of foolish and ignorant 
blindness, not in those who could not see the ‘true’ nature of God’s chosen people, 
but in the Jews who failed, and allegedly continue to fail, to perceive themselves 
as others must have seen them, that is as mere savage ‘brigands’. This suggested 
element of failure links with Voltaire’s representation of Jewish responsibility and 
his demand for their engagement in an honest self-criticism.312
* * *
The Christian Word
Manifestly, in the claim to the one true word, salvation through Christ’s 
mediation being the only path, Christianity breaches the universal in exactly the 
same way as does Judaism. As we have seen, for Voltaire such mistaken thinking 
is common to humanity, and he states that ‘dans toutes les religions de 1’Orient, le 
peuple est appele le peuple de Dieu’ (1769).313 The Jewish people are not alone in 
considering themselves uniquely privileged by God, and in the case of the Jews 
and the Christians their identical claims express their most extreme desire to mark 
a difference from the other. In ‘Sur les Pensees de M. Pascal’, Voltaire declares 
that the Jansenist promises ‘the empire of the world’ to those who follow his 
beliefs, and he questions the logic of any ‘system’ that contends that ‘Dieu n’est 
venu que pour si peu de personnes’ (1734).314 In a similarly critical mode, he writes 
that at the time of the Roman Empire, ‘il est incontestable que les chretiens
312 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.228, p.229.
313 Essai sur les mceurs, 1,200.
314 Lettres philosophiques, II, 191.
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voulaient que leur religion fut la dominante’ (1764), and later he contends that 
when Europeans arrived in China, Tonkin and Japan they declared: ‘nous sommes 
sur la terre les seuls qui aient raison, et que nous devons etre partout les maJtres’ 
(1772).315
In his depiction of the two groups, Jews and Christians, Voltaire uses identical 
language in order to strengthen the comparison; in the Sermon des cinquante he 
charges the writers of the Old and New Testaments with having tricked the people, 
and in the Homelies prononcees a Londres, by innuendo, he accuses the copyists 
of the Gospels of having ‘changed the texts’ (1767) -  a criticism that does not rest 
on an ironic suggestion of mistake, but clearly indicates the presence of definite 
devious intention. But, for Voltaire, deceitful manipulation on the part of the 
Christians becomes most manifest in the workings of the First Council of Nicaea 
(325). This council was called by the Emperor Constantine to settle the bitter 
controversy that occupied Christian minds regarding the nature of Christ’s 
divinity.316 Whereas, according to Karen Armstrong for example, this was ‘no arid 
debate but concerned the nature of the Christian experience’, a deliberation where 
the participants ‘were struggling to articulate this experience in conceptual 
symbols to explain it to themselves and to others’, Voltaire finds the dictates that 
proceeded from the council to be the basis of all subsequent Christian dispute. He 
throws doubt on the arbitrary nature of the decisions appertaining to future 
Christian doctrine, and questions the charge of heresy laid against those who held 
beliefs that were previously considered to be acceptable.317 Querying the right of 
authorities to persecute those who continue to revere earlier creeds, he asks 
whether ‘la cruaute, 1’injustice, seraient-elles moins grandes, de punir aujourd’hui 
celui qui penserait comme on pensait autrefois?’ (1763).318
Armstrong, while agreeing that dispute among Christians developed from the 
proceedings of the council, contends that much of this came about as a result of 
the confusion between Western and Eastern thought. She points to the Roman 
Church’s failure to distinguish the difference, as marked out by Basil, Bishop of
Caesarea, between kerygma and dogma. She explains:
315 ‘Tolerance’, VF, p.553, M.xx, p.525 (originally in the Questions sur TEncyclopedie).
316 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.479.
317 A History o f God, p. 132.
318 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 189.
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Both kinds of Christian teaching were essential to religion. Kerygma was the public teaching 
of the Church, based on the scriptures. Dogma, however, represented the deeper meaning of 
biblical truth, which could only be apprehended through religious experience and expressed in 
symbolic form.
So, just as Basil had warned, much of Christian teaching ‘lay beyond words, 
concepts and human powers of analysis’. Armstrong then summarizes the 
problems this presented to the Enlightenment thinkers:
Thus the Trinity must not be interpreted in a literal manner; it was not an abstruse ‘theory’ but 
the result of theoria, contemplation. When Christians in the West became embarrassed by this 
dogma during the eighteenth century and tried to jettison it, they were trying to make God 
rational and comprehensible to the Age of Reason.
Voltaire indeed sees dogma as a contradiction to that reason, but his argument 
goes further, representing it more as ‘the public teaching of the Church’, and less 
as that ‘deeper meaning of biblical truth [...] expressed in symbolic form’ (my 
emphasis).319
Rodney Bomford, borrowing from the thinking of Freud, links man’s 
understanding of God with the workings of the Unconscious. He writes:
The attributes of God are evidently close cousins, at the very least, of the characteristics of the 
Unconscious. What the mystic leaves behind the cloud of unknowing, the philosopher attempts 
to deal with by reasoned argument. If the philosopher’s God is the same as the God of the 
mystics, or in any way like him, then the philosopher will have to speak of his or her God in 
the modalities imposed on language by the Unconscious.
Following his reading of Matte Blanco, Bomford relates religious understanding
to the primary application of symmetry as found in the Unconscious, ‘the
registration of sameness and the ignoring of difference’, and he therefore proposes
that ‘many of the historic controversies of Christianity may be resolved by
319 A History o f God, pp. 133-34, p. 138.
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accepting the necessity of expressing them through paradox and myth, by 
recognising the symmetric logic implicit in all talk of God’. He adds that ‘a people 
who have lost touch with their myths will be exposed to the loss of the centre, for 
they will have no language to connect it with the rest of life’.320 Zizek proceeds 
with this argument, writing:
philosophy needs the recourse to myth, not only for external reasons, in order to explain its 
conceptual teaching to the uneducated masses, but inherently, to ‘ suture’ its own conceptual 
edifice where it fails in reaching its innermost core, from Plato’s myth of the cave to Freud’s 
myth of the primordial father and Lacan’s myth of lamella. Myth is thus the Real of logos: the 
foreign intruder, impossible to get rid of, impossible to remain fully within it.321
This takes us to the root of the problem as seen by Voltaire. For him, all religions 
(except that ‘natural religion’ which he seeks to promote) have been created in 
myth, and by myth he means fable, a story or fantasy that instead of uniting a 
community or giving it meaning, misleads the people. Such myths, whether held 
by Jews, Christians or others, may deny the universal and lead to the breakdown of 
a society.
For Kristeva, just as the Jews showed a way towards a universality through the 
possibility of an embracing of their faith by all, the Christians found a similar 
entrance into the universal through the logos, the Word made flesh in Christ. The 
Ecclesia of Saint Paul was ‘une communaute autre: celle des differents, des 
etrangers transcendant les nationalites par la foi dans le Corps du Christ 
ressuscite’. Kristeva points to the message in Paul’s letter to the Colossians :
D£barrassez-vous des agissements de l’homme ancien que vous dtiez, et revetez l’homme 
nouveau, qui progresse vers la vraie connaissance en se renouvelant a l ’image de son Crdateur. 
Alors vous etes dans un monde oil il n’y a plus ni Grecs, ni Juifs, ni circoncis, ni incirconcis, ni 
Barbares, ni Scythes, ni esclaves, ni hommes libres, mais le Christ, qui est tout en tous.
In the thinking of the early Church: ‘L’alienation de l’etranger cesse dans
320 The Symmetry o f  God, pp.74-75, p. 27, p. 135, p. 150.
321 On Belief, p. 11.
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l’universalite de 1’amour pour 1’autre.’ But Kristeva then shows the gradual 
degradation of Christian teaching, whereby over time Tetranger n’est pas exclu 
s’il est chretien, mais le non-chretien est un etranger dont l’hospitalite chretienne 
n’a cure’. And the decline went further:
Mais d£s son age d ’or, aux IVe et V' si&cles, et tout en manifestant cette largeur d ’esprit qui lui 
a confer^ sa seduction et sa force initiales, le cosmopolitisme chretien porte en son sein cet 
ostracisme qui exclut l’autre croyance et aboutira & l’lnquistion.
From this time Christians ‘tout en se voulant universelles, n’acceptent en leur sein 
que ceux qui adoptent la meme universalite’ (author’s italics).322 The Church’s so- 
called cosmopolitism becomes nothing more than, what Laclau terms, the 
‘universalization of its own particularism’.323 Voltaire, linking the Christians to the 
Jews through their common hatred for the other, suggests to Elie Bertrand that this 
characteristic has marked their past behaviour:
Ils n’ont regardd et traitd comme freres que ceux qui dtaient habillds de leur couleur.
Quiconque portait leur livr^e dtait regardd comme un saint. Celui qui ne l’etait pas dtait 
saintement 6gorg6 en ce monde et damn£ pour l ’autre. (26 December 1763)324
But his criticism then emphasizes the particular lack of charity of Christ’s 
followers: ‘Ce christianisme vous ordonne 1’hospitalite, et rien n’est moins 
hospitalier que vous’ (1768).325
Mythos and logos, the modes of representation seen as indispensable in the 
pre-Enlightenment world, may be thought of as coming apart by the eighteenth 
century. Armstrong unites this era: ‘the people of Europe and America had 
achieved such astonishing success in science and technology that they began to 
think that logos was the only means to truth and began to discount mythos as false
and superstitious.’326 And yet, for Voltaire, the problem of Christianity also exists
322 Strangers a nous-memes, p. 113, p. 121, p. 124, p. 127, p. 128, p. 101. The quotation comes from 
Colossians 3,9-11.
323 Emancipation(s), p. 24.
324 D11580.
325 Sermon preche a Bale, p.587.
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within the holy word itself, the logos that, according to Christian doctrine, became 
incarnate in Christ. He declares that while in the time of Plato the logos was 
wisdom, ‘la raison de l’£tre supreme’, for Christians it has become the Word and 
‘a second person of God’ (1764). This takes his attack on to another, more serious, 
plane: for Voltaire it is no longer just the dogma, but the divine itself, that is man’s 
creation. In Le Taureau blanc (1773) we find this notion of faith founded on a 
man-made divinity most obviously parodied; this story centres around the triple 
metamorphosis of Nebuchadnezzar, changed by human word from man to beast to 
god (a representation that Guenee condemns for its lack of biblical foundation). 
And, drawing on what he mockingly refers to as Vhistoire veritable of the Old 
Testament, Voltaire creates another dual attack; against the illogical stories of 
ancient Judaism, but also against the newer and supposedly more rational beliefs 
of Christianity. He finds that the Christian word has been spread by means of its 
unintelligible nature, and that it has resisted reasoned opposition by its use of the 
incomprehensible. So in ‘Religion’, while attacking the inaccessible nature of the 
Christian doctrine -  such as ‘la consubstantialite du Pere et du Verbe, et la 
procession du pneuma, organe divin du divin logos, deux natures et deux volont^s 
resultantes de 1’hypostase’ -  he condemns the Church’s adoption of ‘une 
metaphysique profonde et au-dessus de 1’intelligence humaine’ (1764).327 Through 
his repetition of the complex terms adopted by the Church, he emphasizes its 
failure to convey a meaningful doctrine, and by including himself among those 
who cannot understand, he exposes the universal non-comprehension of the 
Church’s teachings. Still more seriously, he shows that the dispute as to whether or 
not Jesus is the Word has brought about a history of bloodshed. He writes:
S’il est Verbe est-il 6man6 de Dieu dans le temps ou avant le temps? S’il est 6man6 de Dieu 
est-il codtemel ou consubstantiel avec lui? Ou est-il d ’une substance semblable? [...] On 
sophistiquait, on ergotait, on haissait, on s’excommuniait chez les chrdtiens pour quelques-uns 
de ces dogmes inaccessibles k l ’esprit humain. (1767)328
He summarizes that intolerance is ‘le droit des tigres; et il est bien plus horrible,
327 ‘ Religion’, p.478.
328 ‘ Alius’, pp.369-70.
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car les tigres ne dechirent que pour manger, et nous nous sommes extermines pour 
des paragraphes’ (1763).329 Attacking the obscure doctrines of the Church with his 
satirical comment that ‘la religion chretienne n’en demeurera pas moins vraie 
quand meme on n’en tirerait pas ces conclusions ingenieuses, qui ne peuvent servir 
qu’a faire briller l’esprit’ (1734), he shows how Christianity has moved away from 
its universal base, its openness to all people, and has become controlled and 
manipulated by an elite who re-enforce their position by presenting themselves as 
intellectually superior.330
* * *
Sermon des cinquante
When addressing the Christians’ claim to their unique faith, in the Sermon des 
cinquante Voltaire draws attention to the complexity of their beliefs: ‘on fait de 
Jesus le logos, le Verbe-Dieu, puis consubstantiel a Dieu son pere.’331 But, as he 
again points out in the Homelies prononcees a Londres, such confusing thinking 
or such use of difficult terms, often becomes the cause of dispute and bloodshed: 
‘Enfin, depuis la consubstantialite jusqu’a la transsubstantiation, termes aussi 
difficiles a prononcer qu’a comprendre, tout a ete sujet de disputes, et toute 
dispute a fait couler des torrents de sang’ (1767).332 In the Sermon he repeats his 
condemnation of the destructive potential of religious myths to society as a whole. 
Such beliefs, Voltaire contends, find their origins in man-made dogma alone, a 
dogma created by authorities to satisfy their own ends. He proposes that at first 
men did not dare to ‘faire de cet homme un Dieu, mais bientot on s’encourage’, 
and Christ came to be regarded as God. Voltaire questions which ‘metaphysic of 
Plato’ mixed with the ‘Nazarene sect’ eventually brought about the Trinity, an 
article of faith that is abhorred by the Muslims as an act of idolatry. He demolishes 
its credibility by creating his own fable of falsity: ‘On imagine la Trinite, et, pour 
la faire croire, on falsifie les premiers evangiles.’ He represents the Christian word
329 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 158.
330 Lettres philosophiques, II, 186.
331 Sermon des cinquante, p.451.
332 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.454.
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itself as an act of deception.333
Voltaire uses a similar figure to that adopted in his demolition of the Jewish 
texts; just as the Jews called their writings holy, the Christians’ histoire of Christ 
‘est rapportee dans les livres qu’on nomme Evangiles’. As with the Old 
Testament, he points to the contradictions evident in the Gospels, but, adding 
further to the critical tone, suggests a deviousness in the eventual selection of 
these scriptures; of the original forty-nine, the Church authorities chose four, those 
whose message they considered most compatible.334 Seeking to create a separation 
between fact and fiction that he does not find exists in the early Christian texts, 
Voltaire claims that the writer Flavius Josephus makes no mention of Christ since 
he is ‘un historien trop grave pour avoir fait mention d’un tel homme’. He 
continues:
En un mot, point d’artifices, de fraudes, d ’impostures, que les nazardens ne mettent en oeuvre: 
et aprfcs cela on vient nous dire tranquillement que les apotres prdtendus n’ont pu etre ni 
trompds ni trompeurs, et qu’il faut croire a des tdmoins qui se sont fait dgorger pour soutenir 
leurs depositions.
Demolishing the claims to Christ’s divinity, Voltaire then suggests that the 
accusations that the Christians level at others are in fact true of themselves, and he 
asks satirically: ‘N’en reconnaissez-vous pas vous-memes de supposes?’335
In this highly critical text the writing moves from a factual demolition of all 
biblical scriptures -  both Jewish and Christian -  to a vitriolic attack often couched 
in scatological terms. To diminish the status of the Christian word, the incarnation 
of Christ, Voltaire not only emphasizes his human nature, but reduces his status 
further by added figures of immoral heritage and mythical inaccuracy. He relates 
Christ’s birth to the ‘adulterous homicide’ of David, and connects his conception 
to what he calls the incomprehensible predictions and disgusting actions of the 
prophets: Isaiah’s fathering of Maher Salal-has-bas, whom the Christians ‘ont 
detoume en faveur de leur Christ’; the much repeated and allegedly ‘disgusting’
333 Sermon des cinquante, p.451.
334 Sermon des cinquante, p.449; the number of these Gospels varies in Voltaire’s texts; fifty are 
mentioned in the Philosophie de Vhistoire.
335 Sermon des cinquante, p.451, p.452.
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meal of Ezekiel, interpreted as ‘un type, une figure de l’figlise de Jesus-Christ’. 
Voltaire reinforces his mocking demolition by reference to the Gospels’ 
contradictory records of Christ’s forebears; having emphasized Jesus’ putative 
family line to Joseph he then adds the sarcastic comment that ie s  evangelistes 
assurent que Jesus n’est pas fils de Joseph’. Christ is thereby represented in two 
opposing ways: on one hand, the offspring of Mary alone with no connection to 
the House of David, on the other, the descendent of that honoured, but highly 
immoral, human line.336
As Brumfitt and M.I. Gerard Davis suggest, this text, written in the middle 
years of his life before the appearance of Candide and the author’s involvement in 
causes celebres, marks the period of Voltaire’s most negative discourse regarding 
Jesus.
In his early works [...] Voltaire had shown himself markedly hostile to the person of Christ, 
and this hostility had, if anything, intensified with the years. [...] But already in the Traite sur 
la tolerance of 1763, a new note had been struck, and after 1767 it became the predominant 
one. Christ ceased to be an object of criticism and became one of the great teachers of 
mankind.337
Similarly Pomeau traces a movement towards a more favourable interpretation of 
Jesus on the part of Voltaire. He considers that after 1760, ‘le pour se mele au 
contre’, a process that the critic attributes to Voltaire’s firm rejection of atheist 
thinking, his promotion of theist beliefs through the figure of Christ. Thus, 
between 1767 and 1771, ‘Voltaire a repete les expressions de son attachement a 
Jesus, son “frere”, son “maitre”, et meme son “seul maitre’” . However, we might 
further ask ourselves whether Voltaire’s gradual change in attitude regarding Jesus 
again relates to the end of the period of crisis we are exploring, whether it 
represents a greater coming to terms with his own place in the Judeo-Christian 
world -  a self-acceptance that leads to a more actively tolerant attitude for all 
social groups, and one that embraces all human weakness and difference, whether
it be Jewish, Christian or any other.338
336 Sermon des cinquante, p.443, p.448, p.450.
337 Voltaire: ‘L ’Ingenu’ and ‘Histoire de Jenni’, p.xxxix.
338 La Religion de Voltaire, p.377, p.379.
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* * *
Essai sur les nweurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
In the Essai sur les moeurs Voltaire writes that the Christian religion in 
attempting to define itself has adopted the views of others. Just as the ancient Jews 
took articles of their faith from those with whom they came in contact, so 
Christianity has embraced the thinking of different peoples. But he suggests that, 
in following certain beliefs, the Church has frequently confused simple people by 
the obscurity of its complex ideas. At the same time, according to Voltaire, when 
adopting the metaphysical theories of Greek philosophy, Christianity subsequently 
failed to embrace fully the more enlightened teachings of the early thinkers: ‘Les 
philosophes platoniciens d’Alexandrie, ou il y avait tant de Juifs, se joignent aux 
premiers chretiens, qui empruntent des expressions de leur philosophie, comme 
celle du Logos, sans emprunter toutes leur id6es’ (1756).339
For Voltaire the contradictions found between the various sects of Christianity 
regarding the different dogmas expose the nonsensical nature of such thinking. He 
asks: ‘Qu’importe, en effet, que les chretiens reconnaissent dans Jesus Christ un 
Dieu portion indivisible de Dieu, et pourtant separee, ou qu’ils reverent dans lui la 
premiere creature de Dieu?’ (1775). Such arguments based on ‘incomprehensible 
systems’ ignore the io is  de la morale’, laws that in encouraging the love of 
neighbour, are understandable and essential to all mankind. To illustrate further 
his separation between a logical universal religion and the dogmatic teachings of 
Catholics and Protestants that are founded on obscure metaphysics, Voltaire 
makes use of the Figurative paradigm of the anahaptistes anglais. These, in his 
eyes, while ‘se croyant chretiens, et ne se piquant nullement de philosophie, [...] 
n’etaient reellement que des deistes’. Contending that ‘les plus savants d’entre eux 
pretendaient que le terme de fils de Dieu ne signifie chez les Hdbreux qu ’homme 
de bien, comme fils de Satan ou de Belial ne veut dire que mechant homme’  
(1756), he takes his questioning to the heart of the accepted Church teaching; he 
attempts to destroy the reality of Christ’s incarnation by representing it as a mere
continuation of the anthropomorphic beliefs of early or pagan religions. He shows
339 Essai sur les moeurs, I, 223.
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how, from early history, individuals who have rejected the authorized doctrines of 
faith have been denigrated or condemned by others.
Tous les dieux de I’antiquitd 6taient adores sous une forme humaine; et ce qui montre bien & 
quel point les hommes sont injustcs, c ’cst quc chcz les Grccs on fldtrissait du nom d ’athdes 
ceux qui n’admettaient pas ces dieux corporels, et qui adoraient dans la Divinitd une nature 
inconnue, invisible, inaccessible ft nos sens. (1756)
The historical example acts as a metaphor for the situation regarding the free­
thinkers, the deists and non-conformists of the eighteenth century, against whom 
the accusations of heresy or atheism were often laid.340
La Pucelle
In La Pucelle Voltaire ridicules the half-man, half-god nature of 
Hermaphrodix. Presenting him as the ‘noble’ and ‘very worthy’ offspring of a 
divine spirit and a Benedictine nun, this work not only mockingly questions the 
alleged chastity of those in holy orders, but also undermines the morality of all 
religious parties who have given their own manipulative interpretation to stories or 
supposed events that otherwise would be conceived as a contradiction to the 
particular moralities that they profess to hold. This move implies an attack on the 
Christian accounts relating to Christ’s birth, while also characteristically 
emphasizing the fictional element of all such revered stories; Voltaire connects his 
poetic figure to those of classical mythology. His mockery then further 
undermines the notion of Hermaphrodix’s divine ‘double nature’ (1730-62) by 
linking this individual’s spiritual-human duality to another equally ambiguous 
characteristic, one that by indicating androgyny or bisexuality further reduces the 
representation from the realm of the purely metaphysical to that of basic 
physicality.341
But here once more Voltaire expands his indictment to include the alleged
340Essai sur les moeurs, III, 129; II, 320-21 (Moland’s italics); I, 177.
341 La Pucelle, IV, 283, p.330.
123
chosenness of the Christians, in particular the Jansenists. Although F.A. Taylor in 
his edition of the Lettres philosophiques contends that the writer’s representation 
of Pascal’s belief in predestination is exaggerated, or even ‘misrepresented’, in La 
Pucelle Voltaire again draws attention to this perceived element of Jansenist 
teaching.342 The Jansenist is the ‘esclave du destin’, the ‘enfant perdu de la grdce 
efficace’ (1730-62). God is the provider of such justice and grace: ‘Quesnel l ’a dit, 
nul ne peut en douter’ (1730-62). Through irony, Voltaire condemns the injustice 
of an arbitrary distribution of grace, the unfair treatment of those who are rejected 
through no fault of their own. This reiterates his criticism of all groups who seek 
to distinguish themselves by claiming a specious right to special status or to 
preferential treatment. And, in addition, the poem furthers the argument against 
the Church’s intentional use of obscure language to spread its message. Voltaire 
describes Saint Denis adopting ‘very consoling’, ‘theological’ and unintelligible 
words to persuade the uneducated Jeanne to embark on her divinely ordained 
mission (1730-62), an indictment that is reinforced in Candide through the figure 
of Pangloss who acts as the metaphor for the propagation of all such abstruse 
doctrines -  ones that he does not understand himself -  and through Candide who, 
for much of the story, appears as the unquestioning receiver of that message.343
* * *
‘Juifs’
Further considering Voltaire’s representation of chosenness, we discover that 
the argument becomes more complicated in the undated section III of ‘Juifs’. Here 
he emphasizes the way the Christians have interpreted the dispersion of the Jewish 
people as an anachronistic punishment for their failure to recognize Christ as the 
Messiah, an accusation of foolish non-awareness that in the antipascal he presents 
as unwarranted, since the ‘monarch’ (the poor and crucified Jesus) had not 
appeared in the manner that the Jews had expected; in this earlier text Voltaire 
asks how they could have recognized ‘un Dieu cache sous la figure d’un Juif 
circoncis, qui par sa religion nouvelle a detruit et rendu abominables la
342 Lettres philosophiques, (repr.1992) p. 184.
343 La Pucelle, III, 137-38, p.304; IV, 158, p.325; II, 192, p.285.
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circoncision et le sabbat, fondements sacres de la loi judaique’ (1734).344 He thus 
excuses the Jews for their alleged failure. But in ‘Juifs’ he elaborates the figure 
further in order to increase the force of his criticism against the Church. 
Excoriating the devious pragmatism that has coloured Christian treatment of the 
very people from whom its takes its authority, he writes: ‘Ce qu’il y a de singulier, 
c’est que les chretiens ont pretendu accomplir les propheties en tyrannisant les 
Juifs qui les leur avaient transmises’ (undated). Voltaire dismantles the usual 
representation of Judaic causality by removing its negativity from the Jews and 
placing the blame for subsequent failures squarely on the Christians. They, 
according to Voltaire, have manipulated their claimed heritage to their own 
advantage so as to pursue their own selfish agenda. Denying the special, chosen 
nature of the Jews, the Christians have in fact appropriated this claim so as to 
embellish their own status; they have founded their particular identity on the same 
premise as that which they have taken from their despised other.345 Zizek explores 
the paradox that exists within this causality:
Saint Paul conceives of the Christian community as the new incarnation of the chosen people: 
it is Christians who are the true ‘children of Abraham’. What was, in its first incarnation, a 
distinct ethnic group is now a community of free believers that suspends all ethnic divisions 
(or, rather, cuts a line of separation within each ethnic group) -  the chosen people are those 
who have faith in Christ. Thus we have a kind of ‘ transubstantiation ’ o f the chosen people:
God kept his promise of redemption to the Jewish people, but, in the process itself, he changed 
the identity of the chosen people. (author’s italics)346
But Voltaire’s discourse once more exposes the promises declared by the 
Almighty as the mythical creations of mankind, not the embodiment of a God- 
given religion or the expression of a universal morality, but the workings of a 
particularized interpretation of la morale.
344 Lettres philosophiques, II, 198.
345 ‘Juifs’, p.524.
346 The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 130.
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The task of analyzing Voltaire’s representation of the contemporary 
stereotypes entails constantly asking in what places he repeats unquestioningly the 
popular false figures and where he rejects them. Even if seeking to mark a 
separation between his conscious indulgence of fantasy images and those 
instances where the unconscious fantasy can be discerned on the surface of his 
discourse, we need to observe how at times he intentionally plays on the 
stereotypes in order to engage his reader. But his very adoption of such figures 
reintroduces the paradox that exists in any drive for the tolerance of the other, that 
is the personal dislike, disapproval or distaste that gives rise to a consciousness of 
the need in the self for an extension of such tolerance. In his apparent desire to 
define an identity for the Jews, Voltaire repeatedly alleges the existence of certain 
undesirable ‘Jewish’ attributes or practices, and these remarks reveal the tensions 
in his own thinking. Such negative statements express his need to explain to 
himself his antipathy and to find a clear-cut distinction between what he views as 
worthy or unworthy of tolerance.
We have seen how in his article ‘Tolerance’ he draws attention to the aporia 
that exists in a meaningful interpretation, and argues that the tolerance of the 
ancient Romans allowed for the growth of the new Christian sect, which in turn 
was to become the instigator of subsequent savage acts of fanaticism -  a causality 
in which intolerance is an effect of tolerance. In the nineteenth-century Gamier 
Freres edition the article opens with the following questions: ‘La tolerance serait- 
elle un aussi grand mal que Vintolerance? Et la liberte de conscience est-elle un 
fleau aussi barbare que les buchers de VInquisition?’ (undated: editor’s italics). 
However, we should note that this first section, found in the Moland CEuvres 
completes and omitted by later editions of the article, was taken by Beuchot from 
a copy of Decroix, one of the editors of the Kehl publications.347 Despite that, this 
passage was excluded from Kehl, and did not appear until the Perronneau edition. 
But, as Gunnar von Proschwitz indicates, Kehl presents us with a problem, one 
that he does not seek to answer definitely: ‘Une question se pose ici: est-ce que
Ton peut se fier a l’edition de Kehl, est-ce que son texte reproduit avec fidelite le
347 ‘Tolerance’, M.xx, p.517.
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texte de Voltaire?’348 Brumfitt and Gerard Davis comment that the ‘Kehl editors 
[...] showed themselves occasionally capable of making minor corrections on their 
own responsibility’, but ‘it is highly unlikely’ that they would have included a 
long passage ‘if they had not been convinced of its authenticity’.349 Schwarzbach 
agrees that if such texts were available to the Kehl editors, they could indeed have 
been rejected because of doubts concerning authenticity: for certain later additions 
he finds Beuchot to be ‘the sole authority’. In the case of such materials, he argues 
that ‘there is little likelihood that Voltaire had intended their publication’. As for 
the article ‘Tolerance’, here Schwarzbach suggests that the Kehl editors’ 
suppressed the passage in Decroix’s possession possibly because it could be ‘a 
sketch for almost any of Voltaire’s essays on tolerance and adds nothing 
unfamiliar’.350 But if we accept (with reservations) the above citation as it stands, 
we find in it a summary of two insoluble problems, ones that Voltaire raises 
repeatedly: should we be held responsible for the unforeseen outcomes of our 
often well-intentioned actions; should we place limits on our tolerance? Having 
considered the first question, we now concentrate on the second.
Voltaire points to a need for some parameters. In Chapter XVIII of the Traite 
sur la tolerance he questions the dilemma whether or not it is ‘permis de faire un 
petit mal pour un grand bien’ (1763) -  a repetition of his polemic on the teachings 
of Saint Augustine, earlier the subject of his satirical conte, Cosi-Sancta 
(composed 1714-16: first published Kehl). The message now becomes darker, 
referring to institutionalized acts of savagery performed in the name of religious 
obedience to a divine order. But, as universal morality calls for the good of 
society, wherever certain deeds, ‘examples of fanaticism’, are against the laws of 
the realm or republic, the perpetrators of such actions must be contained. ‘Crimes’ 
against society deserve to be persecuted by the state. His examples of those in the 
contemporary world whose fanatical religious beliefs, reprehensible maxims, 
might merit another’s intolerance include the Jesuits, Franciscans, Protestants, and 
the Jews; in the last case he bases his reasoning solely on a satirical hypothesis 
founded on the Jews’ obedience to God’s commandments in the Old Testament.
348 ‘Beaumarchais et Voltaire: Fedition de Kehl’, p.452.
349 ‘L ’Ingenu’ and ‘Histoire de JennV, p. 145, note 151.
350 ‘The problem of the Kehl additions to the Dictionnaire philosophique' , p.44, p.46.
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With a clearly implied mocking reference to the Jewish texts, he alleges that were 
they to become masters ‘they could well’ kill all idolaters leaving only ‘nubile 
young girls’. In light of such episodes in the biblical narrative, Voltaire shows 
repressive intolerance as being in accordance with the droit humain, and he 
concludes the chapter with the comment: ‘Ce sont a peu pr&s les seuls cas oh 
l’intoldrance parait raisonnable’ (1763). Earlier in Chapter IV of the same text, he 
argues that the Emperor of China’s expulsion of the Jesuits arose not from his 
intolerance, but from the intolerance of the brotherhood itself.351 But in the Prix de 
la justice et de Vhumanite Voltaire reinforces the reservation that must be placed 
on state intervention. While a ruler may commit his act of intolerance in order to 
control another’s criminal activities against the state, such control must not itself 
become criminal: ‘un crime est toujours crime’, and he adds: ‘La vraie raison 
d’etat consiste k vous precautionner contre les crimes de vos ennemis, non pas a 
en commettre’ (1777). Throughout his oeuvre Voltaire stresses his conviction that 
all punishment or repression should not be excessively harsh, but should be 
relative to the seriousness of the crime; where possible the aim should be to bring 
about a reform in the behaviour of offenders so that they might become useful 
members of society.352
In Chapter IX of the Traite de metaphysique (1734-37) Voltaire distinguishes 
between a universal and a particularized understanding of morality. For him, the 
former is based on a commonly held idea of what is good for society, founded on 
an absence of lying, cheating, deceiving and doing harm to one’s fellow beings. In 
line with this, he represents any failure to live up to the standards set by universal 
morality as wrong. But, while he shows several of the activities of certain groups 
as entirely deserving of condemnation, he repeatedly marks out a clear distinction 
between those wrongdoings which are merely contemptible, and those which by 
reason of being intentionally detrimental to others are intolerable.
On the rarer occasions that he mockingly represents the contemporary Jews, 
his contempt conforms to the popular stereotypes, whereas when he describes the 
Christians he usually adopts either his own figures or those of other philosophes; 
contrary to eighteenth-century public opinion, his representation of the Christians
351 Traite sur la tolerance, p.238.
352 Prix de la justice, p.572.
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shows them as deserving of intolerance in the light of their own brutality. Not 
always acknowledging that the Jews have been forced into their unpopular trades, 
he represents them following supposedly corrupt practices and reputedly revering 
(what he designates as) disgusting or abominable biblical traditions -  it is in this 
last category that the mocking passage of the Traite sur la tolerance belongs. But 
he also shows that, unlike the Christians, and unlike their so-called legendary 
biblical ancestors, the present-day Jews do not engage in criminal activities that 
seek to deprive others of the rights belonging to all mankind, or that are purposely 
detrimental to the good of society as a whole. Thus, while Voltaire frequently 
portrays Christianity as deserving of the intolerance of others, he represents the 
‘modem’ followers of Judaism, despite their reputedly reprehensible customs and 
traditions, as meriting the dues owing to all human beings -  a contention that 
obviously pertains to the fact that unlike the Jews, so-called ‘true’ Christians were 
not, in his time, discriminated against as such. And, Voltaire further clearly 
distinquishes between foolish self-deception and the wilful misleading of others, 
between the subject’s own ignorance and that it deviously imposes on vulnerable 
people. He writes: ‘Quiconque n’est coupable que de se tromper merite 
compassion, quiconque persecute merite d’etre traite comme une bete feroce’ 
(1777). In this chapter addressing la morale we consider Voltaire’s treatment of 
these issues, issues still pertinent today.353
* * *
Accusations of ‘perversity and falsityf in the Jewish people
First we have to consider in more detail the grounds that Voltaire asserts for 
his mocking antipathy and dismissive contempt for Jewish people whose cause at 
times he promotes. Accordingly, we find that he goes further when embracing 
many of the commonly held fantasies of his period by conflating these with others 
that he perceives as representative of the Jewish character as a whole. In addition 
to the figures of non-belonging, wandering, proliferation, arrogance and
misguidedness, he introduces another still more negative mark of identity: a
353 Histoire de I’etablissement du christianisme, p. 116.
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general lack of la morale. While, in the contemporary Jews, this becomes 
represented in terms of their alleged apathy, among the (for him) mythical people 
of the Old Testament, the failure appears as an ignoring of those universal lois 
fondamentales which all mankind understands -  the natural perception of the just 
and the unjust that in Le Philosophe ignorant Voltaire discovers ‘even’ in the 
Jews. In ‘Morale’ he contends that the activities of the biblical Jews indicate that 
they ‘manquaient de morale ou manquaient a la morale’ (1767).354
Here we come to the problem that underlies all Voltaire’s argument: 
theological disputes have brought about a history of bloodshed as a result of the 
way that ‘on a toujours neglige la morale pour le dogme’ (1756).355 But the ideal 
religion should be devoid of dogma, obeying the precepts of the commonly 
understood universal morality. Voltaire therefore expresses his wish that ‘on laisse 
reposer le dogme, on n’annonce que la morale’ (1763).356 Further emphasizing this 
separation of man-made dogma and God-given morality, he writes: ‘Les rites 
etablis divisent aujourd’hui le genre humain, et la morale le reunit’ (1765), a 
statement whose meaning he then expands with the remark that: ‘La morale est 
une, elle vient de Dieu; les dogmes sont differents, ils viennent de nous’ (1765).357
Repeatedly expounding the divisive nature of dogma, Voltaire does not 
acknowledge that in religion there is any need for that ritual which Douglas shows 
to be ‘the condition of its existence’.358 While she demonstrates that the religious 
is transmitted through the symbolism of ritual just as the social is through the 
symbolism of language, Voltaire constantly calls for a separation between a God- 
given universal morality and humanly contrived dogma and religious practices. In 
his notebooks he writes: ‘Toutes les religions hors la notre sont 1’ouvrage des 
hommes, c’est pourquoi elles different. La morale est la meme, elle vient de dieu 
et est une comme lui’ (1735-50: my italics). Here my emphasis indicates the 
addition to the text that Voltaire included above the line, one that gives Besterman 
reason to remark that ‘it is amusing to see Voltaire being cautious even in a
private notebook’. This last comment reminds us of the caution with which we
354 ‘Morale’, p.398.
355 Essai sur les mceurs, III, 177.
356 Remarques pour servir de supplement a VEssai sur les mceurs, p.553.
357 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p. 152; ‘Juste(du) et de l ’injuste’, p.283.
358 Purity and danger, p.77.
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must interpret all this writer’s discourse.359
Even while expressing a faith in the gradual development of mankind’s 
reasoning, Voltaire makes the elitist pronouncement that enlightenment still 
remains beyond the understanding of the majority of people: ‘Le monde 
s’ameliore un peu; oui, le monde pensant, mais le monde brute sera longtemps un 
compose d’ours et de singes, et la canaille sera toujours cent contre un’ (1777).360 
In Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers Voltaire has the Abbe set out the 
problem for the propagation of a universal religion that is founded solely on the 
commonly understood morality. Such a religion will never exist as unthinking 
people will always turn to superstition: ‘Une religion de philosophes n’est pas 
faite pour les hommes’ (1767). Voltaire shows that in all societies there is a 
division between those who think and those who do not, and he demonstrates how 
a lack of enlightenment is present in all groups.361
Thus, having accepted that dogmas do exist among religious believers, 
Voltaire takes his argument further and in the Sermon des cinquante suggests that 
any theological dictates which violate morality will serve to negate the truth of the 
religion that holds them sacred: ‘La religion doit etre conforme a la morale, et 
universelle comme elle: ainsi toute religion dont les dogmes offensent la morale 
est certainement fausse.’ He contends that the Jews have proved the false nature 
of their religion by its rejection of universal morality and by the sanctification of 
acts that are in contradiction to it. In this way he deprecates and condemns 
Judaism for two failings, which he defines as its falsity as evidenced by its 
unethical tenets, and its failure to teach a moral message.362
He creates a figure of broken religious continuity, a chain of different, ever- 
changing beliefs, linked from the ancient Phoenicians to the biblical Jews, and 
eventually to the Christians. His figure presents the perpetuation of man-made 
fable, and this exposes the absence of a timeless, true faith grounded in the 
adoration of the universal God. But the figure of unoriginality becomes more 
critical with his claim that the Jews, having taken the fables of others, have
created imitations that are even more false. He writes: ‘Le miserable peuple juif,
359 ‘Leningrad Notebooks’, p.348.
360 Prix de la justice, p.549.
361 Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers, p.396.
362 Sermon des cinquante, p.439.
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nouvellement etabli dans ses rochers entre la Phenicie, T£gypte, et la Syrie, prit 
toutes les superstitions de ses voisins, et, dans l’exces de sa brutale ignorance, il y 
ajouta des superstitions nouvelles’ (1768). He lifts the perceived unoriginality of 
the Jews into another sphere: a feebleness, uninventiveness of mind becomes 
characterized by a more actively negative figure, one presenting their examples of 
the Bible as dishonest and harmful to the good of society.363
Voltaire then expands his representation by investing it with social and 
personal characteristics; he identifies the Jews by their occupations (money­
lenders, financial middle-men, second-hand clothes dealers) with the supposedly 
attendant attributes of greed, deceitfulness and unoriginality -  since he 
understands the social restrictions that have forced certain roles on the Jews, we 
can only find it reprehensible that he allows himself to use the commonly 
perceived characteristics of these occupations as metaphors for the Jewish 
character. In his notebooks Voltaire points to how such rhetorical figures can be 
used effectively: ‘Les pensees d’un auteur doivent entrer dans notre ame comme 
la lumiere dans nos yeux, avec plaisir et sans effort, et les metaphores doivent etre 
comme un verre qui couvre les objects mais qui les laisse voir’ (1735-50?).364 
Like humour, metaphor contains a deeper meaning for the reader to discover. So 
Voltaire’s descriptions of the Jewish texts, beliefs and customs are often couched 
in the stereotypically negative language usually appertaining to their trades: they 
are described in terms of plagiarism, mendaciousness, falsity, fraudulence, 
treachery and theft. In a letter to Joseph Michel Antoine Servan Voltaire uses this 
critical figure to scorn Jewish claims to originality; for him the Jews are only 
second-hand clothes dealers who have ‘retoume les habits des anciens’ (13 April 
1766).365 This metaphor repeats the thinking found in his comment of the previous 
year, where he writes: ‘Les Juifs firent done de l’histoire et de la fable ancienne ce 
que leurs fripiers font de leurs vieux habits; ils les retoument et les vendent 
comme neufs le plus cherement qu’ils peuvenf. Contending that the Jews are an 
‘ignorant’, ‘uncouth’ people lacking in imagination, Voltaire represents them as 
having recycled their traditions, even those of their religion, in the same way as
363 A.B.C., pp.334-35.
364 ‘Leningrad Notebooks’, p.346.
365 D 13250.
they have recycled their old garments. He continues:
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Lors done qu’on voit un ancien rite, une ancienne opinion 6tablie en £gypte ou en Asie, et 
chez les Juifs, il est bien naturel de penser que le petit peuple nouveau, ignorant, grossier, 
toujours priv£ des arts, a copi£, comme il a pu, la nation antique, florissante et industrieuse.
(1767)’*'
He again makes use of the stereotypical image of the Jews, their supposed 
involvement in dishonest imitation, with the comment:
C’est une erreur absurde d ’avoir imagind que les Juifs fussent les seuls qui reconnussent un 
dieu unique: c ’6tait la doctrine de presque tout l’Orient, et les Juifs en cela ne furent que des 
plagiaires, comme ils le furent en tout. (1767)3*57
By a rhetorical use of repetition, this message is reinforced in Dieu et les hommes, 
where he sarcastically attributes to the Jews a plagiaristic nature, the appropriation 
of the customs and practices of others:
Ils empruntent les noms de Dieu chez les Phtmiciens; ils prennent les anges chez les Persans; 
ils ont l’arche errante des Arabes; ils adoptent le bapteme des Indiens, la circoncision des 
pretres d ’£gypte, leurs vetements, leur vache rousse, leur chdrubins, qui ont une tete de veau 
et une tete d ’dpervier, leur bouc Hazazel, et cent autres c£r£monies. ( 1769)368
Moreover, just as the texts are described in terms of falsity, their beliefs in 
terms of plagiarism, and their social practices in terms of fraud and forgery, the 
character of the people is described in terms of treachery. This appears in 
Voltaire’s letter to Cardinal Dubois regarding Salomon Levi -  one of the rare 
instances where he indicts a named Jewish individual. Here he contends that ‘a 
Jew’, by not belonging to any country, ‘peut aussi bien trahir le roi pour 
l’empereur que l’empereur pour le roi’ (28 May 1722).369 Schwarzbach accuses
366 4 Abraham’, p.297, p.298 (later additions to the 1764 text).
‘Job’, p.250.
368 Dieu et les hommes, p.351.
369 D106.
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Arthur Hertzberg of taking ‘Voltaire’s anti-semitism for granted’ and contends 
that, when charging Voltaire and Diderot, he ‘refuses to consider the possible 
excuse of validity for the stereotype of the grasping, unscrupulous Jew’.370 But, 
despite his highly negative representation of Voltaire, despite seeing him as ‘the 
major link in Western intellectual history between the anti-Semitism of classical 
paganism and the modem age’, Hertzberg allows that ‘there was probably some 
truth in Voltaire’s charges against Levi’.371 Jory acknowledges that the slurs in this 
‘strange’ letter may be ‘regrettable’, but suggests that ‘they are mild in 
comparison’ to those found in other writings of the time.372 As for Pomeau, in this 
case he marks out a pragmatism on Voltaire’s part, a desire to separate himself 
from those with whom he identifies. Pomeau comments:
Antisdmitisme ou la religion n’entre pour rien. A cette date, nulle trace encore de 
rantijudaisme qui inspirera si souvent les attaques ult£rieures. Ici la n^cessitd de se distinguer 
du Juif, dont il deviendrait en fait Tassocid, l’amdne h reprendre les th6mes de l’antis^mitisme 
ambiant.373
We shall later consider the significance of Pomeau’s observation regarding the 
integration of Voltaire’s idea of self with his identification of the Jews, but here 
we might also perceive an alternative message directed at the Christians as a 
whole. While the young Voltaire presents a figure of Jewish treachery, and while, 
as Aldridge proposes, he emphasizes ‘the trade of money-lender, which everyone 
despised’, he also suggests the part played by Christian Europe in the perceived 
character of the Jews. Because the former refuses to offer full assimilation and 
integration to the Jewish people, it cannot expect loyalty from those it excludes.374
Gay, writing in the 1950s, points to the way Voltaire ‘urged Jews to assimilate 
themselves to Western civilization by abandoning their dietary laws and their 
“hatred” of other nations’.375 Katz explores how in his answer to Pinto, ‘Voltaire,
as it were, opened up the way for a vision of the Jew’s future in enlightened
370 ‘The Jews and the Enlightenment anew’, p.365, p.362.
371 The French Enlightenment and the Jews, p. 135, note.
372 ‘Voltaire and the Jews of Metz’, p.98.
373 Voltaire en son temps, I, 114.
374 Voltaire and the Century o f Light, p.36.
375 VoUaire’s Politics, p.351.
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society’ -  a figure that might be interpreted as an embracing of ‘the good Jew’. 
But Katz criticizes Voltaire’s suggestion of assimilation, particularly as it appears 
in the Essai sur les nueurs (Chapter CIV: 1761) where he links the Gypsies with 
the Jews. For Katz, the representation on this occasion is indicative of Voltaire’s 
belief in an eventual disappearance of the Jewish people, and he shows how the 
writer suggests that, when they cease to be useful as merchants, the Jews will lose 
their separate identity. Katz summarizes:
When they stop fulfilling this function, they will lose the basis of their existence and 
disappear inevitably. He is no longer talking in terms of the Christian concept of absorption of 
the Jews through conversion, but rather of gradual assimilation into the scum of mankind, the 
despised masses, to which they already belong and which will eventually swallow them up/"6
While this swallowing up would involve the impoverished majority of the Jewish 
people, we have to remember that for Voltaire such elitist thinking was in line 
with his views relating to the unenlightened canaille at large. But it has been 
normal in recent years to question any promotion of assimilation, and David Theo 
Goldberg writes:
liberals are moved to ov ercome the racial differences they tolerate and have been so 
instrumental in fabricating by diluting them, by bleaching them out through assimilation or 
integration. The liberal would assume away the difference in otherness, maintaining thereby 
the dominance of a presumed sameness, the universally imposed similarity in identity.
He then further elaborates:
Perceived failures of some racially defined groups to advance or integrate are then taken to 
turn not on dominant boundary construction, restriction, and exclusion but on the absence of 
certain kinds of values on the part of the group itself. This paradigmatic disposition to blame 
the victim implicitly reifies as given the very definition of otherness it is claiming to erode, 
much as it takes for granted the assumption of ethnic identification it valorizes.377
376 From Prejudice to Destruction, p.46, p.47.
377 Racist Culture, p.7, p.78.
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Assimilation thus loses any positive connotation that implies an embracing of the 
other, and it becomes invested solely with an element of refusal that calls for a 
rejection of what marks the other as other. This links to a negative causality that 
legitimizes the blame placed on the outgroup for the treatment it receives from the 
ingroup.
Applying this argument to our field of enquiry, we find that in the passage 
referred to by Katz the discourse implies that the Jews are partly responsible for 
their own treatment; setting aside religious issues, Voltaire indicates that in order 
to deserve people’s understanding and acceptance they need to convert to the 
social ways of Christian Europe. In this case, the particular has become the 
standard for the universal. Likewise, in the profoundly critical Examen important 
de Milord Bolingbroke, Voltaire represents the ancient Jews as responsible for 
their own victimhood: ie s  Juifs furent si longtemps reduits a un esclavage que 
leur brigandages avaient tant merite’ (1766). At the same time, in this text he 
repeats the message of the Essai sur les moeurs\ he links the Jews and Gypsies and 
exposes a relationship between usefulness or non-usefulness and continued 
survival or disappearance. But in the Examen this figure undergoes a change of 
emphasis, one that gives greater prominence to a separation between the Jews and 
the Gypsies: Voltaire shows the Jews and Banians as different from the latter in 
that they continue to exist by trade. In this passage, therefore, he spotlights the role 
of the individual’s personal responsibility for aspects of his existence, an 
existence that is partly dictated by the way that individual chooses to live his life 
in face <9/ the treatment he receives from others.378
These statements show how at times, with regard to the question of causality,
Voltaire’s thinking appears ambivalent. On one count, he indicates that it is no
wonder that the Jews carry the burden of guilt and are punished for their past
violence, while, on another, he demolishes this argument by representing them as
victims and all humanity as equally guilty of immorality. But the Jews are the
only people who have been historically punished, and Voltaire apparently
questions the injustice of such selectiveness where guilt is universal. So at times,
when seeking to find an answer to this conundrum, he reverts to the contemporary
378 Examen important, p. 174, p.286.
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negative thinking and finds a reason for their status as victims in aspects of their 
own behaviour which have brought about the actions of others. When suggesting 
deservedness, he claims that their savage and intolerant behaviour in biblical 
times has earned them the hatred of the world. Similarly, he continues to portray 
the Jews in terms of a misplaced pride in their claims to chosenness, citing this as 
a primary cause of their persecution by others, by those whom they exclude from 
the special status. His attack in ‘Ame’ bases Jewish responsibility on this 
allegedly self-made causality. Subsequent to God’s promises and menaces in 
Deuteronomy, they, the chosen people of God, believe that ‘il n ’y a rien que de 
temporef, and that at the hands of others they must suffer in this world for their 
sins (1764). Yet, while here the discourse is in tune with the contemporary 
fantasies, Voltaire still insists that they do not deserve to be treated with 
intolerance.379
Sometimes he allows himself to make the attack more personal; he does not 
restrict his accusation of deservedness to higher moral or social issues, but extends 
it to the stereotypically banal, an action which lets him give further voice to his 
mockery. On occasion, therefore, the Jews become represented in the humiliating 
terms of disease or dirtiness. In Dieu et les hommes he repeats the ancient charge 
that the biblical Jews were ‘une troupe de lepreux chasses d’£gypte\ ‘vagabonds 
sujets a la lepre’ (1769), and in La Bible enfin expliquee he says ‘que de nos jours 
meme la populace de cette nation est si malpropre et si puante’ (1776).380 Voltaire 
adopts the figure of the unclean as a marker of differentiation, in this case 
investing his representation with a quality of timelessness. He projects onto the 
Jews an enduring figure of dirtiness and unhealthiness that becomes seen as an 
indicated reason for their non-acceptance and persecution throughout the ages. 
Here the historical blurring is complete. But, while in this case Voltaire uses the 
defamatory stereotype to diminish the standing of the people, he repeatedly 
emphasizes that the Jewish social condition has been, and continues to be, in large 
part the result of the treatment that they have received. Poverty, squalor and ill-
179 ‘Ame’, p.314
380 Dieu et les hommes, p.337; La Bible enfin expliquee, p. 119, note 3. Dennis Prager and Joseph 
Telushken show this representation of leprosy to be a calumny that was started in the third century 
B.C.E. by the Egyptian priest Manetho; it was also repeated by Tacitus and Marx. (Why the Jews?, 
p.69.)
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health are not fixed characteristics; they are markers, not of an essence, but of an 
existence that can be rectified.
Voltaire’s correspondence with Cardinal Dubois dates from his early years, but 
at the end of his life in 1773 he writes a comparable letter to the Chevalier de 
Lisle. Here the prejudiced negativity of the text presents serious problems for the 
modem critic. He remarks:
Je sais qu’il y a quelques Juifs dans les colonies anglaises. Ces marauds-la vont partout oil il y 
a de l’argent k gagner, comme les Gu£bres, les Banians, les Armdniens, courent toutc l’Asie, 
et comme les pretres isiaques venaient, sous le nom de Bohemes, voler des poules dans les 
basses-cours, et dire la bonne aventure. Mais que ces d£pr£puc£s d ’Israel, qui vendent de 
vieilles culottes aux sauvages, se disent de la tribu de Nephthali ou d ’Issachar, cela est fort 
peu important; ils n’en sont pas moins les plus grands gueux qui aient jamais souill6 la face du 
globe. (15 December 1773)38'
Parts of this passage are frequently quoted by those who wish to condemn 
Voltaire for his anti-Jewish, or even ‘antisemitic’ attitudes, but selective reading 
or incomplete references can lead to distorted or incorrrect interpretations and the 
letter should be viewed as a whole. There is no doubt that here he repeats many of 
the stereotypical fantasies, that is to say the connection between the Jews and 
other wandering or marginalized peoples, and their similarity to the allegedly 
‘thieving’ Gypsies. Voltaire re-emphasizes the Jews’ involvement in avaricious or 
demeaning practices and trades, and his mocking tone reintroduces his dual 
indictment: he dismisses the contemporary, supposedly unenlightened Jews who 
continue with their so-called despicable activities, and he sardonically demolishes 
the truths of their Judaic past, thereby reinforcing his critical biblical exegesis. We 
must here acknowledge some further manipulative amalgamating of the Jewish 
past and present. Voltaire shows his desire to strengthen his general criticism of 
the Jews by embroidering his two representations of them (the ancient and the 
modem) with implied or open reference to certain faults attributed to the other. 
But again, while the attack appears most clearly directed against the contemporary 
Jewish people, the main underlying message is not to represent them in terms of 
581 D18687
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perceived timeless characteristics, but to demolish the assumed veracity of their 
chosen status and their sole possession of the word of God. The letter sets out a 
mocking illustration of the impossible paradox that Judaism presents for Voltaire, 
the (for him) incompatible connection between the Jews’ exclusive claims to the 
divine and the incongruous realities of their actual existence, one lived in a state 
of deprivation and victimhood. Rather than a credible presentation of their so- 
called continued historical entity, this is a mocking and manipulative demolition 
of their enduring chosenness, an argument that contrives to convince the reader of 
the illogical nature of the Jewish claims.
The significance of this passage lies in the fact that it is found so late in 
Voltaire’s life, at a period when most of his Jewish discourse is concerned with 
attacking the Judaic religion, and at a time when there is little evidence of 
similarly unbalanced writing against contemporary Jews. Those accusing Voltaire 
of antisemitism reiterate the same few defamatory passages (including the above 
cited correspondence), a repetition that attests to the scarcity of other similar 
documents. Accepting Jennifer Tsien’s theory regarding the place of taste (or its 
absence) in Voltaire’s private works, in this letter to de Lisle he may have allowed 
himself to exceed the bounds of acceptable or well-moderated discourse in a 
mistaken desire to amuse an associate: he permits himself to make full play of the 
contemporary fantasies about the Jews. The derisive tone of the text as a whole, 
including the way it addresses other non-Jewish issues, gives credence to this 
argument. Voltaire reveals in his mockingly self-deprecating conclusion the spirit 
in which he intends the letter to be read: ‘Conservez vos bontes pour le vieux 
bavard malingre.’
In Un Chretien contre six Juifs, Voltaire directs his wit not just at Judaism’s 
so-called irrational stories, but also at the accusations made against him by the 
Abbe Guenee in his highly successful Lettres de quelques Juifs. Seeking to restore 
his own reputation, Voltaire scornfully repudiates the Abbe’s negative reading of 
his Jewish discourse, although he concedes that perhaps his hypothetical ‘friend’ 
has gone too far in his remarks:
mon ami a pu se permettre quelques petites libert^s sur le peuple de Dieu, a 1 ’exemple de
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saint Jerome. Mais quand il est all£ trop loin (ce qu’il ne faut jamais faire), [...] il en a 
demand^ pardon & M. Pinto, juif de Bordeaux, fort estimd des chr^tiens. (1777)3E
This apology does not appear entirely heartfelt and it suggests a certain mitigation 
of personal blame by its reference to a father of the early Church (with the 
accompanying implication of the Christian inheritance of anti-Judaism), but at the 
same time it does admit to ‘the writer’s’ failure to be always responsible for what 
he says.
However, this brings us to a second point, one that is of equal importance for 
this study. By its appearing at such a late stage in Voltaire’s life, the letter to 
Chevalier de Lisle indicates the presence of an enduring life-long disdain on his 
part for the unenlightened Jewish people. The message in this correspondence 
does not represent twenty/twenty-first century antisemitic thinking, but fits with 
the eighteenth-century anti-Jewish attitudes of scornful derision and sarcasm, a 
mind-set founded on the age-old Christian tradition. While these remarks certainly 
do not seek to exempt Voltaire from blame, I contend that they introduce once 
more the essential point of this thesis: this passage, in displaying attitudes that 
again serve to draw our attention to his permanent and deep-rooted contempt for 
most Jews, exposes how much he needed to set aside his personal prejudices 
before including them in his programme of universal tolerance.
*  *  *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire contends that falsity characterizes the 
Bible and thus, emphasizing the deceptive nature of the holy texts and the 
unreliability of the books ‘so falsely imputed to Moses’, he speaks of ‘le nombre 
infini de contradictions, qui sont le sceau de 1’imposture’. The implication is 
deeply critical, stressing the intentionally fraudulent nature of the contradictions. 
This allows him to present a two-way argument: he postulates that the Jews have 
created a false religion based on dishonest dogmas, and that this religion has 
served to create the devious character of its people. He therefore proposes that it
382 Un Chretien contre six Juifs, p.503.
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will be ‘sous ce double aspect de perversite et de faussete que nous examinerons 
dans ce discours les livres des Hebreux et de ceux qui leur ont succede’. He 
savagely condemns the Jewish scriptures, alleging ‘les traits contre la purete, la 
charity, la bonne foi, la justice, et la raison universelle, que non seulement on 
trouve dans chaque chapitre, mais que, pour comble de malheur, on y trouve 
consacres’. These episodes honoured by the Jews, sarcastically referred to by 
Voltaire as ‘that holy people’, contradict the reasoned faith in one God, 
‘remunerateur du bien, vengeur du mal’.383
He again traces the origin of these ‘perverse’ people back to ‘the extravagant 
injustice’ that dared accuse the Supreme Being ‘d’avoir donne la parole a un 
serpent pour seduire une femme’, an action that put an end to the ‘innocent 
posterity’ of Eve. This allows him to introduce his often declared conviction of a 
failure in the faith of the early Jews, the apparent absence of a belief in the 
afterlife with its promise of retribution for personal sins, even while that same 
faith held that future generations were to be punished for the actions of the parent. 
Voltaire contends that a belief in the immortality of the soul, an article of faith 
that promotes the individual’s good behaviour, remains lacking from Jewish 
teaching during the ‘barbarous centuries’ of which he is speaking, an omission 
that evidences a lack of reason in these ‘wretched people’ who cannot appreciate 
the benefits of such a dogma to society as a whole.384 He introduces an element of 
didactic pragmatism, similar to that found in the Lettres philosophiques when he 
describes how the Anglican denomination persuaded the English people to profess 
adherence to the established faith: the followers of the English Church swore 
allegiance to the laws of the land and thereby they benefited society as a whole, 
and, in addition, promoted their own social advancement. Voltaire repeatedly 
combines pragmatism with religious spirituality: recorded statements and episodes 
from his own life illustrate both his conviction in the practical need for religion -  
as summed up in his famous, hypothetical comment that were there no religion ‘il 
faudrait l’inventer’ (1769) -  and his appreciative acknowledgement of God’s 
creation.38S The documented evidence of his expressions of wonderment on two
383 Sermon des cinquante, p.444, p.441, p.439, p.442, p.438.
384 Sermon des cinquante, p.439.
385 Epitre a / ’auteur du livre des trois imposteurs, p.403.
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occasions (that of the frosty, starry night spent outdoors with Madame de Chatelet 
when their carriage broke down, and that of his early morning walk in the 
mountains near Femey) appear to concur with Freind’s comment in the Histoire 
de Jenni: ‘Pour savoir s’il est un dieu, je ne vous demande qu’une chose, c’est 
d’ouvrir les yeux’ (1775).386
However, in the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire goes further and contends 
that by examining whether or not the holy scriptures conform to morality, we may 
discover ‘s’ils peuvent avoir quelque ombre de vraisemblance’. No true faith can 
be founded on immorality, and so he expounds the dishonest nature of the ‘fable’ 
of the daughters of Lot, and even more savagely condemns the reversal of 
morality in the story of King David. Here Voltaire not only shows that David ‘est 
puni pour la seule bonne et sage action qu’il a faite’ -  the ‘wise and useful’ census 
of his people -  but also, in an indictment that directly addresses the Christians, 
that Jesus’ birth was recompense for the former’s act of ‘adulterous homicide’. 
Thus he justifies his demolition of the authenticity of the Jewish texts by 
introducing into his argument these attributes of non-retribution and unmerited or 
immoral reward.387
But Voltaire adds further weight to his charge of Jewish perversity and 
falsity. He stresses the unoriginality of the Jews by suggesting that even the name 
they gave their God, Adonai, ‘du nom d’Adonis’, was borrowed from the 
Phoenicians, and mockingly he describes the Children of Israel’s arrival in the 
promised land, where ‘la premiere personne qui introduit par une trahison ce 
peuple saint est une prostituee nommee Rahab’. In this latter case his intention is 
clear; by demonstrating that the fulfilment of God’s promises to his chosen people 
was achieved through an act of treachery, he demolishes the Bible’s moral claim 
and reduces the divine significance of the holy scriptures. For similar purpose, he 
emphasizes the reported falsehood of the patriarchs:
Nous n’insisterons point sur le mensonge d ’Isaac, p6re des justes, qui dit que sa femme est sa
soeur, soit qu’il ait renouveld ce mensonge d ’Abraham, soit qu’Abraham fflt coupable en effet
386 Histoire de Jenni, p.553. For details of these episodes, see Rene Vaillot, Voltaire en son temps,
I, 585, and Rene Pomeau, La Religion de Voltaire, pp.416-17.
387 Sermon des cinquante, p.439, p.443.
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d’avoir fait de sa soeur sa propre femme; mais arretons-nous un moment au patriarche Jacob, 
qu’on nous donne comme le module des hommes. II force son fr6re, qui meurt de faim, de lui 
c&ier son droit d ’amesse pour une assiette de lentilles; ensuite il trompe son vieux p£re au lit 
de la mort.
This figure he then reinforces, extending the characteristic of the individual to 
include the whole group: ‘Leur Dieu avait fait de Jacob un voleur, et il fait des 
voleurs de tout un peuple; il ordonne a son peuple de derober et d’emporter tous 
les vases d’or et d’argent, et tous les ustensiles des figyptiens.’388
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire makes no reference to Jewish 
victimhood caused by the prejudice of others; instead his literal repetition of the 
Bible stories serves to give a representation of their self-created calumny. He 
indicates that those wishing to attack Judaism have no need to create falsehoods, 
but may rely on the Jews’ own holy texts for evidence of their perversity, 
abomination, savagery and immorality. And in the Sermon Voltaire makes another 
scornful reference to the Jews’ alleged dirtiness, but now the accusation becomes 
more caustic by being placed in a magical context. He comments mockingly that 
the wise men of Egypt found themselves equal to the Jews in acts of sorcery, but 
‘il furent vaincus sur 1’article des poux; les Juifs, en cette partie, en savaient plus 
que les autres nations’. He then takes the figure of the unclean to an even lower 
degree, representing the actions of the prophets in excremental terms. By his 
intentionally literal presentation of the story of Ezekiel, Voltaire reduces both the 
religious and the social to the level of the revolting.389
He condemns the role that sorcery and prophecy have played in the 
promulgation of religion; for Voltaire these are despicable and identifying Jewish 
practices, grounded in superstition. Mocking the Jews’ prophetic pronouncements, 
he dismisses the relevance of prophecy by linking it to their fantastical biblical 
stories: ‘Un prophete du voisinage veut maudire ce peuple, mais son anesse s’y 
oppose avec un ange.’ And he goes further, conflating prophecy with 
manipulation, self-advancement and greed: ‘ces prophetes etaient [...] des gens qui
388 Sermon des cinquante, p.441, p.442, p.440, p.441.
389 Sermon des cinquante, p.446.
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se melaient de deviner pour gagner quelque chose.’390
While the message delivered in this text follows the pattern Voltaire sets out 
elsewhere, namely a fiercely presented argument against what he displays as the 
perverse and untrustworthy Jewish (and Christian) actions recounted in the 
scriptures, an argument intended to expose behaviour that he finds deplorable, I 
find that here the tone suggests a greater lack of control than that apparent in later 
satirical works. Although its themes occur elsewhere, in this case the passionate 
way Voltaire presents them indicates the presence at this time of an especially 
bitter personal antagonism on his part towards the Jews. The Sermon des 
cinquante evidences a lack of control that might cause us to interpret it according 
to Bayard’s description of ‘failed works’. But although this text is frequently 
dismissed as a vitriolic deist tract, for our purposes it is particularly significant for 
the way it exposes Voltaire’s difficulty in overcoming his personal prejudices.
*  *  *
‘Juifs’
As in the Sermon des cinquante, in ‘Juifs’ Voltaire postulates the
seditiousness of the Jews by reintroducing the figure of Rahab, the betrayer of her
own people (1756). Through this manoeuvre he is able to present a historical
example of an untrustworthy nature; he portrays their dependence on acts of
falsity as something that endures into modem times. On this occasion, he
performs a two-way movement that suggests a lasting, negative Jewish essence;
discovering no essence in chosenness, Voltaire now endeavours to find it in the
Jews’ morality or lack of morality. So, just as in his letter regarding Salomon
Levi he lifts characteristics of the biblical patriarchs into his representation of
contemporary Jews (lying, deceiving, thieving), he now reverses this action and
attributes to Jews of the past involvement in activities practised by those of the
contemporary age. In this instance, Voltaire’s manipulative erasing of the
distinctions between the Jews of different times and places points to a link
purposely constructed to enforce his message of a persistent Jewish immorality.
The separation he marks elsewhere between history and myth is now glossed
390 Sermon des cinquante, p.446, p.447.
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over; here he needs to create a connection between biblical and contemporary 
Jews in order to give force to his representation of ‘Jewishness’. So, when writing 
about the Babylonian Exile, he contends: ‘II paraTt que les Juifs [...] s’adonnerent 
aux metiers de courtiers, de changeurs, et de fripiers; par la ils se rendirent 
necessaires, comme ils le sont encore, et ils s’enrichirent’ (1756). Beside the 
Jewish ‘interest’ in children, he discovers a Jewish interest in wealth and a 
permanent, historically based involvement in money-making enterprises. To 
emphasize this, he places their supposed avarice above even their religious 
fervour; of the failure of rich Jews remaining in Babylon after the exile to 
contribute to the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, he proposes: ‘c’est une 
preuve [...] que les Juifs, qui aimaient leur temple, aimaient encore plus leur 
argent comptant’ (1756). He then extends this representation to include that other 
figure of the Jews, a lack of originality, whereby they are seen as mere 
counterfeiters of the ideas and talents of others. We note that these negative 
citations all belong to the same early section of ‘Juifs’, a situation that supports 
our theory that these stereotypically critical views are also representative of that 
period of crisis and unmoderated writing that we are seeking to define.391
However, in the third section of ‘Juifs’, taken from the private papers, there is
a much more compassionate portrayal of the Jews. Voltaire describes them as
‘reduits a courir de terres en terres, de mers en mers, pour gagner leur vie’
(undated); he shows them denied occupations and material possessions wherever
they go. Thus he dismantles the negative representation of a volontary Jewish
wandering and non-belonging, and replaces these figures by one of their unwanted
and uncalled-for victimization. Voltaire then continues: ‘Le commerce, profession
longtemps meprisee par la plupart des peuples de l’Europe, fut leur unique
ressource dans [lies siecles barbares; et comme ils s’y enrichirent necessairement,
on les traita d’infames usuriers.’ He shows the negative causality of that
commerce which has offered them their only chance of surviving in the world;
their involvement in this has given the people of Europe an excuse to deny them
citizenship. And he goes further: ‘L ’invention admirable des lettres de change
sortit du sein du desespoir, et pour lors seulement le commerce put eluder la
violence et se maintenir par tout le monde’ (undated). The practices of usury, so
391 ‘Juifs’, p.513, p.516, p.518.
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often described in terms that indicate a Jewish vice, here become the 
responsibility of the Christians who have brought those practices into existence.392
This passage brings together all the sympathetic elements of Voltaire’s Jewish 
discourse; the Jews are ‘obliged’ to wander, ‘declared incapable’ of certain 
employment, denied all occupation other than that despised by most people, then 
blamed for their success and tortured for their profits. He thus adds a new 
dimension to his previous arguments relating to Jewishness: their identity defined 
by their tendency to wander, their outsider nature, and their occupations, has in 
fact been forced on them by the activities of others, just as ‘infamous markers’ 
have been imposed on them to make their difference visible. The Christians have 
availed themselves of their services even while persecuting them, and this 
persecution has ensured that they remain for ever locked in their position of 
subservience, abjection and obedience. In this way, the stereotypical criticism is 
turned on its head; here Jewishness becomes not an indictment of the real Jews, 
but an indictment of the Christians.
Foregrounding Christian hypocrisy and injustice, Voltaire exposes the falsity 
of their accusations against the Jews: ‘on les mettait en prison, on les pillait, on les 
vendait, on les accusait de magie, de sacrifier des enfants, d’empoisonner les 
fontaines; on les chassait du royaume, on les y laissait rentrer pour de l’argent’ 
(undated). In this case, every such accusation is reduced to a figure of avarice, not 
among the Jews, but among the Christians, and the charges of sorcery, like those 
of human sacrifice, are revealed as fantasies that have been spread by Christian 
calumny. Adding to his argument, he re-emphasizes the way that the Church has 
slanderously contrived to interpret the Jews’ wandering existence as a punishment 
for their non-recognition of Christ as the Messiah.393
*  *  *
Essai sur les mceurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
In the Essai sur les mceurs, Voltaire contends that the Jews became rich and 
‘necessary’ by performing their role ‘de courtiers, comme ils en ont servi partout’
:,92‘Juifs,,pp.524-26.
393 ‘Juifs’, p.525.
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(1756), a figure made more concrete in this instance by being placed in the 
historical framework of fifteenth-century Spain. He writes that by the time of 
Ferdinand and Isabella ‘cette nation etrangere si odieuse et si necessaire’ (1756) 
had by commerce and usury drawn to itself all the country’s wealth; it had 
become ‘pemicieuse par ses profits sur les Espagnols’ (1756). Emphasizing a 
historical continuity dating from ancient times, he claims that during the Middle 
Ages the Jews ‘garderent tous leurs usages sociables’, and succumbed to avarice, 
‘se faisant de l’usure un devoir sacre’ (1761). In this instance, Voltaire’s figure 
acts in a reverse mode; he gives to the social activity a quasi-religious purpose.3** 
But, as in ‘Juifs’, on occasion Voltaire softens his criticism of the Jews by 
reiterating that the contemporary Jewish involvement in their financial activities 
has been the result of the restrictions placed on them by Christian society, a state 
of affairs similar to that in which the much praised Quakers find themselves; both 
groups are restrained by ‘la necessite de gagner de 1’argent par le commerce’ 
( 1734).395 This figure, that represents man’s choice of livelihood as dictated by a 
necessity that has been forced on him, remains a constant one throughout 
Voltaire’s writing. At the end of his life, he states that under the Roman Empire 
the Jews, unable to sacrifice to the gods of Rome, were obliged to become 
involved in business and ‘forced to enrich themselves’ (1777).396 Ironically he sets 
out the tension that lies at the heart of the Jewish practices, the paradox that 
underpins the Jews’ existence: ‘En un mot, ils furent partout usuriers, selon le 
privilege et la benediction de leur loi, et partout en horreur par la meme raison’ 
(1761).397 Again he shows the way trade has developed in answer to Jewish needs, 
bringing them the very wealth that has then earned them the jealousy of those who 
first imposed the restrictions. But Voltaire also introduces a further element into 
his argument. When we compare his separate representations of the marginalized 
Jews and Quakers, it appears that his concern is not so much for the occupation 
itself as for the manner in which that occupation is carried out. While in his 
commercial dealings the English Quaker ‘avait su mettre des bomes a sa fortune
et a ses desirs’ (1734), in the Jews’ financial activities Voltaire perceives the
394 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 160, 159, 160, 164.
395 Lettres philosophiques, I, 51.
396 Histoire de Vetablissement du christianisme, p.81.
397 Essai sur les maeurs, II, 163.
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presence of greed; he alleges that the Jews’ so-called ‘falsity’ ‘ne contribua pas 
peu a leur disgrace’ (1756) -  here he renders them partly responsible for the 
treatment that they have received.398 Commercial exchange may ofen be useful and 
profitable to society, but it should not be driven by personal avarice or ambition, a 
contention that might have had particular resonance for Voltaire himself following 
his unfortunate, if not shameful, financial dealings in Berlin in 1750-51 with the 
Jewish banker Hirschel -  an episode described by Frederick II as one involving 
‘un fripon qui veut tromper un filou’. Yet, even in this case where he sees a need 
for the Jews to improve their behaviour, because their actions lack brutality, he 
advocates that they deserve to be treated with tolerance.399
While we may agree with Pomeau’s suggestion that the writer’s satirical 
allusions to Jewish usury in biblical times could be drawn from his literal reading 
of Deuteronomy XXIII, a further explanation for this and other similarly negative 
portrayals of the Jews might be found by reference to what Voltaire writes about 
other groups in the Essai sur les mceurs.400 Referring to the allegation of murder by 
Louis XI of the due de Berry (1472), he comments: ‘L’histoire ne doit point l’en 
accuser sans preuves; mais elle doit le plaindre d’avoir merite qu’on l’en 
soup9onnat’ (1756).401 Even when proof of certain practices is missing, people are 
often accused of certain behaviour on the grounds of their other attested actions. 
Accordingly, individuals frequently deserve their reputations or are responsible 
for the blame attributed to them. This paradigm gives Voltaire an additional 
excuse for claiming the involvement of the ancient Jews in those monetary 
activities practised by their modern-day heirs. In this particular instance, in order 
to define Jewishness, he manipulatively conflates the mythical and the historical 
so as once more to create a two-way movement, one that enables him to blame 
both ancient and modem Jews for the faults of the other. But here his indictment 
again rests on presumed evidence of a Jewish existence that is redeemable, not on 
an unchangeable essence.
In La Philosophie de Vhistoire, Voltaire re-adopts a stereotypically suggestive
language that adds to the negative representation of Jewish morality. In a passage
398 Lettres philosophiques, I, 1; Essai sur les mceurs, II, 160.
399 D4358 to his sister, Sophia Friderika Wilhelmina, Margrave of Baireuth (22 January 1751).
400 Essai sur les mceurs (1990), II, 63 note.
401 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 118.
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that repeats the thinking of Dieu et les hommes, he shows the Jews as having 
plagiarized everything from others, even those customs, rites and beliefs that he 
constantly ridicules and despises:
Les Juifs memcs, malgrd leur horreur pour le reste des hommes, qui s ’accrut avec le temps, 
imitfcrent la circoncision des Arabes et des Egyptiens, s’attach£rent comme ces demiers, Si la 
distinction des viandes, prircnt d ’eux les ablutions, les processions, les danses sacrdes, le 
bouc Hazazel, la vache rousse. ( 1765)402
Moreover, he again brings together the Gypsies, the Jews and the ‘dregs’ of the 
world, not just in terms of wandering, but also in terms that allege a thieving 
nature. Drawing on this contemporary fantasy of the ‘cheating’, ‘deceitful’ Jew, 
he readopts a highly prejudiced metaphorical discourse to describe both the 
manipulative biblical texts and the people who hold them sacred: ‘ils mirent en 
oeuvre de fausses medailles, de fausse inscriptions’ (1756).403 Later expanding this 
figure, he writes: ‘C’est ainsi que de tout temps ils avaient falsifie leur tradition 
par des fables’ (1761),404 a comment to which he adds: ‘de tout temps les Juifs ont 
defigure la verite par des fables absurdes’ (1769).405 The repeated attention that he 
gives to this passage over some thirteen years, the continual fine-tuning of his 
comments, demonstrates Voltaire’s constant concern to create a representation of 
all-pervading falsity within the Judaic tradition. By his implied reference to the 
despised trades and other practices reputed as scurrilous, he brings the religious on 
to the same level as the social. This manoeuvre again carries Voltaire’s attack over 
into those two areas of the spiritual and the practical: Judaism fails on both counts, 
presenting truths that are neither divinely inspired nor conducive to responsible 
human behaviour. These figures of falsity and deception reinforce the message 
that Voltaire intends to drive home, namely, the absence of a universal morality at 
the heart of Judaism. While the Jews as human beings understand the just and the 
unjust, the allegedly mythical people of the Bible (and those who revere their
402 Im  Philosophie de I ’histoire, pp. 102-03
40' Essai sur les moeurs, II, 160.
404 Essai sur les moeurs (1990), II, 960, note to page 58; in this passage Pomeau makes other 
amendments to the Moland edition.
405 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 160.
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teachings) reject the moralities that the universal lois fondamentales dictate.
In this text too, Voltaire connects the Jews with sorcery and magic, and so 
while he writes that magic has always existed, practised by all ignorant peoples, 
he represents it as a particular metier of the Jews ‘des qu’ils furent repandus dans 
le monde’ (1765). According to Fenichel, the stereotype of a supposed Jewish 
involvement with magic results from the ‘antisemitic’ fantasy that the Jews 
believe themselves ‘magically superior’ through their participation in the power of 
God, and Voltaire makes his own particular use of this figure in order to carry 
further his ridicule of the biblical texts; he mockingly repeats the stories of Moses 
who pronounced the name of Jehovah ‘d’une maniere si efficace a l’oreille du roi 
d ’Egypte Phara Nekefre, que ce roi en mourut sur-le-champ’, and of the 
‘pythonisse d’Endor, qui evoqua l ’ombre de Samuel’ (1765).406 In his 
correspondence Voltaire attacks the books of Maccabees in which such magical 
stories appear, stating that Thistoire y est falsifiee a chaque page’. Yet these 
scriptures (treated as apocryphal by the Protestants) he then shows to be taken 
from other neighbouring peoples who believed in magic: they did not belong to 
the Jews’ own books of law -  an acknowledgement that again removes the charge 
of a foolish Jewish particularity. Voltaire reinscribes the Jews in the universal 
when he declares: ‘Enfin, la Pythonisse etait une etrangere.’ (11 October 
1763) The way he plays with his interpretations of such figures, alternatively 
creating their connection with or separation from the Jews, reveals the manner in 
which he manipulates his discourse according to his purpose of the moment.407 
But, for him, even this mockery is still not destructive enough, and so he takes the 
magical figure further, uniting it with one denoting bestiality:
Le sabbat des sorciers en est une preuve parlante; et le bouc avec lequel les sorcidres dtaient 
supposdes s’accoupler, vient de cet ancien commerce que les Juifs eurent avec les boucs dans 
le ddsert, ce qui leur est reprochd dans le Uvitique (chap. 17). (1765)408
At the same time, Voltaire chooses to bring the figure of the magical into a
406 La Philosophie de I’histoire, p.209.
407 D11453 to the Marquis d’Argence.
408 La Philosophie de I’histoire, p.209.
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more historical time frame, and he writes that in ancient Rome ‘il n’y a guere eu 
parmi nous de proces criminels de sorciers sans qu’on y ait implique quelque juif’. 
He then comments that those Jews ‘qui ne pouvaient devenir de riches courtiers 
faisaient de propheties ou des philtres’, and this broadens the argument by 
bringing together the two elements of greed and of victimhood, thus reintroducing 
the dual issue of responsibility and rights. According to Voltaire, on one hand, the 
desire for greater material benefits has encouraged the Jews to engage in 
deceptive practices in which they themselves possibly do not believe, and, on the 
other, because they have been subjected to a discrimination that has forced them 
to choose to follow despised activities, they suffer further discrimination. The 
ignorance that allows for such beliefs or actions has not just caused deception and 
suffering in those who witness it, but also to those who practise it, and so ‘des 
milliers de miserables assez insenses pour se croire sorciers’ have been burned at 
he stake by ‘des juges assez imbeciles et assez barbares pour les condamner aux 
flammes’ (1765). The tone here concentrates on both the foolishness of supposed 
Jewish tradition, and the destructive foolishness of humanity in general.409
In the Essai sur les moeurs, Voltaire reconsiders the question of the Jews’ 
victimhood as the result of false blame. He indicts the ‘popular accusations’ that 
have been unjustly levelled at them, and the social restrictions to which they have 
been subject (1761). Seen as the perpetrators of a ‘tyrannie sourde’, the spoilers of 
the nation, ‘on prit enfin la parti de les chasser et de les depouiller’ (1756). 
Revealing the hypocrisy behind the treatment that they have suffered, Voltaire 
writes: ‘Ils furent chasses de presque toutes les villes de l’Europe chretienne en 
divers temps, mais presque toujours rappeles’ (1761). Objects of both jealousy 
and discrimination because of their success in their financial dealings, the Jews 
have been accepted or rejected according to others’ current needs. This thinking 
marks his condemnation of the savage and immoral pragmatism shown by the 
Spanish at the end of the fifteenth century:
On prit enfin le parti de les chasser et de les depouiller. On ne leur donna que six mois pour
vendre leurs effets, qu’ils furent obliges de vendre au plus bas prix. [...] Les uns se retirerent
en Afrique, les autres en Portugal et en France; plusieurs revinrent feignant de s’etre fait
409 La Philosophie de I ’histoire, p.209, p.210.
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chr^tiens. On les avait chassis pour s’emparer de leurs richesses, on les re9ut parce qu’ils en 
rapportaient. (1756)410
Such hypocritical actions on the part of the Christians have caused the Jews to 
resort to similar acts of falsity, the feigning of conversion to ensure their survival. 
The notion of an immoral causality is now reversed: no longer Jewish, it has 
become Christian.
*  *  *
La Pucelle
In La Pucelle Voltaire again attacks the magical aspect of religion, scorning: 
‘Ce vieil instinct qui fait croire aux prodiges’ (1730-62). To emphasize this 
element in ancient Jewish teaching, he suggests its negative religious causality for 
the Christian followers. Thus he portrays the friar, Grisbourdon, ‘grand clerc en la 
sorcellerie’, in these terms:
Savant dans l’art en Egypte sacre,
Dans ce grand art cultivd chez les mages,
Chez les Hdbreux, chez les antiques sages,
De nos savants dans nos jours ignore. (1730-62)
Voltaire then traces the Christian’s inheritance of the Jewish magical tradition:
Le moine gris possddait le baton 
Du bon Jacob, 1’anneau de Salomon,
Sa Clavicule et la verge enchantde 
Des conseillers sorciers de pharaon,
Et le balai sur qui parut mont6e 
Du preux Saiil la sorci&re 6dent£e,
Quand dans Endor cl ce prince imprudent
Elle fit voir l’ame d ’un revenant. (1730-62)
410 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 162, 159, 163, 159-60.
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But Voltaire also lifts the figure of the sorcerer into the modern world. The old 
woman, the companion of ‘the Jew’, ‘predit la pluie et le beau temps, / f...] guerit 
les blessures 16geres / Avec de l’huile et de saintes prieres’ (1755-62). The 
passage intentionally confounds: sorcery unites the religious and the secular, the 
Christian and ‘the Jew’. And continuing to attack all instances of deception, in this 
poem Voltaire sets out to show the unforeseen morally destructive results that 
such behaviour can bring about; ‘demonstrating’ how the Jewish religion itself 
was founded on an act of falsity, the serpent’s deceit and hypocrisy, he expounds 
the idea that this brought about humanity’s fall from grace -  a figure that he 
mockingly parodies in Le Taureau blanc (1773).411
Much of Voltaire’s emphasis in La Pucelle is given to condemning the 
contradiction that he finds present in the Jewish tradition: the unjust rewarding of 
acts of immorality. For him the Jewish acceptance of non-retribution accorded to 
sinners, and the unfair punishment of later generations, marks an essential lack of 
reason at the heart of the Jewish faith. Among the Christians, the lecherous, 
hypocritical, ‘incontinent’ ‘pere au grand cordon’, Grisbourdon, who seeks by 
deflowering Jeanne ‘to serve’ his country, his Church and himself, is sent to Hell, 
the ‘digne sejour de ces esprits pervers’ (1730-62); ‘just Heaven’, punishes the 
knight Chandos for his violations, his ‘impiety, blasphemy, impenitence’ (1730- 
62); and the ‘disloyal soul’ of the unrepetent ‘aumonier inhumain’ ‘Alla grossier 
la cohorte infemale’ (1730-62).412 But, in contrast, in the Jews’ ‘fabled’ accounts 
of Judith’s ‘saintly perfidy’ (1730-62), Aod’s murder of Eglon ‘au nom de Dieu’, 
and Samuel’s ‘brave’ butchery of Agag by his ‘main divine’ (1755-62), Voltaire 
identifies an absence of such spiritual retribution.413 Instead, in its place he 
reintroduces his figure of the Jews’ alternative and continuous punishment in this 
world: God has left ‘son peuple en esclavage’ (1755-62). This figure, by 
foregrounding the absence of personal retribution and the absence of individual 
responsibility for crimes, strengthens Voltaire’s charge against the Jewish 
religion. In his eyes Judaism fails in its essential role to act as a brake to the worst
411 La Pucelle, IV, 6 7 ,p321 ; II, 86-89, p.280; IV, 540-47, p.341; VIII, 392-94, p.403.
412 La Pucelle, II, 131, p.282; II, 101, p.281; V, 28, p.346; XIV, 196,200, p.490; XII, 116, p.452;
XII, 142, p.453.
4,3 La Pucelle, II, 223, p.286; XVI, 130-31, 132, pp.509-10.
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of human behaviour: it lacks la morale. As indicated when he asks of the ‘divine 
Agnes’ ‘quelle erreur est la votre / De vous punir pour le peche d’un autre?’ 
(1730-62), he indicts the unfairness of any system which punishes a victim for the 
sins of another.414
Further figures that are more openly anti-Jewish appear in La Pucelle, again 
drawing on the stereotypical representations of deception, unoriginality, 
untrustworthiness and theft. With an obvious play on words, Voltaire speaks of ‘le 
peuple fidele / De ses patrons emportant la vaisselle / Et par le vol m^ritant son 
bonheur’ (1755-62): he questions the notion of ‘fidelity’, and openly links reward 
or happiness to wrongdoing. He also compares the monk Bonifoux’s vision to the 
prophetic dream ‘De ce Jacob, heureux par un mensonge, / Patte-pelu dont 
l ’esprit lucratif / Avait vendu ses lentilles en Juif’ (1730-62).4,s Voltaire’s repeated 
reference to every-day possessions (crockery, utensils, lentils) serves both to 
denigrate the sanctity of the biblical texts, and to reduce the Jewish character to 
one marked by petty pilfering. But the linked figures of avarice and deceit are 
brought into more contemporary times by his depiction of the ‘well-paid’ fortune­
tellers of Charles VII, and the ‘worthy Hebrew’ who ‘galantly lends’ to La 
Trimouille and Arondel ‘Deux mille ecus a quarante pour cent / Selon les us de la 
race benite, / En Canaan par Moise conduite’ (1755-62). This ‘Jew’ unites with 
the old woman to help the two knights on their way, but with an added touch of 
satire Voltaire later indicates that even this service was performed dishonestly; 
‘false advice’ directs the young men onto the wrong path (1755-62).416
While Voltaire shows that calumny has led to the perpetuating and propagating 
of false accusations against the Jews, in La Pucelle he condemns all spreading of 
slander, exclaiming: ‘O calomnie! affreux poison des Cours, / Discours malins, 
faux rapports, medisance, / Serpents maudits’ (1730-62). And, in the context of 
this poem, it is in the figure of Agnes, the naive sacrificial lamb, the unthinking 
victim of the machinations of others, that victimhood is most consistently and 
continuously represented. Her name, like that of Candide, suggests her 
ingenuousness and open purity, traits that stand in contrast to the manipulative
414 1m  Pucelle, XVl7l58, p.511; X, 190-91, p.423.
415 La Pucelle, XVI, 123-25, p.509; XIII, 297-99, p.476.
416 La Pucelle, VIII, 422-24, p.404; IX, 32, p.406.
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character of Church and society. Voltaire draws her with sympathy, the sinner 
who sins unintentionally and who has to suffer in silence the abuse of others. In 
this manner, he links errancy not just with wandering and implied deviancy, but 
also with innocence, ignorance and unavoidable victimhood.417
* * *
Candide
Again drawing on contemporary fantasy, in Candide Voltaire presents a 
fictional representation of ‘enduring Jewishness’, portrayed in the highly negative 
register of uncontrolled behaviour, selfishness, deviousness and immorality; he 
shows even the enlightened ‘Jew’ to be quick-tempered, lustful and lacking 
refinement in a way that suggests his otherness. Again creating a link between the 
contemporary Jews and their biblical past, and suggesting the character’s 
connection with the latter, Voltaire writes: ‘Cet Issachar etait le plus colerique 
Hebreu qu’on eut vu dans Israel depuis la captivite en Babylone.’ Issachar’s 
financial success, even though connected to the merchant status that Voltaire so 
often commends, relates to a scheming financial acumen that links him with 
certain other Jews in the conte. These, like the old woman’s companion in La 
Pucelle, are unnamed money-lenders who carry out their profitable financial 
negotiations at high rates of exchange. Here Voltaire’s figure uses the procedures 
of fictional caricature to mark out his separation between respectable and 
unrespectable commercial practices.418
While the attack in Candide does not openly address the Bible, the critique 
remains the same as that found in the discursive texts critical of the Jews -  the 
falsity of their claims regarding the sanctity of the holy scriptures, and the 
perversity of their example to future generations. Candide, wishing to protect 
Cunegonde from the amorous and lustful advances of the Governor of Buenos 
Aires, looks to the patriarchs of the Old Testament as a model. This episode could 
be interpreted as evidence of an attribution of Jewish guilt for the wrongdoings of 
the Christians, but Voltaire diminishes the importance given to such a perceived
417 La Pucelle, IV, 432-34, p.336.
418 Candide, p. 148.
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causality by showing how the Bible’s pernicious effect is ultimately the 
responsibility of the person who imitates its practices. The blame for choosing to 
follow an immoral example in fact rests with whosoever makes that choice, and 
Voltaire re-emphasizes the connection/separation between blame and 
responsibility by comparing the actions of the biblical patriarchs and the 
ingenuous Candide: while Abraham submitted to deceit, pretending that Sarah 
was his sister, the young protagonist, relying on a natural sense of morality, 
cannot allow himself to utter such a falsehood, an episode that shows that biblical 
scripture need not be responsible for a later event. In ‘Chame des evenements’ 
(1764) Voltaire proposes that while all effects have a cause, not all causes need 
have an effect, and it is to illustrate this that he ridicules Pangloss as the proponent 
of optimisme419 Accordingly, he suggests that, just as a writer may not be blamed 
for unforeseen events of later generations, Judaism, even while having introduced 
an immoral religious tradition, cannot be held to blame for the deeds of others of 
another time. Candide’s natural understanding of universal morality and his 
refusal to follow the Bible’s negative examples repeats the figure found in La 
Pucelle, where the uneducated Jeanne d’Arc, who has never read Vhistoire, 
declares that nonetheless she would be ‘d’un courage bien bas / De tuer gens qui 
ne combattent pas’ (1730-62). And Voltaire introduces these episodes in order to 
achieve two further objectives: first to show the enduring nature of human 
characteristics and human experience, the faults, merits and temptations of all 
mankind -  that is the mundane commonality uniting contemporary people and 
those honoured and supposedly historic fathers of Jewish teaching -  and second to 
support his claim of the essential lack of morality at the heart of the biblical 
Jewish character.420
* * *
Allegations of the ‘abominable’ and the ‘disgusting’ in Judaism
To give force to his demolition of the Judaic tradition, Voltaire emphasizes
419 ‘Chaine des 6v£nemerits', pp.525-26.
420 La Pucelle, II, 291-92, p.290.
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the brutal and revolting nature of many of the supposed articles of faith. He 
contends that the proof of these actions may be found in the texts themselves, and 
he backs up his indictment, commenting that: ‘on ne peut juger d’une nation que 
par ses archives, et par ce qu’elle rapporte d’elle-meme’ (1764).421 The emphasis 
is now on the intolerable nature of Jewish behaviour in the biblical past. 
Therefore, again insisting that he is ‘holding’ to the text, Voltaire claims to have 
evidence of the appalling actions of the ancient Jews -  brutal savagery, human 
sacrifice and bestial or coprological traditions. Referring to the rites the Jews 
adopted from others, he declares: ‘Ce qu’ils ont ajoute d’eux-memes parait d’une 
grossieret£ et d’une absurdite si revoltante qu’elle excite l ’indignation et la pitie’ 
(1766). It is on the ‘revolting’ accounts of such actions that, he claims, the Jews 
base the truth of their religion and the chosenness of their people. Voltaire insists 
that the questioning reader of the scriptures cannot be selective in his 
interpretation; he must accept all or none of the texts as the true word of God. In 
this way, he refuses the believer the interpretative literary freedom that he allows 
himself. While at times Voltaire emphasizes the contradiction between the related 
events and their impossibilty, at others -  as Katz suggests -  he imposes a factual 
reading on an obviously metaphorical episode. This latter action allows him to 
foreground the supposedly abominable and disgusting nature of certain stories so 
as to undermine faith in the whole religion. Bringing the literalness of the 
unbeliever to those texts understood symbolically by believers, in his argument 
Voltaire ignores the symbolic dimension and rests on the illogicality of an 
assumption that an all-good, all-reasoning Creator could have prescribed a savage 
and irrational ordinance.422
Voltaire continues to reiterate the distinction between a universal and a 
particular understanding of la morale, the opposition between what benefits all 
humanity, and the mere adoption of arbitrary conventions and customs. But 
writing for his European readers, in areas of the absurd he at times fuses the two 
interpretations together, incorporating into his presentation of universal morality 
elements of the Christian world’s understanding, with its emphasis on a 
particularized notion of purity: in this way he reinforces his mocking defamation
421 ‘JephUf, p.242.
422 Ex amen important, p. 179.
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of the biblical Jews. Douglas has investigated the different interpretations given 
by specific groups to certain actions, and the way these interpretations fit into 
their own symbolic systems. While these differences may rest on only minor 
details, our personal ‘pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any 
object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications’. Douglas 
shows the importance of such classifications in the Judaic laws of the ‘clean’ and 
the ‘unclean’. But Voltaire, when viewing such issues, ones that he considers 
‘absurd’, glosses over the particular significance of all such distinctions, and 
instead portrays his own society’s interpretation as the example par excellence of 
the universal. Thus he can better ridicule the biblical texts. However, in contrast, 
in the field of the abominable, his argument rests solely on the universal 
understanding of morality. Brutal actions against a vulnerable victim or activities 
that contradict what is generally seen as reasonable human behaviour are 
represented in terms of their utterly intolerable nature: they require the intolerance 
of all people.423
* * *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante, by reading the scriptures through the morale
universelle, Voltaire can increase his mocking denigration of the biblical texts and
those who hold them sacred: ‘L ’absurdite dement heureusement ici la barbarie;
mais, encore une fois, ce n ’est pas ici que j ’examine le ridicule et 1’impossible; je
m ’arrete a ce qui est execrable.’ Although he considers that a perverse nature is a
universal characteristic of mankind, in this case Voltaire wishes to particularize
the Jewish people and those who have followed them. His excoriation of the Jews
rests on his listing of what he finds in the Bible to be ‘les horreurs historiques qui
revoltent la nature et le bon sens’. So he contends that ‘jamais le sens commun ne
fut attaque avec tant d’indecence et de fureur’, and he asks us to see ‘sur quels
pretextes, sur quels faits, sur quels miracles, sur quelles predictions, enfm, sur
quel fondement est batie cette degoutante et abominable histoire’. To give added
strength to his attack on the morality of the Jews, Voltaire here makes use of a
423 Purity and Danger, p.45.
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favourite device; he applies an intentionally close reading, following ‘step by 
step’ the ‘historical’ accounts found in the Bible;424 he adopts that Lockean 
empirical clarity that, as shown in the Lettres philosophiques, depends on a ‘pas a 
pas’ development of an argument.425 Even while claiming mockingly to be holding 
‘respectfully’ to the text, by his literal interpretation he is able to deepen his 
criticism of those who believe the Bible to be God-given and true. To expose the 
unprecedented extravagances with which the Bible ‘teems’, he reviles the 
prostituting and incestuous sexual practices of Lot, he excoriates the allegedly 
revolting and abominable habits of Ezekiel, and repeats his negative 
representations of the inhabitants of Sodom, the deceitful prostitute Rahab, the 
treacherous Aod, and Samuel’s butchery of Agag. Voltaire bitterly condemns ‘ce 
tissu de meurtres, de vols, d’assassinats, d ’incestes’ that have been performed in 
the name of God, and exclaims: ‘Que de crimes commis au nom du Seigneur!’426
* * *
‘Juifs’
In ‘Juifs’ Voltaire again constructs a timeless ‘Jewish’ character lacking in 
morality, one that has always been a ‘brigand’, a ‘slave’ or ‘seditious’. He writes: 
Tesprit seditieux de ce peuple se porta a de nouveaux exces: son caractere en tout 
temps etait d’etre cruel, et son sort d’etre puni’ (1756). While the figure of 
brutality is represented in terms of their past, their position as an object of 
universal dislike and discrimination persists into the present. He then goes further 
and accuses the ancient Jews of following a law of the savages, claiming that, 
according to his literal reading of the Bible, they accepted or encouraged 
bestiality, so-called ‘fornication’ and human sacrifice, sexual, social or religious 
practices that he despises, mocks or bitterly condemns. In his highly satirical 
second section, while feigning to accept the divine nature of Jewish law, Voltaire 
gives an over-literal biblical interpretation, a hyperbolically caricatural procedure 
of his most intense mockery. He claims that this provides evidence of the ‘bizarre’
424 Sermon des cinquante, p.442, p.439, p.447, p.444, p.439.
425 Lettres philosophiques, I, 169.
426 Sermon des cinquante, p.444, p.442.
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practices of the ancient Jews: copulations and supposed offerings, and trials and 
sacrifices which ‘ne sont que des operations de bouchers en ceremonie’ (undated). 
He continues to refer to what he calls the Jews’ ‘disgusting practices’ until the last 
decade of his life; again claiming to be holding to the text, in the ‘Reponse a 
quelques objections’ he writes:
Vous perdez tout d’un coup cinq belles villes que le Seigneur vous destinait au bout du lac de 
Sodome, et cela pour un attentat inconcevable contre la pudeur de deux anges. En v£rit£, c ’est 
bien pis que ce dont on accuse vos m£res avec les boucs.
Sarcastically professing his sympathy for the Jewish people, he adds: ‘Comment 
n ’aurais-je pas la plus grande pitie pour vous quand je vois le meurtre, la sodomie, 
la bestialite, constates chez vos ancetres’ (1771 ).427
While on the one hand Voltaire denies the truth of the scriptures, on the other 
he continues to demolish Jewish claims of innocence of their supposed crimes, 
asking why a law against bestiality was deemed necessary when the practice did 
not exist, why the putting to death of victims promised to God might not be 
considered as human sacrifice. He questions how the Jews might explain the 
violence perpetrated on the Midianites, the savage treatment of the young women, 
or Samuel’s slaughter of Agag. He concludes: ‘Ou renoncez a vos livres, [...] ou 
avouez que vos peres ont offert a Dieu des fleuves de sang humain, plus que n’a 
jamais fait aucun peuple du monde’ (1771). For Voltaire, here the choice is a 
simple one: either Jewish history and teachings are savage and immoral, or they 
are false. The heavy sarcasm in this fourth section of ‘Juifs’, therefore, returns to 
that much favoured device of a double-pronged attack, one levelled first against 
Judaism’s unquestioning faith in the biblical stories, and then against its 
‘impossible’ authenticity. He sets out to destroy the Bible’s claims to truth by 
ridiculing the facts and figures of its mythic assertions and by declaring the non­
morality of the scriptures. Once more applying a mathematical logicality to 
enforce his exaggeratedly rational argument, he mockingly scorns the claimed 
conquests of the biblical Jews over their enemies:
427 ‘Juifs’, p.518, p.523, p.534.
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A l’dgard des trente-deux mille pucelages, je lui en souhaite. Notre petit pays est de l’£tendue 
de Madian; il contient environ quatre mille ivrognes, une douzaine de procureurs, deux 
hommes d ’esprit, et quatre mille personnes du beau sexe, qui ne sont pas toutes jolies. Tout 
cela monte & environ huit mille personnes, supposd que le greffier qui m’a produit ce compte 
n’ait pas exagdr<£ de moitid, selon la coutume. Vos prctres et les n&tres auraient peine k 
trouver dans mon pays trente-deux mille pucelles pour leur usage.
Finally Voltaire returns to his much-used figure of the donkey and with blatant 
scorn comments satirically: ‘A 1’egard des soixante et un mille anes qui furent le 
prix de vos conquetes en Madian, c’est assez parler d’anes’ (1771).428
In these later passages of the text, the content readdresses, what are for 
Voltaire, long-held contentious issues regarding Judaism. But at the same time the 
tone is tuned more to a blatant mockery based on his perception of the scriptures’ 
irrationality, and less to the vitriolic and impassioned revulsion evidenced in the 
earlier parts of ‘Juifs’. The emphasis in the 1770s rests on terms such as 
‘inconceivability’, ‘accusation’, constatation, and on the various reiterated 
representations of foolishness, terms which dismantle his earlier attribution to the 
Jews of a continuous essence of immorality.
* * *
La Pucelle
These sarcastic figures reappear with their biblical overtones in La Pucelle 
where Voltaire opens his poem comparing the courageous virtues of Jeanne d’Arc 
to other women, but then comments in language that echoes the biblical texts: 
‘J ’aimerais mieux le soir pour mon usage / Une beaute douce comme un mouton.’ 
Continuing the satire, he reveals the problems that face Saint Denis in his search 
for a virgin in France:
Nos franc-archers, nos officiers, nos princes
Ont des longtemps ddgami les provinces.
Ils ont tous fait, en ddpit de vos saints,
428 ‘Juifs’, p.536, p.537.
Plus de Mtards encor d ’orphelins.
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Christian Europe is revealed as following in the tradition of the ancient Jews, 
using young women for sexual gratification. Similarly, Voltaire introduces into 
this parody those elements so frequently found in the ancient scriptures -  murder, 
sodomy, adultery, and incest. While feigning to be writing a ‘serious’ work that 
upholds the tenets of Christian teaching, Voltaire in fact presents it as a travesty 
that mocks the holy texts of the Jews. The poem, like the Bible, promulgates its 
authority through the recounting of fables that relate practices considered immoral 
by its religious followers.429
* * *
Candide
These figures are relevant for our examination of Candide. Having been 
literally booted out of the ‘earthly paradise’ (the delapidated castle of the Baron de 
Thunder-ten-tronckh), Candide finds himself on the battlefield, surrounded by 
mutilated corpses. The images Voltaire creates of the injustice perpetrated by war, 
bodies hacked into pieces, women and children slaughtered without reason, young 
girls taken as ‘booty’ to satisfy the soldiers’ ‘natural needs’, reiterate the much 
repeated representations he gives of similar, brutal biblical events. This manoeuvre 
foregrounds the identical nature of the faults found in both the ancient people of 
the Bible and the men of the Church, the comparable hypocrisy and immorality of 
both groups. In this case we can read, therefore, a dual representation of the 
Christians and their forefathers the Jews. Both, asserting their specious right to 
uphold their God-given authority through violence, have in fact taken power for 
themselves solely by an act of sophistry or brutality.
*  *  *
Essai sur les moeurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
In a highly satirical passage in La Philosophie de Vhistoire, Voltaire again
™~La Pucelle, I, 12-13, p.258; 1,352-55, p.275.
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mocks the alleged customs of the ancient Jews, and scathingly points to how the 
stories of Ezekiel and others have been related. Condemning the way the figures 
of Aholah and Aholibah have been used in these accounts, he writes:
Ces expressions nous semblent bien inddcentes et bien grossifcres; clles ne l’etaient point chez 
les Juifs, elles signifiaient les apostasies de Jerusalem et de Samarie. Ces apostasies dtaient 
repr£sentdes tr6s souvent comme une fornication, comme un adult£re. II ne faut pas, encore 
une fois, juger des mceurs, des usages, des fa^ons de parler anciennes, par les notres.
(1765)430
Although in this instance, where his writing appears more controlled than in 
the Sermon des cinquante and the first two sections of ‘Juifs’, Voltaire 
acknowledges the non-literal signifying function of the sacred text, still he 
contrives to reduce the significance of the clearly stated representational intent of 
the passage; he purposely slants his interpretation in order to persuade his reader 
and to drive home his indictment of the Bible’s immorality and uncivilized nature. 
His intentional change of emphasis, his minimization of the metaphorical 
character of the biblical reference, which states that ‘Samaria is Aholah, and 
Jerusalem Aholibah’, supports Katz’s accusation against him regarding his 
misrepresentation of the Bible’s figurative content. Here, in order to reduce the 
function of the metaphor, Voltaire emphasizes the indecency and grossness of the 
discourse, the very failings of which his own texts are often accused. As a result, 
in this case rather than giving us a demonstration of the way biblical readers 
manipulatively explain the holy scriptures through a metaphor that does not exist, 
Voltaire presents us with a further illustration of the fact that he himself is the 
manipulator.431 In certain more objectively constructed texts, such as the Homelies 
prononcees a Londres (1767), he gives full recognition to the place of figure in the 
biblical writings, but at other times in his hallucinatory works his representation of 
certain episodes glosses over their metaphorical nature and presents them in 
highly literal terms. But such an action can be the cause of failure: by introducing 
an unbalanced and contentious interpretation that is so blatantly subjective,
430 La Philosophie de I’histoire, p.241.
431 Ezekiel 23,4, in The Jerusalem Bible (USA: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1998).
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Voltaire risks provoking a distrust on the part of his audience for all his statements 
that are critical of the Bible. Because his argument appears unfounded, his readers 
are encouraged to question the rightness or accuracy of all his interpretation. 
Exaggeration or deceptive reporting of this kind can cause many people to view 
with scepticism every aspect of his exegesis. Instead of encouraging them to read 
on, Voltaire’s humour may in this context create the reverse effect: a rejection of 
his works and a refusal to consider all aspects of his philosophical and theological 
argument. Sarcasm is a dangerous tool that needs to be applied with caution, a 
quality that Voltaire does not always show.432
Further issues should however be considered that weigh against that reaction. 
In our examination of any passage, we have to remember for whom the particular 
text was intended. The highly controversial and manipulative slant that Voltaire 
sometimes gives to certain stories (such as those found in the Book of Ezekiel), 
occurs above all in those texts that he wrote solely for his fellow enlightened. The 
Sermon des cinquante, in particular, was initially meant for circulation among 
those of his private circle, those who most probably had read his other texts, 
and/or who were themselves moderately well acquainted with much biblical 
teaching. Whether or not we today have a deep knowledge of the Bible, we must 
not allow this to colour our perception of how others of a former period might 
have received Voltaire’s comments. Rather than accusing him of seeking to 
mislead the uninformed -  the very fault for which he condemns the Church -  we 
should remember that in these instances Voltaire was endeavouring to expose in 
the texts certain ‘ludicrous’ and ‘revolting’ features for the edification of those 
people who already had some understanding of their content, those capable of 
engaging in reasoned debate.
Furthermore, we might also observe the misunderstanding that Douglas 
discovers in the way people often read the biblical passages; she shows how we 
commonly interpret the place given in the Bible to holiness in terms of our 
understanding of morality. She writes:
Incest and adultery [...] are against holiness, in the simple sense of right order. Morality does
not conflict with holiness, but holiness is more a matter of separating that which should be
432 Homelies prononcees a Londres, pp.463-64.
separated than of protecting the rights of husbands and brothers.
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According to her, the biblical figures are intended to drive home the divine 
message and are not seen as social ordinances. And she further explains how, in 
special circumstances, our interpretations of what designates the unclean -  ideas 
on which our symbolic systems are based -  can become reversed; for this reason 
‘religions often sacralise the very unclean things which have been rejected with 
abhorrence’.433 Therefore, in the case of the Jews, while the notion of defilement is 
founded on a separation between the pure and the impure, holiness can, on 
occasion, be attained by a humble acceptance of the defiled. As for Ezekiel’s meal 
(as it appears in the Bible), here the description does not relate to the content of 
the food, but to the way that it has been prepared; its significance rests on the 
notion of defilement caused by the use of dung as fuel for the baking of bread, and 
accordingly it is in this way that we should understand the Bible’s statement: 
‘Yahweh, the God of Israel, says this: This is the way the Israelites will have to eat 
their defiled food, wherever I disperse them among the nations.’434
But Voltaire often takes these various episodes at face value, that is according 
to the literal sense that he has given them, and so, even while he claims to be 
avoiding a judgement on the practices of others, he constructs as ‘uncivilized’ the 
behaviour that marks the scriptures. Now he wishes to condemn, not so much the 
imagined or pretended indecency itself, but the falseness of the authority that such 
stories both take from and give to the Judaic tradition as a whole. Satirically he 
indicates how the divine should be distinguished from the actions of men: 
‘Presque tout evenement purement humain chez le peuple juif est le comble de 
l’horreur. Tout ce qui est divin est au-dessus de nos faibles idees’ (1765). But then 
bringing together in an implied shared indictment these two elements of ancient 
Jewish identity, the social and the religious, he concludes: ‘l’un et l’autre nous 
reduisent toujours au silence’ (1765). By denegation, he creates a reversal: by 
implying that he cannot speak of these things, he brings them more sharply into 
focus, he gives voice to the very issues that he feigns to deny. He superabundantly
433 Purity and Danger, p. 67, p. 196.
434 Ezekiel, Chapter 4, verse 13.
speaks what he designates as unspeakable.435
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* * *
Charges of Christian hypocrisy, falsehood and deception
While Voltaire’s figures relating to the Jews reiterate contemporary fantasies, 
projecting on to them such negative qualities as falsity and perversity, the figures 
that he adopts to represent the Christians reverse most of the accepted stereotypes 
of the times. Contrary to a European self-perception created around a figure of 
honesty and charity, he portrays Christians in terms of deviousness and deception, 
figures similar to those he presents regarding the Jews. Apart from his intent to 
depict both groups with the commonly shared failings of avaricious greed and a 
desire for personal advancement, Voltaire extends the condemnation by laying 
particular emphasis on the more serious fault of religious manipulation. Just as he 
attacks the people of biblical times for supposedly deceiving their followers with 
false teachings, he vehemently criticizes the Christians for the same deceit and 
their intentional misleading of their flock. The foundations of the Church are 
presented as a mere tissue of lies intended to deceive the unenlightened.
C’est une suite non interrompue de faussaires. Ils forgent des lettres de J£sus Christ, ils 
forgent des lettres de Pilate, [...] des dvangiles au nombre de plus de quarante, [...], etc., etc. 
Vous le savez, monsieur, vous les avez lues, sans doute, ces archives infames du mensonge, 
que vous appelez fraudes pieuses; et vous n’aurez pas l’honnetetd de convenir, au moins 
devant vos amis, que le tr6ne du pape n’a €i€ dtabli que sur d’abominables chimfcres pour le 
malheur du genre humain? (1767)436
While, according to his representation, in the religious domain this deception goes 
as far as the pragmatic selecting of the Gospels and the so-called invention of the 
dogma of the Trinity, in the social it appears in the manipulative use of slander 
and calumny, and in the intentional perversion of the moralities that Christ’s
435 La Philosophie de I’hisloire, p.225.
436 Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers, pp.376-77.
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people proclaim.
Voltaire shows how Christendom has made use of age-old fantasies to 
denigrate the reputations of those that it wishes to persecute: the false reporting of 
the alleged activities of others, whether Christian, Muslims or Jews. In the 
Histoire de Jenni (1775) he satirizes the misrepresentation by Catholics of 
Protestants (the ‘tricking’ of the Spanish people by the Church authorities who 
have sought to dehumanize their ‘monstrous’ English invaders), in ‘Tolerance’ 
(1772) he describes the slandering of the followers of Islam, and in the Relation 
de la mort du Chevalier de La Barre (1766) he refers to the calumnies that have 
been spread against the Jews, calumnies such as their so-called failure to 
recognize the Messiah, a charge which he repeatedly denies has any value. DesnS 
proposes: ‘Voltaire n’hesite pas a reprendre les stereotypes chretiens sur le juif 
asocial [...] mais jamais il ne reprend les stereotypes de Tapologetique chretienne 
la plus courante sur le peuple deicide, coupables des pires actes sacrileges et 
criminels.’437 However, this statement should be considered further in light of the 
two following comments. First, in the Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke 
Voltaire refers to how ‘les pretres juifs forcerent le president Pilate a faire fouetter 
Jesus, et a le faire pendre a une potence en croix, comme un coquin d’esclave’. 
This leads Voltaire to question satirically the practicalities of their finding a nail 
long enough to pierce Jesus’ hands and feet, after which he opines, nonetheless, 
that ‘les Juifs etaient bien capables de cette abominable atrocite’. In this passage 
he points to the Jews’ acceptance of the treatment meted out by the Romans to 
supposed felons, and repeats the Christian scriptures’ message of the priests’ role 
in calling to their colonial masters for Jesus’ crucifixion. But, although bitterly 
condemning all violence, Voltaire frequently suggests that the reactions of the 
Jewish priests to Jesus’ actions might have been understandable, and this now 
leads him to remark that people of all times who speak out against priests must 
expect persecution. He therefore draws a link between the actions of Jesus and the 
Quaker leader, Charles Fox, describing the former as ‘prechant quelquefois 
comme lui une bonne morale, et prechant surtout 1’egalite qui flatte tant la 
canaille’ (1766). By this comparison, Voltaire portrays Jesus solely as the founder
437 Inventaire Voltaire, p.766.
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of the Christian sect, as an enlightened (if uneducated) man with principles.**8 As 
in so many of his texts, here Voltaire writes out the divine nature of Christ, and by 
this manoeuvre he suggests that the Jews might be held responsible for willingly 
participating in an act of violence against a man, but should not be charged with 
deicide. Second, in relation to Desne’s comment, in the Essai sur les mteurs 
Voltaire repeats another popular fantasy levelled against the Jews, even though 
here the reference has been moved from the Jewish to the Christian field. 
According to him, Louis XI attempted to stave off his approaching death by 
drinking children’s blood: ‘C’etait un des exces de 1’ignorante medicine de ces 
temps, medicine introduite par des Juifs’ (17611.439 But, in this case, although the 
accusation remains against the Jews, the main indictment in the passage is against 
the Christians who are shown as having adopted only the worst of supposedly 
Jewish practices.
Voltaire establishes another paradoxical link between the Jews and the early 
Christians. In the Histoire de Uetablissement du christianisme he unites the two 
groups, showing how both ‘ne pouvant entrer dans les emplois qui exigeaient 
qu’on sacrifiat aux dieux de Rome, ils s’adonnaient necessairement au negoce, ils 
etaient forces de s’enrichir’; both groups were involved in ‘le commerce, le 
courtage et l’usure’ (1777) -  the figure is no longer restricted to the Jews alone.440 
When driven by need, both have engaged in those activities, and then have been 
equally condemned for their success: the two cases are identical. However, in the 
contemporary field, the Christians, now grown too proud or even too idle, leave 
others to perform the roles that they spurn, and then condemn those others for 
their achievements. Thus the Christians, even while denouncing Jewish practices, 
seek to benefit from the financial services that the Jews offer. The former’s 
perverted perceptions of the latter are marked by greed, jealousy and calumny; as 
Rousseau, speaking in the name of Christendom, satirically sums up: ‘L ’avidit6 
nous donne du zdle, et ils sont trop riches pour n’avoir pas tort.’441 Moreover, the 
general hypocrisy that lies behind much of Christian teaching also marks the
Church’s expansionist activities; actions such as exploration, colonization and
438 Examen important, p.221.
439 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 120-21.
440 L ’histoire de Velablissement du christianisme, p.81.
441 Emile ou de I’education, p.397.
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even proselytism in reality have often been little more than excuses to satisfy its 
monetary greed.
In addition, while professing to be the arbiters of morality, a morality 
frequently founded on their particular notions of sexual purity, the supposedly 
virtuous Christians have cheated, deceived, seduced and betrayed their victims. 
They emphasize the importance of their holy laws and insist on the obedience of 
the flock, but Voltaire takes up the centuries-old accusation about the Church’s 
supposed involvement in acts of alleged sexual deviation. He constantly indicates 
the failure of the men of God to live up to their professed standards, and across his 
texts he repeatedly condemns priests and prelates for their lack of charity, 
chastity, abstinence and obedience. He underlines the contradiction between what 
they proclaim and what they do. But his criticism becomes its most severe when 
he points to the fatal misinterpretation that has sometimes been given to such 
doctrines. The actions of a supposedly ‘charitable’ little sect in Denmark, 
believing it permissible to commit ‘un petit mal pour un grand bien’, murdered 
their babies immediately after baptism so that without sin they could go to 
paradise (1763).442 By this historical example, emphasizing as it does the inhuman 
nature of religious fanaticism which willingly destroys the most innocent, Voltaire 
condemns the way Christians have interpreted charity itself. And the instability of 
this interpretation reinforces the instability of the Christian identity that is founded 
on such interpretation.
So, for Voltaire, Christian behaviour is doubly at fault: for insisting on
moralities that are grounded solely on a particular understanding of la morale, and
for the hypocritical way the leaders themselves have both failed to abide by the
attested standards and contrived to conceal that failure. To draw attention to this
message, therefore, Voltaire frequently turns to the metaphor of the prostitute, one
that allows him to point to the ambivalence present in much of Christian society,
an ambivalence at times even more devious than that found in the ancient Jewish
texts. Agnes in La Pucelle is the King’s mistress, but in the eyes of the populace
she is seen as a whore; Paquette in Candide is alternatively the object of desire or
the victim of abuse or rejection. Voltaire thus links these members of
contemporary society to the biblical protagonist Rahab and, thereby, creates a
442 Traite sur la tolerance, p.237.
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figure of an enduring but paradoxical tradition, one that portrays the dual nature of 
woman, both the temptress and the mother of salvation. In the Examen important 
de Milord Bolingbroke he emphasizes this connection:
Et remarquons en passant que cette femme nommde Rahab la paillarde, est une des aieules de 
ce Juif, dont nous avons depuis fait un dieu, lequel dieu compte encore parmi celles dont il est 
n6 l’incestueuse Thamar, l’impudente Ruth, et l ’adult£re Bethsab£e.
(1766: editor’s italics)4"
Voltaire also uses this dual figure in connection with La Pucelle's protagonist, 
Jeanne d’Arc; the success of her mission depends on her continued virginity even 
while, as Voltaire sarcastically indicates, the authorities’ physical verification of 
this status is in itself abusive. Moreover, alongside her alleged divinely chosen 
nature, he constantly reminds us of Jeanne’s earthy quality and her readiness to 
give herself to Dunois, who completes the paradox in being the bastard, the so- 
called fils de putain (1750-62).444
But, above all, Voltaire excoriates Christianity’s supreme falsity as evidenced 
by the way that its men of God have presented themselves; to those they have 
deceived or cheated, they declare themselves to be the sole means to an attainment 
of absolution and redemption. This brings us to Voltaire’s criticism of the 
sacrament of confession, a doctrinal act that, he contends, in the hands of 
scheming men of the Church becomes a powerful tool for the further manipulation 
and intimidation of the unenlightened. He writes: ‘Le fanatisme, dans [l]es siecles 
deplorables, etait parvenu a un tel exces que la confession n’etait qu’un 
engagement de plus a consommer leur sceleratesse; elle devenait sacree, par cette 
raison que la confession est un sacrement’ (1766). By designating confession as 
holy, as a sacrament that is obligatory for the people, the Church authorities can 
control the actions of their flock. However, more perniciously still, they have not 
used this merely to restrain their congregations, but in order to encourage them to 
perform inhuman acts in the name of their religion. Voltaire repeatedly re­
emphasizes his indictment: ‘La confession [...] est souvent devenue, dans des
443 Examen important, p. 195.
444 La Pucelle, XIV, 305, p.493 .
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temps de sedition et de trouble, un encouragement au crime meme’ (1766),445 and: 
‘on s’est servi de la confession, de la communion et de tous les sacrements, pour 
commettre les crimes les plus horribles’ (1763).446
In a comparable way, Voltaire criticizes the way Christians have manipulated 
their interpretation of the story of Genesis. Questioning their logic, he asks why 
children are bom into original sin because of the actions of Adam and Eve, why 
they are damned ‘parce que leur premier pere et leur premiere mere avaient mange 
du fruit de leur jardin’ (1768).447 Adopting false modesty to underline the apparent 
illogicality of the Christrian doctrine, he strengthens his criticism by juxtaposing 
Adam’s disobedience and Cain’s murder of Abel: ‘II semble a notre faible raison 
que Dieu soit injuste en favorisant le fratricide, et en punissant etemellement tous 
les enfants de ce coupable [Adam], non pas pour expier un fratricide, mais pour 
une d^sobeissance qui semble excusable’ (1767).448 The desire to eat from the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil is understandable, but the killing of another human 
being is intolerable, and yet in the eyes of Christians the moral judgement is 
reversed. Voltaire shows how original sin was a later invention of the Church, and 
states that ‘ il est indubitable que les Juifs n’avaient jamais entendu parler du pech6 
originel’, and that ‘aucun des premiers Peres de l’£glise n’avan£a cette cruelle 
chimere’. But he takes his argument still further, proposing his own explanation 
for the eventual adoption of this doctrine: ‘L’£glise fait valoir ce systeme terrible 
pour rendre son bapteme plus necessaire’ (1768).449 While the religious authorities 
enforce the people’s sense of need for a man-made sacrament, in the Lettres 
philosophiques Voltaire ridicules the significance of all such sacraments by the 
Quaker’s reductive metonymic reference to the sprinkling of salty water.450 These 
episodes show how Voltaire, through his interpretation of the Bible’s account of 
the Fall, transfers his accusation from the Jews to the Christians. He focuses on 
the way the Church authorities have deviously explained the ancient texts in a new 
manner so as to promote their own importance and power, and, in so doing,
445 Commentaire sur le livre Des delits et des peines, p.564, p.566.
446 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 184.
447 A.B.C., p.336.
448 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.467.
449 A.B.C., pp.337-38.
450 Lettres philosophiques, 1,3.
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Voltaire demolishes the significance of a causal theory that puts the Jews at the 
root of subsequent Christian doctrine. The Christians are not just blameworthy for 
their willing acceptance of Jewish tradition and mythology, but also for the way 
they have reinterpreted these to their own advantage:
Les pr6dictions ont de tout temps un moyen dont on s’est servi pour s^duire les simples, et 
pour enflammer les fanatiques. (...] Si aucune prediction ne s’accomplit, on les explique, on 
leur donne un nouveau sens; les enthousiastes l’adoptent, et les imbeciles le croient.
( 1735-52)45'
And Voltaire sums up his opinion of all such divinations by answering his own 
question: ‘Mais qui fut celui qui inventa cet art? ce fut le premier fripon qui 
rencontra un imbecile’ (1765).452
While prophecy has become a weapon in the Christians’ armoury, Voltaire 
sets out to mark its separation from the reasoning of thinking people:
Le philosophe n’est point enthousiaste, il ne s’drige point en proph&te, il ne se dit point inspire 
des dieux. [...] Ceux qui se dirent enfants des dieux dtaient les p£res de l’imposture; et s ’ils se 
servirent du mensonge pour enseigner des v£ritds, ils £taient indignes de les enseigner; ils 
n’etaient pas philosophes: ils etaient tout au plus de tres prudents menteurs.
He seeks to inspire in his fellow enlightened an enthusiastic determination to 
improve the lot of mankind, but, for him, such fervour in the men of Christ has 
become a false mask behind which they have concealed their personal selfish 
ambitions. In his view, religious hypocrites are Tespece la plus lache et la plus 
cruelle de toutes’: they are perpetrators of fanaticism, but apathetic to the well­
being of others. He declares: ‘£tre hypocrite? quelle bassesse! mais etre hypocrite 
et mechant, quelle horreur!’ (1765).453 And, when reiterating the contradiction 
evident between the actions and the pronouncements of God’s servants in the 
Church, Voltaire rebuts the charge that he has concentrated on the ‘crimes’ of the
ecclesiastics and passed over in silence those of the secular community. He
451 Siecle de Louis XIV, II, 32.
452 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p. 193.
453 ‘Philosophe’, VF, pp.433-34, p.446.
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C’est que les abominations des pretres, et surtout des pretres papistes, font un plus grand 
contraste avec ce qu’ils enseignent au peuple; c’est qu’ils joignent h la foule de leurs forfaits 
un crime non moins affreux, s’il est possible, celui de l’hypocrisie. C ’est que plus leurs moeurs 
doivent etre pures, plus ils sont coupables. ( 1766)454
Voltaire’s point is clear: the immoral acts of such people are most deserving of 
condemnation, both for their deceitful nature, and for their being carried out by 
those whose teachings show that they know better.
*  *  *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire demolishes the standing of the Christian 
Church through his accusation that it takes authority for Christ’s divinity from Old 
Testament prophecy; this action perpetuates the perversity and falsity of the 
biblical forefathers. But he questions if future generations will be able to believe 
‘que le judai'sme et le christianisme se soient appuyes sur de tels fondements, sur 
ces propheties’. He links the two groups in their ‘coutume vaine et superstitieuse’, 
and, referring to the prophet Isaiah’s proclamation of the future birth of the 
Messiah, he writes: ‘Voila, mes freres, ce que les chretiens ont detoume en faveur 
de leur Christ: voila la prophetie qui etablit le christianisme.’ Scorning such 
evidence, Voltaire again endeavours to reveal how the Christian faith is founded 
on a contrived interpretation. He continues his attack against the Christians by 
once more showing how they have hypocritically added to Jewish belief, how they 
have introduced a degree of falsity and manipulation not found in the original 
texts, actions that expose the illogicality and absurdity of the Christian inheritance:
Chaque devin predit aux Juifs leur delivrance, quand ils sont captifs; et cette del iv ranee, c ’est, 
selon les chretiens, la Jerusalem celeste, et l’figlise de nos jours. Tout est prediction chez les 
Juifs; mais chez les chretiens, tout est miracle, et toutes ces predictions sont des Figures de
454 Examen important, p.349.
J£sus Christ.455
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*  *  *
‘Juifs’
In ‘Juifs’ Voltaire portrays how, when the Jews were persuaded, if not forced, 
to convert to Christianity, the authorities availed themselves of the opportunity to 
arrange matters to their own advantage. So with extreme deviousness it was 
decided that since ieurs biens venaient pour la plupart de l ’usure, la purete de la 
morale chretienne semblait exiger qu’ils en fissent une restitution generale; et 
c ’est ce qui s’executait par la confiscation’ (undated).456 Voltaire thus reverses the 
figure of ‘Christian purity’; the representation becomes negated by the implication 
of specious hypocrisy, and the acts performed in the name of the Church are 
revealed as mere sophistry. To underline this, he stresses how throughout the 
Christian world the Jews receive different treatment, depending solely on the 
political thinking of the countries in which they find themselves: intolerance in 
France, Spain and Portugal, but tolerance in the prosperous trading countries of 
England and Holland. In his notebooks Voltaire makes a connection between 
intolerant religious thinking -  such as that found in Catholic countries -  and 
hypocrisy, and concludes: ‘Dans les pays oh l’on a liberte de conscience, on est 
delivre d’un grand fleau. II n’y a point d’hypocrites’ (1735-50?). In liberal 
countries the treatment of minorities is not dictated by dogmatic religious belief, 
but directed by political pragmatism that in turn opens the way to more honest 
societies.457 He draws a similar link in the Homelies prononcees a Londres, where 
he proposes that religious thinkers might learn from those merchants who engage 
in the free exchange of ideas:
Puissent tous les th^ologiens de la terre vivre ensemble comme les commersants, qui, sans 
examiner dans quel pays ils sont n6s, dans quelles pratiques ils ont 6l6 nourris, suivent entre 
eux les regies inviolables de l’equitd, de la fidelity, de la confiance rdciproque. (1767)458
455 Sermon des cinquante, p.447, p.448.
456 ‘Juifs’, p.525.
457 ‘Leningrad Notebooks’, p.252.
458 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.473.
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And in the Traite sur la tolerance Voltaire reiterates his conviction of the wide- 
ranging beneficial results that open-mindedness can bring; in tolerant countries all 
religious groups ‘vivent en freres [...] et contribuent egalement au bien de la 
societe’ (1763).459 This representation of outsiders as providers of services to 
Christendom reintroduces the practical element in Voltaire’s argument regarding 
tolerance. As in the Lettres philosophiques, he points to the greater advantages 
that liberality can bring to a society, and he indicates the foolishness of any group 
that by intolerance rejects such beneficial commerce. And in the Avis au public 
sur les parricides he takes this into a wider and more philosophical dimension; he 
emphasizes the need for all religious groups to work together to combat the 
difficulties faced by every living person.
Le genre humain est semblable a une foule de voyageurs qui se trouvent dans un vaisseau; [...] 
Hd! qu’importent leurs sectes? II faut qu’ils travaillent tous ci calfuter le vaisseau, et que 
chacun, en assurant la vie de son voisin pour quelques moments, assure la sienne; mais ils se 
querellent, et ils p^rissenl ( 1766)460
For Voltaire, just as the spiritual and the practical together have a role to play in 
religion, the moral and pragmatic reasons for tolerance are not exclusive one of 
the other.
*  *  *
Essai sur les mceurs and La Philosophie de I ’histoire
The same figures of Christian moral failure occur in the Essai sur les mceurs, 
where Voltaire describes Ferdinand and Isabella both ‘ayant toujours les mots de 
religion et la piete a la bouche, et uniquement occupes de leur ambition’ (1756). 
He mockingly reinforces this image of pious hypocrisy when he writes how 
Ferdinand was ‘fameux par la religion et la bonne foi dont il parlait sans cesse, et 
qu’il viola toujours’ (1756). Voltaire sarcastically emphasizes the allegedly ‘tres
459 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 147.
460 Avis au public, p.536.
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chretien’ nature of the Catholic ruler and his wife, and then sets their ambitious 
acts against the so-called charity that the Christians claim for themselves alone. 
By this manoeuvre he again encourages us to question the very meaning of 
Christianity, placing the reality of its actions against the hypocritical face that it 
presents to the world.461
Voltaire underlines the advantages that societies can gain or lose from their 
relations with others. While the Moors were essential to the Spanish who ‘ne 
subsistaient que du travail de leurs anciens ennemis’ (1756), these same Christians 
suffered as a result of their persecution of the Jews:
le profit passager que le gouvemement tira de la violence faite a ce peuple usurier, le priva 
bientot du revenu certain que les Juifs payaient auparavant au fisc royal. [...] On y remddia 
autant que Ton put par des bulles. (1756)
And this statement allows Voltaire to move his argument forward, to create a 
figurative network that progresses from a reference to the monetary practices of 
the Jews to one introducing the hypocritical actions of the Christians.
Chaque particulier est oblige d ’acheter cette bulle [de la Cruzade] pour avoir le droit de 
manger des oeufs et certaines parties des animaux en careme, et les vendredis et samedis de 
1’annde. Tous ceux qui vont a confesse ne peuvent recevoir l’absolution sans montrer cette 
bulle au pretre. On inventa encore depuis la bulle de composition, en vertu de laquelle il est 
permis de garder le bien qu’on a vol6, pourvu que Ton n’en connaisse pas le mattre. De telles 
superstitions sont bien aussi fortes que celles qu’on reproche aux Hdbreux. (1756)
Thus, while Voltaire incorporates the actions of the Jews into the field of the 
universal, he both lessens his criticism of them and strengthens his indictment of 
the Christians. This takes the criticism against foolish intolerance to a more 
serious level that concentrates on demonstrating how, through hypocritical 
manipulation, falsehood and calumny can open the way to persecution.462
461 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 157, 201.
462 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 159, 160, 161.
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*  *  *
La Pucelle
Taking as La Pucelle's starting point a historical event, the English occupation 
of fifteenth-century France, Voltaire reveals how the French authorities endeavour 
to give a righteous pretext to what is in fact a purely political ambition. They 
represent their aim to expel the foreigners from France in religious terms, as a 
divine mission directed by Saint Denis. But the religious figures for the most part 
attest a total disregard for (or non-belief in) the faith that they proclaim. To 
emphasize further the hypocrisy of their actions, Voltaire creates a striking 
contrast between the poem’s characters; he separates the naive, but principled, 
innocents who are unwittingly driven to pursue little understood objectives, and 
the pragmatic, immoral, and usually materialistic individuals, who act solely in a 
spirit of selfishness and deviousness. Forcefully introducing the question of the 
corruption of the men of the Church, Voltaire shows how the king’s lapse from 
Christian virtue is abetted by his morally indulgent confessor, Bonifoux. In 
mocking terms he describes the latter thus:
[...] un mortel tout petri d ’indulgence,
Qui doucement fait pencher dans ses mains,
Du bien, du mal la trompeuse balance,
Vous m6ne au ciel par d ’aimables chemins,
Et fait p6cher son maitre en conscience. (1730-62)
Bonifoux, represented as a Panglossian figure who ‘dans les effets voit la cause et 
l’admire’ (1755-62), is shown using the authority of the Old Testament texts to 
encourage the king the follow the patriarchs’ ‘vogue’ for adultery (1730-62). In 
this way, Voltaire invests his representation of falsity in the ancient Jews with a 
figure that portrays the Christians as manipulative. He condemns the Church 
authorities for their dishonestly selective reading of the Judaic scriptures, for 
allowing themselves that freedom of interpretation in which he himself engages. 
But in such cases, for Voltaire, there is a clear distinction between his purpose and
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that of the Christian leaders: his own free interpretation of the texts he sees as 
beneficial to society -  it aims to enlighten -  whereas that of the Church is 
detrimental as its intention is to obfuscate. Moreover, he adds to his criticism by 
now presenting Jewish causality merely as a creation of the Christians, an excuse 
on their part for the inexcusable. Therefore, with implied reference to errancy or 
deviancy and a play on the word ‘consolation’, the confessor advises the king: ‘De 
leurs peches si vous suiviez la trace, / Si vos beaux ans sont livr£s a l’amour, / 
Consolez-vous’ (1730-62). This allows Voltaire to create a link between the 
consolation of confession which allows the king to sin ‘en conscience’ and sexual 
‘consolation’. This structure reappears when the penitent Agnes is welcomed into 
the convent. The abbess suggests that she will be able to ‘consoler les filles du 
Seigneur’ (1730-62), a statement whose full significance is only later understood. 
Among the inmates of the nunnery, Agnes meets the abbess’s lover, bachelier 
‘Soeur Besogne’, who proceeds to rape her (1730-62).463
For Voltaire, the sexual violence carried out by men of the Church becomes 
more repellent because of the particular significance that religion has given to 
sexual acts. Thus his poem indicts the Church’s teaching on chastity, the 
incarcerating of young people in religious houses, the imposed sense of guilt in 
those engaged in loving but illicit relationships. In La Pucelle the ridiculing of the 
Christian moral code is taken to its extreme in the figure of the lovers who, on 
visiting the shrine of Mary Magdalene, ‘virtuously’ learn to hate one another, a 
figure of Christian morality that reiterates that of the Avis au public sur les 
parricides where Voltaire describes monks as ‘ennemis du genre humain, ennemis 
les uns des autres et d’eux-memes’ (1766).464 And, above all, Voltaire condemns 
the sophistry of the immoral men of the Church who carry out their seductions 
promising absolution to the ‘sinners’. Using the figure of the lecherous Franciscan 
Grisbourdon as a starting point, twice in his poem Voltaire refers to the case of the 
Jesuit, Girard, who was charged with the crime ‘d’avoir eu de petites privautes 
avec [...] sa penitente’ (1730-62). Going still further so as to dismantle Christian 
doctrine itself, he scorns any idea of absolution received from a man-made ritual.
~™TaPucelle, XII, 153-57, pp.453-54; XXI, 261, p.581; XII, 171, p.454, XII, 192-94, p.455; X, 357, 
p.429; X, 398, p.430.
464 Avis au public, p.531.
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Voleur de jour, voleur de nuit, corsaire,
Mais saintement h la Vierge attach^
Et sans manquer r^citant son rosaire
Pour etre pur et net de tout p6ch6. (1755-62)
According to Voltaire, faith supported by physical trappings that have been given 
divine significance is (at best) nothing but foolish superstition. He mocks the 
cuisine de poche, the missels and the salt, seen as necessary articles by the 
confessor Bonifoux before he murmurs his benediction in Latin -  a language 
incomprehensible to most of his flock.465
* * *
Candide
In Candide Voltaire reiterates his scorn of Christian ritual and the claimed 
efficacy of the sacraments and sacred objects by a further reference to holy water, 
in this instance used supposedly to revive the young baron after his attack by the 
Bulgares: the patient revives when its saltiness stings his eyes. And Voltaire 
continues to question the role of the confessor, not just by allusion to the billets de 
confession, but by metaphorically linking sickness and salvation found in the 
spiritual domain with that found in the physical. Just as the confessor who leads 
his victim astray can promise redemption, the doctor who visits Candide in Paris 
worsens the health of the sufferer before offering him a cure. Both these figures 
suggest an abuse of authority, one that enforces its position of power by first 
creating a need in the vulnerable for its services.
In this text Voltaire proceeds with his objective of throwing doubt on the 
Christian idea of charity, and questions the morality that is defined by a particular 
interpretation of what is right and what is wrong. The first point is brought sharply 
into focus by the way Voltaire contrasts the protagonist’s repeated attempts to help
465 La Pucelle, II, p.283, note de Voltaire (cf. Ill, p.308, note de Voltaire); VIII, 336-39, pp.401-02; 
XVII, p.528, note de Voltaire.
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his fellows with the uncaring behaviour of the supposedly ‘charitable’ Christian 
preacher. This marks out a separation between doing and saying, between what 
actually helps mankind and what does not. The second issue, that of morality, is 
raised by Candide’s unwillingness to imitate the ways of his religious forebears, 
his rejection of the option of lying to advance his own cause, a decision which 
further separates him from those moral authorities who, while considering 
themselves to be his superiors, falsely present their own actions and thinking. 
And, paying particular attention to how the Christian world has used sexual 
behaviour to explain its moralities, the story then brings this aspect into question 
by the figures of the ‘strange genealogy’ of Pangloss’ syphilis, the Abbe’s exploits 
in Paris, and the relationship of Paquette and Frere Giroflee. Moreover, the 
Baron’s castle, the so-called ‘earthly paradise’, is found to be structured on a total 
absence of those ‘moral’ qualities which purport to give right to authority. 
Pangloss and Candide’s noble mother have both been involved in so-called illicit 
affairs, and yet Candide, wishing to follow their example, is evicted from the 
castle. Voltaire thus reveals how social hierarchy is ungrounded, Christian 
morality is arbitrary, and equality and justice are lacking.
* * *
The abominable and intolerable elements in Christian behaviour
Whereas, according to Voltaire, the Jews have given example of their
abominable character by their reported deeds of the Old Testament, in the case of
the Christians the accusation does not rest on allegedly ‘disgusting’ or brutal
events or myths in a fictional past, but on real deeds of the present, actions
authorized by those ‘abominables chimeres’ portrayed as holy doctrines, and here
pursued ‘pour le malheur du genre humain’ (1767).466 In this instance, his
comments reject the idea of the absurd and concentrate solely on the utterly
contemptible and intolerable, and so, as the enquiry turns from the allegedly
mythical Jewish practices to real Christian actions, the indictments move into a
noticeably more serious register. The biblical events themselves are now
466 Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers, p.376.
180
irrelevant, in this case represented as merely metaphorical images, while it is the 
Church’s manipulative and pragmatic interpretation itself that comes under highly 
critical scrutiny. At the same time, Voltaire’s discourse progresses from criticism 
of a hypocrisy that disguises personal ambition or a desire for other people’s 
admiration, to the denunciation of the falsity that intentionally contrives to create 
an excuse for personal or universal acts of brutality or intolerance. Voltaire shows 
the extent of his own fanaticism, his personal missionary drive in the name of 
tolerance and the rejection of the intolerable
First, he accuses the Christians of savage proselytism, a project often invested 
with a desire for personal promotion, and he exposes the way that men of the 
Church have used their religion to explain or give reason to their cruel actions. 
Second, he denounces the depths to which manipulation has descended. Pointing 
to the sophistry that seeks to excuse the brutality of the auto-da-fe as a so-called 
redemptive act of faith, in the Traite sur la tolerance Voltaire condemns the 
Inquisitor’s claim that his actions were performed for the good of the victims 
( 1763).467 In the Histoire de Jenni he uses his protagonist to deride the justice of a 
faith that ‘cooks’ a people who follow different practices from its own, and the 
authority which, having burnt someone ‘because he is a Jew’, then takes all his 
possessions. With a rhetorical use of bathos that gives force to the comment, 
Freind sums up that this is ‘un tres mauvais argument’ (1775).468
Voltaire shows how arrogance has led the Christians to endeavour to spread 
their message to all comers of the world: ‘Leur opinion etait que toute la terre doit 
etre chretienne.’ This marks a profound difference between the Christians and the 
Jews; the latter ‘ne couraient point la terre et les mers pour m£pris’ (1764).469 As 
Arkush explains, for Voltaire, while Judaism was ‘capable of doing only limited 
harm, Christianity [...] with its elaborate dogmatic theology and its universalistic 
pretensions, has inevitably inspired its clerical leaders to stir up the worst kinds of 
trouble’.470 Repeatedly interweaving figures of such missionary zeal with those of 
avaricious exploration or territorial expansion, Voltaire then takes the matter
further. He asks whether, when wanting to persuade others of the rightness of
467 Traite sur la tolerance, p.248.
468 Histoire de Jenni, p.527.
469 ‘Tolerance’, VF, p.554, p.553.
470 ‘Voltaire on Judaism and Christianity’, p.239.
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one’s own religion, it would not be better to act ‘avec la plus insinuante douceur, 
et la moderation la plus engageante’ (1764);471 he questions the logicality of those 
who hope to convert others ‘en les revoltant continuellement par les calomnies les 
plus atroces, en les persecutant’ ( 1766).472 Creating a further connection between 
violence and hypocrisy, he points to the negative effects of Christian actions by 
quoting Archbishop Tillemont’s statement: ‘La violence peut faire des hypocrites; 
on ne persuade point quand on fait retentir partout les menaces’ (1763).473 And, 
through the voice of the rabbi, Voltaire exposes the Christian actions as absurd, 
directed by a total lack of rationality:
O tigres ddvots! panth&res fanatiques! qui avez un si grand m£pris pour votre secte que vous 
pensez ne la pouvoir soutenir que par des bourreaux, si vous 6tiez capables de raison je vous 
interrogerais, je vous demanderais pourquoi vous nous immolez, nous qui sommes les p£res 
de vos p&res. (1761 )474
The Christians’ perceived need to resort to violence in order to promote their faith 
serves to undermine the authenticity of that very faith itself. Voltaire, therefore, 
looks for an explanation for the Christians’ more brutal antagonism, their 
obligation to resort to such acts of utter cruelty: he suggests that the anger with 
which missionaries have responded to the rejection of their teachings stems from 
their sense of wounded pride. In the Idees republicaines he contends that ‘c’est 
l ’orgueil seul qui est intolerant’, before adding: ‘C’est lui qui revolte les esprits, en 
voulant les forcer a penser comme nous; c’est la source secrete de toutes les 
divisions’ (1768).475
While at times Voltaire indicates an ambivalence as to whether or not the Jews 
were the guilty ‘cause’ of nefarious ‘effects’ in the Christian religion, he removes 
all doubt from the charge of the Christians’ willing adoption of their savage 
inheritance from the Jews. He reviles the way the Church has embraced the brutal 
Jewish tradition; it has not just accepted the textual accounts of violence, but has
471 ‘Religion’, p.486.
472 Avis au public, p.523.
473 Traite sur la tolerance, p.227.
474 Sermon du Rabbin Akib, p.281.
475 Idees republicaines, p.432.
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perpetrated an equivalent savagery against others, including the very people from 
whom it has received its teachings. The paradox that this introduces is set out in 
detail by the rabbi, who says: ‘C’est ainsi que, par une contradiction aussi absurde 
que leur fureur est abominable, ils offrent a Dieu nos makibs (nos psaumes), ils 
empruntent notre religion meme, en nous punissant d’etre eleves dans notre 
religion’ (1761 ).476 This repeats the thinking of Voltaire’s early notebooks, where 
he metaphorically sums up the tension with the words: ‘When I see Christians 
cursing Jews methinks I see children beating their fathers’ (c.1726).477
Voltaire reveals how the most brutal acts become invested with claims of 
sanctity:
C’est ainsi que ces monstres impitoyables invoquaient le Dieu de la cl^mence et de la bontd, 
le Dieu pardonneur, en commettant le crime le plus atroce et le plus barbare, e x e u n t  une 
cruaut£ que les demons dans leur rage ne voudraient pas exercer contre les demons leurs 
confreres. (1761)478
His criticism of the Church’s manipulative reasoning and spurious 
pronouncements is not levelled at the Catholics alone, but at any Christian group 
which makes use of such religious sophistry. So writing to d’Alembert about the 
Iatter’s article ‘Geneve’, Voltaire attacks the Calvinists, declaring that, to justify 
Servet’s assassination, ‘des pretres veulent canoniser ce crime’ (6 December 
1757).479 Sparing no groups when they deserve condemnation, later he writes again 
to d’Alembert: ‘Fanatiques papistes, fanatiques calvinistes, tous sont petris de la 
meme m... d6trempee de sang corrompu’ (12 December 1757).480 This statement 
integrates with his portrayal of most religions as perversions or falsifications of 
reason and persuasive rhetoric, and as directly hostile to universal morality by dint 
of their divisiveness. Christians distort reason and paralyse the reasoning powers 
and moral judgement of the populace, so that those members of the religious 
institutions who have the advantage can engage with impunity in the savage
476 Sermon de Rabbin Akib, p.281.
477 ‘Small Leningrad Notebook’, p.51 (written in English in the original text).
478 Sermon de Rabbin Akib, p.281.
479 D7499.
480 D7512.
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violence that is natural to humanity: there is no comeback because religious belief 
is used to keep people terrified. To support their teachings, the Christians have 
resorted to deceit and manipulation, often denying their followers the chance to 
read and judge things for themselves. But this leads Voltaire to introduce a tension 
into his argument for enlightenment. While widespread education might be able to 
bring about a more tolerant society, the manipulative measures of the Catholic 
Church to keep the people in ignorance -  by limiting in the uneducated their 
knowledge of the scriptures, and by adopting the Latin language that the canaille 
does not understand -  presents the reverse face of this figure: the actions of the 
educated religious authorities expose how knowledge can be abused.
* * *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante, selectively interpreting the texts to manipulate
his reader, Voltaire concentrates on the aspects that he finds most revolting in the
Bible, thence dismantling the whole structure of the Church; he reiterates that
Christianity gives its support to the ‘abominable’ Judaic tradition because that
tradition is the bedrock of the Christian faith. This is a figure that he repeats many
years later, when in the Histoire de Jenni he presents Warburton’s contention that
Moses’ non-reference to the existence of the immortality of the soul might be
taken as proof of a divine mission -  a claim that in the Traite sur la tolerance is
described as an abuse of the truth. Freind, the Anglican divine, comments
satirically: ‘Cette conclusion absurde fait malheureusement conclure que la secte
juive etait fausse; les impies en concluent par consequent que la notre, fondee sur
la juive, est fausse aussi’ (1775).481 Voltaire thus reinterprets the Judeo-Christian
tension in a way that diminishes the status of the latter. The Christians cannot
afford to deny the ‘truths’ of the Old Testament for fear of reducing the status of
Christ, and this makes them the vulnerable party and contradicts their self-claimed
superiority; the Church is dependent on Judaism, while Judaism is able exist
without Christianity. Voltaire shows that while there may be a mutual need for
Jews and Christians in the social world -  an exchange of services, a commerce
481 Histoire de Jenni, p.538.
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based on usury and usefulness, one that for materialistic reasons trades persecution 
with non-persecution -  in the religious sphere it is the Jews and not the Christians 
that can stand alone. Thus, in the Sermon, he links the example set by the 
unsavoury stories in the Old Testament to the Christian faith, portraying how 
actions such as those of Ezekiel are taken as figures ‘de l’^glise de Jesus Christ’. 
These episodes act as preludes to the abominable deeds performed throughout 
Christendom, where, in the name of faith, ‘dans tous les temps on se bat, on 
s’egorge, on s’assassine’.482
* * *
‘Juifs’
So moving on from his analysis of the ancient savagery of Judaism, into the 
barbarism found in the contemporary world of Christianity, Voltaire reaffirms 
how the Jews and Christians share a common heritage marked by violence and 
morally repugnant behaviour. In the later section of ‘Juifs’, mockingly addressing 
the Jews, he carries his derision over to include the Christians:
Comment n’aurais-je pas la plus grande pitie pour vous quand je vois le meurtre, la sodomie, 
la bestiality, constates chez vos ancetres, qui sont nos premiers p6res spirituels et nos proches 
parents selon la chair? Car enfin, si vous descendez de Sem, nous descendons de son frere 
Japhet; nous sommes yvidemment cousins. (1771)
From this he concludes: ‘Vous futes des monstres de cruaute et de fanatisme en 
Palestine, nous l’avons et6 dans notre Europe’ (1771). But, according to Voltaire, 
while the ancient Jews carried out their actions in the name of a mistaken religious 
obedience, the Christians’ activities have been driven solely by their avaricious 
ambitions. Moreover, he shows the way the latter have hypocritically sought to 
distance themselves from the reality of their actions, not just by creating false 
justifications, but also by employing others to commit the atrocities that they wish 
to perpetrate. Speaking for the Christian world, therefore, Voltaire remarks
satirically: ‘Toute la difference est que nos pretres vous ont fait bruler par des
482 Sermon des cinquante, p.448, p.452.
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laiques, se contentant d’appliquer votre argent a leur profit, et [...] vos pretres ont 
toujours immole les victimes humaines de leurs mains sacrees’ (1771). Both acts 
are intolerable, but the Christians’ fault is the greater, not just because they should 
know better, but because they have embroiled others in those brutal deeds that 
they have cloaked in hypocrisy.4®
* * *
La Pucelle
In La Pucelle Voltaire gives us a dramatic example of the depths to which 
Christian personal ambition or wounded pride may sink. Dorothee’s uncle, the 
Archbishop, not only shows total disregard for the moralities proclaimed by his 
faith, an adherence to honesty, charity and chastity, but takes his wrongdoing to 
the ultimate degree; his attempted seduction of his niece is not just a disregard for 
the bonds of a particularized morality or a violation of avuncular duty, but, more 
seriously in the eyes of the Church, an act of ‘spiritual incest’, one whose 
sinfulness is then propounded by his later hypocritical and savage actions. As 
Norbert Schlippa points out, ‘le pretre est une autre representation traditionnelle 
de 1’image du pere -  “pere spirituel” de la plupart des religions rtwelees’,*484 in the 
Dictionnaire philosophique Voltaire refers to the Abbe in these terms, and in the 
Prix de la justice he explains: ‘C’est une espece de sacrilege dans un homme 
d’eglise de coucher avec une fille qu’il a baptisee, ou confirmee, ou confessee’ 
(1777).485 In Catholic doctrine all such actions are ‘un peche mortel, un sacrilege, 
un inceste spirituel’ (1771), and so accordingly Dorothee describes her uncle’s 
actions as an outrage to nature and to the Church (1730-62).486
Repeatedly in his texts, Voltaire indicts the way the Church both creates 
relational bonds -  between penitents and confessors, godchildren and godparents, 
co-godparents or extended family -  and annuls others. As he reveals through 
historical and fictional figures (Catherine of Aragon in the Essai sur les mceurs, 
the Inquisition’s victims in Candide and Mile St. Yves in VIngenu) such actions
4X3 ‘Juifs’ , p 534, p 541.
484 La Lai du pere et les droits du cceur, p.79.
485 ‘AbtrtT (1765), p.287; Prix de la justice, p.567.
486 ‘Inceste’, p.452 (originally in the Questions sur I 'Ency elope die); La Pucelle, VII, 158, p.382.
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can become the cause of persecution or tragedy. He therefore queries the human 
and social dimension to moral dictates pronounced on sexual issues, and 
underlines the pragmatic or particularized nature of religious or ethical ordinances 
relating to such practices. Questioning the relativity of laws, Voltaire asks 
whether we should not distinguish ‘entre les devoirs universels et les devoirs 
locaux’ (1777).487 Just as he suggests a separation between homosexuality and 
pederasty, he draws a similar distinction between fornication and adultery. In the 
Histoire de Jenni Voltaire presents an alternative argument to that of the 
established Church; Freind demonstates how adultery, as an act of theft, the taking 
of another’s possession, is wrong according to universal morality, but ‘la 
fornication entre deux personnes libres’ is ‘sinful’ only according to a particular 
moral interpretation. More importantly still, Voltaire emphasizes the significant 
difference between chosen relationships and the abuse of the vulnerable. In La 
Pucelle, through the experiences of Agnes, he reveals his sympathy for unwilling 
victims; she, when raped by Soeur Besogne, has to accept that: ‘Souffrir en paix, 
soupirer et se taire, / Se resigner est tout ce qu’on peut faire’ (1731-35). But while 
he creates a separation between willing and unwilling physical relationships, the 
Church unites all such actions as sins. The universal morality relies on mutual 
consideration or beneficence, but spiritual leaders interpret morality according to 
their own particular codes, even though (according to Voltaire) it is not their place 
to designate what is or what is not to be permitted. Their role is to show 
tolerance.488
However, in La Pucelle the abuse of power, the miscarriage of justice, goes 
still further. The Archbishop does not just break the trust given to him by his 
office, but also exacerbates his fault by the most corrupt form of hypocrisy; 
against the victim who has refused him, he levels a charge of earlier sexual 
promiscuity, and condemns her to the auto-da-fe. Dorothee, the unwilling 
recipient of the Archbishop’s lust, is found guilty by the Church for her loving 
extramarital relationship with La Trimouille. But Voltaire, portraying her as the 
innocent, the accuser as the true sinner, shows that it is the seducer who should
487 Prix de la justice, p.563.
488 La Pucelle, X, 416-17, p.431.
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‘Sparer le mal qu’il a fait, parce que la faiblesse a droit a l’indulgence’ (1766).489 
Demolishing the prelate’s false presentation of morality, and exposing the 
contradiction between his actions and his religious pronouncements, Voltaire 
presents immorality as existing in the Archbishop’s actions alone: his attempted 
seduction of his niece, and his hypocritical efforts to conceal his own behaviour.
These figures point clearly to Voltaire’s denunciation of all cruelty practised 
against the vulnerable, in particular in the name of religion. In the figure of the 
Archbishop, he gives two levels to this indictment: the significance placed on 
sexual morality, and the way the meaning given to any relationship can itself be 
manipulated according to the moment. Through his condemnation of the 
hypocrisy and cruelty of the prelate, Voltaire attacks the very teachings, beliefs 
and practices of the Catholic Church. While it has set itself up as the arbiter of 
morality, his aim is to depict the devious, pragmatic or genuine motivations that 
may lie behind the professed objectives of certain of its authorities; like the Grand 
Inquisitors in Candide and the Histoire de Jenni, the Archbishop has his personal 
reasons for the intimidation or destruction of his victim. These episodes give a 
human face and reality to the brutality that marks the Inquisition. Condemning the 
way ceremonial contrives to mask the savagery of the event, Voltaire exposes the 
real purpose of such trappings: ‘A mesure que les hommes acquierent plus de 
lumieres, l’appareil devient plus inutile: ce n ’est guere que pour le bas peuple qu’il 
est encore quelquefois n^cessaire’ (1738).490 In his opinion, such ceremonial is just 
another device to confuse or deceive the unenlightened.
* * *
Candide
Voltaire constantly re-emphasizes how hypocrisy makes possible the violence 
that the Christians perpetrate for purposes of power and personal profit. In 
Candide, therefore, a further paradoxical message appears through the militaristic 
activities of the Jesuit fathers and the contradictory policies carried out by them in 
the Old World and the New; in the former they act as confessors to the Spanish
489 Commentaire sur le livre Des delits, p.540.
490 Lettres philosophiqes, Appendix, p.240.
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and Portugese kings, in South America they take up arms against them. The 
Christians pursue their agenda in a spirit of selfish ambition, forging political and 
religious alliances at will, solely in order to further their own cause. Drawing on 
the imagery of the Bible, the conte relates a litany of war, battles and civil strife, 
but renders the butchery more telling by the way that the Bulgares and Abares 
both sing their Te Deum to the same God, the Christians unite with the Muslims to 
defeat other Christians, compatriots join in combat against each other in civil war. 
The supposedly religious programme of the Jesuits of South America is nothing 
but a project of self-enrichment, and with obvious sarcasm Voltaire writes: ‘Los 
Padres y ont tout, et les peuples rien; c’est le chef-d’oeuvre de la raison et de la 
justice’. The claimed charity, generosity and fairness of the Christians is revealed 
as false and contrived. Displaying their arrogance, the Europeans have travelled 
the world imposing their faith and politics for reasons of personal gain and 
unnecessary desires, ever ignoring the universal understanding of moral justice 
and its fundamental laws.491
In Candide Voltaire metaphorically re-addresses the paradox of European 
expansion and discovery, the benefits and disadvantages they have brought to both 
the Old World and the New. Pangloss’ sickness ‘qui empoisonne la source de la 
generation, [...] et qui est evidemment 1’oppose du grand but de la nature’ stands 
as a metonym for the price paid to provide the new and unnecessary pleasures of 
Western society, but it also acts as a metaphor for the exploitative intolerance of 
Christianity as a whole. The figure of disease, previously applied to the Jews, now 
depicts the Christians, but in a way that emphasizes its more pernicious influence 
on other people.492 In the Avis au public Voltaire writes:
La rage du prdjugd qui nous porte a croire coupables tous ceux qui ne sont pas de notre avis, 
la rage de superstition, de la persecution, de 1’inquisition, est une maladie epid6mique qui a 
regnd en divers temps, comme la peste. ( 1766)493
The effect on the Europeans has been detrimental both morally (by the promotion
of greed and brutality), and practically (by the human losses geographical
491 Candide, p. 169.
492 Candide, p. 131.
493 Avis au public, p.534.
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expansion has incurred) -  a repetition of Voltaire’s concerns regarding the state 
of certain European populations at the time. But an equally cruel price is paid by 
those of other parts of the world; the black slave is beaten and mutilated as he 
works on the sugar plantation, the Oreillons have been brutalized by the Jesuits. 
Thus Voltaire takes his attack to the heart of what defines the civilized and the 
uncivilized, the Christian and the unchristian; the colonizers have physically 
damaged the slave, but they have taken their abuse to lower depths by their 
undermining of the very moral codes of the native people they seek to conquer. 
Barbarism is now depicted not as a characteristic essential to the Oreillons, but as 
a characteristic brought about in them by the supposedly ‘civilized’ men of God 
who are themselves barbaric. The brutal intentions of the men of the New World 
who wish to punish Candide represent the effect of a negative Christian causality, 
the result of their experiences with their European other.
The conte attacks the way the Church acts with selfish pragmatism and, 
thereby, again questions the Europeans’ alleged civilization and superiority: the 
Inquisitor both persecutes and trades with ‘the Jew’, the missionaries and 
merchants embrace the black slave as a ‘son of Adam’, as a ‘brother’, but treat 
him with brutality, and deny him his rights as a human being. But, despite his 
bitter experiences, the slave holds on to the true meaning of his faith, the people of 
Eldorado do not know the temptations of greed and acquisitiveness, the Oreillons 
before committing an act of brutality seek to verify the justice of their actions; 
these episodes re-enforce Voltaire’s condemnation of the way Europeans have 
mis-represented themselves. He shows how the allegedly ‘savage’ Oreillons 
respond to a natural understanding of morality, reconsidering whether or not it is 
‘chretien’ to cook Candide, a figure that links to Voltaire’s bitter criticism of the 
auto-da-fe. He contrasts the Europeans’ lack of genuine moral or religious 
conviction with the principles of those people they encounter in the New World, 
and exposes again the illogicality whereby the Christians have endeavoured to 
convert others to their religion of peace, charity and tolerance by engaging in 
practices that totally contradict those claims.
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Essai sur les mceurs and La Philosophie de I'histoire
When indicting the violent hypocrisy of supposedly holy individuals, in the 
Essai sur les mceurs Voltaire again takes the argument from the mythical examples 
of the ancient Jews, to the lived realities of the Christians. Using as historical 
paradigms the plots against the Medici and Sforza families, where the murderers 
took advantage of the Mass to perpetrate their deeds, he shows how even in the 
most sacred domain falsity and savagery marks Christian practices. Continuing his 
attack, he then uses another historical starting point, the burning of Savonarola in 
fifteenth-century Florence. This murderous act, that was performed in the name of 
the Christian religion, is defined in those terms of absurdity and barbarity so often 
attributed to the biblical Jews:
Vous regardez en pitie toutes ces scenes d’absurditd et d’horreur; vous ne trouvez rien de 
pareil ni chez les Romains et les Grecs, ni chez les barbares. C’est le fruit de la plus infame 
superstition qui ait jamais abruti les hommes, et du plus mauvais des gouvemements.
(1761)
And, juxtaposing representations of hypocrisy, deception and utter brutality, he 
expounds the theoiy that religious doctrine itself was founded on a devious act of 
falsity or lack of charity: TInquisition etait moins un rempart de la foi qu’un fleau 
invente pour troubler les hommes’ (1756).494 Again Voltaire suggests the presence 
among the Christians of an intention to harm others; their brutality is not an error, 
an accident of their religion, but a purposeful desire to abuse their victims. In the 
Commentaire sur le livre Des delits et des peines he writes that where i a  charity 
manque, la loi est toujours cruelle’ (1766).495This statement, in affirming that 
cruelty and charity are mutually exclusive, sets out the logic of his argument: 
Christian identity is dismantled because the cruelty of their actions exposes their 
lack of charity, that very quality on which they claim their identity is founded. In 
contrast, Voltaire reveals how the Church’s true character is driven by 
deviousness, deceitfulness and brutality, examples of behaviour that is intolerable
494 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 180, 296.
495 Commentaire sur le livre Des delits, p.540.
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and that renders the Christians deserving of the intolerance of others.
Constantly ensuring that his reader perceives the paradox between the 
Christians’ claims and their actions, Voltaire summarizes:
C’est une chose bien deplorable que la meme religion qui ordonne [...] le pardon des injures, 
ait fait commettre depuis longtemps tant de meurtres, et cela en vertu de cette seule maxime, 
que quiconque ne pense pas comme nous est reprouv^, et qu’il faut avoir les r6prouv£s en 
horreur. (1756)
He repeatedly stresses that, with the one exception of the Quakers, a lack of 
tolerance is found in all areas of the Christian religion. This intolerance has grown 
with the increase in their power, so that in turn victims have become victimizers. 
All groups may forget their peaceable teachings when they find themselves in a 
position of authority: their misplaced pride can lead to intolerance.
Ce meme Jean Calvin avait [...] prechd la tolerance. [..] Mais Jean Calvin changea d’avis des 
qu’il se livra k la fureur de sa haine th6ologique: il demandait la tolerance dont il avait besoin 
pour lui en France, et il s’armait de Fintol£rance a Gen£ve. (1761)496
But then restricting the charge, Voltaire reiterates that a savage, confrontational 
and proselytizing nature is a uniquely Christian characteristic; it is particular to 
Christ’s followers alone. He writes: ‘L’opinion n’a guere cause de guerres civiles 
que chez les chretiens, car le schisme des Osmanlis et des Persans n’a jamais ete 
qu’une affaire de politique’ (1763). He adds that such opinion gave birth to the 
crusades, even while these were promoted by the popes solely ‘pour leur interet’ 
(1763). Thus Voltaire collates Christian religious fervour with a characteristic of 
material greed: once more he replaces the alleged spiritual objective by one of 
ambition or avarice -  the presumed avarice of the Jews is equally to be found in 
the Christians; for him, in this area the former are worthy ‘fathers’ of the latter.4*7 
Voltaire exposes how the Spanish Inquisition made use of a false legality in 
order to achieve its materialistic ends, to seize the possessions of the Jews: ‘c’est
496 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 555,307.
497 Remarques pour servir de supplement, p.553, p.547.
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contre eux principalement que fut etabli le tribunal de 1’Inquisition, afin qu’au 
moindre acte de leur religion, on pOt juridiquement leur arracher leurs biens et la 
vie’ (1756). Reiterating his accusation against the greedy nature of Christian 
proselytism, he claims that ‘les Europeens n’ont fait precher leur religion depuis le 
Chili jusqu’au Japon que pour faire servir les hommes, comme des betes de 
somme, a leur insatiable avarice’ (1756). He strengthens his argument by further 
example, by pointing to the pragmatic ambitions of the Christian missionaries in 
Japan in the seventeenth century. Following in the footsteps of the trading 
Portugese, i a  religion chretienne y est portee a la faveur de ce commerce, et, a la 
faveur de cette tolerance de toutes les sectes admises si generalement dans l’Asie, 
elle s’y introduit, elle s’y etablit’ (1756). Playing on the tolerant nature of their 
hosts, Christianity became ‘la religion dominante, et bientot 1’unique’ (1756).498 
However, Voltaire repeats his East-West reversal, his representation of the one­
way commerce that marks the absence of a need in the former for the services of 
the latter. In the Traite sur la tolerance, he writes: ‘C’est en vain que le ministre 
Colbert, sentant le besoin que nous avions des Japonais, qui n’ont nul besoin de 
nous, tenta d’etablir un commerce avec leur empire’ (1763).4"  But Voltaire takes 
his criticism further; just as in his indictment of the Jews’ commercial activities he 
incorporates a suggestion of a lack of that probity evident among the Quakers, 
here in the trading practices of the Christians he finds an absence of the charitable 
qualities claimed by these followers of Christ. Commerce has enriched the 
Christians, ‘mais c’etait aux depens de la chretiente’ (1756).500
In the Essai sur les mceurs Voltaire reasserts the illogicality of a religion that 
seeks to bring about conversion by aggression; confiscation of the goods of Jews 
who turned to Christianity ‘n’etait pas un sQr moyen de les convertir’ (1761). 
Moreover, by creating distrust between individuals that led to the breakdown of 
society, the Christian desire to convert others proved itself to be intolerable. 
Voltaire further envenoms his portrayal of the Church’s ambitious and avaricious 
missionary zeal by once more relating it to disease and pestilence. The Christians 
have ‘infected’ the world with their proselytism and ‘pour fruit de leurs croisades,
498 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 160,376; III, 169.
499 Traite sur la tolerance, p. 151.
500 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 448.
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ne remporterent enfin que la lepre’ (1756). Like the syphilis attributed to 
Columbus’ explorations, all the Europeans’ worldwide ambitions are marked by 
sickness and death, by effects that are not just detrimental to the victims in the 
New World, but also harmful to the victimizers themselves. European exploration 
has been justified by false claims, the supposed territorial ‘rights’ of those who 
first sighted ‘new’ lands, and the satisfaction of needless new tastes and fashions 
such as cocoa, cochineal, and tobacco. But the falsity of the justifications plumbs 
still lower depths: while the Christian conquerors spread the accusation that the 
people of Peru practised human sacrifice, ‘ce reproche paraJt avoir ete imagine par 
les vainqueurs pour excuser leur barbarie’ (Kehl).501
Within this figure of proselytism Voltaire also emphasizes the discord that has 
existed between different religious groups: ‘L’ordre de Saint-Fran9ois hafssait 
celui de Saint-Dominique’ and ‘les deux ordres se dechainerent l’un contre 
1’autre’ (1756). Therefore, while Europeans have attempted to spread their 
message to the world, the greatest obstacle to their acceptance by others ‘est la 
difference des opinions qui divisent nos missionnaires’ (1761).502 But in the 
Homelies Voltaire demolishes the status of the Christians by an even more 
intensely negative reversal, one that compares them unfavourably to the often 
deprecated Jews. He writes:
Les Juifs disperses et malheureux se consolent de leur abjection quand ils nous voient 
toujours opposes les uns aux autres depuis les premiers jours du christianisme, toujours en 
guerre ou publique ou secrete, pers6cut£s et persdcuteurs, oppresseurs et opprimds; ils sont 
unis entre eux, et ils rient de nos querelles dtemelles. (1767)'®'
Now it is the Jews who appear united and rational; the Christians, divided and 
irrational.
While the material in this chapter’s last section does much to complete our 
understanding of Voltaire’s attacks on the Jews, and to attenuate our inevitably 
negative judgement of the very sombre figures found in the earlier sections, it does
501 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 162,1,425; II, 388.
502 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 179; I, 196.
503 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.483.
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not, of course, lead us to conclude that the attacks on the Jews are fully elucidated 
by exploring Voltaire’s hostility to Christianity. He himself frequently states that 
the situations of the Christians and the Jews are not comparable; consequently, an 
attack on the Church, however savage it may be, does not damage the object in the 
same way as does the equivalent anti-Jewish discourse. Although Voltaire may 
have needed courage to attack his coreligionaries -  since the Church had for 
centuries aligned itself with, or even constituted, the dominant political power -  he 
did not distinguish himself from the crowd when pouring contempt and 
condemnation on the long-persecuted Jews, an action that may well (as Pinto 
remarked) have put them in further danger. Because he attacks the Jews many 
times without supplying the context of his denunciation of Christians, he places 
his statements on the same level as the age-old acts of persecution. In a 
‘performative’ reading, therefore, we have to conclude our analysis of the material 
in this chapter by saying that Voltaire’s lucid statements about injustice and unfair 
charges against the Jews are frequently not confirmed by what his discourse 
against the Jews enacts. However, as even this chapter, along with the rest of the 
thesis, argues, that is not the full story. To get closer to understanding Voltaire’s 
discourse we must always consider the precise context of each of his attacks on 
the Jews, giving particular attention to his intended reader in every case, and its 
place in his reflection of tolerance and intolerance as a whole. As I have said 
earlier, this study does not aim to come down globally on the side of either 
exoneration or condemnation, but to set out as full a picture as possible for the 
purpose of scholarly understanding.
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Chapter 5 Universal humanity and savage difference
Although humanity is potentially correctable through enlightened reason and 
its corollary, universal morality, Voltaire portrays our species as essentially 
violent. Man is brutal and so selfish that even his acts of tolerance are often 
pragmatic, performed solely for purposes of self-interest, not for reasons of 
altruistic principle. Even while Voltaire views the progressive improvement of 
mankind as possible, he acknowledges that by its retrogressive actions the human 
race repeatedly returns to the barbaric.
By incorporating representations of barbarity into his Jewish and Christian 
figures, Voltaire’s discourse on intolerance questions the role of religion. In the 
search for tolerance, religion should play its part and, rather than encouraging 
man’s savage behaviour, its chief purpose should be to control it: a major 
Enlightenment theme. He declares that, although ‘on s’est servi dans toute la terre 
de la religion pour faire le mal, [...] elle est partout institute pour porter au bien’ 
(1756).504 He contends, therefore, that it is better for mankind ‘d’etre subjugue par 
toutes les superstitions possibles, pourvu qu’elles ne soient point meurtrieres, que 
de vivre sans religion’ (1763), and he asks: ‘Quel autre frein pouvait-on done 
mettre a la cupidite, aux transgressions secretes et impunies, que 1’idee d’un 
maitre etemel qui nous voit et qui jugera jusqu’a nos plus secretes pensees?’ 
(1769).505 This brings us to the heart of Voltaire’s argument relating to atheism. He 
proposes that for most people a belief in an all-seeing God is essential in order to 
restrain their natural savage passions. He emphasizes the uncontrollable character 
of the atheist who is not restrained by fear, and he states that both rich and poor, 
powerful and weak, when lacking a faith in God, are free to carry out their selfish 
or execrable actions. He writes: ‘les athees sont dangereux. Si le christianisme a 
des principes execrables, l’atheisme n’a aucun principe. Des athees peuvent etre 
des brigands sans lois, comme les chretiens et les mahometans ont et6 des 
brigands avec des lois’ (1777).506 And, worsening the charge against atheists, in the 
voice of Freind, Voltaire compares their brutal behaviour with the religious
504 Essai sur les mceurs, III, 182.
505 Traite sur la tolerance, p.242; Dieu et les hommes, p.280.
506 Histoire de Tetablissement, p. 113.
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fanaticism that drove the actions of men such as Henri IV’s murderer: ‘Un roi 
athee est plus dangereux qu’un Ravaillac fanatique’ (1775).507 In the Homelies 
prononcees a Londres he suggests that atheism is more pernicious than religious 
enthusiasm since, while the atheist will remain constant in his unprincipled 
behaviour, the religious fanatic may later come to regret his previous brutal or 
unjust acts carried out in the name of his faith: ‘Le premier est un monstre pour 
toute sa vie, le second n’aura et6 barbare qu’un moment’ (1767).508 However, as 
Voltaire’s discourse is ever mobile, in the Histoire de Jenni -  written at a period 
when he became particularly concerned about the recent growth of atheism among 
his fellow philosophes -  he dismantles this last argument, writing: ‘on peut guerir 
un athee, mais on ne guerit jamais le superstitieux radicalement; 1’athee est un 
homme d’esprit qui se trompe mais qui pense par Jui-meme, le superstitieux est un 
sot brutal qui n’a jamais eu que les idees des autres’ (1775).509 Earlier, in a similar 
way, he argues that fanaticism is more dangerous than atheism for its passion 
sanguinaire: Tatheisme ne s’oppose pas aux crimes, mais le fanatisme les fait 
commettre.’ This, he concludes, is because ‘les athees sont pour la plupart des 
savants hardis et egares qui raisonnent mal’ (1764).510 In these instances Voltaire 
presents a total lack of faith as less dangerous than a dogmatic religiosity. But he 
also introduces a proviso. Marking out a separation between the people who lack 
reason, and those that are enlightened -  above all, the few (like Diderot) who act 
according to universal morality -  he shows that only among the latter group does 
atheism present no danger. By this argument Voltaire demonstrates how his views 
relating to atheism fit with his wider supposition regarding the need for 
individuals to develop their power to think for themselves.
But, expanding the debate, Voltaire then suggests that all intentionally savage 
acts, even those performed in the name of religion, are in fact the actions of the 
atheist, because no true believer could commit such a crime in the sight of God; in 
his barbarous actions, Pope Alexander VI ‘insultait la Divinite, dont il se moquait’ 
(1767).511 Voltaire reinforces this figure by further use of historical example, again
507 Histoire de Jenni, p.573.
508 Homelies prononcees d Londres, p.438.
509 Histoire de Jenni, p.574.
510 ‘Ath6e, ath6isme\ pp.388-89.
511 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.438.
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by reference to the murders of members of both the Medici and Sforza families 
during the Mass. In the Essai sur les mceurs he writes:
Quand on voit un pape, un archeveque, un pretre, m&iiter un tel crime, et choisir pour 
1’execution le moment oil leur Dieu se montre dans le temple, on ne peut douter de l’ath^isme 
qui rdgnait alors. Certainement s’ils avaient cru que leur Crdateur leur apparaissait sous le 
pain sacr6, ils n’auraient osd lui insulter it ce point. (1761 )512
Fanaticism, performed supposedly in the name of faith, may point not just to the 
perpetrator’s brutality and irrationality, but more seriously to his deceit and 
hypocrisy, to his lack of pious sincerity. Such fanaticism, enacted in the name of 
religion, can be carried out only by those who do not think about what they do -  
they act in blind obedience to a higher temporal authority -  or by those who abuse 
their enlightenment and falsely conceal their true motives and their absence of 
genuine religious belief.
Although his hypothesis regarding the need for an invented man-made religion 
has at times caused Voltaire himself to be accused of double-faced cynicism, I 
would argue that he does not so much call for the creation of an artificial faith, but 
rather points to the need for a set of moral maxims that might benefit society as a 
whole. Faith cannot be invented in the self, a created set of beliefs can only be 
imposed on unthinking others; this is the very offence of which he so often 
accuses the Church. With regard to Christian dogma, he declares: ‘Inventer toutes 
ces choses, extreme friponnerie. Les croire, extreme betise. Mettre un Dieu 
puissant et juste a la place de ces etonnantes farces, extreme sagesse’ (1769).513 In 
light of what we know regarding his obvious loathing for hypocrisy and feigned 
devotion, his earlier statement suggests not so much that a religion should be 
invented, as that in a world without God there would be a need for the benefits 
that religious doctrine can bring about. The apparent pragmatism evident in 
Voltaire’s receiving of the sacrament at Easter 1768 and 1769 has allowed many 
critics to accuse him of hypocrisy. In his letter to d’Argental, Voltaire explains his 
actions in terms of a paternalistic desire to set a good example to those around
512 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 169.
513 Dieu et les hommes, p.500.
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him: ‘J’edifie tous les habitants de mes terres et toils les voisins en communiant’ 
(23 May 1769).514 However, even while these episodes pose questions, they should 
be placed in the wider context of the very real threats of religious persecution 
present at the time. In answer to the doubts raised by his colleagues, in 1769 
Voltaire writes separately to d’Argental (9 April) and Madame Denis declaring 
how by partaking in the Mass he wished to avoid ‘disagreable’ consequences for 
his family, and he makes his remarks more significant by referring to the case of 
Nicolas Boindre who, when denied absolution, had his body ‘jette a la voirie’ (17 
April 1769).515 In addition, we should take into account his designs for his church 
at Femey, constructed without obvious Christian symbols. As described by 
Pomeau: ‘Cette eglise dediee non a une personne de la Trinite, ni a la Sainte 
Vierge, ni k un quelquonque saint, s’annonce celle d’un theiste.’516 These points 
allow us to ask whether Voltaire’s participation in the Mass was driven by a social 
pedagogical desire, or by a wish to protect himself from possible oppression, or 
again, whether he was merely engaging in a particular rite learnt from childhood 
in the absence of any other religious practice with which he could fittingly replace 
it; he frequently refers to the difficulty of shaking off entirely the religious 
teachings of one’s youth, to the way most people find it hard to reject ‘une religion 
sucee avec le lait’ (1756).517 Thus his actions partially suggest a resorting to an act 
of worship that, as far as possible, has in his own mind been stripped of the 
dogmatic excrescences that he despises. His personal convictions or doctrinal 
interpretations of the Mass at the time of taking the sacrament remain private. But, 
although we can never know the complete answer, the cynical separation that 
Voltaire repeatedly draws between what he sees as the acceptable and non- 
acceptable elements of his religion, emphasizes his constant desire to avoid 
hypocrisy.
Yet, when reading his letter to d’Argence, critics have found further cause to
accuse him of such falsity; mockingly Voltaire remarks:
5I4D 15659.
5,5 D 15596.
516 Voltaire en son temps, II, 52.
517 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 331. This separation appears in his comment to his visitor at Femey 
regarding God the Father and God the Son, and Pomeau points to the ‘nuances’ contained in 
Voltaire’s ‘purely theist’ statement that he died, not as a Catholic, but ‘in the Catholic religion’ {La 
Religion de Voltaire, p.417, p.353).
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toutefois il est fort bon de faire accroire aux hommes qu’ils ont une ame immortelle, et qu’il y 
a un dieu vengeur qui pumra mes paysans s’ils me volent mon bl£ et mon vin, qui fera rouer 1£ 
haut les juges des Calas, et brfller ceux d’Abbeville. (20 April 1769)518
However, despite the sarcastically cynical tone, the message here remains the 
same: as with tyrants or those in authority, so with ordinary people, it is only 
religion that can help improve their behaviour by the values demanded in this 
world, and by the recompense and retribution it promises in the next. Whatever 
the truth regarding Voltaire’s personal trust in a universal God, his discourse 
suggests that the spiritual is not necessarily excluded by his pragmatic 
presentation of religious belief as the sole means to restrain those natural human 
passions and ambitions that are harmful to others. Instead it calls for a balance 
between the poles of atheism and religious extremism: ‘Nous condamnons 
l’atheisme, nous detestons la superstition barbare, nous aimons Dieu et le genre 
humain: voila nos dogmes’ (1768).519
So ideally Voltaire promotes a natural religion without dogmatism, but in 
reality, for him, established religion often fails on two counts: first, in its 
interpretation of the divine word, an interpretation that leads to unwitting error and 
self-deception, and, second, in the way man uses it to manipulate and deceive 
others. It is in the name of religion that men have produced those reversals from 
the civilized to the barbaric; while man has made progress with the development 
of his genie, for Voltaire ‘dans ce qui conceme la religion, nous sommes revenus 
au gland, aux peaux de betes, et aux cavemes’ (1767).520 Religious enthusiasm has 
driven people to commit acts of savage excess, while institutionalization, 
disguised by ceremony and rules, has afforded to religious authorities the power to 
satisfy their own political, financial and carnal ambitions: ‘sous le masque de la 
religion, ils croient pouvoir nuire impunement’ (1769). In this way, religions have 
historically added to the propagation of violence.521
Violence may be marked out into a hierarchy of forms and functions: for
518 D15600.
519Profession de foi des theistes, p.64.
520 Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers, p.391.
521 Le Pyrrkonisme de I’histoire, p.297.
200
retaliation against those seen as enemies or rivals; for personal power and profit; 
for sexual gratification; and, finally, for reasons that relate to the savage. While on 
one level this last example may come about in answer to the demands for personal 
survival (an area that Voltaire appears to understand by his representation of 
certain demands placed on those at the time seen as ‘primitive’ people), on another 
it develops in answer to the paradoxically inhumane expectations or desires of 
those who profess themselves to be civilized. Voltaire repeatedly indicts the false 
face that religious ceremonial gives to brutal reality, the way a savage act is 
euphemistically presented as one of sacrifice, purgation, purification, or the moral 
conversion of another. Viewing all ritual as based on the misleading of the 
ignorant or innocent by an artificial performance, one that hides its true purpose, 
Voltaire therefore repeatedly returns to his representation of the social and 
religious activities of civilized societies as acts of deception; he sets out to 
emphasize the way their leaders resort to malicious disguise, to a devious 
camouflaging of intent.
*  *  *
Old Testament barbarity
Violence is a central part of what Voltaire portrays as the abominable and the 
revolting elements in Judaic tradition. It marks the existence, for him, of an ever 
present moral failure in the Bible and the people it describes. Here, while on one 
count the condemnation is limited and addressed solely to the Jews of a mythical 
past, on another it becomes a generalized indictment of all the ancient Jewish 
people, an indictment that is levelled at them as a uniform group. Voltaire’s 
condemnation, therefore, does not in this case differentiate between individuals, 
and he stereotypically portrays all biblical Jews as guilty of a willing participation 
in their savage practices.
To show this, Voltaire constantly seeks to draw a figurative link between what 
he represents as human sacrifice performed by the Jews, and the barbaric act of 
cannibalism; in La Bible enfin expliquee he writes: ‘tant qu’il y eut des Juifs, leur
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histoire fut Fhistoire des cannibales’ (1776).522 Similarly, in Dieu et les hommes, 
linking this alleged practice to their ‘total ignorance’ of the immortality of the 
soul, he contends that the Jews ‘sont encore les seuls dont la loi ait ordonne 
expressement de sacrifier des victimes humaines’. He then summarizes: ‘II paraTt 
que les coutumes des Juifs etaient a peu pres celles des peuples barbares que nous 
avons trouves dans le nord de 1’Amerique, Algonguins, Iroquois, Hurons, qui 
portaient en triomphe le crane et la chevelure de leurs ennemis tues’ (1769).523 
Voltaire reduces the mythical representation of the ancient Jews by reforging a 
link between them and the living ‘uncivilized’ peoples of his day; by this 
manoeuvre he invests them with figures of savagery and brutality. He goes on to 
conflate the Jews’ behaviour with a deeper immorality by suggesting that among 
these comparable groups they alone have given a legality to their actions, they 
alone represent their deeds as manifestations of God’s law. Thus he questions 
which is the greatest crime: the pious ceremonial sacrifice of a victim ‘a l’honneur 
de la Divinite’, or the eating of one’s brutal attacker ‘qu’on a tue a son corps 
defendant’. Emphasizing the division between the practical and the religious, he 
then indicates that the eating of victims for the satisfaction of hunger belongs in a 
different category to that of misguided faith and superstition. Using these 
arguments to strengthen his criticism of the Jews, he justifies the accusations he 
levels against them by reapplying his logic of deserved blame; he asks 
rhetorically: ‘Et en effet, pourquoi les Juifs n’auraient-ils pas ete anthropophages? 
C’eflt ete la seule chose qui eut manque au peuple de Dieu pour etre le plus 
abominable peuple de la terre’ (1764).524 However, at times this same accusation is 
dismantled by mockery; as Besterman writes: in the Lettre de M  Clocpicre d M. 
Eratou (1761) ‘Voltaire inquired with persuasive innocence “whether the Jews ate 
human flesh, and how it was prepared’” .525 So too, in the derisive Instruction du 
gardien des Capuchins de Raguse a Frere Pediculoso, using his much-used 
figure, Voltaire states: ‘Si le dejeuner d’fizechiel est un peu puant, le diner des 
Israelites, dont il parle est un peu anthropophage’ (1768).526 Although we need to
522 La Bible enfin explique'e, pp. [117]-118, note 2.
523 Dieu et les hommes, p.371, p.374.
524 ‘Anthropophages’, p.347, p.349.
525 Voltaire, p.462; the passage referred to is found in Lettre de M. Clocpicre, p.235-38.
526 Instruction du gardien des Capuchins, p.306.
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put aside our spontaneous reactions to such highly critical and sarcastic comments, 
nonetheless these passages allow us again to observe that separation that Voltaire 
creates between absurdity and reality, between the revolting nature of the ‘fables’ 
of the Bible which (he professes) deserve to be ridiculed, and the contemporary 
Christians’ abominable actions which render humour out of place. Having seen 
how Voltaire realizes the figurative nature of passages, such as that referring to 
Ezekiel (even if, in many cases, the metaphorical element is barely 
acknowledged), his connecting of this biblical figure with that relating to the 
actions of the Israelites, breaks down the literality of the representation as a whole. 
Moreover, while the tone is highly condemnatory towards the Jews, once more 
Voltaire does not particularize them, but includes them within the universal, 
showing that such savage actions in the name of dogma are still practised by 
people of the contemporary world.
These examples illustrate how, by reference to the uncivilized other, Voltaire 
diminishes the status of all those readers of the Bible who claim to be either 
divinely chosen or paragons of enlightened behaviour. He takes the comparison 
into a new dimension by dismantling the commonly held understanding of what 
denotes the true meaning of the ‘savage’. This he questions in the Entretiens d ’un 
sauvage et d ’un bachelier where, having shown a natural understanding of the just 
and the unjust, the so-called savage declares:
Vous me paraissez plaisants, vous autres messieurs les habitants de l’Europe, de pretendre que 
nous ne pouvons rien avoir sans vous: nous sommes tout autant en droit de croire que nous 
sommes vos pfcres, que vous de vous imaginer que vous etes les notres.
Then in the ‘savage’s’ concluding response Voltaire mockingly stresses the
particularized nature of the European idea of universal morality: to the question as
to whether or not it was necessary that the conquerors should kill the people of
Guyana because of their different opinions, ‘the savage’ replies: ‘Oui, pourvu
qu’on les mange’ (1761).S27 In his contes Voltaire constantly returns to the
paradoxes that mark the supposed separation between the civilized and
uncivilized: in the Histoire de Jenni the ‘good Parouba’ describes his peaceable
527 Entretiens d ’un sauvage et d ’un bachelier, p.271.
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people as ‘ceux que vous appelez sauvages’ (1775), while in Ulngenu (1767) the 
Huron is gentle and open-minded, but shocked by the Europeans who commit acts 
of cruelty beyond the contemplation of the ‘Indians’ of the New World.528 
Supposedly less civilized nations show tolerance, and so-called ‘savages’ show 
qualities absent in certain Christians. In La Philosophie de I’histoire, declaring 
that ‘les peuples du Canada, et les Cafres, qu’il nous a plu d’appeler sauvages, 
sont infiniment superieurs aux notres’, Voltaire again points to this reversal:
Les pr^tendus sauvages d’ Amdrique sont des souverains qui re^oivent des ambassadeurs de 
nos colonies, que l’avarice et la l£g6rete ont tran sp lan ts  aupres de leur territoire. Ils 
connaissent l’honneur, dont jamais nos sauvages d’Europe n’ont entendu parler.
(1765)529
This passage reveals how ‘savagery’ not only marks the character of the canaille 
who lack ability and reason, but also drives the actions of those Europeans who 
are in authority. Voltaire therefore reviles the spiritual leaders themselves by 
commenting: ‘Cependant, et jesuites et jansenistes se reunirent tous contre 1’Esprit 
des lois, et contre ... et contre ... et contre... et contre ... Et nous osons apres cela 
nous moquer des Lapons, des Samoyedes et des negres!’ (1764).530
*  *  *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire clearly draws on this figurative network 
to link the butchery perpetrated by the ancient Jews to a Taw of cannibals’ and to 
alleged acts of human sacrifice. Having described how Moses commanded the 
priests to kill twenty-three thousand Jews in punishment for their having 
worshipped the Golden Calf, he then continues:
528 Histoire de Jenni, p.545.
529 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, pp. 109-10.
530 ‘Convulsions’, p.643. Peter Gay has pointed out how Voltaire used the term canaille as ‘a 
general Schimpjwort, rather than as simply a derogatory term for the masses’ (Voltaire’s Politics, 
p.220, note 82).
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Apr£s cette boucherie, il n’est pas dtonnant que ce peuple abominable sacrifie des victimes 
humaines k son Dieu, qu’il appelle Adonaidu nom d’Adonis, qu’il emprunte des Ph^niciens. 
Le vingt-neuvidme verset du chapitre XXVII du IJvitique defend express^ment de racheter 
les hommes d£vou6s k l’anath^me du sacrifice, et c’est sur cette loi de cannibales que Jephtd, 
quelque temps apr&s, immole sa propre fille.
Voltaire then summarizes: ‘Tout cela est execute a la lettre selon les livres 
hebreux.’ This alleged proof of the Jews’ engagement in ritual human killing 
allows him to excoriate their unquestioning obedience to the savage dictates of 
their God. Retracing a history of brutality from the early Jews to the later years of 
their kings, he sums up:
Ne nous appesantissons pas, mes chers frdres, sur les barbaries sans nombre des rois de Juda 
et d’Israel, sur ces meurtres, sur ces attentats, toujours mel£s de contes ridicules; ce ridicule 
pourtant est toujours sanguinaire, et il n’y a pas jusqu’au prophfcte Llisde qui ne soit barbare.
On this occasion, where he unites absurdity and barbarity, Voltaire reveals that his 
present attack has moved on from questioning the dichotomy between 
interpretations of the Bible -  whether they represent a savage reality or irrelevant 
falsity. Instead, in this case, his accusations of pemiciousness against the Old 
Testament rest not on whether the accounts are true or untrue (the question of 
reality now has no importance), but on immoral messages found in the stories 
themselves.™
In the Sermon Voltaire reinforces his rhetoric by reference to those events that 
he repeatedly condemns throughout his oeuvre. Varying his representation of 
certain episodes, at times he seeks to diminish the authenticity of the passages, at 
others to disgust his reader: reporting the massacre of the Midianites, he mocks the 
biblical narrative by commenting that, were it not for the extravagance of its 
assertions, ‘nous fremirions d’horreur a ce recit’; relating Joshua’s massacre of all 
the inhabitants of Jericho ‘sur laquelle il n’avait, de son aveu, aucun droit’, he 
foregrounds the injustice and barbarity of the ‘holy’ people. These events and 
other immoral acts of carnage all, according to Voltaire, give evidence of the
S31 Sermon des cinquante, p.441, p.442, pp.443-44.
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savage ambition of the Jews, their desire for power and self-advancement. So too, 
he indicates that Jewish violence was constantly guided by a mistaken idea of 
retribution and sexual morality. Thus he writes that, following the fatal physical 
assault on the Levite’s wife by the tribe of Benjamin, the eleven other tribes who 
considered that ‘il fallait punir les coupables’, slaughtered all but six hundred of 
the Benjamites. Yet, according to the following satirical comment, the punishment 
itself was marked by a failure of morality on two counts: first by the savage nature 
of the retribution carried out, and second by the brutal, undeserved compensation 
of the perpetrators of the original crime:
les onze tribus sont enfin fachdes de voir pdrir une des douze, et, pour y remedier, ils 
exterminent les habitants d’une de Ieurs propres villes pour y prendre six cents filles qu’ils 
donnent aux six cents Benjamites survivants pour perp£tuer cette belle race.
Voltaire uses this figure to show how violence breeds violence, and how the cycle 
of brutality can be broken only by the propagation of reason and the rejection of 
fanaticism.532
*  *  *
‘Juifs’
In ‘Juifs’ Voltaire repeats his denunciation of the brutal stories told in the 
Sermon des cinquante, including the Fall of Jericho and the actions of the 
Benjamites and the eleven other tribes, and he condemns the selfish, pitiless 
motives that promoted these savage acts. He asserts that violence was used to 
fulfil the Jews’ desire to proliferate and to achieve all their greedy ends. Repeating 
virtually verbatim his mocking figure of the Sermon regarding the attack against 
the Midianites, he continues: ‘Tous les hommes, toutes les femmes, et les enfants 
males, furent massacres: les filles et le butin furent partages entre le peuple et les 
sacrificateurs’ (1756). No distinctions are made between the young girls and the 
booty, that is between their roles as women and as sacrificial objects of abuse.
This figure, therefore, combines all the elements of violence; the savage slaughter,
532 Sermon des cinquante, p.442.
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the selfish power struggles, the retaliatory actions, and finally the sexual 
exploitation. But at the same time it allows Voltaire to develop his argument 
further, to re-address his even more troubling accusation against the Jews: their 
alleged involvement in human sacrifice. He writes: ‘Les savants ont agite la 
question si les Juifs sacrifiaient en effet des hommes a la Divinite, comme tant 
d’autres nations’ (1756). In this case the personalized nature of the condemnation 
is somewhat reduced by being included in a more universal framework, but 
Voltaire immediately indicates that the answer to the question he poses is 
irrelevant, a mere ‘question de nom’. He contends that a law which declares that 
people must die, in whatever circumstances, cannot be separated from the law of 
cannibals. Whether or not the murder occurs on ‘un autel avec des rites religieux’, 
it always remains an act of human sacrifice (1756). Thus Voltaire feels able to 
include Jephthah’s slaughter of his daughter, Saul’s intended murder of his son, 
and Samuel’s butchery of Agag, as examples of Jewish cannibalistic ritual killing. 
With bitter sarcasm he commiserates with the ancient Jews; expressing mock 
sympathy for their calamities, and then, referring again to the actions of Jephthah, 
he writes: ‘il lui fit comme il avait voue; et il avait voue d’egorger sa fille pour 
remercier le Seigneur. Belle action de graces!’ (1771). This much repeated 
argument appears in almost identical form in the private papers where Voltaire 
states that, while human sacrifice was generally common in ‘barbarian times’, in 
Leviticus it was expressly ordered ‘d’immoler les hommes qu’on aura voues en 
anatheme au Signeur’. He then sums up:
II n’est done que trop vrai que les Juifs, suivant leurs lois, sacrifiaient des victimes humaines. 
Cet acte de religion s’accorde avec leurs mceurs; leurs propres livres les reprdsentent 
egorgeant sans misdricorde tout ce qu’ils rencontrent, et rdservant seulement les filles pour 
leur usage. (undated)53’
In the ‘Reponse a quelques objections’, while mockingly professing 
compassion for the Jews, Voltaire takes his ridicule onto a further plane. In order 
to re-emphasize the connection between immorality and the absence of a religious 
truth, he adopts a tone of the most savage sarcasm that plays with the metaphorical
533 ‘Juifs’, p.513, p.534, p.523.
significance of the passage:
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Parmi vos calamit<Ss, qui m’ont fait tant de fois frdrnir, j ’ai toujours comptd le malheur que 
vous avez eu de manger de la chair humaine. Vous dites que cela n’est arrive que dans les 
grandes occasions, que ce n’est pas vous que le Seigneur invitait k sa table pour manger le 
cheval et le cavalier, que c’dtaient les oiseaux qui dtaient les convives; je le veux croire.
And, continuing to feign sympathy, Voltaire declares: ‘Oui, vous avez immole des 
victimes humaines au Seigneur; mais consolez-vous: je vous ai dit souvent que 
nos Welches et toutes les nations en firent autant autrefois’ ( 1771).534 But, in this 
case, by his reference to the Welches (his pejorative term for the unenlightened 
French) and other nations, his criticism against the Jews is again softened 
somewhat; they are not particularized, but included in the universal to which the 
people of France themselves belong: despite the sarcastic tone, Voltaire indicates 
mankind’s shared inheritance of inhuman brutality.535
*  *  *
La Pucelle
Once more showing the negative examples that the scriptures have given to 
future generations, in La Pucelle Voltaire repeats the violent figures of war found 
in the Bible: the savage treatment of women and the brutal butchery of victims. 
But he also draws our attention to the ludicrous nature of many of the biblical 
claims: the conflicts fought with primitive or impractical weapons, the conquest of 
Jericho following the collapse of its walls at the sounding of the Israelites’ 
trumpets. By contriving to link these events with those of Charles VII’s army and 
Jeanne’s victory at Orleans, he lays bare, what is for him, the illogical or 
impossible nature of the sacred stories.
* * *
534 ‘Juifs’, p.535, p.534.
535 See Supplement du discours awe Welches (1764), p.254.
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Candide
In Candide, again representing contemporary brutality in terms that recall the 
ancient scriptures, Voltaire reiterates his biblical figures of battlefields and the 
savagery that results from war. Young women, according to the droit de guerre, 
an oxymoronic phrase that subverts the very idea of rights, may be ‘eventrees 
apres avoir assouvi les besoins naturels de quelques heros’, a statement that by use 
of antiphrasis, foregrounds the conquerors’ false presentation of heroism. 
Portraying the women as victims of both sexual and retaliatory violence, Voltaire 
shows how, through the application of a false logic and a mistaken idea of justice, 
they, as the spoils of war, may be raped and then murdered.536
But he also introduces other figures of violence away from the battlefield: the 
savage castration of the Neopolitan singer, the mutilation of the old woman and 
the black slave; the exploitation of Paquette; the ritualized murder of various 
individuals by the Inquisition; the execution of victims by the power-hungry 
Turkish authorities in Constantinople. In Candide the indictment of the savage is 
universal, directed against the multiple forms of brutality practised by all 
mankind. Moreover, the vieille's mutilation at the hands of the janissaries, 
performed so that they may avoid starvation and thereby not break their oath to 
withstand their enemies, serves to indict all such foolish adherence to barbaric 
dictates or religious promises. In addition, by representing the imam as applying to 
the old woman the same balm ‘qu’on met aux enfants qu’on vient de circoncire’, 
Voltaire links the cutting off of her buttock to the act of circumcision, thereby 
placing all such rites and practices in the field of the general; in this instance he 
does not particularize such brutal actions as so-called Jewish failings alone.537
* * *
Essai sur les moeurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
In the Essai sur les moeurs Voltaire reunites cannibalism and murder (or 
human sacrifice), but defines a fundamental difference between these actions, one 
that reinforces his reduction of the latter to the lowest level of savagery. The
536 Candide, p. 127.
537 Candide, p. 161.
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former, the eating of victims, while an atrocity that is ‘si revoltante pour notre 
nature, est pourtant bien moins cruelle que le meurtre’, and thus i a  veritable 
barbarie est de donner la mort, et non de disputer un mort aux corbeaux ou au 
vers’. He sets aside European prejudice in order to distinguish between the moral 
and the immoral, the just treatment of another human being and violent injustice. 
To drive his point home, he represents in historical terms the biblical Jews’ 
allegedly savage acts performed in mistaken or foolish obedience to God’s 
supposed commandments. With a further underplaying of the metaphorical 
content of the episodes, Voltaire writes:
Les plus anciens livres que nous ayons ne nous permettent pas de douter que la faim n’ait 
pouss6 les hommes k cet exc£s. Moi'se meme menace les H6breux, dans cinq versets du 
Deuterome, qu’ils mangeront leurs enfants s’ils trangressent sa loi. Le prophfcte £z6chiel 
r£p£te la meme menace, et ensuite, selon plusieurs commentateurs, il promet aux Hebreux, de 
la part de Dieu, que s’ils se defendent bien contre le roi de Perse, ils auront k manger de la 
chair de cheval et de la chair de cavalier. (1761 )538
In line with this, in La Philosophie de Vhistoire Voltaire returns to those 
much-repeated acts of butchery reported in the Old Testament: the massacre 
ordered by Moses; Jephthah’s sacrifice of his daughter; Samuel’s murder of Agag. 
But, more seriously, he attacks Judaism itself, questioning how reasoning 
individuals might believe in ‘a fugitive people from Egypt’ who by ‘express order’ 
of God ‘soit venu [...] immoler sept ou huit petites nations qu’il ne connaissait 
pas’. He queries how these people could be punished by that same God ‘pour 
epargner un seul homme d^voue a l’anatheme’ (1765).S39 When writing to 
d’Argence, Voltaire declares that a religion insults the Divinity by claiming that 
God could have ordered his people to perform such acts of fanaticism: ‘C’est 
outrager Dieu, si les hommes peu vent l ’outrager’ (11 October 1763).540 And later, 
in a similar way, regarding the episodes recounted in the book of Joshua, he 
declares:
538 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 388-89.
539 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.213.
540 D11453.
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L’auteur, pour ajouter le blaspheme au brigandage et k la barbarie, ose dire que toutes ces 
abominations se commettaient au nom de Dieu, par order expr&s de Dieu, et dtaient autant de 
sacrifices de sang humain offerts k Dieu. ( 1767)541
These comments take his criticism back to the area of the alleged immorality of 
the Jews and their mistaken belief in their divinely chosen status, allowing him to 
reach a highly satirical conclusion: while there might be difficulty in believing that 
‘un peuple si abominable eut pu exister sur la terre’, because these facts are in 
their holy books, ‘il faut la croire’ (1765).542 Thus he brings his argument 
full circle, proving by his logic that the immorality of the Bible stories reveals 
even the reported accounts of brutality to be works of fiction, and this lifts his 
indictment away from the Jews as a living people and encloses it within the field 
of myth-making and the religious. And Voltaire goes further, showing how it is 
this aspect that marks the Jews out as different from all other peoples. In Le 
Pyrrhonisme de Vhistoire, addressing the problems faced by those who want to 
find logical answers and explanations for the questions raised by the brutality and 
absurdity of the biblical stories, Voltaire writes satirically:
On pourrait faire ces questions et mille autres encore plus embarrassantes, si les livres des 
Juifs dtaient, comme les autres, un ouvrage des hommes; mais 6tant d’une nature enti£rement 
differente, ils exigent la vdndration, et ne permettent aucune critique. Le champ du 
pyrrhonisme est ouvert pour tous les autres peuples, mais il est fermd pour les Juifs.
(1769)543
It is Judaism itself, rather than Jewish practices, that sets the Jews apart from other 
people. But, more seriously, it is this religion (like Christianity) that has given the 
stories authority, and so it is religion alone that must be held responsible for the 
calumnies perpetrated against the Jews.
* * *
541 Examen important, p. 196.
542 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.213.
543 Le Pyrrhonisme de Vhistoire, p.243.
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Christian barbarity and intolerance
Expanding the separation between Christians and Jews, Voltaire further 
dismantles the usual European understanding; he introduces these not just in terms 
of the self and other, but in a guise that no longer positively prioritizes the former 
group. Reversing the stereotypical representation of a negative Jewish causality, 
he stresses how the Christians’ mistaken pride has prevented them from learning 
from those that they believe to be their inferiors. In his letter of 1 March 1764 to 
d’Alembert, he rhetorically addresses the French:
Vous pr^lendez que votre religion doit etre cruelle autant qu’absurde, parce qu’elle est fondee, 
je ne sais comment, sur la religion du petit peuple juif, le plus absurde et le plus barbare de 
tous les peuples; mais je vous prouve, mes chers Welches, que tout abominable qu’6tait ce 
peuple, tout atroce, tout sot qu’ il dtait, il a cependant donne cent exemples de la tolerance la 
plus grande.544
Rejecting for the most part the critical figures so often attributed to the Jews, and 
again portraying them in terms of their tolerance, Voltaire raises the argument to 
another level, one that draws attention to the contrast between the open-minded 
Jews and the intolerant Christians who have followed them. Here solely in his 
expression of surprise at the paradox that this presents does he give evidence of 
persisting European anti-Jewish prejudice.
By repeatedly referring to the tolerance of the Jews of more recent times, he 
shows how the Christians’ failure to heed the beneficial lessons of their ‘fathers’ 
has negated the Jewish responsibility for the intolerance of its heirs. And, to 
reinforce the difference between the Christians and the religious others that they 
so frequently deprecate, he takes his comparison further, moving it into yet 
another field. He shows how the Muslims of old in Spain treated people of other 
religions with tolerance, while the Christians butcher ‘non-believers’ in the name 
of, what he presents as, minor or illogical differences of custom, such as 
circumcision or laws of ablution. Assuming the voice of the rabbi, Voltaire
544 D11739.
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exclaims: ‘Ah! mes freres, quelle raison pour bruler des hommes!’ (1761).545 It is 
now the people of Europe who, because of their lack of charity and humanity, 
deserve to be called savage: their actions are those of ‘des anthropophages’. 
Moreover, by further reference to Old Testament acts of savagery, he 
demonstrates how the Christians have not just failed to learn from their forebears, 
but have gone further: drawing on the biblical examples of intolerance, they have 
then created ‘des phrases pour justifier ces fables de cannibales’ so that in turn 
they can prove the rightness of their own faith (1766).546 Voltaire affirms that the 
Christians have used the religious texts to create specious justifications for their 
acts of persecution; as example, he refers to the time of Henri IV’s struggles with 
the Ligue, when Christian apologists made use of the Jewish scriptures:
C’est une chose digne d’attention que la fourberie et le fanatisme avec lesquels tous les 
auteurs de ce temps-l& cherchent & soutenir leurs sentiments par les livres juifs: comme si les 
usages d’un petit peuple confine dans les rochers de la Palestine devaient etre, au bout de trois 
mille ans, la r£gle du royaume de France. (1769)547
Worse still, in their selective reading of the texts, Christians have intentionally 
ignored the allegorical nature of the stories in order to pursue their own devious 
ends. Rhetorically Voltaire asks: ‘Comment pourrions-nous prendre au pied de la 
lettre ce que les Juifs ont regarde comme des contes?’ (1766). Now, fully 
acknowledging the Bible’s metaphorical nature, Voltaire takes his indictment 
away from the ancient people of a mythical past, and redirects it towards all those 
contemporary individuals who continue to choose to revere such fictions as holy 
truths.548
Voltaire criticizes the Jews for their having given many immoral examples to 
the people who follow them, but his attack against the Christians is of a more 
serious order. They are personally responsible for their own behaviour, although 
they seek to excuse themselves by claiming that when murdering, lying, 
deceiving, stealing they are treading in the footsteps of the ancients. He stresses
545 Sermon du Rabbin Akib, p.280.
546 Examen important, p. 198.
547 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 544.
548 Examen important, p. 193.
213
that imitation does not remove personal fault, and that responsibility for our own 
actions cannot be attributed to others:
Mais si un Juif a 6l6 barbare jusqu’cl son dernier moment, que nous importe? Sommes-nous 
Juifs? Quel rapport les absurdit^s et les horreurs de ce petit peuple ont-elles avec nous? On a 
consacrd des crimes chez presque tous les peuples du monde: que devons-nous faire? Les 
d^tester, et adorer le Dieu qui les condamne. (1767)549
Positing the insane character of the acts recorded in the Bible, Voltaire writes of 
those who continue to copy them: ‘Mais, malheureux, tu n’es ni Rachel, ni Jacob, 
ni Abraham, ni Dieu; tu n’es qu’un fou furieux’ (1776). And, to underline the 
illogical perversity of those who seek to absolve themselves by blaming others, 
Voltaire here reverses the order of his biblical examples; while earlier in the 
sentence he moves them from ‘God’, to ‘Abraham’, to ‘Jacob’, to ‘Rachel’, now 
he takes them upwards from Rachel to God. This emphasizes the hypocrisy of 
Christian claims; in taking their false teachings right up to God himself, they 
blasphemously attribute to him the greatest of crimes, murder.S50
As with the Jews, so too with the Christians, Voltaire condemns all ceremonial 
slaughter, those contrived acts of supposed religious ceremony, by integrating it 
into the figure of the purely savage, the Toi de cannibales’. He creates a network 
between the sacrificial or cannibalistic acts of ‘primitive’ peoples and the 
sanctimonious claims of the auto-da-fe. He writes:
C’est le plus horrible effet des superstitions qui ont inondd la terre, que d’immoler des hommes 
& la Divinity. Mais cette abomination est bien plus naturelle qu’on ne croit. Les anciens actes 
de foi des Espagnols et des Portugais, [...] nos massacres d’Irlande, la Saint-Barth61emy de 
France, les croisades des papes contre les empereurs, et ensuite contre les peuples de la langue 
d’oc; toutes ces dpouvantables effusions de sang humain ont-elles 6t6 autre chose que des 
victimes humaines offertes a Dieu par des insenses et des barbares? (1769)551
Voltaire unites the Christians with the rest of humanity as both victimizers and
549 Home lies pronoticees a Londres, p.441.
550 La Bible enfin expliquee, p. 136, note 1.
551 Dieu et les hommes, p.371.
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victims of such savagery, and the figure of cannibalism thus becomes central to 
his campaign against intolerance.
But he also adds a second level to his attack, one that brings together in the 
shared representation of cannibalism the sacrificial elements of the Jewish rites 
and the Christian celebration of the presence of Christ’s body in the bread eaten at 
Mass. He undermines not just the practices of the religion, but goes so far as to 
deprecate the very doctrines on which it is founded. In this way, he reduces the 
highest claims of doctrinal difference to a (for Voltaire) very low order, an equal 
level of barbarity and ridicule. The doctrine of transsubstantiation becomes 
mocked not just by its dependence on unintelligible dogma, but also by the 
mundanely physical essence of the communion bread. This, for Voltaire, marks ‘la 
manducation superieure, fam e nourrie ainsi que le corps des membres et du sang 
de l’homme, Dieu adore et mange sous la forme du pain, present aux yeux, 
sensible au gout, et cependant aneanti’ (1764).552 In Le Diner du Comte de 
Boulainvilliers Voltaire emphasizes how superstition, here linked both to the 
person of Christ and to the making of gods ‘avec de la farine’, has caused 
‘civilized’ people to descend lower than the ‘savages’ (1767).553
In the Sermon du Rabbin Akib Voltaire plays on a vocabulaiy of food with its 
implied reference to anthropophagy; he speaks of the thirty-two Israelites 
‘consumed’ by the flames and ‘devoured’ by the fires of the auto-da-fe. He also 
satirically refers to the lack of proof as to whether or not certain victims were 
eaten after their burning; he mockingly suggests the probability of such treatment 
in the case of the two ‘appetising’ fat young boys. Voltaire thus enables his Jewish 
protagonist to reinscribe sacrificial murder in terms of cannibalism, and to Jay an 
accusation of presumed guilt on the Christians. These passages acquire still greater 
significance by appearing alongside the rabbi’s call for a separation to be made 
between the charges of barbarity -  including murder and cannibalism -  levelled 
against biblical Jews by their enemies, and the actuality of the Jews’ contemporary 
existence; the implication behind his discourse is that, even while modem 
Christians perform the very same actions of which they accuse others, they make
552 ‘Religion’, pp.478-79.
553 Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers, p.397.
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use of calumny to justify persecution of those with whom they do not agree.554 
Moving on from this, we see that Voltaire’s intent is to reapply the same logic 
against the Christians that elsewhere he uses to indict the ancient Jews; he shows 
that the accuracy of the charges, the epithet given to a perceived action, is of less 
importance than the reality of the crime itself. For him, it is a question of 
semantics by what name murder is defined, and so he adopts the same metaphor to 
describe the ‘Arlequins anthropophages’ that killed, or attempted to kill, Calas, 
Sirven and La Barre (16 July 1766), and ‘la rage des cannibales des Cevennes’ 
(1766).555
Investigating the examples of violence performed for reasons of retribution 
and retaliation, Voltaire condemns the way brutal punishment is falsely justified 
by reference to the victim’s own guilt; he repudiates the manner in which the 
condemned individual is represented as deserving of his treatment, regardless of 
how extreme his punishment may be. The criminal is responsible for his own 
actions, but the way his crime is punished becomes the responsibility of another. 
While the excuse of blame has been used to vindicate the workings of the 
Inquisition, in Voltaire’s view, even if certain behaviour is found to be intolerable, 
no punitive or corrective treatment should be excessively barbaric or severe. 
According to him, the primary purpose of such brutality on the part of the 
perpetrators is to secure their own power and personal profit. Moreover, a similar 
purpose lies behind much of the bloodshed that has occured throughout the 
Christian world: while differing interpretations of dogmas have caused divisions 
between various sects, it is in the false name of religious enthusiasm with its 
pretensions of reforming the wrongdoers that ever increasing acts of savagery 
have been perpetrated. Writing at the end of his life, Voltaire states:
Les fanatiques de Port-Royal et les fanatiques jesuites se sont rdunis pour precher ces dogmes 
dtranges avec le meme enthousiasme; et en meme temps ils se sont fait une guerre mortelle. Ils 
se sont mutuellement anathdmatisds avec fureur, jusqu’a ce qu’une de ces deux factions de 
possddes ait enfin detruit l’autre.
554 Sermon du Rabbin Akib, p. 281.
555 D13420 to Comte and Comtesse d’Argental; Avis au public, p.533. With the help of Voltaire, in 
1770 the protestant Sirven was finally cleared of the charge of murdering his daughter who had 
been put into the care of the Catholics.
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Souvenez-vous, sages lecteurs, des temps mille fois plus horribles de ces 
dnergum^nes, nommes papistes et calvinistes, qui prechaient le fond des memes dogmes, et 
qui se poursuivirent par le fer, par la flamme, et par le poison, pendant deux cents anndes pour 
quelques mots diffdremment interprdtds. (1777)556
Finally, Voltaire takes his attack against Christian dogma into a new area: the 
Church’s responsibility for parricide, the slaughter of the fathers of the state. Here 
he indicts those spiritual authorities who have used their power to incite the more 
unthinking to acts of murder. He underlines the hypocritical nature of these 
actions: ‘les bons peres avaient saintement mis Je couteau dans les mains des 
parricides.’ Again emphasizing the hypocrisy of the Church, he exposes how its 
leaders have endeavoured to distance themselves from their crimes by declaring 
‘ce n’est pas nous’ (1759).557 Voltaire’s argument here relates to that regarding the 
‘dangerous’ power of confession; as he remarks: ‘Les assassins des Sforces, des 
Medicis, des princes d’Orange, des rois de France, se preparerent aux parricides 
par le sacrement de la confession’ (1765).558 In such cases, Voltaire presents the 
murderers as mindless henchmen, their confessors as schemers who use their 
position to ensure their social standing.
* * *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire darkens his mockery by commenting that 
in their doctrine of transsubstantiation the Catholics ‘poussent [...] 1’extravagance’ 
to the point where they put their god ‘dans un morceau de pate’. He contends that 
the early Christians’ committed blasphemy when they declared Jesus to be God, 
and this act of sacrilege continues to be taken to its extreme in the Mass. He brings 
his attack against transsubstantiation down to the processes of literal 
incorporation, digestion and excretion:
556 Dernieres remarques, pp.38-39.
557 Memoires, p. 59.
558 ‘Confession’, VF, pp.634-35.
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tandis que leur dieu est mang£ des souris, qu’on le digfcre, qu’on le rend avec les excrements, 
ils soutiennent qu’il n’y a pas de pain dans leur hostie, que c’est Dieu seul qui s’est mis k la 
place du pain, k la voix d’un homme.559
The figure contrasts the physical character of the host, with the claimed 
metaphysical status of the deity, given alleged presence merely by a human 
pronouncement. Voltaire sees the Mass as another example of the Church’s 
manipulation of that superstition which connects with those other ‘rapacious 
activities’ of confession and absolution, activities that have allowed the Church to 
strengthen its hold on the people by the threatened witholding of these mysteries. 
He asserts the double character of the holy fathers’ actions: first, these sacraments 
have given priests a false power that has caused suffering to their flock, and 
allowed them to trick the people into obedience; second, and even more 
fundamentally, the very denial of the claimed benefits rests on, what is for him, a 
falsity. Voltaire connects in an ever-descending spiral of condemnation, 
transsubstantiation, confession, indulgences, exorcisms, ‘false miracles’ and 
‘ridiculous images’, and he argues that the spread of such superstitions has led the 
Church to become divided, a situation that has brought about the mutual 
assassination and massacre of Christian followers.
* * *
Candide
In Candide the issue of cannibalism appears in the episode of the Oreillons, 
who prepare to eat the hero, believing him to be a Jesuit, and here Voltaire 
introduces a further dimension that levels an even more satirical criticism at his 
own society. The ‘savages’ allow themselves to be persuaded to desist from their 
actions by listening to reason, in contrast to the ‘holy’ fathers who remain constant 
in their determination to persecute by fire. In the latter case, the figure of 
constancy conflates with that of obstinacy, a rigid adherence to a thinking that 
refuses reason and is driven by private ambition -  a representation that takes on
further significance when placed alongside Voltaire’s repeated portrayal of the
559 Sermon des cinquante, p.452.
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Christians’ inconstancy in the matter of their vows of poverty, chastity and 
obedience. Furthermore, Candide’s comment that to cook other men is inhumane 
an act that is ‘peu chretien’, points to the paradox underlying Christian savagery -  
a figure that reappears in La Pucelle with the comment that Clovis’ presumed 
murder of others ‘n’est pas trop chretien’ (1730-62). These episodes reintroduce 
Voltaire’s polemic on the true nature of the term ‘Christian/christian’. Throughout 
the conte prelates seek their revenge through a distorted representation of 
morality, while the alleged savages, the Oreillons, alone endeavour to verify their 
facts before carrying out their execution. By emphasizing the latter’s rational 
searching for proof, diametrically opposed to the inquisitors’ irrational reliance on 
unproven evidence, Voltaire increases the distance he stresses between the two 
groups.560
In Candide, condemning brutality, he demonstrates that all mutilation is 
savage, whether in the name of art, of commerce, or of faith. He introduces into 
the story the Neopolitan who has been castrated so that he can sing to God’s glory 
in the chapel, a figure that by combining a Christian religious objective with 
physical mutilation removes the negative particularity of Judaic circumcision. 
Moreover, the old woman’s story of suffering for the sake of upholding a religious 
promise not only connects with the Old Testament accounts of Jephthah, Saul and 
Samuel, but further serves to expand Voltaire’s attack on hypocritical unreason. 
By juxtaposing his figures, by uniting the fulfilment of a sacred vow with the 
satisfaction of hunger, Voltaire links excessive religious fervour to cannibalism, 
intentionally confusing the religious and the pragmatic. But it is with the devious 
thinking of the imam, for whom the infliction of suffering is better than breaking 
an oath, that the argument moves into another area, one that repeatedly occurs in 
Voltaire’s writing. In ‘Careme’ he questions the logic of those who claim that 
during a fast the rich ‘papist’ feasting on his fish does not sin, while the starving 
pauper may be damned for eating a scrap of meat. Fasting is merely a matter of 
will for the rich, but the poor ‘font careme toute l’annee’ (1769).561 In his 
notebooks Voltaire sums up the illogical and destructive nature of such dictates, 
again demarcating the useful from the useless, and differentiating the actions of
560 Candide, p. 179; La Pucelle, V, p.349, note de Voltaire.
561 ‘Careme’, p.436, p.437.
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those who claim to assist mankind and those who give real, practical help to the 
rest of society: ‘Jeuner, prier, vertu de bonze; secourir, vertu de citoyen’ (1735- 
50?).562
He does not acknowledge the symbolic significance whereby, as Douglas 
explains, most dietary laws give order to the world. In the case of the Jews, he 
repeatedly ridicules their ideas of the clean and the unclean, often conflating these 
definitions with a biological fallacy such as the ruminating hare without a cloven 
foot. But, at the same time, Voltaire realizes the price the Jews have paid for 
remaining loyal to their beliefs. In Candide he uses the Jewish food laws as a 
marker of the Jews’ separateness, a metonymic reference to the outsider status that 
has been used to justify their persecution. Through antithesis, in this conte he 
portays the victims of the Inquisition as persecuted solely because they have 
removed the lard from their chicken: they are condemned to die in the auto-da-fe, 
not because they are reputed to have broken any specific laws, Jewish or 
Christian, but because by their actions they have defined themselves as Jewish, 
and on these grounds alone they are to be put to death. Moreover, even while 
allowing himself mockingly to adopt the popular stereotype, Voltaire again shows 
in the Jews a real constancy that undermines the Christians’ claims to comparable 
religious obedience; while the former firmly hold to laws and beliefs that may 
bring about their persecution, the latter have an elastic attitude to their dictates. 
The enforcement of the Christian rules such as abstinence from certain foods at 
certain times, or the teaching on chastity and obedience, impinges most on the 
people least able to conform to its dictates: the vulnerable are subordinated to a 
ruling from which the authorities are partially, if not wholly, exempt.
The murder of the Jews at the auto-da-fe introduces a figure of violence
marked by a retaliatory objective. But, at the same time, by placing the Jews
beside the other victims, Voltaire draws attention to the full range of the Church
leaders’ devious thinking. Just as the Jews are condemned in the name of their
‘foolish’ practices, a Biscayen is to be burnt in punishment for his ‘incestuous’
relationship with his co-godparent, and Pangloss and Candide are declared guilty,
the first for saying too much, the second for remaining silent. Voltaire reveals the
nonsensical nature of the excuses given by the inquisitors for their choice of
562 ‘Leningrad notebook’, p.395.
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victims for execution. He shows how, by playing on fear in order to bolster its 
position, the Christian Church deploys both physical and spiritual means to scare 
its flock into obedience: its violence expresses itself in a dual use of intimidation, 
that is in the physical threat of torture and execution, and in the mental dread of 
excommunication, the denial of absolution and last rites. Voltaire’s focus on the 
manipulative nature of the Church’s teachings on salvation and resurrection, 
partially disqualifies his other arguments about the ‘foolishness’ of people who 
have not put their faith in a doctrine he so often presents as beneficial to society. 
The intentional savagery behind the Christian threat of eternal damnation emerges 
as a more vile example of unreasoning than the early Jews’ ‘foolish’ belief in the 
non-prosecution of the guilty in the afterlife.
In his argument against the sacrament of confession, Voltaire traces its history 
from other ancient societies to the biblical Jews and then to the early Christians. 
This allows him to condemn the way the Church has moved it from a lay context 
to a religious one: ‘Les Juifs se confessaient a leurs camarades, et les chretiens 
aussi. II parut dans la suite plus convenable que ce droit appartint aux pretres’ 
(1774).563 As a result, according to Voltaire, the Abbes were able to ‘invent’ a new 
formula: absolution. Condemning this latter practice for the arrogance it manifests 
in those officiators who claim to be able to absolve the sins of others, Voltaire 
contends that ‘il semble qu’il eut ete plus respectueux pour l’fitre supreme, et plus 
juste de dire: “Puisse-t-il pardonner & tes fautes et aux miennes!”’ (1765).** Then 
reversing the figure of the confidentiality of the confessional, he makes the further 
charge that ‘quelques confesseurs, pour accorder leur interet avec le sacrilege, 
usent d’un singulier artifice. Ils rendent compte, non pas precisement de ce que le 
prisonnier leur a dit, mais de ce qu’il ne leur a pas dit’ (1771): priests, under the 
cloak of secrecy, for their own purposes have been able to distort the truth and 
falsely spread calumny and lies.565 Aware of the difference between Protestant and 
Catholic practices, Voltaire sarcastically presents the distinction in a way that 
diminishes even more the significance of the latter; he contends that Protestants 
confess to God (who cannot be deceived), while Catholics confess to men who
563 ‘Confession’, M.xviii, p.224 (originally in the Questions sur I’Encyclopedic).
564 ‘Confession’, VF, p.634.
565 ‘Confession’, M.xviii, p.226 (originally in the Questions sur I’Encyclopedie).
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cannot know what the sinner wishes to omit. This instance undermines Voltaire’s 
claimed reluctance to enter into the disputes that divide the religious sects; he sets 
up confession as another area where the Catholic Church acts differently from the 
Jews and other peoples. As practised by the Church of Rome, confession deserves 
to be repudiated because the authorities make play of superstition; it is a highly 
pernicious practice, a tool for fanatics to incite the unreasoning to barbarous acts. 
In Candide, by his oblique reference to Damiens’ attempted assassination of Louis 
XV, Voltaire reiterates his charge against the men of the Church; he repeats his 
contention that they promote the criminal actions of certain unthinking members 
of their flock. The latter, having listened to the sottises of their spiritual leaders, 
become inspired to commit murder.566
In this conte Voltaire also focuses on the way society has continued to use 
violence to pursue sexual ambitions; he presents this as an ever present threat, the 
dark side of human nature. Throughout Candide, in every sphere except Eldorado, 
the image is one of sexual ambition, exploitation or violence, as seen in the stories 
of Cunegonde, the old woman, the castrato, and, in a different register, the women 
with the monkeys. Even the gentle Candide looks on his beloved, ‘appetising’ 
Cunegonde with a consuming gaze, so that from the start of the story she appears 
as little more that an object of sexual desire. Similarly, the passage relating to the 
Bulgares and Abares moves swiftly from a description of the armies’ supposed 
devotion in the service of their God, to one of butchery, brutality, rape and 
abduction. In Le Siecle de Louis XIV  Voltaire focuses clearly on the contradiction 
that exists in reality between the proclaimed triumphs of supposed victors and the 
brutal realities experienced by the victims of war: ‘on perissait de misere au bruit 
des Te Deum et parmi les rejouissances’ (1735-52). Exposing the tension 
underlying the glorious representations of war where, even within the supposedly 
charitable Christian world, women are the ‘rightful’ booty of the savage aggressor, 
Voltaire links together all the forms of violence, from the retaliatory to the 
personally ambitious, the sexual to the savage.567
* * *
566 Candide, p.221.
567 Le Siecle de Louis XIV, 1,317.
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La Pucelle
La Pucelle repeats Voltaire’s representation of war as a brutal act that claims a 
false authority and legality to satisfy personal ambitions and carnal desires. With 
echoes of the Old Testament texts, the English prince claims his victor’s spoils: 
murdering, raping, ‘taxing’ and ‘pillaging’ (1730-62). And in the elaborate 
preparations for the auto-da-fe, Voltaire portrays through antiphrasis the 
ceremonial’s fundamental misinterpretation of justice: ‘On voit deja la ville ou la 
justice / Arrangeait tout pour cet affreux supplice’ (1730-62).568
In this text the issue of confession and absolution serves to reveal further 
paradoxes contained within Church teaching. First, Voltaire questions the justice 
of a faith that promises redemption to criminals who repent at the moment of 
death, while those whom he honours, such as Marcus Aurelius, Trajan, Plato and 
Socrates, are ‘tous malheureux morts sans confession’ (1730-62).569 As in the 
Traite sur la tolerance, he questions the paradox whereby such ‘modeles des 
hommes’ are condemned to eternal damnation, while those such as Ravaillac and 
Damiens who might have died ‘avec les formules prescrites’ are saved (1763). 
These figures serve to introduce further elements into Voltaire’s argument about 
the utility of a belief in the afterlife, and into his representation of the early Jews’ 
lack of this belief. In La Pucelle redemption and resurrection are no longer 
presented as relevant to the promotion of good behaviour, since, although 
Grisbourdon and others receive just punishment for their crimes, this results from 
their own pride and obstinacy: they refuse confession. In this way Voltaire further 
illustrates the lack of reason that he contends lies at the heart of Christianity. 
Although portraying both Jews and Christians as unpunished for their personal 
sins, as escaping the retribution they deserve, he marks the difference between the 
two cases: at the moment of death, Christians find absolution in the ‘word of 
man’. Voltaire therefore throws doubt on the justice of a faith that allows life-long 
sinners to be redeemed, while worthy human beings, ignorant of Christ’s 
teachings, are denied salvation -  an indictment linked to his deprecation of the 
doctrine of original sin. From the question of which criminals and assassins might
568 La Pucelle, I, 190, p.267; VI, 400-01, p.373.
569 La Pucelle, V, 89, p.348.
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have benefited from confession and last-minute absolution, Voltaire then moves to 
the condemnation of all such Church practices, including excommunication and 
those false extensions of confession itself, indulgences, whereby the sinner obtains 
forgiveness by a mere financial transaction. Indulgences, ‘trafficked’ by Pope Leo 
X ‘pour payer ses plaisirs’ (1763), become representative of the Catholic Church’s 
avaricious greed, just like those other practices that Voltaire ridicules, simony, and 
the buying of papal permission in order to arrange or annul a marriage. Through 
these examples, he affirms that the obtainment of spiritual purity, the meriting of 
religious office, and the definition of incest all come to depend solely on wealth, 
social position, and, above all, the word, not of God, but of man.570
*  *  *
‘Juifs’
The figures found in Candide recur in ‘Juifs’; Voltaire questions the false logic
that claims an act of violence legitimizes a retaliatory act of savagery, attacks the
mistaken notion of an oath and the misplaced sense of virtue, and condemns the
religious deviousness that has invested savage actions with sanctity. In the
Seventh Letter, he brings together the Christians and the Jews in a unified tradition
of sacrificial brutality and absurdity, in this case emphasizing the social element
present in the actions of the former group, the religious in the latter. His argument
against the Church rests on its use of laymen to carry out its brutal acts, while that
against the Jews attacks their continuing ‘ridiculous’ adherence to a past religious
tradition. But his indictment against the Jews simultaneously implies the
possibility that if they should reject their ancient beliefs, a better, more reasoning,
future might become open to them. This passage prompts us to ask whether in this
instance Voltaire is deepening the chasm between the two groups, whether he is
stressing that difference which he observes between the Jewish spirit of tolerance
and indifference, and the Christian one of intolerance and ambitious religious
enthusiasm. He entertains the prospect that educated Jews might eventually reject
all blind faith and be assimilated into enlightened society. But in the case of the
Christians, by his repeated negative expositions of their characteristically brutal
570 Traite sur la tolerance, p.250, p. 141.
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behaviour, he opens up the possibility that, with their growing temporal power, 
Christ’s followers could take to ever more extreme limits the selfish and 
materialistic agenda pursued in the name of their faith.
*  *  *
Essai sur les maeurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
The figures of savagery and hypocrisy combine once more in the Essai sur les 
maeurs’s representation of the auto-da-fe. Voltaire further particularizes his 
condemnation of the Christians, deploring the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century 
practice of granting confession and absolution to prisoners before their execution: 
‘On etait barbare en ceremonie chez les peuples chretiens occidentaux; et ce 
raffinement d’inhumanite n’a jamais ete connu que d’eux’ (1769). Even when 
allegedly absolved of their sins, victims were still put to death. This reverses 
another popular stereotype of European superiority, one grounded in the idea that 
refinement is linked to progress; instead, it is in the Christian world that plumbing 
the ultimate depths of inhumanity goes hand in hand with developing 
enlightenment -  a situation that questions the meaning of enlightenment itself. On 
the origins of the auto-da-fe, Voltaire writes: ‘Ce Torquemada, domincain, devenu 
cardinal, donna au Tribunal de 1’Inquisition espagnole cette forme juridique 
opposee a toutes les lois humaines, laquelle s’est toujours conservee’ (1756). The 
supposedly ‘civilized’ Christians’ juridical right to judge others fails the test of 
universal morality. The false logic of right concocted through the devious 
activities of the Spanish rulers, Ferdinand and Isabella, conceals the combination 
of hypocrisy, brutality and pragmatic greed. Reference to human sacrifices 
supposedly performed by other peoples exposes the greater barbarity of the 
Christians: ‘Tout ce qu’on nous raconte des peuples qui ont sacrifie des hommes & 
la Divinite n’approche pas de ces executions accompagnees de ceremonies 
religieuses’ (1756). The device of the outsider’s viewpoint confers objectivity: 
‘Un Asiatique qui arriverait a Madrid le jour d’une telle execution ne saurait si 
c’est une rejouissance, une fete religieuse, un sacrifice, ou une boucherie; c’est 
tout cela ensemble’ (1756). Voltaire indicates that hypocrisy leads the Christians
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to criticize others for the very savagery which they fail to recognize in themselves. 
They falsely or exaggeratedly report the deeds of others in order to justify or mask 
their own immoral actions. He conflates his argument with the question of what 
distinguishes the civilized from the savage: ‘On reprochait a Montezuma 
d’immoler des captifs a ses dieux: qu’aurait-il dit s’il avait vu un auto-da-feT 
(1756).571
Voltaire proposes that, following the Reformation, possible benefits might 
have come to the Church of Rome, ‘mais on n’en a verse que plus de sang, et les 
querelles des theologiens sont devenues des guerres de cannibales’ (1761). This 
attack embraces the central tenet of the Catholic faith; the presence of Christ’s 
body at the Mass. In a later addition to the text, he reduces that issue to the level of 
the mundanely absurd or irrelevant, thereby further diminishing the significance of 
the sacrament itself: ‘Ainsi, tandis que ceux qu’on appelait papistes mangeaient 
Dieu sans pain, les lutheriens mangeaient du pain, et Dieu. Les calvinistes vinrent 
bientot apres, qui mangerent le pain, et qui ne mangerent point Dieu’ (1769). For 
Voltaire, belief in transsubstantiation becomes a mere superstition beyond the 
imaginings even of the peoples of early history; he writes sarcastically: ‘Nous 
lisons dans Ciceron que les hommes, qui ont epuise toutes les superstitions, ne 
sont point parvenus encore a celle de manger leurs dieux, et que c’est la seule 
absurdite qui leur manque’ (1765). This figure reappears in a different form in a 
later addition to a passage in the Essai sur les mceurs where Voltaire reports an 
alleged conversation between a Mexican cacique and a Spanish captain to whom 
he had presented some slaves and some edible game. The former says: ‘Si tu es 
dieu [...] voila des hommes, mange-les; si tu es homme, voila des vivres que ces 
esclaves t’appreteront’ (1761); the argument is that while the Christians eat their 
God, in other religions God eats man, and although for Voltaire both are examples 
of savagely, the first is the more absurd.572
In the Essai Voltaire readopts the figure of the allegedly heretical Muslims to 
demolish the supposedly reasonable behaviour of Christ’s followers. The latter, 
despite the development of their intellectual and political powers, have become 
ever more savage, while ‘a mesure que les mahometans devinrent puissants, ils se
571 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 119,350,351.
572 Essai sur les moceurs, II, 284,286; 1,67; II, 393.
226
polirent’ (1756).S73He repeatedly demonstrates how the Europeans have in the 
social sphere developed their genie, to the point of becoming more reasonable and 
gentle in their behaviour, but constantly depicts the Christian spirit as driven by an 
ambition that, when charged with religious enthusiasm, makes them forget all 
charitable beneficence. Speaking for those of the West, Voltaire concludes: ‘nous 
voulons passer pour tolerants; que nous sommes encore loin, mes chers freres, de 
meriter ce beau titre!’ (1768).574 To dismantle the argument of European 
superiority, Voltaire moves the idealized centre away from the authorities of the 
established Church to those followers of Christ widely perceived as outsiders: the 
Anabaptists, the forefathers of the Quakers. These ‘ont ete le contraire des 
chretiens; ceux-ci furent d’abord des freres paisibles, souffrants et caches, et enfin 
des scelerats absurdes et barbares’. He then concludes: ‘Les anabaptistes 
commencerent par la barbarie, et ont fini par la douceur et la sagesse’ (1775). He 
creates a negative figure of regression around the representation of the recognized 
Church, reintroducing a dual interpretation of the progress of man in the ‘modem’ 
Christian world. To illustrate another aspect of the rift between Christian 
dogmatism and progressive tolerance, he refers to an alternative historical 
paradigm: while fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italy flourished, ‘les disputes de 
religion qui agiterent les esprits en Allemagne, dans le Nord, en France, et en 
Angleterre, retarderent les proges de la raison au lieu de les hater: des aveugles qui 
combattaient avec fureur ne pouvaient trouver le chemin de la verite’ (1756). By 
demonstrating that intolerance existed in countries now renowned for their 
tolerance, Voltaire shows how all groups can at times submit to violence and 
unreason; it is only when they put aside their religious fanaticism that they can 
reach a position beneficial to the society as a whole. If we take these references 
into the wider context, Voltaire’s point becomes clearer: despite man’s repeated 
reversals to savagery, progress from his brutal past into a more tolerant future 
remains possible; if religious fanaticism is rejected, there is hope for all -  
Christian, Jew, or other -  to leave behind their savage past and to work towards a 
better future.575
573 Essai sur les mceurs, 1,214.
574 Sermon preche a Bale, p.585.
57s Essai sur les mceurs, II, 303, 249.
Chapter 6 Enthusiasm and indifference
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Voltaire emphasizes that if man wishes to achieve a better future, he must 
learn to reason for himself, and to be responsible for his own actions and thinking. 
It is only by individuals taking that responsibility that those authorities who seek 
to abuse their position will be controlled. In the Lettres philosophiques he 
separates the non-fanaticism of enlightened thinkers from the enthusiasm of 
religious bodies: he marks out the former’s rejection of dogmatism and contrasts it 
with the savage zeal of the latter; he points to the modest behaviour of men such 
as Newton and Locke, while decrying the aggressive fervour of the followers of 
Luther, Calvin and Zwingli who ‘founded sects that divided Europe’ (1734).576 By 
tracing the history of the Jesuits from Saint Ignatius, through Saint Francis Xavier, 
to their missionaiy activities in Japan, Voltaire sets out his understanding of 
religious enthusiasm, starkly drawing attention to how it can decline into 
uncontrolled brutality.
Enfin l’enthousiasme devient si dpiddmique qu’ils forment au Japon ce qu’ils appellent une 
chretiente. Cette chrdtientd finit par une guerre civile et par cent mille hommes dgorges: 
l’enthousiasme alors est parvenu k son dernier degrd, qui est le fanatisme, et ce fanatisme est 
devenu rage. (1771J577
For Voltaire, the deterioration of credulity into religious fanaticism conflates 
with his figure of blasphemy and the false ascription of brutality to the will of 
God. Pointing to the paradox, he writes: ‘Enfin le superstitieux devient fanatique, 
et c’est alors que son zele est capable de tous les crimes au nom du Seigneur’ 
(1767).578 To the poison spread by such religious enthusiasm, Voltaire finds only 
one remedy: ‘L’esprit philosophique, qui n’est autre chose que la raison, est 
devenu chez tous les honnetes gens le seul antidote dans ces maladies 
epiddmiques’ (1771).579 And declaring that ‘la chose la plus rare est de joindre la
raison avec l’enthousiasme’, he exposes the difficulty for religion and reason to
576 Lettres philosophiques, 1,80.
577 ‘Enthousiasme’, M.xviii, p.553 (originally in the Questions sur VEncyclopedie).
578 Hornelies prononcees a Londres, p.457.
579 ‘Confession’, M.xviii, p.231 (originally in the Questions sur I’Encyclopedie).
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live together: ‘la raison consiste a voir toujours les choses comme elles sont’ 
(1765).580 This repeats his contention, as laid down more than thirty years earlier 
‘II ne m’appartient que de penser humainement; les th^ologiens decident 
divinement, c’est tout autre chose: la raison et la foi sont de nature contraire’ 
(1738).581 But, as Katz shows, there is a pungency in Voltaire’s own discourse, one 
that although ever eschewing violence, is forcefully directed against every 
perceived act of fanaticism, every perpetrator of intolerance. Insisting on the need 
for honesty in what he and his colleagues express, Voltaire writes to Marmontel: 
‘J ’ai dit tres librement ce que je pensais, parce que je  ne pouvrais dire ce que je  ne 
pensais pas’ (12 April 1764).582 And to Damilaville he declares: ‘J’ai tout examine 
sans passion et sans interet; j ’ai toujours dit ce que j ’ai pense, et je ne connais 
aucun cas dans lequel il faille dire ce qu’on ne pense point’ (26 March 1764); here 
speaks the voice of a self-aware intelligence making every effort to set aside the 
passion and self-interest which motivate even our altruistic deeds.583 But, although 
Voltaire claims to be coolly uninterested, his writing gives repeated evidence of 
his obsessive determination to redress an imbalance that he finds exists between 
the passion of religious fanatics and the passivity of many moderate thinkers. 
Even while his discourse attempts to present an objective picture, it is marked by 
this deliberate strategy to inspire his fellow philosophes into action against the 
enemies of enlightenment. Understanding the problem that exists in the combat 
against the ‘monster’ of fanaticism, he asks: ‘Faut-il rester oisif dans les tenebres? 
ou faut-il allumer un flambeau auquel l’envie et la calomnie rallumeront leurs 
torches?’ He recognizes that in encouraging people to stand firm against 
intolerance he risks inciting them to similar acts; he accepts that those fighting 
fanaticism need to direct their followers on a course between the Scylla and 
Charybdis of ‘fatal indifference’ and savage fanaticism. But, despite the danger 
that one’s own actions might stir up further extremism, might reawaken ‘quelques 
tetes de cette hydre du fanatisme’, he concludes: ‘Pour moi, je crois que la verite 
ne doit pas plus se cacher devant ces monstres, que Ton ne doit s’abstenir de
580 ‘Enthousiasme’, VF, p.60.
581 Lettres philosophiques, I, 192.
582 D11821.
583 D 11798.
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prendre de la nourriture dans la crainte d’etre empoisonn6’ (1766).584
Although understanding the pernicious effect of fanaticism, and even while 
professing the need for a balance between excessive enthusiasm and apathy, 
Voltaire, does not allow for a lukewarm approach in his fight against brutal 
extremism. Despite his constant fear of his enemies, in his desire to ecraser 
Vinfame, he condemns ‘la prudente lachete’ (22 June 1766), insisting that against 
the opponents of tolerance there is little place for insipid resistance: the 
philosophes must be ‘zealous disciples’ to their cause (25 August 1766).585 He 
declares: ‘Je ne peux plus que faire des voeux pour la tolerance. 11 me parait qu’il 
n ’y en a plus guere dans le monde. Les ennemis sont ardents, et les fideles sont 
tiedes’ (18 January 1764).586 He concludes Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers 
with the comment: ‘N’est-il pas honteux que les fanatiques aient du zele et que les 
sages n’en aient pas? II faut etre prudent, mais non pas timide’ (1767).587 In the 
same vein he comments regretfully: ‘Le nombre de ceux qui pensent est 
excessivement petit, et ceux-D ne s ’avisent pas de troubler Je monde’ (1738).588 
Thus, when writing to Damilaville regarding the Calas and Sirven afffairs, he 
concludes his letter with the words: ‘vous etes un homme selon mon coeur; votre 
zele est egal a votre raison; je  hais les tiedes. [...] Ecr. J’inf., Ecr: J’inf: vous dis-je’ 
(15 March 1765).589
Voltaire seeks to underline the separation between the claims of religious 
enthusiasts and the reality of their actions, and to show how the growth of 
superstitious fervour in people serves to diminish their charitable feeling for 
others. He writes: ‘Plus le superstitieux se concentre dans des pratiques et dans des 
croyances absurdes, plus il a d’indifference pour les vrais devoirs de l ’humanit6’ 
(1767).590 Reiterating this view when corresponding with Louise Honorine Crozat 
du Chatel, Voltaire makes further reference to the widespread absence of 
moderation between the extremes of excessive enthusiasm and apathetic 
indifference:
584 Le Philosophe ignorant, pp. 104-05.
585 D13369 to Comte and Comtesse d’Argental; D13513 to Damilaville.
586 D11651 to Damilaville.
587 Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers, p.408.
588 Lettres philosophiques, I, 202.
589 D 12462.
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Je n’ai pu encore k mon age m’accoutumer k l’indifference et k la fegdrefe avec laquelle des 
personnes d’esprit traitent la seule chose essentielle. Je ne m’accoutume pas plus aux sottises 
6normes dans lesquelles le fanatisme plonge tous les jours des tetes qui d ’ailleurs n’ont pas 
perdu absolument le sens commun sur les choses ordinaires de la vie. Ces deux contrastes 
mfetonnent encore tous les jours. (2 September 1770)S91
Six years earlier, his letter to d’Alembert suggests that he considers his endeavour 
to find a path between these poles has not been entirely successful; he writes: ‘On 
a tres longtemps examine, en composant l’ouvrage [‘Tolerance’], s’il fallait s’en 
tenir a precher simplement 1’indulgence et la charite, ou si l’on devait ne pas 
craindre d’inspirer de 1’indifference’ (13 February 1764). In his programme 
against fanaticism Voltaire marks out a clear separation between a tolerant 
indifference such as that manifested by the philosophes in matters of religious 
belief, and a passive apathy that allows for the peipetration of savage intolerance 
by others. As in the case of enthusiasm, he points to a distinction, one that, in this 
case, exists between a negative lack of concern or involvement in matters of social 
injustice, and a positive, philosophic openness to choice or questioning.592 Frederic 
Deloffre sums up Voltaire’s aim in the Lettres philosophiques:
Le motif fondamental est la tolerance [...]. Mais Voltaire vise un but plus caclfe et plus 
important k ses yeux: il s’agit pour lui de cfeer dans l’opinion un £tat d’indifference, voire de 
m€pris k lfegard de la religion, en suggdrant que l’incr&iulife l’emporte sur la ‘superstition’ 
dans tous les domaines.593
Deloffre specifically identifies religious indifference, an attitude close to 
agnosticism, in which the individual simply does not ask himself any questions 
about the divine; this attitude is a favourable ground for tolerance to all religious 
and other differences. In other words, the same term ‘indifference’ has two 
separate significations. Voltaire constantly stresses that religious indifference must
not be confused with that other apathetic indifference for another’s suffering. In
591 D 16626.
592 D11695.
593 Lettres philosophiques (1986), p.8.
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the Homelies prononcees a Londres he rejects indifference to humanitarian 
questions:
Ne dites pas qu’en prechant la tolerance nous prechons l’indifference. Non, mes fferes; celui 
qui adore Dieu et qui fait du bien aux hommes n’est point indifferent. Ce nom convient bien 
davantage au superstitieux qui pense que Dieu lui saura gfe d’avoir profefe des formules 
inintelligibles, tandis qu’il est en effet tfes indifferent sur le sort de son ffere qu’il laisse p£rir 
sans secours, ou qu’il abandonne dans la disgrace, ou qu’il flatte dans la prosp£rife, ou qu’il 
persecute s’il est d’une autre secte, s’il est sans appui et sans protection. ( 1767)5W
Although Voltaire does not deny that people may be good, he contends that 
they are too often also weak and cowardly: ‘Un des grands malheurs des honnetes 
gens c’est qu’ils sont des laches. On gemit, on se tait, on soupe, on oublie’ (c.10 
August 1766).595 Repeatedly he stresses the way people seek to shield themselves 
from reality, to blank out truths that they do not want to know -  they take refuge 
in mindless activities or lighthearted diversion. But, worse still, when people do 
not think for themselves, unwittingly they can be drawn into a participation in acts 
of fanaticism: the evidence of this becomes manifest by the public’s presence at 
the auto-da-fe. Voltaire denounces the way people submit to ‘des opinions 
fantastiques, qui conduisent les ames faibles a un enthousiasme destructeur et aux 
plus detestables atrocites’ (1766), and, again accusing those whom he sees as most 
at fault in the propagation of such unthinking fanatism, he writes: ‘Vous 
connaissez [...] k quel exc&s la populace porte la cr6dulite et le fanatisme, toujours 
encourage par les moines’ (1766).596 The criticism has a double target: while again 
it allows Voltaire to show the authorities’ responsibility for behaviour contrary to 
the universal morality, it also exposes the fault of submissive people who have 
allowed themselves to be manipulated, who have passively failed to stand up for 
the right. In his letter to the Comte and Comtesse d’Argental, where he expresses 
his horror at the execution of the young La Barre, he bitterly questions the role 
played by the spectators at the event:
594 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.460.
595 D13485 to d’Alembert.
596 Avis au public, p.531; Relation de la mort du Chevalier de La Barre, p.506.
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Est il possible que le peuple l’ait soufferte? L’homme en g£n£ral est un animal bien l&che; il 
voit tranquillement d^vorer son prochain, et semble content pouvu qu’on ne le ddvore pas; il 
regarde encore ces boucheries avec le plaisir de la curiosity. (23 July 1766)597
Adopting an animal metaphor, such as he frequently uses in order to expose the 
instability of mankind’s claim to superiority over other creatures, he declares; 
‘Pour moi je mourrai bientot, et ce sera en detestant le pays des singes et des tigres 
ou la folie de ma mere me fit naitre il y a bientot soixante et treize ans’ (c.10 
August 1766).598 And, he continues, because so many people submit to the actions 
of fanatics, the latter enforce their domination;
on est arret£ par mille liens, on demeure tranquillement sous le glaive, expose non seulement 
aux fureurs des mdchants, mais k leurs railleries. Les fanatiques triomphent. [...] Cela est aussi 
honteux pour I’humanite que l’infame persecution qui nous opprime. (18 August 1766)5"
Despite the oppression that victims suffer, they cannot blame others entirely for 
their treatment; they have to accept that, to some degree, they have a responsibility 
for the world in which they find themselves. Voltaire contends that any resistance, 
however feeble, is preferable to none; ‘Les cris ne sont pas inutiles; ils effrayent 
les animaux camassiers au moins pour quelque temps’ (19 July 1766).600
Condemning all examples of laziness of mind, the idleness that allows 
unthinking individuals to accept actions, customs, and dogmas without 
consideration, Voltaire ridicules the blind and unquestioning nature of those who, 
through faith, become victims of the hypocritical machinations of the people in 
authority. To illustrate this, he creates a comparison between followers of the 
ancient cults of Apollo and Diana, and those ‘paysans grossiers’ of his day, 
underlining their apparently common tendency to give in to unreasoning 
behaviour:
Une populace grossiere et superstitieuse qui ne raisonnait point, qui ne savait ni douter, ni
597 D 13441.
598 D 13485 to d’Alembert
599 D 13500 to Damilaville.
600 D 13431 to Damilaville.
233
nier, ni croire, qui courait aux temples par oisivet<5, et parce que les petits y sont dgaux aux 
grands, qui portait son offrande par coutume, qui parlait continuellement de miracles sans en 
avoir examine aucun, et qui n ’^ tait gufcre au-dessus des victimes qu’elle amenait; cette 
populace, dis-je, pouvait bien [...] etre frappee d ’une horreur religieuse, et adorer, sans le 
savoir, la statue meme. (composed 1756: published 1764)601
In such unthinking people, there is no limit to which their gullibility will not 
extend, and Voltaire condemns such credulity by declaring that it is ‘la marque la 
plus infaillible de 1’ignorance’ (1735-52).602 Men and women prove themselves to 
be superior to animals, not by spiritual election, but by their choosing to be 
thinking beings who have the power to reason. In the comedy, Nanine, Voltaire 
reiterates this view:
II faut 6tre homme, et d’une ame sensde 
Avoir h soi ses goflts et sa pens6e.
[...]
Le singe est n6 pour etre imitateur,
Et 1 ’homme doit agir d ’aprfcs son cceur. (1749)603
Voltaire sees it as man’s duty to make use of that reason informed by the heart, 
that ‘present que le Createur a fait a ces etres que nous nommons pensants’ (1748- 
51 ).604 Accordingly, in the Epitre au roi de Danemark, he gives credit to the king 
for the manner in which he rules, writing: ‘Tu rends ses droits a l’homme, et tu 
permets qu’on peases.’ To this he then adds that ‘au mortel qui pense on doit la 
liberty (1770).605
As a man of his times, Voltaire does not seek a society built on egalitarian 
social ideas, and contends that, since talents and abilities are not equal, society has 
to be conducted according to a hierarchical order at the head of which should sit
601 ‘Idole, idolatre, idolatrie’, p.211.
602 Le Siecle de Louis XIV, I, 174.
603 Nanine, p.83.
604 Lettres philosophiques, I, 210.
605 Epitre au roi de Danemark, p.424, p.432.
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Ceux qui disent que tous les hommes sont 6gaux disent la plus grande v6nt£, s’ils entendent 
que tous les hommes ont un droit dgal k la liberty, k la propridt^ de leurs biens, k la protection 
des lois. Ils se tromperaient beaucoup s’ils croyaient que les hommes doivent 6tre dgaux par 
les emplois, puisqu’ils ne le sont point par leurs talents. (1761)
While he acknowledges that in society differences will always exist, at the same 
time he insists that certain essential rights should be accorded to all human beings. 
This he conflates with the question of social utility: by means of his satirical 
declaration that the ‘necessary inequality’ at the heart of the establishment of the 
nobility in Europe has been unequalled, he reintroduces his often repeated 
condemnation of the useless idleness of the aristocracy.606
In the Lettres philosophiques Voltaire asks rhetorically which is the more 
useful to the state, ‘un seigneur bien poudre qui sait precisement a quelle heure le 
Roi se leve, a quelle heure il se couche [...], ou un negociant qui enrichit son pays 
[...] et contribue au bonheur du monde’ (1734), a question which in the Essai sur 
les maeurs he then answers by praising ‘le roturier utile qui paie la taille’, and by 
condemning ‘cette multiplicity ridicule de nobles sans fonction et sans vraie 
noblesse’ (1761). These so-called nobles who pay ‘nothing to the state’ fail to 
contribute to the world in which they live: they exist as mere parasites of society. 
Through this argument, which links with that so often levelled against those in 
enclosed religious orders, Voltaire takes us back to the question of the duality of 
man’s responsibilities and rights: all people should seek to serve their fellows, to 
be useful to their community, and all people deserve to be treated as human beings 
that have the potential to think for themselves. As the two elements are reverse 
sides of the same coin, any claim made to just one part of this duality is unjust and 
it diminishes the authority of the other: a failure to recognize one’s responsibilities 
partially dismantles the moral basis on which one’s rights are founded.607
The rights owing to mankind include humane treatment, kindness and 
beneficence, and the fundamental freedoms of all people: the freedom from the
606 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 134.
607 Lettres philosophiques, I, 122; Essai sur les mceurs, II, 141.
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confiscation of personal property, and the freedom from persecution. But greatest 
of all for Voltaire is the freedom of thought which enables people to think for 
themselves. This allows them to rise above their environment, to avoid the 
manipulation of others, and to resist their own apathetic acceptance of injustice. 
Freedom of thought and the quality of human kindness define, not the human 
animal, but man himself, and therefore all people have a responsibility to conserve 
these ‘deux biens qui appartiennent essentiellement a l’homme’ (1768).608 Voltaire 
therefore declares that thinking for ourselves should become a regime that we 
should strive to adopt (1766).609 But, recognizing that enlightenment itself can be 
abused, that man’s God-given gift of reason can be put to bad use, he expresses 
the wish that his thoughts and actions might be ‘dignes de ce pouvoir qui m ’a fait 
naJtre’ (1767).610
By his being pensant, a person moves from an existance as a mere creature in 
human form to a life in which he attains his full potential. The human being 
defined solely by his physical body and inward-looking nature, becomes fully 
humanized when he has humanity, that metaphysical quality which causes 
individuals to look outwards and to question universal problems common to all 
mankind. For Voltaire, humanity is to be discovered when the most humane soul 
combines an understanding of justice and virtue: ‘C’est en qualite d’etres pensants 
que nous connaissons le juste et l’injuste’ (1767).611 The distinction between those 
who think and those who do not now has a further implication of deservedness; 
Voltaire comments: ‘il faut traiter en etres pensants ceux qui pensent, comme on 
traite les brutes en brutes’ (1760).612 The latter constitute the unthinking members 
of the human race, the people who, like animals, are incapable of acting as 
responsible, reasoning and useful members of their group; the former are those 
individuals who are of service to all fellow human beings and to society at large. 
Desiring to undo the negative effects that fanaticism brings about in others, 
Voltaire aims to ‘changer en hommes utiles, des sujets qu’on a rendu des betes
608 Sermon preche a Bale, p.590.
609 Avis au public, p.535.
6)0 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.445.
611 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.436.
612Reflexions pour les sots, p. 121.
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inutiles’ (18 November 1758).613 But at the end of his life he accepts that apathy 
and fanaticism still exist, that there is still a ‘multitude effroyable de gueux qui 
deshonorent la nature humaine utile a elle-meme et a ]’£tat’ (1777). These 
comments show how he extends the notion of utility from its role in a limited 
practical domain, to the wider philosophical field.614
By translating Voltaire’s point from the area of the universal to the particular, 
we can apply the two elements of his discourse to the religious groups under 
discussion in this thesis: on one hand, he portrays the Christians as guilty of 
intolerant enthusiasm, of failing to show humanity and reason, on the other, he 
depicts the unresisting Jews as partially deserving of their misfortune. In his view, 
the latter are at fault, not just because they continue with their unquestioning faith 
in the Judaic teachings, but also because they accept without opposition the role 
that the Christian world has accorded to them. They collaborate with the common 
understanding of their identity, the negative inflation imposed on them by the rest 
of society: they cany ‘the collective shadow of heroic Western consciousness’, an 
‘abject identification with an acceptable persona’. In this instance, once more 
Voltaire taps into the stereotypical fanatasy, accusing the Jews of a weakness held 
to be partly responsible for their treatment. But this very argument contains an 
essential difference from the common prejudice, one that separates it from the 
polarized thinking of the antisemite: Voltaire softens his criticism of the Jews by 
levelling his charge, not just at them, but also at his fellow members of 
Christendom. Christians too must accept their share of blame, not just for causing 
the Jews’ non-resistance by the way they persecute them, but also for repeating 
the latter’s behaviour by continuing in their unthinking acceptance of the 
‘illogical’ biblical texts.615
*  *  *
613 D7946 to Antoine Jean Gabriel Le Bault.
614 Prix de la justice, p.536.
615 Sylvia Brinton Perera, The Scapegoat Complex, p. 52.
Charges of Jewish credulity and non-reasoning
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While Voltaire condemns misplaced pride in all people, he particularly levels 
this attack against the Jews, and thus he extends his condemnation of the Jewish 
claim of divine election. He declares:
L’orgueil de chaque juif est int£ress6 k croire que ce n’est point sa detestable politique, son 
ignorance des arts, sa grossi&rete qui l’a perdu; mais que c’est la col ere de Dieu qui le punit. II 
pense avec satisfaction qu’il a fallu des miracles pour l’abattre, et que sa nation est toujours 
la bien-aim6e du Dieu qui la chatie. (1734)616
Again presenting Jewish pride in abasement as misplaced, wrongly founded on 
the notion of chosenness, and as a primary cause of their sufferings, he carries his 
condemnation over into the present: the Jews continue to believe themselves to be 
the chosen people of God, and their persisting credulity gives proof, for Voltaire, 
of their failure to apply their reason.
He then conflates the figure of mental apathy with utility. When scornfully 
attributing to the Jews mere calculating skills, Voltaire draws a distinction 
between their productive, mechanical usefulness and the philosophical usefulness 
of others. In his portrayal of the Jews’ role in the commercial world, he varies his 
representation to fit the argument of the moment, at times showing them as 
potentially valuable members of society, at others drawing a negative picture of 
their financial expertise. But in his comment of 1771 he expresses concern as to 
the greater worth of the Jews, suggesting that not until they begin to question the 
recorded truths of their religion and to engage in the deeper issues of the world 
will their usefulness to mankind move from a purely practical field to one in 
which they can play a role in improving the lot of all people: only then will they 
become really useful citizens. But, while Poliakov finds that here Voltaire has 
tapped into the antisemitic fantasy which finds a lasting Jewish essence of non­
reason, I would argue that the discourse in this period refutes this charge and 
indicates another objective; Voltaire targets the Jews, not because he sees them as
incapable of enlightenment, but because (in his mind) they do not strive enough to
616 Lettres philosophiques, II, 195-96.
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attain their true potential. 1 contend that his programme at this time is not one 
affirming the permanent marginalization of the Jews, but rather one expressing the 
possibility that eventually they may arrive at (what he sees as) a more fulfilling 
future.
*  *  *
Sermon des cinquante
But in the more negative atmosphere of the Sermon des cinquante, attacking 
the Jews, he exclaims: ‘contentons-nous de deplorer l’aveuglement le plus k 
plaindre qui ait jamais offusque la raison humaine.’ In this instance, he denies to 
them a full ability to reason, so that even when he concedes that they eventually 
developed a belief in the immortality of the soul, he reduces this with the 
comment that i a  raison n’en per9a pas davantage chez le miserable peuple’. On 
this occasion Voltaire allows himself to blur together all Jews of the past -  the 
people of the ancient Bible with those of early historical times -  in their united 
foolishness, a figure that by implication includes believers of his own day who 
still revere Judaic teachings. His satire intensifies to represent ‘la nation cherie’ as 
governed by God himself, before proceeding to undermine this figure by his 
representation of the Supreme Being ‘irritated’ by the apparent humanity of Saul 
who wished to spare Agag -  an episode that gives him further example of the 
blasphemous nature of the biblical texts. By this manoeuvre that, through reversal, 
implies the inhumane nature of God (the very opposite of that to which human 
beings should aspire), Voltaire diminishes the authority of the Jews’ deity. And, 
through introducing this episode into a more contemporary context, by creating a 
hypothetical parallel event relating to the Emperor Charles V and Fran§ois Ier of 
France, Voltaire is able to expose the ludicrous aspect of this biblical account that 
denies the true worth of Saul’s humane nature, and upholds Samuel’s subsequent 
butchery as sacred. Ridiculing such obedience to a god, whose rejection of true 
humanity denigrates the faith of those who honour him, Voltaire proposes that the 
alleged pride of the Jewish people in their religion proves itself totally 
unfounded.617
617 Sermon des cinquante, p.448, p.449, pp.442-43.
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In the Sermon des cinquante his highly critical attack endeavours to deny that 
the Jews’ obedience to their laws is a mark of strength and loyalty: he refers to 
their dietary restrictions in a mocking figure that also serves to demean 
Christianity. Describing Christ’s miracle of casting out demons and transposing 
them into a herd of pigs, he comments sarcastically, ‘on peut croire que les 
maitres de ces cochons, qui apparemment n’etaient pas juifs, ne furent pas 
contents de cette farce’ -  a figure that connects with that of Le Diner du Comte de 
Boulainvilliers, where the text throws doubt on the idea that such animals should 
be found ‘dans un pays ou il n ’y avait point de cochons’ (1767). By again making 
reference to these mundane practicalities or incongruities, Voltaire diminishes the 
significance given to all religious fasting, and demolishes the standing of the texts 
held as sacred by both Jews and Christians. Through the use of bathos he reduces 
the relevance of their religious teachings as a whole.618
The Sermon des cinquante opens with a prayer in which Voltaire contends 
that true submission to God and the absence of superstition are the only requests 
that man should make to the ‘Dieu de tous les globes et de tous les etres’, a 
statement that intentionally exposes the alleged claims of the Jews, who, 
according to Voltaire, see God not as ‘le pere de tous les hommes, mais de fleurj 
seule famille’ (1772).619 Presenting the Old Testament as ‘littered with unheard-of 
extravagances’ -  miracles, false representations and fabulous, unbelievable 
achievements -  he derides the followers of Judaism for (what he sees as) their 
senseless credulity :
De miracles en miracles nous arrivons jusqu’& Samson, reprdsentd comme un fameux paillard, 
favori de Dieu; celui-1^, parce qu’il n’6tait pas ras6, d£fait mille Philistins avec une m&choire 
d ’&ne, et attache par la queue trois cents renards qu’il trouve k point nomm6.
Having depicted faith as basing its authority on mere pretexts, Voltaire can then 
demonstrate how credulity has allowed for the setting up of the very religions that 
in time have come to cause suffering, not just to their enemies, but also to their
followers.620______
618 Sermon des cinquante, p.267; Le Diner du Comte de Boulainvilliers, p.372.
619 Sermon des cinquante, p.438; 11 fautprendre un parti, p.544.
620 Sermon des cinquante, p.447, p.446.
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However, on a more positive note, in the final stages of the Sermon des 
cinquante Voltaire suggests that the credulous nature of all unthinking believers 
may be about to pass. The foolishness of the Bible’s man-made dogma had been 
preceded by the patriarchs’ simple faith in one God; as that foolishness belonged 
to a mere stage of unreason, with progress people might easily come to accept a 
reasonable faith once more.
II faut avoir le courage de faire encore quelques pas: le peuple n’est pas si imbecile qu’on le 
pense; il recevra sans peine un culte sage et simple d’un Dieu unique, tel qu’on nous dit 
qu’Abraham et No6 le professaient, tel que tous les sages de l’antiquit6 l’ont professd, tel qu’il 
est re9u k la Chine par tous les lettres.
In this instance, even if we have to question Voltaire’s sincerity in his reference to 
the patriarchs, he draws a connection between the early biblical fathers and the 
people of China whom he constantly commends. Moreover, by indicating the 
possibility of the existence of a ‘wise and simple cult’ before the introduction of 
later Jewish teachings, Voltaire now draws a distinction between the Jewish 
people of different periods; he shows that, as with all groups, among them too 
there may be found contradictory cycles of ignorance and enlightenment. This 
proposition opens out his argument, in that it negates the charge of foolishness as 
a permanent essence of the Jews, and -  by his removing from them such a lasting 
and particularized character of religious unreason -  he unites them with the 
universal. This passage denotes a comparable movement within the Sermon des 
cinquante itself. Now, in its conclusion, the pamphlet appears no longer as a mere 
hallucinatory text, but rather as part of Voltaire’s deist programme to promote 
man’s use of his reason; at the last moment, in its drive towards the objective of 
the propagation of tolerance, it too offers hope for a better future to all people who 
can open their minds to less dogmatic thinking.621
* * *
621 Sermon des cinquante, p.453.
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‘Juifs’
In ‘Juifs’, referring again to the Jews, Voltaire claims that:
Ils sont le dernier de tous les peuples parmi les musulmans et les chr6tiens, et ils se croient le 
premier. Cet orgueil dans leur abaissement est justify par une raison sans rdplique: c’est qu’ils 
sont r^ellement les pfcres des chr&iens et des musulmans. (1756)
While indicating that the reason for their conceit is irrefutable, he reverses his 
point by satirically implying that the heritage of Judaism renders pride impossible. 
He compares this misplaced thinking in Judaism to that of a mother with two 
children. He writes: ‘Mais quelque mauvais traitement qu’elle en ait re9us, elle ne 
laisse pas de se glorifier de leur avoir donne la naissance’ (undated). The 
illogical aspect of Jewish pride introduces the figure of Jewish responsibility for 
the actions of the religions that have followed in the path of Judaism: in the 
Sermon des cinquante he refers to Judaism’s record as the worthy prelude, the 
worthy example to all other religious persecutions. In the final section of ‘Juifs’ 
Voltaire draws a link between the Jews and Christians: ‘Vous futes des monstres 
de cruautd et de fanatisme en Palestine, nous l’avons ete dans notre Europe’ 
(1771).622 But in this later instance he emphasizes the equal blame of both groups, 
and suggests not a causal continuity, but a parity between them. He makes this 
comparison in a letter to d’Alembert, but goes on to suggest that the Christians 
might learn from the Jews: ‘Or, si, les tigres et les loups de la Palestine se sont 
adoucis quelquefois, je propose aux singes, mes compatriotes, de ne pas toujours 
mordre et de se contenter de danser’ (1 March 1764). These variations of 
emphasis show how he proceeds from a negative point to one that is more 
positive, and then to the realization that we all need to move on from destructive 
memories.623 Having spoken of fanaticism, Voltaire exclaims: ‘oublions tout cela, 
mes amis’ (1771). He calls on us to acknowledge that tolerance can be achieved 
only by embracing the fact that faults exist in both self and other, and by our 
voluntary letting go of negative attitudes belonging to the past.624
622 ‘Juifs’, p.512, p.524, p.541.
623 D11739.
624 ‘Juifs’, p.541.
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When considering the question of man’s ability to reason, Voltaire 
foregrounds the foolishness of credulity based on obviously false evidence, and in 
the case of the Jews, he cites the figure of their food laws, writing:
II y est d6fendu de manger de l’anguille, parce qu’elle n’a point d ’dcailles; ni de lfevre, parce 
que, dit le Vaicra, le lfevre rumine, et n’a point le pied fendu. Cependant il est vrai que le 
Ifevre a le pied fendu, et ne rumine point; apparemment que les Juifs avaient d’autres lfevres 
que les ndtres. Le griffon est immonde, les oiseaux k quatre pieds sont immondes; ce sont des 
animaux un peu rares. (undated)
Mockingly he professes that, since the scriptures cannot be wrong, believers, 
faced with the evidence of the texts, have to concede that it must be modern 
science that is ignorant. And this claim, so clearly contrary to reason, allows him, 
again through reversal, to demolish the veracity of the Bible.625
The same food laws serve at times to dismantle Voltaire’s representation of 
Jewish tolerance, in this instance shown as limited in its application. While, on 
many other occasions he praises the quality of tolerant religious indifference in 
the Jews, he now integrates this into the figure of Jewish foolishness; Pharisees 
and Saducees showed tolerance of others in areas of metaphysical and social 
importance -  whether or not to believe in the afterlife with its beneficial influence 
on human behaviour -  and yet they brutally punished those who broke their laws 
regarding the clean and the unclean.
Cette prodigieuse difference entre les sentiments de ces deux grands corps ne causa aucun 
trouble. Les Juifs nfetaient attaches scrupuleusement, dans les demiers temps de leur sdjour k 
Jerusalem, qu’& leurs cdfemonies fegales. Celui qui aurait mang£ du boudin ou du lapin aurait 
6t6 lapidd; et celui qui niait l’immortalife de 1 ’ame pouvait etre grand-pretre. ( 1756)626
Voltaire endeavours to undermine the Jews’ claim that their laws are God-given 
by emphasizing their man-made particularity, and this enables him to show how 
brutal intolerance committed in the name of such laws represents a supreme form
625 ‘Juifs’, p.522.
626 ‘Juifs’, p.519.
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of foolishness. For him, this example of the Jews’ supposed unreason in (what he 
sees as) irrelevant matters -  set against their embracing of differences regarding 
more serious philosophical issues -  gives resonance to his allegation of illogicality 
in the Jews. But, although the Pharisees and Saducees were, for him, foolish in 
their understanding of what was important and what was not, in matters relating to 
the religious, they showed tolerance. In the ‘Lettre sur Mr Locke’, Voltaire refers 
to these cases where they did not persecute each other, did not ‘trouble the 
government’, and exclaims: ‘O miserables hommes, profitez de ces exemples! 
Pensez et laissez penser’ (1748-51).627 More significantly still, in a later passage 
Voltaire asks: ‘ceux qui se feraient un scrupule de communiquer avec les religions 
etrangeres, ceux-l& ne meritent-ils pas le titre d’ennemis du genre humain?’ 
(1767).628 We can interpret these comments by displacement as implying that, by 
virtue of their religious tolerance, the Jews of more modem times, unlike many 
Christians, deserve their place among those humane members of mankind who are 
prepared to embrace the difference of others. This reverses the figure of the Jews 
as able merely to calculate.
These episodes give further evidence of Voltaire’s manipulation of his figures, 
his selectiveness in choosing examples of Jewish actions; when he finds the facts 
do not support the argument, he diminishes the relevance of what does not fit, 
often by recourse to mockery. Accordingly, his open acknowledgement of the 
tolerance of the victimized Jews of more recent times relates to his deliberate 
emphasis on the failings of the all-powerful Christians; he uses the two figures to 
drive forward his programme for the rejection of intolerance.
* * *
Essai sur les mceurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
In La Philosophie de Vhistoire, contending that the Jews have hated and been 
hated throughout the ages, Voltaire conflates the figure of unjustified conceit and 
lack of questioning with one of uncontrolled barbarity and fanaticism brought on 
by an absence of la morale; the ‘little Jewish nation’, rampant in its misfortune,
627 Lettres philosophiques, I, 213.
628 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.474.
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Hie se vante elle-meme d ’etre sortie d ’ligypte comme une horde de voleurs, emportant tout ce 
qu’elle avait emprunt6 des Eigyptiens; elle fait gloire de n’avoir jamais dpargnd ni la 
vieillesse, ni le sexe, ni l ’enfance, dans les villages et dans le bourgs dont elle a pu s’emparer. 
Hie ose Staler une haine irr6conciliable contre toutes les autres nations; elle se rdvolte contre 
tous ses maitres. (1765)629
Believing that God has deigned to accord them a chosen status, the Jews are 
content to submit unquestioningly to the suffering that has resulted from that 
special nature, to see God’s hand in everything that befalls them. Thus Voltaire 
suggests that their initial misconception was based on ignorance, while their later 
adherence to the idea of their chosenness and victim status has been marked by 
stubborn foolishness and a resistance to reason:
Quand leurs yeux furent un peu ouverts par d ’autres nations victorieuses, qui leur apprirent 
que le monde dtait plus grand qu’ils ne croyaient, ils se trouvfcrent, par leur loi meme, ennemis 
naturels de ces nations, et enfin du genre humain. Leur politique absurde subsista quand elle 
devait changer; leur superstition augmenta avec leurs malheurs. (1761)630
Representing the Jews’ beliefs as grounded on a blind trust in their texts, Voltaire 
contends that, while credulity is a failing found among all people, they have 
carried it to extremes: ‘Chaque peuple a ses prodiges; mais tout est prodige chez 
le peuple juif’ (1765). Going to extremes himself, he contends that ‘si les Juifs, 
qui esperaient la conquete du monde, ont 6te presque toujours asservis, ce fut leur 
faute’ (1765). In his eyes, credulity has led to ambition, which has, in turn, led to 
the Jews’ subjection: failure to use their reason has become the primary cause for 
their suffering; mental apathy is responsible for their status as victims. But 
Voltaire’s message appears more positive when his discourse is viewed as a 
whole; he shows that, like deprivation and poverty, unthinking indifference need 
not be lasting, and that among all people passivity, irrationality and unreason can
629 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, pp.234-35.
630 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 164.
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be rectified.631
How the Jews have been seen or treated by others is then represented in a 
more recent, and thereby, more real context. Voltaire proposes that when the 
Inquisition’s public burnings took place, the spectators that witnessed them did 
not feel much horror ‘parce que c’etaient leurs anciens ennemis et des Juifs qu’on 
immolaif (1756). The Jews, according to the opinion of the crowd, are worthy of 
such treatment; they, in the eyes of the onlookers, have no standing as human 
beings who deserve the sympathy of others. In this instance, Voltaire’s attack 
focuses on the Christians, both those in authority who carry out the persecution, 
and the wider public who silently condone such an activity. The perpetrators are 
guilty for the hypocritical way that they reinterpret Christian charity, the crowd is 
at fault for their acceptance of such brutality, by their denying to the Jews the 
rights of all human beings -  those fundamental freedoms that Voltaire defines as 
belonging to all mankind. Through this action, Christians have (by implication) 
denied the Jews any claim to the universal human status on which those rights are 
based.632
* * *
Candide
Religious belonging results from accident or convention that is dictated by 
time or space; Voltaire parodies this unstable foundation in his portrayal of the 
ambivalent status of Cunegonde, on designated holy days alternatively the 
mistress of the Inquisitor and of Don Issachar. Most religious faith comes not 
from God but is a creation of man, and so its interpretation rests on a changing set 
of rules dictated by chance. To show that the only solution to this rests in the 
individual’s determination to reason for himself, Voltaire directs his mockery 
against the very person who purports to instruct others. Pangloss, who chooses to 
ignore the evidence before his eyes, remains trapped in his unthinking existence, 
and despite the sufferings he experiences, accepts all these as part of God’s 
greater scheme in ‘the best of all possible worlds’. Bowing submissively and 
unquestioningly to misfortune, he insists on holding to his ‘premier sentiment’,
631 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.222, p.265.
632 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 350.
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adding that ‘il le soutenait toujours, et n’en croyait rien’. Voltaire thus vilifies the 
way people can deceive themselves and others by proclaiming to adhere to a faith 
that they no longer believe: cowardice or laziness makes it easier not to question 
or deny.633
Pangloss’ ready submission to his fate links him with the other unprotesting 
victims of the auto-da-fe. And another comparable figure appears in the person of 
the black slave, whose pragmatic mother passively collaborates in an abusive 
system, an action that in the Essai sur les mceurs Voltaire bitterly condemns by 
remarking that ‘un peuple qui trafique de ses enfants est encore plus condamnable 
que l’acheteur’ (1756). This parent, by selling her child to enslavement, embraces 
the favourable interpretation given by the so-called fetiches to their actions, their 
representation of the ‘happiness’ and ‘honour’ to be found in slavery to white 
masters -  a figure invested with further negative significance by its implied link to 
financial gain.634 But the hero, Candide, who has been raised ne jamais juger de 
rien par lui-meme’, eventually breaks away from all such unreasoning conduct, 
and, when able to question and to act independently, becomes a member of 
society who is useful to his fellows. Voltaire ultimately gives pride of place to the 
practical; he demonstrates that less benefit comes to society from abstract 
argument than from productive human labour that improves the lives of others.635
* * *
La Pucelle
When contesting Bayle’s argument regarding the supposed atheism of so- 
called uncivilized peoples, Voltaire represents them as children, remarking that 
‘un enfant n’est ni ath6e ni deiste, il n ’est rien’ (1764).636 In La Pucelle this figure 
marks all blind faith, and becomes embodied in the shape of Sottise, the queen of 
foolishness, who, as the ‘vieil enfant’ of ignorance, has never learnt to grow up. 
Indicating the dangers that lurk when reason sleeps, Voltaire re-emphasizes the
link between laziness of mind and credulity, writing:
633 Candide, p.251, p.256.
634 Essai sur les mceurs, III, 177.
635 Candide, p.234.
636 ‘ Athde, athdisme’, p.391.
247
Prfcs de son tr6ne est sa sotte famille,
Le fol orgueil, l’opiniatretd,
Et la paresse et la cr6dulit6.
Elle est servie, elle est flattie en reine,
On la croirait en effet souveraine,
Mais ce n’est rien qu’un fantome impuissant. ( 1730-62)637
He here calls for a dual effort of determination by all people; first, on the personal 
level, the rejection of the blind acceptance of illogical teachings, and on the social 
level, a resistance to those environmental influences that further undermine the 
individual’s ability to think for himself. The positive point behind this discourse is 
that in all cases of such infantile lack of reason, enlightenment is possible: 
informing the ignorant is an easier task than curing the fanatic who has much to 
unlearn and no desire to unlearn it.
* * *
Voltaire’s questioning of charges of indifference and non-resistance in the 
contemporary Jews
With his recognition that the religious creed in which one is raised depends on 
one’s place of birth, Voltaire acknowledges that respect for that religion is 
difficult to shake off ‘quand l ’enfance l ’a imprime dans le coeur’; he concludes 
that ‘les hommes sont toujours attaches k  leurs anciens usages’ (1735-52).638 This 
understanding gives further meaning to his comment that the Jews’ ‘unfortunate 
persuasion’ must have been very strong, because they preferred to suffer the worst 
persecution rather than retract their beliefs. He holds that, while ‘on a vu [...] 
quelques Juifs feindre d’abjurer, tantot par avarice, tantot par terreur’, none had 
ever embraced Christianity in ‘good faith’ (1767).639 Judaism is the creed ‘qui est
le plus rarement abjur£e’ (1756) -  here we need to be careful to mark Voltaire’s
637 La Pucelle, III, 67-72, p.301.
638 Le Siecle de Louis XIV, 1,461, II, 5.
639 Lettres a SA . Mgr Le Prince de ***, p. 517, p.516.
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distinction between stubborn non-reasoning and the faithful adherence to a set of 
principles.640 But, even while in the Homelies prononcees a Londres he declares 
that ancient Jews were ‘d’un col roide et dur entendement’ (1767), he does not see 
in them an enduring essence of non-rational thinking. Suggesting that certain 
‘modem’ Jews show evidence of reasoning, he declares that some people no 
longer believe Moses to be the author of the Pentateuch. Although in this case 
Voltaire’s main objective appears to be to undermine the authority of the early 
books of the Bible, and to question the way both Jews and Christians insist on 
adhering to their holy laws, this text does, nonetheless, introduce a figure of 
progress in his portrayal of the contemporary Jewish people, a move away from 
passive non-questioning to an application of reason.641
In the ‘Lettre sur Mr Locke’ Voltaire reiterates his condemnation of people 
who, taught not to question, accept everything as the oracle: ‘Les superstitieux 
sont dans la societe ce que les poltrons sont dans une armee’ (1738).642 By this 
comparison, Voltaire links the religious and the social in a way that moves the 
attack forward into the area of general apathy and weakness, faults that have 
brought about the subjection or suffering of individuals. Failure to stand up to 
another’s abusive treatment means an acceptance of the role or place accorded to 
one -  usury, servitude, prostitution, persecution, segregation and banishment. 
Furthermore, apathy, indifference or weakness do not excuse lapses from 
universal morality; Voltaire condemns non-resistance in those who do not stand 
up against wrongdoing, whether to the self or to the other. In carrying out orders, 
those under command are as responsible for their actions as those who initiate 
them. Referring to the slaves who aided Simeon and Levi in the murder of the 
people of Sichem, he writes: ‘Je dis que ces esclaves etaient aussi coupables que 
les maitres [...] c ’etait un crime execrable d’obeir & leurs commandements.’ 
Likewise executioners, unquestioningly obeying those who impose savage laws, 
‘sont aussi criminels que les juges, quand ils mettent a execution une sentence 
reconnue evidemment injuste et barbare au tribunal de la conscience de tous les 
hommes’ (1777). The morality on which true justice is founded is thus again
640 ‘ Juifs’, p.524.
641 Homelies prononcees a Londres, p.463, p.474.
642 Lettres philosophiques, 1,201.
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demonstrated to be independent of any particular interpretation, and concordant 
with the universal understanding of la morale, the morality common to all people 
who use their reason.643
To emphasize how apathy or passivity can open the way to fanaticism, 
Voltaire links the figure of indifference to that which diametrically opposes it: 
indifference is the other side of fanaticism, connected to it by a two-way 
movement -  brutal fanaticism can cause fearful indifference, just as indifference 
allows for the growth of fanaticism. To illustrate that interdependence, Voltaire 
returns to the paradigm of public execution. He baldly describes the manner of the 
people’s attendance at these events:
Toute la canaille qui court a ces spectacles, comme au sermon, parce qu’on y entre sans payer, 
fondait en larmes; et aucun n’aurait ose d&ivrer la victime, quoique tous eussent volontiers 
lapid£ le barbare qui la faisait pdrir. (1777)644
The picture that Voltaire paints is one of cowardly submission, a fearfulness in the 
face of intimidation, a rejection of what one believes to be right. In AH.C. he 
proposes that people have lost their liberty to act freely because of their own past 
actions:
Cela est clair: personne ne peut avoir perdu sa liberty que pour n’avoir pas su la ddfendre. II y 
a eu deux manures de la perdre: c ’est quand les sots ont €\& tromp^s par des fripons, ou quand 
les faibles ont subjugu^s par les forts.
Because such timidity stifles true humanity, he therefore concludes that ‘le plus 
grand dSfaut du genre humain [...] est d’etre sot et poitron’ (1768).645
* * *
Sermon des cinquante
Voltaire does not just explain the Jews’ unreasoning acceptance of the biblical
643 Prix de la justice, p.572, p.573.
644 Prix de la justice, p.536.
645 A.B.C., p.348, p.361.
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stories by mental apathy, but also by their mode of action in general. He describes 
how at the time of their departure from Egypt ‘au lieu de prendre les armes en 
gens de coeur, [ils] s’enfuient en brigands conduits par leur Dieu’. While he 
mostly represents war as the cause of great suffering, sometimes he portrays it as 
necessary to defend one’s rights. He acknowledges that in certain cases battle may 
be justified, but he accuses the ancient Jews of fighting only when the results 
promised to be beneficial to themselves. For Voltaire, biblical history is either 
marked by this desire for personal advancement at any cost, or by cowardice and a 
non-concern for the well-being of others.646
*  *  *
‘Juifs’
Still presenting apathy as an enduring characteristic of the Jews, Voltaire 
unites it here with avarice. He contends that in Babylon this nation was ‘trop 
occupee de son commerce et de son courtage pour songer a la guerre’; through 
their trade the Jews ‘se rendirent necessaries, comme il le sont encore, et ils 
s’enrichirent’ (1756). In the early part of ‘Juifs’, portraying the Jews’ financial 
usefulness as the result of their involvement in businesses that benefited 
themselves, Voltaire imputes their unwarlike character to selfish ambition and 
greed. In this case, his Jewish figure becomes that of self-serving indifference 
rather than that of a peace-loving nature.647
But at times in ‘Juifs’ Voltaire’s attack against Jewish apathy embraces his 
protest at the whole of mankind, and becomes part of a universal failing. In this 
case the figure of the auto-da-fe serves to expose, with all Voltaire’s sarcasm, the 
weakness and non-resistance of the spectators, content to witness the brutal 
suffering of victims. He writes:
Je pleurais k l’age de seize ans quand on me disait qu’on avait brfll£ a Lisbonne une mbre et 
une fille pour avoir mang6 debout un peu d’agneau cuit avec des laitues le quatorzieme jour 
de la lune rousse; et je puis vous assurer que 1 ’extreme beauts qu’on vantait dans cette fille
646 Sermon des cinquante, p.441.
647‘Juifs’, p. 519, p.516.
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n’entra point dans la source de mes larmes, quoiqu’elle dflt augmenter, dans les spectateurs, 
l’horreur pour les assassins et la piti6 pour la victime. ( 1771)648
Voltaire both derides the Jews’ ‘nonsensical’ food laws, markers of their identity, 
and condemns the foolish and unthinking brutal nature of mankind as a whole that 
is prepared to persecute others for little or no reason. He applies the figure of the 
auto-da-fe to expose the illogical emotion of the people whose sympathy is 
increased because of the age and beauty of the victim. However, at this later 
period of writing, Voltaire places particular stress on the Jews’ role as victims, 
and, despite the mockery, portrays them with a degree of sympathy that reiterates 
his condemnation of the way they have been selected as objects of abuse. He 
indicates the paradox by which they, mistakenly believing themselves to be the 
chosen people of God, have in reality become the chosen victims of others. But 
this does not mean that in this instance he removes all criticism from the Jews; he 
shows that, although he abhors the particularized nature of Christian persecution, 
he continues to include the Jews in that accusation of non-resistance and lack of 
reason common to so many people. The indictment remains against the Jews, 
although it has become softened by their inclusion in the universal.
*  *  *
La Pucelle
In La Pucelle Voltaire repeats this condemnation of all human apathy, 
portraying the spectators awaiting the public burning of Dorothee, afraid to stand 
up to the brutal executioner Sacrogorgon, the instrument of the Inquisition, whose 
name, created ‘pour intimider la populace’ (1756), acts as an indictment on the 
false sanctifying of brutality; it repeats the hypocrisy present in the neologism of 
the auto-da-fe:649 In describing how a follower may fawn over his master, Voltaire 
draws a connection between sycophancy and weakness: ‘II voit son maitre, il 
rampe doucement, / Leche ses mains, le flatte en son langage / Et pour du pain 
devient un vrai mouton’ (1760: first published 1764); ‘observant tout d ’un ceil
648'Juifs’, pp.526-27.
649 Essai sur les moeurs, II, 174.
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ferme et content’ (1730-62), such an individual does not make use of his power to 
think, does not stand up for what is right.650
Using a similar figure, Voltaire represents Agnes, the ‘objet charmant et 
doux’, as fated always to sin unintentionally (1730-62). She succumbs to 
providence and accepts her part as victim. But while her position and the role of 
Sacrogorgon are of a totally different order, the latter belonging to the utterly 
brutal, yet both these people in their different ways fail by their common inability 
to resist the actions and orders of others. Finding a relationship between all cases 
of passivity, Voltaire exposes how the fault is merely a question of scale, a matter 
of how far the individual is prepared to go in his non-resistance; just as reasonable 
enthusiasm may develop into brutal fanaticism, passive indifference can open the 
way to an ever-developing abuse of justice. So the spectators at Dorothee’s public 
burning, though again moved by the beauty of the victim, remain inactive and 
docile, condoning the events until the arrival of Dunois, after which their reactions 
undergo a complete reversal -  an episode that indicates the fickleness and easy 
mobility of people’s opinions, the way their thinking and behaviour may be 
directed solely by the guidance of others.651
*  *  *
Candide
In the same way, in Candide the spectators at the auto-da-fi watch the 
horrifying ceremony with both apparent detachment and sentimentality; repeating 
his much used figure, Voltaire foregrounds their superficiality by showing that it 
is the beauty, or whiteness, of Candide’s body that most impacts on Cun^gonde. 
Similarly at the execution of the English Admiral, the passive on-lookers fail to 
protest against the unjust sentence. They allow themselves to accept the policy of 
those in power, to interpret the events as ‘encouragement’ to themselves -  a 
cynical figure of deception and pragmatism that literally repeats that found in Le 
Siecle de Louis XIV, where Voltaire writes that the European habit to thank God 
for a non-existent victory was nothing other than an ‘usage etabli pour encourager
650 La Pucelle, XVIII, 95-97, p.535; VI, 409, p.373.
651 La Pucelle, XI, 75-76, p.434.
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les peuples, qu’il faut toujours tromper’ (1735-52).652
Pan gloss and the young baron both become metaphors for non-resistance: 
they are discovered enslaved in the galleys, a figure that echoes Voltaire mockery 
of all people who endure life without question in an attempt to live out their days 
undisturbed. In the Essai sur les mceurs, referring to events in fifteenth-century 
France, he suggests that when the people submitted to unthinking obedience, they 
‘fut enfin tranquille comme les formats le sont dans une galere’ (1756). Likewise, 
Don Issachar, intimidated by the Inquisitor’s threatened auto-da-fe, accepts the lot 
that life has accorded to him. And Voltaire introduces another comparable figure 
of non-resistance in the person of the black slave, the mutilated worker who, even 
while doubting the pastors’ paradoxical affirmations of a shared Christian 
brotherhood, accepts or resigns himself to the ‘custom’ of the sugar plantation. 
He, the victim, follows in the path of non-resistance first taken by his 
undemanding parent. But Voltaire, speaking with an elitist eighteenth-century 
voice that taps into the theories of Aristotle, then attributes the condition of slaves 
to their usually unchanging genie, to the unresisting character of their ‘nations’:
C’est par 1& que les ndgres sont les esclaves des autres hommes. On les achate sur les cotes 
d ’Afrique comme des betes, et les multitudes de ces noirs, transplants dans nos colonies 
d ’Amdrique, servent un trds petit nombre d ’Europeans. L’expdrience a encore appris quelle 
supdrioritd ces Europeans ont sur les Amdricains, qui, aisdment vaincus partout, n’ont jamais 
osd tenter une rdvolution, quoiqu’ils fussent plus de mille contre un. (1756)653
But here, setting aside his reference to the fantasy of European superiority, we 
also find that Voltaire recognizes Christendom’s wrongful treatment of others, and 
the way that those who are exploited can become conditioned to accept their 
situation.
At other times Voltaire partially dismantles the theory of man’s unchanging 
genie. Showing how the formerly fanatical Anabaptists have become ‘les plus 
paisibles de tous les hommes, occupes de leurs manufactures et de leur ndgoce, 
laborieux, charitables’ (1756), he indicates that where reason is allowed to
652 Le Siecle de Louis XIV, 1,270.
653 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 120, II, 381.
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develop, the character or position of any group may change for the better.654 R.E. 
Florida explores the way the phibsophes used the ‘anti-Nicene movements [...] as 
a contrast to orthodoxy’, and he shows how non-conformist groups who sought to 
promote reason and tolerance provided the writers with ‘examples to throw in the 
face of traditional Christianity.’655 Accordingly, Voltaire applies the figure of the 
now reasonable and tolerant Anabaptists, to set out his argument; although true 
equality can never be found and the weak will be ever vulnerable, everyone can 
and should endeavour to improve in some way the world in which they live. 
Encouraging people to be pragmatic, to accept that their full ambitions may not be 
fulfilled, Voltaire exhorts all individuals to strive to attain their rights as human 
beings and to become useful members of society. Weakness does not exempt 
people from the obligation to use their reason, to make a personal stand according 
to the tenets of universal morality. This point lies at the heart of the conte; 
Candide, finally settling down to his more banal existence, discovers how in a 
limited way he can make life more bearable: he comes to see that work does not 
just stave off i ’ennui, le vice, et le besoin’, but is also ‘le seul moyen de rendre la 
vie supportable’ for himself and for others.656
*  *  *
Essai sur les moeurs and La Phibsophie de Vhistoire
Stressing that freedom of thought is the greatest of freedoms, in La 
Phibsophie de Vhistoire Voltaire compares the rustres of Europe and the 
sauvages of the New World and Africa. Contradicting the contemporary 
Eurocentric thinking, he presents the former group as ignorant and uncreative; 
suffering fiscal depredations, attending religious ceremonies they do not 
understand, they become engaged in wars where they are forced ‘a s’aller faire 
tuer dans une terre etrangere, et a tuer leurs semblables pour le quart de ce qu’ils 
peuvent gagner chez eux en travaillant’. By contrast, those who are labelled as 
savages appear as infinitely superior to ‘nos rustres qui vegetent dans nos villages,
654 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 302.
655 Voltaire and the Socinians, p.256, p.257.
656 Candide, p.258, p.260.
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et des sybarites qui s’enervent dans nos villes’ (1765) -  a further reference to the 
greater value to society of those who fully use their limited powers, as compared 
to those who, wasting their abilities and talents, idle away their lives.657 Voltaire 
then contends that the reason that the Jews in sixteenth-century Poland were able 
to enrich themselves was found in Torgueilleuse oisivete des nobles et de 
1’esclavage du peuple’ (1756).658
Repeating his representation of the Sermon des cinquante of a Jewish lack of 
resistance, Voltaire places in a historical context the Jews’ supposed failure to rise 
up against oppression. He describes how they fled the rigours of Ferdinand and 
Isabella’s Spain ‘puisqu’ils pr&eraient la fuite a la revolte’ (1756).659 A similar 
figure appears with his contention that weakness and feebleness caused the fall of 
ancient Rome. Making the satirical, and, what he sarcastically indicates, 
controversial suggestion that, in this case, the Romans might be compared to the 
Jews, he writes:
La faiblesse des empereurs, les factions de leurs ministres et de leurs eunuques, la haine que 
l’ancienne religion de l’empire portait k la nouvelle, les querelles sanglantes &ev6es dans le 
christianisme, les disputes thdologiques substitutes au maniement des armes, et la mollesse k 
la valeur. (1765)660
While the past greatness of Rome’s empire was the product of their people’s 
courage and prudence, their failure was the result of their weakness and idleness. 
Subservience became responsible for their subjection. But, in a passage that 
recalls his thinking regarding Agnes, Voltaire takes the argument into another, 
more universal, field that partially reduces the negativity of his portrayal of 
submissiveness. Having praised the people of India and China for their lack of 
religious fanaticism and absence of warlike fervour, traits which place them above 
the more savage Europeans, he concludes: ‘mais Jeur vertu meme, ou plutot leur
657 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p. 109, p. 110.
658 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 224.
659 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 350.
660 La Philosophie de Vhistoire, p.266.
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douceur les a perdus; ils ont 6te subjugues’ (1756).661
At times a similar dismantling appears regarding the Jews’ supposed 
passivity. Voltaire repeatedly portrays those of his day as abstaining from war, and 
this representation links them with the Quakers. The Jews’ non-bellicose 
character, dating according to Voltaire from the time of the Babylonian Exile, now 
takes on a more positive social significance. During the reign of Ferdinand and 
Isabella, the Jews ‘etaient ce qu’ils sont partout ailleurs, les courtiers du 
commerce’. Their profession, ‘loin d’etre turbulante, ne peut subsister que par un 
esprit pacifique’ (1756). Voltaire draws a distinction between the warlike Spanish 
people which ‘ne savait que combattre’, and the Jews who were ‘necessary’ 
merchants (1756). On this occasion, he shows their reputation not just resting on 
monetaiy dealings, but also on a non-warlike character that has allowed them to 
engage in commercial practices useful to the state. But, he contends, as a result the 
Spanish, jealous of their success, perceived the Jewish ‘nation’ as a threat, 
although ‘n’etant point gueniere, elle n ’etait point a craindre’ (1756) -  a comment 
that reintroduces the connection between their success and the undeserved envy of 
their persecutors.662
* * *
Demonstrations of fanaticism and complacency by the Christians
In contrast to the more positive figures of constancy relating to the Jews, 
Voltaire repeatedly observes inconstancy in the followers of Christ; the latter do 
not adhere to religious dictates, and individuals are ready to renounce their faith. 
While conversion from Judaism to Christianity rarely occurs, certain Christians 
have abjured their religion in favour of that of the Jews. More negatively still, 
members of the Church find excuse for their greedy ambitions; not only do they 
engage financially with the Jews whom they persecute, but forge political 
alliances with peoples of differing faiths or religious convictions -  actions that 
question the sincerity of Christ’s followers. Voltaire declares: ‘Si ce sont des
661 Essai sur les mceurs, III, 180.
662 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 350, 159, 160.
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etrangers puissants, il est certain qu’un prince fera alliance avec eux. F rancis I", 
tres chretien, s’unira avec les musulmans contre Charles-Quint, tres catholique’ 
(1764).663 He extends his religious argument to include negative elements found in 
the political and the social, once more uniting the Christians with those that they 
condemn. His portrayal of their intolerably selfish immorality and pragmatic greed 
presents the Church’s differential posturing as one without foundation. He re­
emphasizes the separation between fanaticism and philosophic indifference, 
vehemently addressing the Christians:
vous, ennemis de la raison et de Dieu, vous qui blasph^mez Fun et 1’autre, vous traitez 
Fhumble doute et 1’humble soumission du philosophe, comme le loup traita l’agneau dans les 
fables d’fisope; [...] La philosophie ne se venge point; elle rit en paix de vos vains efforts; elle 
dclaire doucement les hommes, que vous voulez abrutir pour les rendre semblables k vous.
(1764)664
For Voltaire there is little difference between the messages contained in the works 
of fiction and the stories of the Bible, except that the latter, claiming to be the 
word of God, demand total belief and obedience. This, in his eyes, justifies his 
condemnation of all people who still unthinkingly have faith in the sacred texts, an 
indictment that implicitly includes the Christians. Just as the Jews unquestioningly 
accept their religious teachings, the unthinking members of the Church blindly 
follow the beliefs imposed on them by their spiritual leaders; just as the Jews 
blasphemously attribute fanaticism to the will of God, the Christians profanely 
ascribe such deeds to the will of Christ. Condemning the Bible’s messages, 
Voltaire therefore exhorts its readers to follow his own example: ‘Toumez-vous 
de tous les sens; tordez le texte, disputez contre les P&res de l ’£glise’ (1771).665 
Thinking Christians, guided by reason and universal morality, must find their own 
explanations for the contents of the texts. But the criticism does not stop here: like 
the Jews, in eveiy area of life they should avoid passive indifference, reject 
fanaticism, and fight for the good of all human beings. While Christ’s followers
663 ‘Tolerance’, VF, p.557.
664‘Ame’, pp.318-19.
665 ‘Juifs’, p.534.
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claim to be superior to their ‘uncivilized’ other, their actions manifest the greatest 
reversal from humanity; it is the duty of all thinking people to ‘sonner le tocsin 
contre ces ennemis de 1’humanite?’ (7/8 May 1761), and to strive for a world in 
which ‘les fanatiques, les superstitieux, les persecuteurs, deviennent hommes!’ 
(1761).666
* * *
Sermon des cinquante
In the Sermon des cinquante Voltaire illustrates how Christian savageiy has 
developed with the increase in superstition. He contends that from its hidden 
beginnings it has grown in power to a position where ‘daring’ to invent new 
dogma that goes so far as to invest Jesus, the man, with the status of the son of 
God, it has propagated its teachings with ever-growing fanaticism. But he then 
suggests (as in the case of the followers of Judaism) that the Christians’ blind 
acceptance of their doctrine may be about to pass. He writes:
Avouez que vous soutenez des mensonges par des mensonges; avouez que la fureur de 
dominer sur les esprits, le fanatisme et le temps ont 61ev£ cet Edifice qui croule aujourd’hui de 
tous cot£s, masure que la raison d6teste, et que l ’erreur veut soutenir.667
He concludes the text reiterating that religion should unite and not divide men. But 
going further in the Sermon preche a Bale, he declares; ‘Si la religion n ’a servi 
qu’a nous diviser, que la nature humaine nous reunisse’ (1768). This statement 
shows how for Voltaire, even if religion has failed in its objective, mankind can 
still be united through its shared humanity -  proof, as he sees it, that man’s respect 
for man is more important than his respect for any individual religious doctrine.668
* * *
666 D9771 to d’Alembert; Sermon du Rabbin Akib, p.281.
667 Sermon des cinquante, p.452.
668 Sermon preche a Dale, p.590.
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La Pucelle
In La Pucelle Voltaire emphasizes how in the majority of Christians 
weakness leads to their complicity in the authorities’ fanaticism. He takes this 
argument to its extreme in his representation of the paradoxical way henchmen 
perform their duties: outwardly they are strong and fierce, inwardly unresisting 
and cowardly. Fearful, or greedy for their own well-being, they are prepared to 
persecute others in order to protect themselves; preferring to be satellites rather 
than supplicies, they demonstrate their supposed power by imposing their will on 
those who are weaker (1756).669
Dans la grand-place on &£ve un bucher;
Trois cents archers, gens cruels et timides,
Du mal d’autrui monstres toujours avides,
Rangent le peuple, empechent d’approcher. (1734)670
Voltaire shows how, only by becoming thinking beings, people can find the 
courage to resist such intimidation, and the intimidators themselves can begin to 
reform their own behaviour. In ‘Philosophe’ he sets out his argument: ‘Les gens 
non pensants demandent souvent aux gens pensants a quoi a servi la philosophie’, 
to which he replies that enlightenment, by encouraging people to think, helps to 
reduce religious fanaticism, ‘a eteindre enfm dans l’Espagne les abominables 
bQchers de 1’Inquisition’ (1771).671
* * *
Candide
In Candide, just as the spectators at the auto-da-fe show scant concern for the 
murderous events before them, Pangloss closes his mind to the questions raised by 
human suffering, and the ‘wisest’ old man in the Propontis refuses to involve 
himself in the affairs of others. In addition, Voltaire readdresses the issue of
indifference through the figure of Pococurante. The Italian noble, who appreciates
669 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 351.
670 La Pucelle, VI, 402-05, p.373.
671 ‘Philosophe’, M.xx, p.205 (originally in the Questions sur I’Encyclopedie).
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that freedom of thought is ‘le privilege de l’homme’, proves that he is able to 
question public opinion, and yet he fails to make full use of his reason. Inactive 
and bored by life, he segregates himself from the world in a way that becomes 
symbolic of his total non-concern for matters relevant to others. He, failing to 
make use of the enlightenment that he has acquired, is apathetic to issues of 
importance to other people and, thereby, he is useless to society. In his case apathy 
does not relate to a lack of reasoning, but to a failure to use that reasoning to good 
purpose.672
Moreover, in order to mock the importance placed by Europeans on noble 
birth and social hierarchy, Voltaire parodies the significance given to the Baron de 
Thunder-ten-tronckh’s heritage. This allows him to insist that the worth of an 
individual should not rest on specious claims to past nobility, antiquity, or even 
mythical chosenness, but on his personal value to society. Besides reiterating 
Voltaire’s attack on the useless idleness of certain nobility, this figure dismantles 
the Church’s pronouncements regarding Christ’s descent from the biblical fathers.
* * *
Essai sur le mceurs and La Philosophie de Vhistoire
Although pointing to a genie of non-resistance among certain ‘races’, Voltaire 
repeatedly repudiates the suggestion that this justifies the actions of those who 
seek to deprive others of their rights as human beings. The failing in one group or 
individual does not legitimize the failing in the other. He condemns the actions of 
the Spanish in Peru, their transportation of black slaves from Africa ‘like animals’, 
and their failure to treat these and the people of the New World ‘comme une 
espece humaine’ (1756). As in Candide, he points to the cruel paradox behind the 
European management of slaves:
Nous leur disons qu’ils sont hommes comme nous, qu’ils sont rachet^s du sang d ’un dieu 
mort pour eux, et ensuite on les fait travailler comme des betes de somme: on les nourrit plus 
mal; s’ils veulent s’enfuir, on leur coupe une jambe, et on leur fait toumer a bras l’arbre des
672 Candide, p.235.
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moulins h sucre, lorsqu’on leur a donn6 une jambe de bois. Apr£s cela nous osons parler du 
droit des gens! (1761)673
The Europeans’ fervour, exercised in the name of religion, has become excuse 
for their most violent savagery -  a trait that is the most extreme manifestation of 
the intolerable. Underlining the relationship between fanaticism and unreason, 
between violence and credulity, Voltaire declares: ‘Jamais la nature humaine n’est 
si avilie que quand l’ignorance superstitieuse est arme du pouvoir’ (1756). But 
such power can become reversed. Referring to the troubles under Henri IV, 
Voltaire describes how many peace-loving ‘citizens’, when led astray by their 
religion, performed their own acts of fanaticism against the wishes of those in 
positions above them: ‘La plus vile populace fait en ce point la loi aux grands et 
aux sages’ (1756). Empowered by their numbers, the same people whom the 
authorities had kept in ignorance, took control over their former masters. On this 
occasion the fanaticism of the weak caused suffering to the strong, thereby giving 
a reverse example of the way religion is able to promulgate the breakdown of 
civilized society.674
Even though the number of the enlightened may be few, Voltaire sees it as 
their duty to guide people onto the way of tolerance, a task which, he contends, in 
itself is not impossible: ‘II ne faut que cinq ou six philosophes qui s’entendent, 
pour renverser le colosse. [...] il s’agit d’arracher les peres de famille a la tyrannie 
des imposteurs, et d’inspirer l ’esprit de tolerance’ (6 December 1757).675 And he 
accepts that by education mankind is proceeding on a path to such enlightenment. 
Although ‘tout n’est pas encore eclaire’ (1761), he hopes that in time states might 
come to follow a loi bienfaisante ‘en faveur de la tolerance universelle’. 
Portraying all mankind as members of a global community, he therefore sums up 
his programme with the following comment:
Vous tous qui m’dcoutez, souvenez-vous que vous etes hommes avant d’etre citoyens d’une
certaine ville, membres d ’une certaine society professant une certaine religion. Le temps est
673 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 401, 417.
674 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 351,545.
675 D7499 to d’Alembert.
venu d’agrandir la sphere de nos id6es, et d’etre citoyens du monde.
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(1768)676
Although Voltaire sees violence as a natural trait of mankind, he does not consider 
it to be an inevitable characteristic, and he proposes that if we use our 
enlightenment, if we learn to think for ourselves, we can avoid succumbing to our 
baser instincts. Acknowledging that i a  pate dont nous sommes petris produit 
souvent des massacres, comme elle produit des calomnies, des vanites, des 
persecutions, et des impertinences’ (1764), Voltaire recognizes that we are all 
subjects to bad behaviour. But, through reference to the Quakers, he gives proof 
that violence does not constitute a human essence, a realization that can encourage 
us to strive towards becoming more useful and tolerant citizens.677
Voltaire’s programme is therefore grounded in his clear separation of the two 
meanings of both enthusiasm and indifference. In the former case he demands a 
rejection of that religious enthusiasm which drives individuals to perform acts of 
brutal fanaticism in the name of their faith; his demand is for a philosophic 
enthusiasm which seeks to encourage a greater involvement in issues fundamental 
to the well-being of all people. As for indifference, here Voltaire distinguishes 
between passive acceptance of violence and/or the suffering of others, and that 
thinking which acts as an antidote to religious fanaticism: the first allows for a 
tolerating of the intolerable, the second fosters a positive tolerance of those 
different from ourselves.
676 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 180; Sermon preche a Bale, p.583.
677‘Fin, causes finales’, p. 119.
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Chapter 7 Voltaire’s self-representation in his drive for tolerance
Voltaire’s disapproval of the hybrid character of the sacred texts (the 
conflation of fable and fact) causes him to adopt the same method in order, by 
ridicule, to demystify the Bible’s message. This introduces a tension in that his 
adoption of a critical methodology identical to that which he denounces in the 
object of his critique -  his use of unbelievable fiction to portray a deeper reality -  
confers on the biblical narratives a legitimacy and authority equal to his own. But 
when using the same technique, Voltaire stresses the difference between his 
openly fictional, comical texts, and the ‘false’ biblical accounts that profess to 
relate the truth. In both his burlesques and his straight-faced satirical analyses, he 
sets out to undermine the veracity of the holy scriptures: he farcically parodies the 
biblical figures, he emphasizes the contradictoiy nature of the supposed facts, and 
he presents a literal interpretation that intentionally dismantles the metaphorical 
content in the books of the Old Testament. However, while these manoeuvres 
endeavour to demolish the sacred nature of the texts revered by Jews and 
Christians, the ambivalence and sheer complexity of Voltaire’s approach reminds 
one of Freud’s example of a tendentious joke. This may be found ‘when the 
intended rebellious criticism is directed against the subject himself, or, to put it 
more cautiously, against someone in whom the subject has a share -  a collective 
person’. It may make use of what it condemns by ‘the powerful technical method 
of absurdity’ or by a ‘representation by the opposite’. The humorous way that 
Voltaire represents Judaic teachings points to an acknowledgement of his 
belonging to the Judeo-Christian collective. But, at the same time, his discourse 
hints at his awareness of his place in another collective -  the collective of all 
victims including the Jews. It is in these two areas that the private myth coincides 
with the public one.678
When examining Voltaire’s texts, we find that the discourse on the Jews
appears to change from one period to another, presenting a variation of register
that comprises a disinterested investigation of historical prejudice and religious
tradition, a comically parodic bagatelle, a clinical demolition of the holy writings,
and a vitriolic, impassioned excoriation of all things Jewish. To explore this
678 Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 156, p. 161.
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tendency, it may help to consider how Voltaire represents his own sense of 
identity; this may enable us to uncover a personal myth through his writings, even 
though I am ever aware that, as Besterman claims, ‘seldom has a great artist 
shown so profound a dislike for exhibiting in public the results of self-analysis’.679 
But Bayard explains the need on the part of critics to be aware of that dimension, 
discemable in literary works even when the writer does not intend it.
£tre concern^ sur un plan fantasmatique, c ’est percevoir dans les oeuvres, demure leurs 
intrigues officielles, les grands fantasmes humains -  presents avec des variations dans toutes 
les cultures comme l’cedipe, la castration, la seduction, la sc&ne originaire, le roman 
familial, fantasmes que nos oeuvres illustrent abondamment si on les lit a la lumifcre de la 
psychanalyse.680
Bayard considers that fantasies might well not be ‘directly readable’, but 
uncovering them can offer possibilities to our greater appreciation of texts, and 
explain why some may appear less successful -  a judgement often passed on the 
Sermon des cinquante and ‘Juifs’. But, while some of the more ‘controlled’ texts 
indicate Voltaire’s sympathy for all exploited people, in order to perceive the less 
visible elements of his discourse we need to observe how he carries that 
connection further. While he readily represents himself as having a share in the 
collective of the oppressed, at times he moves his argument on to a position where 
‘the subjective determinant’ is more clearly marked by what Freud identifies as 
‘the share which the subject has in the person found fault with’. I propose that this 
development becomes most manifest in the texts introducing the least acceptable 
attacks on the Jews.681
First let us consider Voltaire’s share in the collective of those who suffer 
persecution. His identity as victim becomes apparent in his perception of the roles 
of individuals, whether those roles be allotted or chosen. His occupation as a 
writer belongs to the second category, but although chosen, it inexorably brought
679 Voltaire, p.430.
680 Comment ameliorer les oeuvres rate'es, p. 112.
681 Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 157: here Freud is discussing the jokes that Jews 
tell about themselves, where their own comicality is integrated into their shared knowledge of their 
good qualities -  unlike the anti-Jewish jokes of non-Jews.
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with it the various tensions of eighteenth-century society. Pierre Lepape explains 
the social position at the time:
Au debut du si6cle, un auteur sur deux est un homme d’figlise; un quart appartient k la 
noblesse. La part des nobles est plus grande encore dans le domaine de la literature: les 
aristocrates animent les salons, et k partir de 1’impulsion donnde k Versailles, dictent le bon 
go0t en matiere de lettres.682
Particularly in the early years of the century, many artists who were commoners 
found themselves living on the fringe of the aristocracy, a paradoxical situation 
that Voltaire did not begin to appreciate fully before his confrontation with the 
noble Chevalier de Rohan-Chabot in 1726. This semi-subordinate status also helps 
explain Voltaire’s preoccupation with the acquisition of wealth, his desire to 
achieve financial independence and not to join the ranks of impoverished writers, 
his self-confessed ‘seduction’ by the status of princes and his apparent self­
ennoblement when rejecting the name of Arouet.683 For him his chosen profession 
unites him with those employed in (at times) similarly undervalued or exploited 
occupations. So Paquette’s description of prostitution, which she calls ‘ce metier 
abominable qui vous parait si plaisant a vous autres hommes, et qui n ’est pour 
nous qu’un abime de miseres’, may on occasion apply to the occupations of 
various others; the courtesan, the actress, the usurer and, by extension, the 
author.684 Voltaire declares: ‘II y a quarante ans et plus que je fais le malheureux 
metier d’homme de lettres, et il y a quarante ans que je suis accable d’ennemis’ 
(19 January 1758), while in his letter to Helv6tius (19 January 1759) he creates a 
causality between persecution and calumny -  the results of his writing -  and his 
exile:
Ce sont en partie ces tracasseries des Mcs les gens de lettres et encor plus les persecutions, les 
calomnies, les interpretations odieuses des choses les plus raisonables, la petite envie, les 
orages continuels attachez a la litterature qui m ’ont fait quitter la France.685
682 Voltaire le conquerant, p.90.
683 Memoires (1759), p. 17.
684 Candide, pp.227-28.
685 D7592 to d’Alembert; D8055.
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With irony he writes to Henault: ‘II faudra toujours que les gens de lettres soient 
persecutes par la calomnie; c’est leur partage, c’est leur recompense’ (20 October 
1764).686 In the ‘Gens de lettres’ he analyzes the problem further:
I l y a  beaucoup de gens de lettres qui ne sont point auteurs, et ce sont probablement les plus 
heureux; ils sont k l’abri des ddgoflts que la profession d’auteur entrame quelquefois, des 
querelles que la rivalitd fait naTtre, des animosites de parti, et des faux jugements; ils sont 
plus unis entre eux; ils jouissent plus de la societe; ils sont juges, et les autres sont juges.
(1757)687
But the sense of discrimination goes deeper still. Prostitutes, actresses, non- 
Catholic believers (including at times even the Jansenists), as fellow sufferers, are 
victims with whom Voltaire empathizes. He shares with them a deep concern as to 
the possible treatment of their bodies after death, the real likelihood of being 
condemned to the public pit. Besterman feels forced to concede that Voltaire’s 
receiving of the sacrament at Easter was an act of expediency, and it is highly 
feasible that, like the events surrounding his deathbed and the subsequent 
clandestine removal of his body from Paris, this action was in part motivated by 
anxieties regarding the eventual treatment of his corpse.688 Voltaire openly 
expressed his fear of non-burial, and in his letter to the Comte and Comtesse 
d ’Argental displaces the designation of hypocrisy -  connecting it not to his own 
pragmatic thought, but to the thinking of the Church: ‘je vais a la messe de ma 
paroisse; j ’edifie mon peuple; je batis une eglise; j ’y communie, et je m’y ferai 
enterrer, mort-dieu! malgre les hypocrites’ (14 January 1761).689
This letter raises the possibility of a further dimension in Voltaire’s 
understanding of self; for him the individual’s sense of identity may be found in 
his utility, in his useful purpose for mankind. Accordingly, when writing to him, 
Madame Bentinck insists: ‘Hatez-vous de faire votre metier d’etre utile aux
686 D12159.
687 ‘Gens de lettres’, in Articles pour VEncyclopedic, p. 123.
688 Voltaire, p.473.
689 D9540.
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humains, vos semblables’ (23 June 1758).690 And contending that ‘le plus grand 
service est d’eclairer les hommes’ (11 October 1763), Voltaire declares that he 
‘writes to act’ (c.15 April 1767).691 To Elie Bertrand he professes that ‘tous 
les hommes sont freres, et les meilleurs freres sont ceux qui cultivent les lettres’ (1 
January 1765).092 In the same vein, and conflating the drive for enlightenment with 
a biblical analogy, he writes: ‘Cette grande mission a deja d ’heureux succes. La 
vigne de la verite est bien cultivee par des d’Alembert, des Diderot, des 
Bolingbroke, des Hume, etc’ (6 December 1757).693
Drawing on the figure that concludes Candide, Voltaire links the cultivation 
of letters with his combat against fanaticism. As Christopher Cave writes: 
“‘Cultiver les lettres” signifie dans le dictionnaire voltairien “combattre” et 
Voltaire a deja specifie qu’il n ’etait qu’un pauvre cultivateur.’ By making a play 
of his age and fragility, Voltaire distances himself from his attack; this action both 
offers protection to himself and makes his criticism more effective by appearing 
less dogmatically authoritative. As Cave shows, in his correspondance this 
vulnerable ‘representation de soi’ becomes an ‘arme de combat’, where the 
denegation ‘dit le combat de maniere codee, par inversion, allusion, ou ironie’;094 
the same denial marks Voltaire’s letter to Jacob Vemes where he questions the 
worth of his profession (? c. 20 December 1764).695 But his need to make himself 
useful again appears in his letters to Antoine Jean Gabriel Le Bault, where, in a 
more practical vein, he claims to be buying the estate of Femey ‘pour y faire un 
peu de bien’ (18 November 1758), and to Damilaville where he says that he fears 
that he will die before having ‘rendu service’ (25 August 1766).696
The notion of usefulness is much repeated in Voltaire’s Jewish discourse, and 
can count as the second aspect of his personal myth; his share in the collective 
with those that he most criticizes. In the Essai sur les mceurs he indicates that the 
Jews’ very existence depends on their necessity to other nations. With punning
irony he suggests that when the Jews cease to be of service, necessairement they
690 D7764.
691 D11453 to d’Argence; D14117 to Jacob Vemes.
592 D 12284.
693 D7499 to d’Alembert.
694 Voltaire et ses combats, 1,238 (author’s italics).
695 D12251.
696 D7946; D13513.
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will cease to be a ‘separate society’; they will become absorbed into the ‘scum’ of 
the world (1761). Here, I propose, we can discover a figurative network linking 
Voltaire’s life’s work with the Jewish trades: both are necessary. The writer and 
(according to him) the Jewish people construct their selfhood in that characteristic 
of being needed; this quality becomes essential to their sense of identity and self- 
worth. A further negative figure unites members of this collective. Just as he, at 
different periods, is either feted or reviled, the Jews from place to place or time to 
time have received totally contradictory treatment at the hands of the pragmatic 
Christians; this cruel paradox he addresses in ‘Juifs’, and again in the Essai sur les 
moeurs where he sums up: ‘Ce n’est pas une legere preuve des caprices de 1’esprit 
humain de voir les descendants de Jacob brfiles en procession a Lisbonne, et 
aspirant a tous les privileges de la Grande-Bretagne’ (1761). The commercial 
trader and the author (like the prostitute, actress, and usurer) are appreciated when 
useful, but are scorned and derided when no longer deemed of service.697
This important homology requires further comments. First, it is I, of course,
not Voltaire, who points to these remarkable similarities linking self-portrayal to
the portrayal of the Jews, so as to discern the development through his writing life
of a personal myth of which he may have been partially aware, but which he never
made explicit. Second, we would not expect Voltaire to thematize his sense of his
own usefulness exactly as he does that of the Jews. While ie  plus grand service
est celui d’eclairer les gens’, he ranks the money-lending to which Christendom
relegated the Jews one of the lowest of services. However, the two useful tasks
have a common relational structure, in the fact that those for whom Voltaire and
the Jews are useful and even needed, the privileged members of the larger society,
treat them badly. There is plenty of textual evidence of this shared relational
structure, which helps us to grasp the writer’s personal myth through an imaginary
identification. Voltaire rejects subjective writing (like that of Rousseau) and must
presumably therefore find subjective satisfaction in writing frequently about the
Jews, where he can combine compassion with reversal into the negative. No one
could deny that he found the Jews highly important in European society to give
them and their destiny so much attention. My point is that their importance in his
eyes lay not only in the Judaic foundations of Christianity, but also in the
697 Essai sur les mceurs, II, 166, 164.
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correspondence between their destiny and his way of experiencing his own; his 
personal myth. This rapprochement must have had more than subjective value, 
however; Voltaire must have felt it contained a key of some sort to the troubled 
history of Europe, or he would hardly have persisted in his references to the Jews 
in so many writings for so many years. As for the extent to which those references 
relied on anti-Jewish stereotypes, we can at least remark that there is no impartial 
access to knowledge of human reality. Any grasp of reality has our own particular 
fantasy as a starting-point. As a final comment at this point in my discussion, we 
might add to the striking homologies in the texts about Jews and about himself -  
usefulness alternating with dispensability -  another homology that Voltaire may 
well have thought about. The writer and ‘the Jew’ are not merely useful or useless 
to the privileged, but disturbing, and therefore roundly condemned by those in 
power when they dare to depart from their instrumental role of objects for the 
privileged, when they dare to exhibit their autonomy as subjects: the writer, when 
he construes enlightenment as critique of the powerful; ‘the Jew’, when he 
manages despite discrimination to enrich or otherwise distinguish himself. 
Furthermore, though Voltaire did not foretell this, they were to share the other side 
of that same coin: Voltaire, and also the Jews, would have through their efforts a 
future rayonnement, a reversal into the positive, not included in the birthright of 
the privileged of the Ancien Regime.
To this representation we might add other issues that appear either directly or 
indirectly linked in Voltaire’s discourse: the Jewish role of outsider and his own 
self-claimed illegitimacy, the Jews’ exile and non-belonging and his sense of 
banishment, their alleged scheming and avaricious nature and his ready 
involvement in questionable financial affairs, their castration/circumcision and his 
self-claimed physical weakness and impotence (Gilman marks out a commonly 
perceived analogy between the circumcised Jew and the ‘feminized male’).698 
Repeatedly in his correspondence, Voltaire refers to his exile dans le desert at 
Femey; Frederick II describes him as a fripon (22 January 1751);699 Madame 
Denis calls him avaricious, and, in a note to La Pucelle, Voltaire refers to FrSron's
698 Inscribing the Other, p. 138.
699 D4358 to Sophia Frederika Wilhelmina of Prussia.
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accusation against him of plagiarism.700 The documented attribution of comparable 
characteristics to himself and to the stereotypically represented ‘Jew’, supports 
Pomeau’s comments relating to Voltaire’s attitude towards Salomon Levy, and 
Poliakov’s contention that Voltaire was ever seeking to ‘se debarrasser du Juif en 
lui’.701 Manuel suggests something similar with his comment that ‘one might half- 
seriously venture the idea that Voltaire found in the Jews and ancient Judaism a 
fetish into which he could pour those aspects of his being that he loathed in 
himself’.702 Sibony shows how such negative thinking regarding the other does not 
rest on intolerance of difference but on ‘la peur de voir Vautre, qui dans sa 
difference est soupgonne semblable, (author’s italics).703
What we might therefore call an imaginary ‘Jewishness’ in Voltaire’s sense of 
identity becomes more marked around the period generally agreed to have been 
one of the most troubling for him. It was in that period that some of Voltaire’s 
most vitriolic writings addressing the Jews appear, suggesting that there was an 
exces d'hallucination at that time, where the writing is ‘submergee par un trop- 
plein d’affects et de representations, comme possedee par eux’. Here Voltaire 
Taisse transparaitre, avec peu d’amenagements, l’intensite de sa souffrance ou le 
contenu de ses desirs’.704
In the period in question there appears a lack of ‘isolation’, an interruption to, 
what Pomeau terms, Voltaire’s ‘interior veto’.705 The Jewish discourse becomes 
particularly subjective, no longer the cool repetition of religious traditions with 
satirical comments as found in the ‘Remarques sur les Pensees de M. Pascal’ 
(1734), not a farcical parodic satire of human folly or religious faith as in La 
Pucelle (1730-62), Le Mondain (1736) or Candide (1759), not the bitter sarcastic 
attack on the ‘fables’ of Judaism as in the ‘Reponse a quelques objections’ 
(‘Juifs’, Section IV, 1771) and the La Bible enfin expliquee (1776), nor the logical 
dismantling of the ‘impossible’ biblical accounts on which Christianity is founded 
as in the Histoire de Vetablissement du christianisme (1777) and the Dernieres
700 See D5714, Voltaire to d’Argental (10 March 1754); La Pucelle, VI, p.371.
701 Histoire de I ’antisemitisme, p. 115.
702 ‘Israel and the Enlightenment’, p.39.
7<B Le ‘racisme une haine identitaire, p.97.
704 Comment ameliorer les oeuvres ratees, p.96.
705 Candide (1959), p. 10.
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remarques sur les Pensees de M. Pascal (1777). In La Bible enfin expliquee 
Voltaire removes his authorial presence entirely from the body of the writing; he 
reproduces the texts verbatim thereby allowing them to perform a self-demolition, 
merely aided by his highly satirical and literal antiphrasal footnotes. Contrary to 
Poliakov, who argues that Voltaire’s ‘antisemitism’ increasingly develops during 
his life, I would contend that while his later works Jose none of their savage 
virulence against the Judaic faith, stories and traditions, and while these writings 
become ever more surgical in their demolition of the biblical texts, it is in the 
Sermon des cinquante -  here I rely on Wade and Desne’s research and dating -  
and in the early part of ‘Juifs’ that the tone is more ‘chimerical’ in the sense that 
Langmuir uses this term, that is, reactive to ‘ill-understood menaces to individual 
psychic integration’. In these instances the writing becomes extremely subjective, 
with repeated reference to Jewish ‘plagiarism’, ‘dirtiness’, ‘savagery’, 
‘immorality’, and ‘disgusting practices’. These highly negative projections are 
certainly not absent at other periods, but I would argue that in those cases they 
generally appear either with less intensity or less frequency, or in the form of a 
satirical attack, not so much against the people, as against the religion that holds 
the teachings sacred. Voltaire’s prejudices always troubled him, but in his periods 
of control, his thinking regarding them surfaces less passionately in the text.706
The question therefore arises: what made that middle period so significant to 
Voltaire’s self-understanding, and intensified his imaginary ‘Jewishness’? In line 
with Mauron’s methodology, we can refer here to biographical evidence, looking 
first at his relationships with two women particularly close to him around this 
time. We know of his bitter disillusionment and disappointment on discovering his 
former mistress, Madame du Chatelet, with Saint-Lambert, and Pomeau has 
indicated the possible parallel between the episode in Candide and the writer’s 
own experience; Don Issachar -  ‘the Jew’ -  discovers Cunegonde with the 
eponymous hero on a sofa, just as Voltaire found fimilie with her new lover in a 
similar situation. People have tried to blame both parties, some accusing Voltaire 
of earlier desertion, others indicting Madame du Chatelet with unfaithfulness, but 
I introduce this and other events into my thesis only for the relevance they may
706 Toward a Definition o f Antisemitism, p.33.
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have for Voltaire’s writing of the period.707 We now know from the discovery of 
certain correspondence that, notwithstanding his distress on learning of fimilie’s 
affair, Voltaire himself had been for some time engaged in an intimate relationship 
with his niece, Madame Denis. Dawson, like Besterman, emphasizes the 
contemporary attitudes towards incest and remarks that such 'relationships were 
not uncommon in the eighteenth century’ (although she suggests a certain unease 
in Voltaire, and reminds us how he requested his letters to be burned). Dawson 
draws attention to how, around 1750, the highly erotic register disappears from the 
love letters to Madame Denis. Voltaire continues to write to her, but the tone 
changes. Following Madame du Chatelet’s untimely death after the birth of Saint- 
Lambert’s child in 1749, Voltaire appeared distraught, and shortly afterwards he 
moved to Potsdam to take up residence at the court of Frederick II, with whom 
Mason contends he had in 1740 probably first engaged in a homosexual 
relationship. But the 1750-53 visit ended in disaster when Voltaire felt obliged to 
leave in disgrace. This is the period of Frederick’s supposed ‘squeezed orange’ 
remark indicating the end of Voltaire’s usefulness, the shameful Hirschel affair, 
and the humiliating arrest by Frederick’s men of Voltaire and Madame Denis at 
Frankfurt, where he was accused of ‘stealing’ the king’s own manuscript. In view 
of these events Voltaire’s allegations about the Jews’ sexual conduct and way of 
life can been seen to address the characteristics, proclivities and failings which, at 
times, he might have found in himself.708
When we consider those episodes in light of his literary figures of Jewishness, 
certain similar, much repeated, themes come to mind; among them, 
homosexuality, adultery and incest. Although these are addressed in Voltaire’s 
texts in terms of the (for him) unstable or immoral nature of both Christian dictate 
and Judaic teaching, his repeated reference to these figures also suggests some 
degree of awareness, perhaps scarcely conscious and manifestly not thought 
through, of a connection to events in his own life: his affairs with Madame Denis 
and (possibly) with Frederick 11, and his close attachment to the ‘divine’ Emilie 
whom he describes and praises in masculine terms. Although we no longer have 
all his intimate correspondence, what we know of these important relationships
707 Candide (1959), p.245, note 4.
708 Voltaire’s Correspondence -  An Epistolary Novel, p.65.
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suggests that they fell into the ‘transgressive’ or illegitimate domain -  incestuous, 
adulterous or homosexual -  this last being punishable by death in the eighteenth 
century, and in a manner similar to that which had been so often meted out to the 
Jews. On 24th May 1726 Voltaire’s old acquaintance Deschaufours was burned at 
the stake for sodomy, and in 1750, the year following Madame du Chatelet’s 
death, in Paris, two others charged with pederasty were similarly executed.709
While Voltaire may have felt particularly drawn following Madame du 
Chatelet’s death to readdress the biblical texts that he had studied with her when at 
Cirey, the cessation at this same time of his erotic correspondence with his niece 
may indicate an uncertainty about the complexity of his own identity, sexuality, 
and inconstancy, a self-questioning which, being largely unreflected, might well 
become projected on to the scapegoat group that was so often in his thoughts. 
And, while Voltaire’s experiences around 1750 suggest some immediate links 
with his writing on the Jews at that same time, the aspect of sexual distress which 
seems to characterize those experiences may invite associations with his childhood 
as a pupil of the Jesuits, if Wootton is right to attach decisive importance to the 
evidence of the Jesuits’ pederastic abuse of their young charges. Such a stark 
contradiction between the sanctity and authority claimed by those spiritual fathers 
and their ‘incestuous’ practices in turn imposes a condensing together of 
Voltaire’s indignation at these hypocritical father figures and his ambivalence 
about his own father, setting up an emotional situation, perhaps a real crisis, which 
in a man so reticent about self-exploration could all too easily find an outlet in 
expressions of anti-Jewish rage. While Voltaire does not demand to be understood 
‘from within’, as does Rousseau, it seems fair enough to carry our scholarly 
investigation of his writing forward in spite of him, with the help of such evidence 
as specialists have accrued about his affective life. In doing so, and in searching 
for traces of a personal myth within his often unimpressive, at times chaotic 
commentaries on the Jews, we certainly do not hope to reduce the work to the life, 
but rather to observe a partial and reluctant emergence, even through the very 
trajectory of Voltaire’s figures, of the unhappy consciousness of modernity.
This hope appears to be well-founded; on the one hand because the traces of
709 cf. D923 to Pierre Joseph Thoulier d’Olivet (4 October 1735), p.221, note 5; Rictor Norton, 
Mother Clap’s Molly House, p.255.
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the personal myth -  a persevering identification with the Jews -  lie on the textual 
surface (one does not have to excavate Freudian slips), and on the other hand 
because in Candide, Voltaire recognizes that ‘les chagrins secrets sont encore plus 
cruels que les miseres publiques’.710 Pomeau suggests that when Voltaire is 
‘too happy’ he cannot write his contes, and Marthe Robert argues that creativity 
may be advanced by suffering and that ‘sans disillusion, il n ’y aurait lieu de 
rever’.711 Mason proposes that, in UIngenu (1767) Voltaire shows ‘the educative 
function of pain’, its fostering of ‘wisdom, understanding and tolerance.712 
Voltaire’s recent unhappy experiences -  in addition to his realization of his 
apparently permanent exile from Paris, together with those distressing public 
events such as the Lisbon earthquake and outbreak of the Seven Years War -  may 
have found a better outlet, or some sort of resolution, in his change of literary 
direction at this time towards propaganda writing in the cause of tolerance. Critics 
agree that Candide marks a turning point in the author’s life and ceuvre; in the year 
of the conte's publication in 1759, writing to Frederick, Voltaire expresses his 
hostility to / ’infame, while the following year, in his letter to d’Alembert, we find 
the beginnings of his campaign to ‘ecraser l’infame’ (23 June 1760).713
I suggest that we acknowledge another development; the further progression 
of his thinking that becomes evident in the period between the writing of Candide 
and the Traite sur la tolerance (1763), one that marks a dramatic advance beyond 
his worst anti-Jewish attacks. The Sermon du Rabbin Akib (1761) fits into this 
timescale, and bears comparison with the earlier Sermon des cinquante. The two 
Sermons both call to God the creator of all mankind, both pray for abstention by 
all people from intolerant acts, both promote a general obedience to the political 
laws. Both sermons parody devout spiritual homelies, one from a deist and the 
other from a Judaic viewpoint. But the later work reconsiders and reassesses many 
of the issues introduced into the earlier one; Jewish identity, the Judeo-Christian 
relationship, Jewish constancy, customs, guilt. Here an identity founded on 
wandering, dispersion and non-integration is represented not as different from, but
as similar to that of other nations; distinctions between the religious groups are
710 Candide, p.202.
7,1 Candide (1959), p. 15; Origines du roman, p.65.
712 Voltaire (1975), p.77.
713 D9006.
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reduced to the Christians’ being merely a partie of the Jews, the direct result of the 
former’s desire to separate themselves from the latter. Discrimination against the 
Jews is metaphorically explained in terms of ‘a respectable mother who has been 
chased from her home’, an action by their enemies that has led to the paradoxical 
situation whereby the Jews are blamed for no longer inhabiting ‘cette maison 
detruite’. Similarly, circumcision and other religious practices such as the Jewish 
food laws become a Christian obsession alone.714 Actions held responsible for the 
Jews’ enduring persecution are represented in a more favourable way; Christ’s 
crucifixion was carried out by the Romans, non-recognition of his divinity was in 
line with the thinking of many people until after the Council of Nicea. Here 
Voltaire also foregrounds the speciousness of claims that the Jews have been 
involved in ‘disgusting’ practices -  human sacrifice, coprology and even usuiy. 
And he demolishes the Christians’ justifications for their persecutory actions by 
emphasizing the extent of time that divides the biblical Jews from those of the 
present day. Using the Christians’ own arguments against the Jewish doctrine that 
punishment may be deferred to future generations, he questions the former’s right 
to persecute the contemporary Jews for ancient crimes by pointing out how absurd 
it would be to punish in like manner the contemporary Vatican leaders for the 
Romans’ rape of the Sabines. So Voltaire argues against a common stereotype: the 
condemnation and persecution of a whole society for the faults of the few. Katz 
sees the later Sermon as the one occasion where Voltaire shows sympathy for the 
Jews, but I propose that this text distinguishes itself for another reason. On this 
occasion, Voltaire concerns himself not with Judaism, but with the contemporary 
Jewish people, and in a way that reveals that they are not all ‘tainted by the same 
defects as their forefathers’; they should not be confused with the people of 
antiquity.715
However, this same figure introduces a discontinuity in Voltaire’s argument: 
the very teaching of the biblical Jews, their deferral of guilt to later generations, 
implies negation of guilt by the individual -  the non-acceptance of responsibility 
for a personal sin, the refusal by the sinner to pay for his own crimes. Although in 
‘Athee, atheisme’ Voltaire suggests that persecution to the fourth generation could
714 Sermon du Rabbin Akib, p.282.
715 From Prejudice to Destruction, p.42.
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act as a highly effective ‘brake’ to corrupt behaviour (1764), in the main, on this 
count he considers that the Jews deserve to be criticized for their ‘immoral’ and 
illogical teachings.716 Deferral of punishment to an innocent victim who suffers for 
the sins of others, also forms a figurative network with his representation of the 
treatment of bastards, a collective of victims that includes, not just the Protestants 
(often, because of Catholic restrictions, declared illegitimate), but also others such 
as himself. Bastards, like Candide, may suffer discrimination and be denied the 
benefits of family, position and wealth. They, the undeserving heirs, suffer for the 
faults of their fathers. Voltaire mocks the idea that it is fair to ‘punir tous les 
descendants d’une faute de leur pere’ (1766), and comments that ‘il n’est pas juste 
de vous saigner et de vous purger parce que vos peres ont ete malades’ (1765) -  a 
telling metaphorical Jink between blood-letting and sickness that fits with 
Voltaire’s repeated figure of violence and the ‘plague’ of superstition and 
fanaticism. While the instigators of any such tradition are to be condemned, the 
inheritors deserve commiseration.717
Yet from here Voltaire takes his argument further so as now to address in 
particular the Catholics. Their denigration of the Jewish idea of deferred 
retribution is part and parcel of their own sophistry and manipulation; while 
ridiculing the belief of the Jews, they have used it in modified but fundamentally 
identical form in their own doctrine of original sin. This Church dogma creates a 
need in the people for Christian baptism, that sacrament which forms a dual 
function in that it washes away the ‘inherited’ guilt of individuals, and thereby 
engages them in a lifelong Church membership that reinforces the power of the 
Church. Voltaire, through the Quaker, portrays the ritual of baptism as a mere 
Judaic ceremony that, like circumcision, deserves to be rejected by Christian 
believers. And his final indictment of the doctrine of original sin lies in its 
illogicality; for the Church, the inherited guilt does not descend from once-living 
ancestors who chose to pursue their savage agenda, but from a mythical innocent 
(if not ignorant) parent who was seduced into wrongdoing by what is, for Voltaire, 
the fictional figure of the serpent -  a particularly ridiculous ‘sin’ since it was 
prompted by the desire for knowledge, the mark of humanity. Graver than that,
716 ‘Ath6e, atMisme’, p.386.
717 Andre Destouches a Siam, p. 120; Pot-pourri, pp.266-67.
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even while exploiting the doctrine of deferred guilt in its own self-interest, the 
Church condemns the Jews’ belief in it, and uses that belief as an excuse for their 
persecution of the Jewish people. Through a reversal of logic, the Christians have 
invested the Jews, what Voltaire repeatedly represents as their ‘parent’ nation or 
religion, with an impure identity; this, as it were, bastardized denomination is 
thereby denied its legitimacy and forced into exclusion. This reveals the Christians 
as doubly guilty; not just as the persecutors of others for a specious definition of 
their own legitimacy, but also as perpetrators of parricide.718
* * *
When readressing the question of how far Voltaire’s period of hallucinatory 
writing impinges on his perceived position as the champion of tolerance, I find 
that whereas so much of his work concentrates on the demolition of the special, 
holy nature of the Bible texts -  an anti-Judaism which cannot be denied -  the anti- 
Jewish element is chiefly found in what I term the middle period. But, although 
here the negative tone occurs with sufficient force to stand out even when 
considered within the framework of the eighteenth-century stereotypical fantasies, 
the question of Voltaire’s tolerance remains open. He declares when writing to 
d ’Alembert regarding the ‘supposed’ author of ‘Tolerance’: ‘II voulait dans son 
texte inspirer de T indulgence, et rendre dans ses notes les Juifs execrables. II 
voulait forcer ses lecteurs a respecter 1’humanite, et a detester le fanatisme’ (1 
March 1764). While statements such as this have caused certain critics to level 
charges of antisemitism against him, when explaining the ‘writer’s’ systeme, 
Voltaire reaffirms his separation of the Bible from the contemporary world; he 
condemns solely the allegedly mythical and fanatical people of the Old Testament, 
thereby leaving the eighteenth-century Jews included in his programme of 
tolerance for all living individuals.719
Voltaire constantly indicates a permanence in the Jews’ ‘wretched’ status, but 
over time he represents this figure in different ways. While in 1776 he portrays 
their non-belonging in terms of a continued ‘unfortunate’ victimhood, in the
718 Lettres philosophiques, 1,3-4.
719 D 11738.
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earlier section I of ‘Juifs’, his description is more negative: he claims that still 
‘today’ they mistakenly hold to a unquestioning belief in their chosenness, that 
still their character is marked by deviousness and deception (1756). But even in 
this less controlled text, Voltaire shows how such characteristics have been 
encouraged by the Jews’ involvement in those trades that the Christians have 
forced on them, and this acknowledgement exposes the tension that exists between 
his conscious drive for tolerance, and his unreflective intolerance. His comments 
also show us that he regards apathy as a characteristic fundamental to Jewish 
identity; in the religious domain it supposedly ‘explains’ a ‘foolish’, unreasoning 
adherence to an amoral/immoral and illogical biblical teaching, and, in the social, 
a passive acceptance of a subservient role. However, even while he suggests that it 
is in apathy above all that a continuity may be found between the people of the 
mythical past and the present, he acknowledges the universal character of 
passivity, and how transcending it calls for the greatest effort on the part of any 
individual.720
Further to this, I would argue that when charging the Jews with passivity, he is 
not so much adopting the common stereotypical fantasy as drawing on his self- 
understanding. At times his own actions suggest his continued fearfulness in the 
face of possible persecution, and on occasion he shows recognition of his own 
non-resistance to his victimhood. When referring to the way the Dictionnaire 
philosophique has been received, in his letter to Damilaville he acknowledges his 
continuing dread of mistreatment:
Que deviendra votre ami? quel role jouera-t-il, quand l’ouvrage auquel il a travaille 20 annees 
devient l ’horreur ou le jouet des ennemis de la raison? ne sent il pas que sa personne sera 
toujours en danger, et que ce qu’il peut esp^rer de mieux est de se soustraire k la persecution, 
sans pouvoir jamais pr&endre k rien, sans oser ni parler ni ecrire. (18 August 1766)721
And to d’Argental he further explains his receiving of the sacrament at Easter: ‘ Je 
ne veux point etre martyr a mon age. [...] Calomnie continuellement, pouvant etre 
condamne sans etre entendu, je passe mes demiers jours dans une crainte trop
720 La Bible enjin expliquee, p.44, note 1.
721 D 13500.
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fondle’ (1 April 1768).722
Voltaire shows how those who are oppressed -  here we could read Agnes, the 
black slave, and even Candide -  seldom even consider changing what appears to 
be the norm. People who are exploited, if conditioned to accept their role, need an 
external impetus to set them on the path to taking responsibility for themselves 
and to claiming the rights that they and others deserve. This argument raises a 
further fundamental issue. If the impetus for change may be painful experience or 
another’s powers of persuasion, and if Voltaire became inspired to embark in a 
new direction as a result of his own suffering, his awareness of this in his own 
experience may have have prompted his blunt exhortation to the Jews in ‘Juifs’; it 
is by achieving autonomy of judgement that people can improve their situation. 
Personal misfortune can be partially mitigated by one’s own determined action. In 
his discourse relating to the contemporary Jews, today’s readers can see that 
unlike the modem era’s racist or antisemite, he never rejects them as 
unchangeable. Whereas in apartheid South Africa the persecution of black 
Africans was justified by the doctrine relating to skin colour, and whereas Nazism 
relied on a notion of genetic inheritance, Voltaire only attacks supposed traits that 
are within the individual’s power to alter.
At the conclusion of this account of my research into Voltaire’s figures, it is 
no longer possible for me to conceive his often open contempt for the Jews and 
Jewishness otherwise than as inseparable from his sense of himself and how others 
may perceive him: thieving, avaricious, deceiving, wretched. Certainly, his 
support for victims of discrimination is grounded in his own sense of being a 
victim himself. We could well imagine that his repetitious outbursts of anger at the 
Jews in their abject history expresses a sense of being persecuted by the very 
thought of them; by the power of that thought to arouse in him the sense of being a 
victim, the subjectivity he never wanted to explore in writing.723
*  *  *
722 D 14904.
723 See The Symmetry o f God, p.36.
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The question whether Voltaire’s Jewish discourse undermines his propagandist 
agenda in the name of tolerance has no simple answer. If he were not Voltaire, he 
could have laboriously censored everything he wrote, to eliminate any expression 
of prejudice contrary to that agenda. The resulting writings would be nothing but a 
clean surface; they would not be a life’s work, an oeuvre, They would not be the 
truth about one man’s hope of overcoming the prejudices that generate fanatical 
violence, and his concomitant indulgence in, and efforts to transcend, the same 
prejudices within himself. Surely this very complex truth can enlighten us stiiJ 
today.
When separating the people of the ‘mythical’ Bible texts from the Jews of his 
own day, he presents their ‘brutal’ histoire in terms of the unbelievable and 
miraculous nature of the Old Testament stories. He mockingly refuses to judge 
‘ces evenements comme on juge des evenements ordinaires’ (1765).724 In La Bible 
enfin expliquee, by frequently making rhetorical use of notes in order to 
emphasize the farcical aspect, he postulates that it is ridiculous for the Christians 
and contemporary Jews to continue to believe ‘fables’. Of the unbelievable 
trickery of Jacob and Laban he writes: ‘On n ’attraperaitpersonne aujourd’hui avec 
de pareilles fraudes; mais ces temps-la n’etaient pas les notres’; of Abraham’s 
deception of the Pharaoh by means of the reputedly beautiful but aged Sarah: ‘Ces 
choses n’arriveraient pas aujourd’hui; mais elles etaient frequentes alors’; of the 
preparations for the sacrifice of Isaac: ‘Toutes ces choses sont au-dessus de la 
nature humaine telle qu’elle est aujourd’hui.’ Underlining the separation of the 
ancient (mythical) times from the present day, Voltaire then concludes that ‘ces 
temps-la etaient differents des notres’ (1776). This manoeuvre has nothing in 
common with the twentieth-century projection on to the Jews of a cruel ‘racial’ 
heritage. It also relativizes Voltaire’s own accusation of violence, applying it 
solely to the brutality of the Bible. He leaves the alleged characteristic of savagery 
enclosed in his anti-Judaic attacks, and removes it from the Jewish people of the 
eighteenth centuiy.725
724 La Philosophic de Vhistoire, p.230.
725 La Bible enfin expliquee, p.46, note 4, p.22, note 3, p.36, note 1, p.48, note 1.
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The hallucinatory writing illustrates the obstacles to an understanding of the 
Jewish people, the historical and contemporary prejudices that Voltaire needed to 
overcome, as well as the projection and denial that were his reaction to his own 
experience of private and collective trauma. The output of the middle period 
allows us to see his deep emotional identification with the Jews, the only realistic 
explanation of his persevering preoccupation with them. His emphasis on a 
pragmatic self-acceptance, in the conclusion of Candide, introduces a more 
hopeful ‘solution’ than any contained in the earlier Histoire des voyages de 
Scarmentado (1754), the conte to which it is often compared. The increased 
positivity in Voltaire that became evident from this time, develops with his drive 
towards a greater polemical, propagandist and political investment in action that 
gains its strength from his desire to make himself useful. The quest for usefulness, 
a creative or positive mark of identity, and an existential mark that he shares with 
the Jews, becomes the force behind his work for the promulgation of tolerance 
towards all people.
Voltaire’s recognition of faults that society or he himself find unacceptable 
drives his promotion for the improvement of the lot of those who belong with him 
in the collective of victims. By becoming more able to acknowledge the shared 
failings of self and other, he definitely moves forward from a resigned acceptance 
of difference as found in the seventeenth-century understanding of tolerance, to an 
active eighteenth-centuiy policy striving for the rights of all persecuted people; he 
makes no exception of the Jews. He affords them that fundamental equality which 
he insists is common to all mankind, and reasserts the Jews’ entitlement to the 
rights owing to all people. Voltaire consciously desired to resist the illogical and 
prejudiced ideas that his period had inherited from the past. He was not entirely 
successful. Studying the times when the conscious project failed, we can discern 
the presence of unconscious determinations at work each time he lost that 
generous mastery for which he deservedly remains famous. In our present era, 
when enlightened European consciousness is radically changed by the shock of 
the Second World War, inducing scholars to attempt to question eveiy aspect of 
our cultural heritage, Voltaire’s repeated lapses from tolerance in respect of the 
Jews must be excavated, and that process cannot fail to be followed by a falling
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out of love with the idealized father figure of Enlightenment secularity. This study 
has striven to maintain a tension between the reality of Voltaire’s failures and the 
reality of his project for the promotion of universal tolerance. In the worst of the 
failed writings, that intolerance of intolerance indispensable to the project of 
tolerance is completely misapplied and falls into intolerance tout court. In other 
places it is clear that Voltaire fraternally includes the Jews in his hope for a 
tolerant world.
What I hope my discussion may have contributed is some understanding of the 
common ground of both the failed and the successful writings, which is that 
Voltaire, like the rest of us, creates his identity on the ‘other’. His others are the 
Jews, and if he were not a great champion of the oppressed and the different, his 
references to them might have been a simple matter of showing them as what he 
was not. The picture is far more complicated than that, because the Jews are the 
principal location of Voltaire’s intense subjective involvement in his cause.
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